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De moderatione in disputando

ORATION 32.

Concerning good order in discussions, and that it is not for every man, nor for every occasion, to discourse about God.

I. Since you have come together eagerly, and the festival is thronged with people, and for this reason it is especially a time for work, come, let us give you some merchandise, even if it is not worthy of our common eagerness, but at least not inferior to our own ability. For the one demands greater things, but the other contributes moderate things; and it is better to contribute according to one's ability, than to fail completely. For he who was not able is not responsible for such things, but he who was not willing is culpable, alike in divine matters and in human affairs. I am a small and poor shepherd, and not yet pleasing to the other shepherds; for it is moderate to say so, whether through goodwill and right reason, or through pettiness and strife, I do not know this; God knows, 36.176 says the divine Apostle, and the day of revelation will make it clear, and the final fire, by which all our works are judged or purified. Yet I will try as far as I am able not to hide the gift, nor to put the lamp under a bushel, nor to bury the talent (things for which I have often heard you reproaching my idleness, and being displeased at my silence), but to instruct with words of truth and to join you to the Spirit.

II. From where then shall I begin to prepare you, brothers? And with what words shall I honor the champions, for whom the present festival is held? What shall I say first, or what is greatest? What is most profitable for your souls? Or what is most useful for the present time? We might know it thus: What is the finest part of our doctrine? Peace; I will add, also the most profitable. And what is the most shameful and the most harmful? Discord. Since I have asked this, and answered it, I will ask a second question also: What most of all destroyed that? And what brought in this? So that, just as in diseases, by cutting away the causes, and by stopping up or drying up the sources of the maladies, we may thus cut off together the streams and results that flow from them. For it is not possible to know anything well about the end, without having rightly considered the beginning. Do you wish, then, to state and make known the cause? Or do you yield to me, the physician, to both declare it and to correct it? For I am ready to speak if you wish it, and more ready to listen to you speaking. You do yield, I know well; for you do not, perhaps, consider us to be poor physicians of such things, nor unskilled in the healing of souls; whether you suppose this poorly or rightly. But do not be surprised if I say something paradoxical; for it is paradoxical, yet true, as I at least affirm, and you will agree, if you will wait to learn it to the end, and not suffer that which I complain of, and rise up from the discourse prematurely out of zeal.

III. Zealous and great natures are the cause of this disturbance; not simply fiery and great (for let us not yet condemn zeal, without which it is impossible for anything great to be achieved towards piety or any other virtue), but noble natures joined with unreason, and 36.177 ignorance, and, with that evil offspring of it, rashness; for rashness is the offspring of ignorance. For weak natures are alike sluggish and slow to move towards both virtue and vice, and do not incline greatly to either side, like the movements of those who are numb. But noble natures, when reason guides and directs them, are a great possession for virtue; but when knowledge and reason are wanting, equally so for vice

1

De moderatione in disputando

ΛΟΓΟΣ ΛΒʹ.

Περὶ τῆς ἐν διαλέξεσιν εὐταξίας, καὶ ὅτι οὐ παντὸς ἀνθρώπου, οὔτε παντὸς καιροῦ τὸ περὶ Θεοῦ διαλέγεσθαι.

Αʹ. Ἐπειδὴ συνεληλύθατε προθύμως, καὶ πολυάν θρωπος ἡ πανήγυρις, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μάλιστα και ρὸς ἐργασίας, φέρε τι δῶμεν ὑμῖν ἐμπόρευμα, εἰ καὶ μὴ τῆς προθυμίας ἄξιον τῆς κοινῆς, ἀλλά γε τῆς δυνάμεως τῆς ἡμετέρας μὴ ἐνδεέστερον. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀπαιτεῖ τὰ μείζω, ἡ δὲ εἰσφέρει τὰ μέτρια· καὶ κρεῖσσον τὸ κατὰ δύναμιν εἰσενεγκεῖν, ἢ τὸ πᾶν ἐλλείπειν. Οὐ γὰρ ὁ μὴ δυνηθεὶς τὰ τοιαῦτα ὑπεύ θυνος, ἀλλ' ὁ μὴ βουληθεὶς ὑπαίτιος, κἂν τοῖς θείοις ὁμοίως, κἂν τοῖς ἀνθρωπίνοις πράγμασιν. Εἰμὶ μὲν ποιμὴν ὀλίγος καὶ πένης, καὶ οὔπω τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀρέσκων ποιμέσιν· οὕτω γὰρ εἰπεῖν μέτριον, εἴτε τὴν εὐδοκίαν καὶ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, εἴτε διὰ μι κροψυχίαν καὶ ἔριν, οὐκ οἶδα τοῦτο· Ὁ Θεὸς οἶδε, 36.176 φησὶν ὁ θεῖος Ἀπόστολος, καὶ δηλώσει σαφῶς ἡ τῆς ἀποκαλύψεως ἡμέρα, καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον πῦρ, ᾧ πάντα κρίνεται ἢ καθαίρεται τὰ ἡμέτερα. Πειράσομαι δ' ὅμως εἰς δύναμιν μὴ κατακρύπτειν τὸ χάρισμα, μηδ' ὑπὸ τὸν μόδιον τιθέναι τὸν λύχνον, μηδὲ κατα χωννύειν τὸ τάλαντον (ἃ πολλάκις ἤκουσα παρ' ὑμῶν τὴν ἀργίαν ὀνειδιζόντων, καὶ δυσχεραινόντων τὴν σιωπὴν), ἀλλὰ λόγοις ἀληθείας ἐκπαιδεύειν καὶ συναρμόζειν τῷ Πνεύματι.

Βʹ. Πόθεν οὖν ἄρξομαι καταρτίζειν ὑμᾶς, ἀδελ φοί; Καὶ τίσι λόγοις τιμήσω τοὺς ἀθλητὰς, ὧν ἡ παροῦσα πανήγυρις; Τί πρῶτον εἴπω, ἢ τί μέγιστον; Τί μάλιστα συμφέρον ταῖς ὑμετέραις ψυχαῖς; Ἢ τί τῷ παρόντι καιρῷ χρησιμώτατον; Γνοίημεν δ' ἂν οὕτω· Τί τοῦ ἡμετέρου λόγου τὸ κάλλιστον; Ἡ εἰρήνη· προσθήσω δ', ὅτι καὶ τὸ λυσιτελέστατον. Τί δαὶ τὸ αἴσχιστον καὶ τὸ βλαβε ρώτατον; Ἡ διχόνοια. Ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦτο ἠρώτησα, καὶ ἀπεκρινάμην, προσερήσομαι καὶ τὸ δεύτερον· Τί τὸ μάλιστα λῦσαν ἐκείνην; Καὶ τί τὸ ταύτην εἰσ αγαγόν; Ἵν', ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς νοσήμασι, τὰ αἴτια περι κόψαντες, καὶ τὰς πηγὰς τῶν παθῶν ἐμφράξαντες, ἢ ἀποξηράναντες, οὕτω καὶ τὰ ἐκεῖθεν ῥεύματα καὶ ἀποτελέσματα συνεκκόψωμεν. Οὐδὲ γὰρ οἷόν τε γνῶναί τι περὶ τῆς τελευτῆς καλῶς, μὴ περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ὀρθῶς σκεψαμένους. Βούλεσθε οὖν ὑμεῖς τὴν αἰτίαν εἰπεῖν καὶ γνωρίσαι; Ἢ ἐμοὶ τῷ θερα πευτῇ παραχωρεῖτε, καὶ δηλῶσαι ταύτην, καὶ διορ θώσασθαι; Καὶ γὰρ εἰπεῖν βουλομένων ἕτοιμος, καὶ ἀκούειν λεγόντων ἑτοιμότερος Παραχωρεῖτε μὲν, εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι· καὶ γὰρ οὐ φαύλους ἰατροὺς ἡμᾶς τῶν τοιούτων ἴσως ὑπολαμβάνετε, οὐδ' ἀμαθεῖς θε ραπείας ψυχῶν· εἴτε οὖν φαύλως, εἴτε ὀρθῶς τοῦτο ὑπολαμβάνοντες. Μὴ θαυμάσητε δὲ, εἰ παράδοξον ἐρῶ λόγον· καὶ γάρ ἐστι παράδοξος μὲν, ἀληθὴς δὲ, ὡς ἔγωγέ φημι, καὶ ὑμεῖς συμφήσετε, ἂν διὰ τέλους μαθεῖν ἀναμείνητε, ἀλλὰ μὴ, ὃ ἐγκαλῶ, πάθητε, καὶ προεξαναστῆτε τοῦ λόγου διὰ θερμότητα.

Γʹ. Φύσεις θερμαὶ καὶ μεγάλαι, τῆς ταραχῆς ταύ της αἴτιον· οὔτιγε ἁπλῶς διάπυροι καὶ μεγάλαι (μήπω γὰρ καταγινώσκομεν τῆς θερμότητος, ἧς δίχα μέγα τι κατορθωθῆναι πρὸς εὐσέβειαν ἢ ἀρετὴν ἄλλην ἀμήχανον), ἀλλὰ γενναῖαι σὺν ἀλογίᾳ, καὶ 36.177 ἀμαθίᾳ, καὶ, τῷ ταύτης ἐκγόνῳ κακῷ, θράσει· θρά σος γὰρ ἀμαθίας ἔκγονον. Αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀσθενεῖς, καὶ πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ πρὸς κακίαν ὁμοίως νωθεῖς καὶ δυσκίνητοι, καὶ οὐδ' ἑτέρωσε μέγα νεύουσαι, οἷα τὰ τῶν ναρκώντων κινήματα. Αἱ γενναῖαι δὲ, λόγου μὲν αὐτὰς παιδαγωγοῦντος καὶ διευθύνοντος, μέγα τι χρῆμα πρὸς ἀρετήν· ἐπιλειπούσης δὲ ἐπιστήμης καὶ λόγου, τὸ ἴσον εἰς κακίαν