1

Contra fatum

OF GREGORY, BISHOP OF NYSSA: AGAINST FATE

You surely remember what happened to me, when recently after a long time the great mountain of unbelief among you, to speak evangelically, was moved to faith, when the most wise Eusebius counseled worthily of his grey hairs in his old age, if indeed one must reckon this the counsel of a man and not some divine alliance of Him who governs humanity for good. Then indeed, as I was astonished at the unexpected wonder, how one so great in unbelief before surpassed the measure of his unbelief by a manifold greater measure of faith, when, as our conversation was proceeding, some discussion of the questions concerning fate 32 arose, you commanded me, O honored and sacred head, to relate to you in writing through a letter the dialogue I had with one of the philosophers in the great city of Constantine concerning this subject. Therefore, having found a little leisure, I set forth for you in a simple and unadorned narrative, shortening the account in a few words as far as possible, taking care especially that the account does not fall far outside the limits of a letter, stretching out to the length of a formal treatise.

I was presenting some arguments concerning our piety to a certain man educated in profane philosophy, as one could surmise from his words, and I was attempting to persuade him to change from Hellenism to an acceptance of our doctrine. But since he argued at length that the choice of things according to one's judgment is not within the power of those who wish it, but connected human life to some necessity, without which none of the things that happen among us could happen, and by this argument he evaded my argument, saying that if it were fated for him to become a Christian, he certainly will become one, even if we do not wish it, but if he were prevented by the necessity of fate, it would not be possible to find any device that could compel fate; As he was saying these things, I for my part, as was natural, thought that he, being deeply 33 committed to Hellenism, was avoiding learning anything about the faith and in this way was evading the consequence of our argument. But since he did not let up, persisting in the same things, saying that all things are subjected to the necessity of fate and that it presides over all beings and that all beings yield to its inclination, both measures of life and differences of character and choices of lives and constitutions of bodies and inequalities of rank, so that one who comes to power by fate certainly rules, and by the same cause one serves as a slave, and likewise is rich and is poor, and again is strong in body and is weak, and that both the short-lived and the long-lived have the same cause (for both he who partakes of life for a short time and he who extends his life for a long time, each becomes so not by his own impulse but from that necessity), and that both natural and forced death are allotted by no other than it and the manifold varieties of violent death, whether brought on by accidents or hangings or judicial sentence or even by plotting, and even more universal and comprehensive calamities than these, earthquakes and shipwrecks and floods of waters and disasters from fire and all such kinds of evils, he went on to attach all these to that cause, and added that in the pursuits of life the reasoning of the one who chooses is in no way master, but that all, serving the power of fate, either philosophize or speak rhetorically or farm or sail or live in marriage or choose the unmarried life, and he strongly affirmed that both virtue and vice have the same necessity; so that

1

Contra fatum

ΓΡΗΓΟΡΙΟΥ ΕΠΙΣΚΟΠΟΥ ΝΥΣΣΗΣ ΚΑΤΑ ΕΙΜΑΡΜΕΝΗΣ

Μέμνησαι πάντως ὅ τί μοι γέγονεν, ὅτε πρώην διὰ πολλοῦ παρ' ὑμᾶς τὸ μέγα τῆς ἀπιστίας ὄρος, εὐαγγελικῶς εἰπεῖν, εἰς πίστιν μετεκινήθη, τοῦ σοφωτάτου Εὐσεβίου τῆς πολιᾶς ἀξίως ἐν γήρᾳ βουλευσαμένου, εἴπερ ἀνθρώπου βουλὴν εἶναι χρὴ ταύτην λογίσασθαι καὶ μὴ θείαν τινὰ συμμαχίαν τοῦ διοικοῦν τος ἐπ' ἀγαθῷ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον. τότε δή μοι πρὸς τὸ παράδοξον ἐκπεπληγμένῳ τοῦ θαύματος, πῶς ὁ τοσοῦτος ἐν ἀπιστίᾳ τὸ πρότερον πολλαπλασίονι τῷ μεγέθει τῆς πίστεως ὑπερέβαλε τῆς ἀπιστίας τὸ μέτρον, ἐπειδή τις προϊούσης ἡμῖν τῆς συνουσίας τῶν κατὰ τὴν εἱμαρμένην ζητουμένων λόγος 32 ἐνέπεσεν, ἐπέταξας, ὦ τιμία μοι καὶ ἱερὰ κεφαλή, τὴν γενομένην μοι πρός τινα τῶν φιλοσόφων διάλεξιν ἐν τῇ μεγάλῃ τοῦ Κωνσταντίνου πόλει περὶ τῆς ὑποθέσεως ταύτης ἐγγράφως σοι δι' ἐπιστολῆς διηγήσασθαι. μικρᾶς τοίνυν ἐπιτυχὼν σχολῆς, δι' ὀλίγων, ὡς οἶόν τε, συντεμὼν τὸν λόγον ἐκτίθεμαί σοι ἐν ἁπλῷ καὶ ἀκατασκεύῳ τῷ διηγήματι φυλασσόμενος ὅτι μάλιστα τοῦ μὴ πόρρω τῶν ἐπιστολιμαίων μέτρων ἐκπεσεῖν τὸν λόγον εἰς λογογραφικὸν μῆκος ἀποτεινόμενον.

Προσῆγον ἐγώ τινας περὶ τῆς καθ' ἡμᾶς εὐσεβείας λόγους ἀνδρί τινι πεπαιδευμένῳ τὴν ἔξω φιλοσοφίαν, ὡς ἐνῆν ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων στοχάσασθαι, καὶ πείθειν ἐπεχείρουν ἐκ τοῦ Ἑλληνισμοῦ πρὸς τὴν συγκατάθεσιν τοῦ καθ' ἡμᾶς δόγματος μετατάξασθαι. ἐπειδὴ δὲ πολὺς ἦν κατασκευάζων μὴ κατ' ἐξουσίαν προκεῖσθαι τοῖς βουλομένοις τῶν κατὰ γνώμην τὴν αἵρεσιν, ἀλλὰ διά τινος ἐξάπτων ἀνάγκης τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ζωήν, ἧς ἄνευ μὴ ἄν τι γενέσθαι τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν γινομένων, καὶ τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ τὸν ἐμὸν παρεκρούετο λόγον, ὡς εἰ μὲν εἵμαρται αὐτῷ γενέσθαι Χριστιανῷ, γενήσεται πάντως, κἂν ἡμεῖς μὴ βουλώμεθα, εἰ δὲ κωλύοιτο τῇ τῆς εἱμαρμένης ἀνάγκῃ, μὴ ἂν γενέσθαι δυνατὸν ἐξευρεῖν τινα μηχανὴν ἣ τὴν εἱμαρμένην βιάσεται· ταῦτα λέγοντος ἐγὼ μέν, ὅπερ εἰκὸς ἦν, φεύγειν ᾤμην αὐτὸν τὸ μαθεῖν τι περὶ τῆς πίστεως τῷ 33 Ἑλληνισμῷ διὰ βάθους ἐγκείμενον καὶ τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ τὴν ἀκολουθίαν τοῦ ἡμετέρου παρακρούεσθαι λόγου. ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐκ ἀνίει τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐπιμένων, πάντα λέγων ὑπεζεῦχθαι τῇ τῆς εἱμαρμένης ἀνάγκῃ κἀκείνην ἐπιστατεῖν τῶν ὄντων καὶ τῇ ῥοπῇ ταύτης πάντα ὑποκύπτειν τὰ ὄντα, ζωῆς τε μέτρα καὶ ἠθῶν διαφορὰς καὶ βίων αἱρέσεις καὶ σωμάτων κατασκευὰς καὶ τὰς τῶν ἀξιωμάτων ἀνωμαλίας, ὡς ἄρχειν τε πάντως τὸν καθ' εἱμαρμένην ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν παριόντα, δουλεύειν τε κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν καὶ πλουτεῖν ὡσαύτως καὶ πένεσθαι, ἐρρῶσθαί τε πάλιν τῷ σώματι καὶ ἀσθενῶς ἔχειν, τό τε ὠκύμορον καὶ τὸ μακρόβιον τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχειν αἰτίαν (ὅ τε γὰρ ἐν ὀλίγῳ μετασχὼν τῆς ζωῆς καὶ ὁ ἐν μακρῷ τῷ χρόνῳ παρατείνας τὸν βίον οὐ κατ' οἰκείαν ὁρμὴν ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς ἀνάγκης ἐκείνης ἐν ἑκατέρῳ ἑκάτερος γίνεται), τόν τε αὐτόματον καὶ τὸν ἠναγκασμένον θάνατον μὴ ἄλλως ἢ παρ' ἐκείνης ἀποκληροῦσθαι τοῦ τε βιαίου θανάτου τὰς πολυτρόπους διαφορὰς ἐν συμπτώμασιν ἢ ἀγχόναις ἢ ψήφῳ δικαστικῇ ἢ καὶ κατ' ἐπιβουλὴν ἐπαγομένας, καὶ τὰ ἔτι τούτων καθολικώτερα καὶ περιληπτικώτερα πάθη, σεισμοὺς καὶ ναυάγια καὶ ἐπικλύσεις ὑδάτων καὶ τὰς ἐκ πυρὸς συμ φορὰς καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα εἴδη κακῶν, πάντα τῆς αἰτίας ἐκείνης ἐξάπτων προσετίθει καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον ἐπιτηδευμάτων μηδαμοῦ τὸν λογισμὸν τοῦ αἱρουμένου κύριον εἶναι, πάντας δὲ τῷ κράτει τῆς εἱμαρμένης ὑπηρετοῦντας ἢ φιλοσοφεῖν ἢ ῥητορεύειν ἢ γεωργεῖν ἢ ναυτίλλεσθαι ἢ ἐν γάμῳ ζῆν ἢ τὸν ἄγαμον αἱρεῖσθαι βίον, ἀρετῆς τε καὶ κακίας τὴν αὐτὴν ἀνάγκην εἶναι διισχυρίζετο· ὥστε