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De mortuis non esse dolendum

OF GREGORY BISHOP OF NYSSA, AN ORATION ON THOSE WHO HAVE FALLEN ASLEEP

Those who make a disaster of the necessary consequence of our nature in those departing from life and who grieve heavily over those passing from this life to the intellectual and incorporeal one do not seem to me to have considered what our life is, but to suffer the fate of the many, who through some irrational custom love their present circumstances as good, whatever they may be. And yet it was fitting for one who is set before irrational nature by reason and intellect to have an inclination only towards this: that which by the judgment of reason is revealed to be both good and desirable, and not to choose in every case that which, from some custom and uncritical affection, seems to them pleasant and agreeable. Therefore it seems good to me, by some device turning them away from their disposition toward the customary, to lead them over as far as possible to the better and more fitting way of thinking for rational beings. For thus the irrationality concerning the passions, which is pursued by the many, would be banished from 9.29 human life. And the earnest purpose of our discourse would be consistent with the subject at hand if, first, we should examine what the truly good is like; then, if we should contemplate the particular nature of life in the body; and in addition to these, if the things laid up for us in hope were set side by side in comparison with present things. For thus our inquiry would advance towards the goal of the discourse, so that the thinking of the many might be changed from the customary to the good. For since in all human beings there is an innate disposition toward the good, and every choice is moved toward this, setting forth the goal of the good for every pursuit in life, for this reason the lack of judgment concerning the truly good is accustomed to bring about many of the sins committed; as if, indeed, the truly good were manifest to all, we would never have missed Him whose nature is goodness, nor would we willingly have been carried away by the experience of evils, if things had not been colored by some false appearance of the good. Therefore, let us understand this first of all in our discourse: what is the truly good, so that through error concerning this, the worse might never be pursued instead of the better. I say, then, that it is necessary to set forth in the discourse, as it were, a certain definition and characteristic mark of the thing sought, through which our understanding of the good might become secure.

What then is the characteristic mark of true goodness? That it is not only useful for something, nor that it appears at certain times 9.30 either beneficial or useless, nor that it is good for one person but not so for another, but rather that which is good both in itself according to its own nature and is the same for everyone and at all times. This, at least in my judgment, is the unerring and infallible characteristic mark of the nature of the good. For that which is good neither for all, nor always, nor in itself apart from external circumstance, would not properly be judged to be in the nature of the good. Therefore, many of those who unthinkingly attend to existing things imagined that the good is in the elements of the world, none of which one would find, upon examining it, to be good both in itself and always and for everyone. For with the usefulness of each of these is mixed also the operation toward the opposite. For example, water is life-giving for those that are nourished in it, but destructive for land-dwellers, if it should flood them; and likewise, air is life-giving for those whose nature is to live in it, but it is found to be destructive and deadly for those who have been allotted an aquatic life, whenever any of the underwater creatures comes into it; so also fire, while becoming useful to us for something, is destructive in most cases; and one would find that the sun itself is neither good for everyone, nor always, nor in every way for those who partake of it;

1

De mortuis non esse dolendum

ΓΡΗΓΟΡΙΟΥ ΕΠΙΣΚΟΠΟΥ ΝΥΣΣΗΣ ΛΟΓΟΣ ΕΙΣ ΤΟΥΣ ΚΟΙΜΗΘΕΝΤΑΣ

Οἱ τὴν ἀναγκαίαν τῆς φύσεως ἡμῶν ἀκολουθίαν ἐν τοῖς ἐξιοῦσιν ἀπὸ τοῦ βίου συμφορὰν ποιούμενοι καὶ βαρυπεν θοῦντες ἐπὶ τοῖς μεθισταμένοις ἀπὸ τοῦ τῇδε βίου πρὸς τὸν νοερὸν καὶ ἀσώματον οὔ μοι δοκοῦσιν ἐπεσκέφθαι τὴν ζωὴν ἡμῶν ἥτις ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ τῶν πολλῶν πάσχειν, οἳ διά τινος ἀλόγου συνηθείας τὸ παρὸν αὐτοῖς ὡς καλὸν ἀγαπῶσιν, οἷον δ' ἂν εἴη. καίτοι γε τὸν λόγῳ καὶ διανοίᾳ τῆς ἀλόγου φύσεως προτεταγμένον πρὸς τοῦτο μόνον τὴν ῥοπὴν ἔχειν προσῆκεν, ὃ τῇ τοῦ λόγου κρίσει καλόν τε καὶ αἱρετὸν ἀναφαίνεται, καὶ μὴ τοῦτο πάντως αἱρεῖσθαι, ὅπερ ἂν αὐτοῖς ἐκ συνηθείας τινὸς καὶ ἀκρίτου προσπαθείας ἡδύ τε καὶ καταθύμιον φαίνηται. διό μοι δοκεῖ καλῶς ἔχειν ἐπινοίᾳ τινὶ τῆς πρὸς τὸ σύνηθες αὐτοὺς διαθέσεως ἀποστήσαντα μεταγαγεῖν ὡς ἔστι δυνατὸν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀμείνω τε καὶ πρέπουσαν τοῖς λελογισμένοις διάνοιαν. οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἐξορισθείη τῆς 9.29 ἀνθρωπίνης ζωῆς ἡ σπουδαζομένη περὶ τὰ πάθη τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀλογία. γένοιτο δ' ἂν ἡμῖν ἀκόλουθος ἡ τοῦ λόγου σπουδὴ πρὸς τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὑπόθεσιν, εἰ πρῶτον μὲν τὸ ἀληθῶς ἀγαθὸν οἷόν ἐστιν ἐξετασθείη, ἔπειτα δὲ τὸ ἴδιον τῆς ἐν σώματι ζωῆς θεωρήσαιμεν, πρὸς τούτοις δὲ εἰ διὰ συγκρίσεως ἀντιπαρατεθείη τοῖς παροῦσι τὰ δι' ἐλπίδος ἡμῖν ἀποκείμενα. οὕτω γὰρ ἂν προέλθοι πρὸς τὸν σκοπὸν τοῦ λόγου ἡ θεωρία, ὥστε μετατεθῆναι τῶν πολλῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ συνήθους ἐπὶ τὸ καλὸν τὴν διάνοιαν. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις φυσική τις πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ἔγκειται σχέσις καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο κινεῖται πᾶσα προαίρεσις τὸν τοῦ καλοῦ σκοπὸν πάσης τῆς κατὰ τὸν βίον σπουδῆς προβαλλομένη, τούτου χάριν ἡ περὶ τὸ ὄντως καλὸν ἀκρισία τὰ πολλὰ τῶν ἁμαρτανομένων εἴωθεν ἐξεργά ζεσθαι, ὡς εἴ γε πρόδηλον πᾶσιν ἦν τὸ ἀληθῶς ἀγαθόν, οὐκ ἂν ἐκείνου ποτὲ διημάρτομεν ᾧ φύσις ἡ ἀγαθότης ἐστίν, οὐδ' ἂν ἑκουσίως τῇ τῶν κακῶν συνηνέχθημεν πείρᾳ, εἴπερ μὴ ἐπεκέχρωστο τὰ πράγματα διεψευσμένῃ τινὶ τοῦ καλοῦ φαντασίᾳ. οὐκοῦν πρὸ πάντων τοῦτο τῷ λόγῳ κατανοήσωμεν τί τὸ ἀληθῶς ἀγαθόν, ὡς ἂν μὴ τῇ περὶ τούτου πλάνῃ σπου δασθείη ποτὲ τὸ χεῖρον ἀντὶ τοῦ κρείττονος. φημὶ τοίνυν χρῆναι καθάπερ ὅρισμόν τινα καὶ χαρακτῆρα τοῦ ζητουμένου προϋποθέσθαι τῷ λόγῳ, δι' οὗ γένοιτ' ἂν ἡμῖν ἀσφαλὴς ἡ τοῦ καλοῦ κατανόησις.

Τίς οὖν ὁ χαρακτὴρ τῆς ἀληθινῆς ἀγαθότητος; τὸ μὴ μόνον πρός τι τὸ ὠφέλιμον ἔχειν μηδὲ κατὰ καιρούς τινας ἢ 9.30 ἐπωφελὲς ἢ ἄχρηστον φαίνεσθαι μηδέ τινι μὲν εἶναι καλὸν ἑτέρῳ δὲ οὐ τοιοῦτον, ἀλλ' ὅπερ καὶ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν φύσιν ἐστὶ καλὸν καὶ παντὶ καὶ πάντοτε ὡσαύτως ἔχει. οὗτός ἐστι κατά γε τὴν ἐμὴν κρίσιν τῆς τοῦ καλοῦ φύσεως ὁ χαρακτὴρ ἀπλανής τε καὶ ἀδιάψευστος. ὃ γὰρ μήτε πᾶσι μήτε πάντοτε μήτε ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ δίχα τῆς ἔξωθεν περιστάσεώς ἐστι καλόν, οὐκ ἂν κυρίως ἐν τῇ τοῦ καλοῦ κρίνοιτο φύσει. διόπερ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνεξετάστως προσεχόντων τοῖς οὖσιν ἐν τοῖς τοῦ κόσμου στοιχείοις εἶναι τὸ καλὸν ἐφαντάσθησαν, ὧν οὐδὲν εὕροι τις ἂν διεξετάζων καὶ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ καὶ πάντοτε καὶ παντὶ καλὸν εὑρισκόμενον. μέμικται γὰρ τῷ ἀφ' ἑκάστου τούτων χρησίμῳ καὶ ἡ πρὸς τὸ ἐναντίον ἐνέργεια. οἷον τὸ ὕδωρ σωτήριον μὲν τοῖς ἐν αὐτῷ τρεφομένοις ἐστὶν ὀλέθριον δὲ τοῖς χερσαίοις, εἰ ἐπικλύσειεν· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ὁ ἀὴρ τοῖς μὲν ἐν αὐτῷ ζῆν πεφυκόσιν ἐστὶ σωτήριος, τοῖς δὲ τὸν ἔνυδρον εἰληχόσι βίον φθαρτικὸς εὑρίσκεται καὶ ὀλέθριος, ὅταν ἐν αὐτῷ τι γένηται τῶν ὑποβρυχίων· οὕτω καὶ τὸ πῦρ πρός τι χρήσιμον ἡμῖν γινόμενον φθαρτικόν ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς πλείοσι, καὶ αὐτὸν δὲ τὸν ἥλιον εὕροι τις ἂν οὔτε παντὶ οὔτε πάντοτε οὔτε κατὰ πάντα καλὸν τοῖς μετέχουσιν·