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Epistula xxvi ad Evagrium monachum

EPISTLE 26. To Evagrius the monk, concerning the Godhead.

I both greatly admire and am very much astonished at your sobriety, how you become the cause of such theorems and such great inquiries, by your precise questions placing us under the necessity of speaking and the struggle of demonstration, bringing necessary and useful questions to us. Clearly then, it is altogether necessary for us, following the questions, to make the answers clear. And so now the question brought forward by you was of this sort and concerning this: in what way might be the nature of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit (which one might correctly call substance rather than nature), whether it is simple or composite? For if it is simple, how will it admit the number three of the aforementioned? For that which is simple is of a single form and without number. But that which falls under numbers must be divided, even if it is not subjected to numbers; and that which is divided is subject to passion; for division is a passion. If, therefore, the nature of the Superior Being is simple, the positing of the names is superfluous; but if the positing of the names is true, and one must trust the names, that which is of a single form and simple immediately departs out of the way. What then might be the nature of the matter?

These things you said to us. The argument of truth will precisely present the proofs of these things, not irrationally putting forth an appearance of unproven faith due to a lack of proof, nor trying to cover the rottenness of its own persuasion by testimonies of old myths, but setting forth into the open the confirmation of the theorem by the comprehension of precise inquiry and correctness of reasoning. Come then, let our discourse from this point proceed as in a sacred chorus, and let it say how one ought to conceive of the Divine, whether simple, or threefold. For the threefold character of the names compels us both to speak and to believe thus, and some, making misuse of these, 46.1104 have constructed rotten and utterly stale dogmas, opining that the substance, along with the attribution of the names, undergoes a passion of division. But those men, as you yourself say, must be left alone, unsoundly advocating for the dogma of their own supposition; but concerning the right comprehension of the knowledge, let us turn our own thought. What God is, therefore, we shall first lay down; and then thus we shall come precisely to the proofs. He is altogether a simple and indivisible substance, possessing by nature simplicity and incorporeality. But perhaps the argument from the division of the names opposes me, taking away the single-formedness of the Superior Being with the number three. Is it therefore necessary for us, on account of the single-formedness, to flee the confession of Father and Son and Holy Spirit? May it not be! For the positing of the names will not harm the indivisible union of the Superior Being. For intelligible things, on the one hand are of myriad names (since they are called by very many names according to each nation), but on the other hand are outside of all appellation; since there is no proper name for intelligible and incorporeal things. For how could things be properly named that do not even fall under our sight, nor are able to be apprehended at all by human senses? But let us take the soul, the smallest part of intelligible things, for a precise understanding of the All. For "soul" (psychē) is addressed by a feminine name, but it is distant from all womanish nature, being in substance neither male nor female. And likewise "reason" (logos), which is brought forth by it, has a masculine name, but it too, as we say, is outside of all male-female corporeality.

But if the last of intelligible things, soul and reason, do not possess a proper name, how could the first and intelligible things beyond all intelligible things by proper names...

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Epistula xxvi ad Evagrium monachum

ΕΠΙΣΤΟΛΗ Κʹ. Πρὸς Εὐάγριον μοναχὸν, περὶ Θεότητος.

Σφόδρα τε θαυμάζω καὶ λίαν ἐκπλήττομαι τῆς νηφαλιότητος, ὅπως τοιούτων θεωρημάτων καὶ τη λικούτων ζητήσεων αἴτιος καθίστασαι, ταῖς ἀκρι βέσιν ἐρωτήσεσιν, εἰς ἀνάγκην ἡμᾶς τοῦ λέγειν καὶ ἀγωνίαν ἀποδείξεως περιιστὰς, ἐρωτήσεις ἀναγ καίας καὶ χρησίμους ἡμῖν ἐπάγων. Πᾶσα δηλονότι λοιπὸν ἀνάγκη, κατόπιν τῶν ἐρωτήσεων ἡμᾶς ἐν αργεῖς ποιεῖσθαι τὰς ἀποκρίσεις. Καὶ νῦν τοίνυν τὸ προσενεχθὲν ἐρώτημα παρὰ σοῦ τοιόνδε καὶ περὶ τοῦδε ἦν, ὥς τινα τρόπον ἂν εἴη Πατρός τε καὶ Υἱοῦ καὶ ἁγίου Πνεύματος ἡ φύσις (ἣν ἄν τις ὀρθῶς οὐ σίαν μᾶλλον ἢ φύσιν καλοίη), πότερον ἁπλῆ τις ἢ σύν θετος; Εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῆ, πῶς τὸν τρεῖς ἐπιδέξεται τῶν προειρημένων ἀριθμόν; Τὸ γὰρ ἁπλοῦν, μονοειδὲς καὶ ἀνάριθμον. Τὸ δὲ ἀριθμοῖς ὑποπίπτον, ἀνάγκη τέμνεσθαι, κἂν μὴ ἀριθμοῖς ὑποβάληται· τὸ δὲ τεμνόμενον, ἐμπαθές· πάθος γὰρ ἡ τομή. Εἰ τοίνυν ἁπλῆ τοῦ Κρείττονος ἡ φύσις, περιττὴ τῶν ὀνο μάτων ἡ θέσις· εἰ δὲ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀληθὴς ἡ θέ σις, καὶ δεῖ τοῖς ὀνόμασι πείθεσθαι, τὸ μονοειδὲς καὶ ἁπλοῦν εὐθὺς ἐκποδὼν οἴχεται. Τίς οὖν ἂν εἴη τοῦ πράγματος ἡ φύσις;

Ταῦτα πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἔφασκες. Ὧν τὰς ἀποδείξεις ὁ τῆς ἀληθείας ἀκριβῶς παραστήσει λόγος, οὐ πίστεως ἀναποδείκτου φαντασίαν ἀπορίᾳ τῆς ἀποδείξεως ἀλόγως προϊσχόμενος, οὐδὲ μύθων παλαιῶν μαρτυρίαις τὸ σαθρὸν τῆς πεποιθήσεως ἑαυ τοῦ καλύπτειν πειρώμενος, ἀλλὰ ζητήσεως ἀκριβοῦς κατανοήσει καὶ λογισμῶν ὀρθότητι τὴν τοῦ θεωρή ματος πίστωσιν εἰς τοὐμφανὲς προτιθέμενος. Ἄγε δὴ λοιπὸν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ἐντεῦθεν θια σευέτω, καὶ πῶς δεῖ τὸ Θεῖον ὑπολαμβάνειν φασκέτω, πότερον ἁπλοῦν, ἢ τριπλεκές. Οὕτω γὰρ ἡμᾶς καὶ λέγειν ἡ τῶν ὀνομάτων τριττὺς καὶ πι στεύειν βιάζεται, καὶ τούτοις ἀποχρησάμενοί 46.1104 τινες σαθρὰ καὶ παντάπασιν ἕωλα συνεστήσαντο δόγ ματα, τὴν οὐσίαν ὁμοῦ τῇ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐπηγο ρίᾳ πάθος διαιρέσεως ὑπομένειν δοξάζοντες. Ἀλλ' ἐκείνους μὲν, ὡς αὐτὸς φὴς, ἐατέον, σαθρῶς τῷ τῆς ὑπολήψεως αὐτῶν συνηγοροῦντας δόγματι· περὶ δὲ τὴν ὀρθὴν τῆς ἐπιγνώσεως κατάληψιν, τὴν ἑαυτῶν διάνοιαν ἐπιστρέφωμεν. Ὃ τοίνυν ἐστὶ Θεὸς, πρότερον ὑποστησόμεθα· καὶ εἶθ' οὕτως ἐπὶ τὰς ἀπο δείξεις ἀκριβῶς ἥξομεν. Ἁπλῆ πάντως ἐστὶ καὶ ἀμέριστος οὐσία, τὸ ἁπλοῦν καὶ ἀσώματον ἐκ φύσεως ἐκτυχών. Ἀλλ' ἴσως ὁ τῆς διαιρέσεως τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀντιπίπτει μοι λόγος, τῷ τρεῖς ἀριθμῷ τὸ τοῦ Κρείττονος μονοειδὲς ἀφαιρούμενος. Ἆρ' οὖν διὰ τὸ μονοειδὲς ἐκφυγεῖν ἡμᾶς τὴν ὁμολογίαν Πατρὸς καὶ Υἱοῦ καὶ ἁγίου Πνεύματος ἐπάναγκες; Μὴ γένοιτο! τὴν γὰρ ἀμερῆ τοῦ Κρείττονος ἕνωσιν οὐ καταβλάψει τῶν ὀνομάτων ἡ θέσις. Τὰ γὰρ νοητὰ, καὶ μυριώνυμα μὲν (ἐπειδὴ παμπληθέσι καθ' ἕκαστον ἔθνος ὀνόμασι κέκληται), προσηγορίας δὲ πάσης ἐκτός· ἐπειδὴ κύριον ὄνομα τῶν νοητῶν τε καὶ ἀσωμάτων οὐδέν. Πῶς γὰρ κυρίως ἑπικληθείη τὰ μηδὲ ὄψεσιν ἡμετέ ραις ὑποπίπτοντα, μηδ' ὅλως ἀνθρωπίνοις αἰσθητη ρίοις ἁλῶναι δυνάμενα; λαμβανέσθω δὲ ἡμῖν τὸ βραχύτατον τῶν νοητῶν μόριον ἡ ψυχὴ, πρὸς τοῦ Παντὸς ἀκριβῆ νόησιν. Ψυχὴ μὲν γὰρ ὀνόματι θηλυκῷ προσαγορεύεται, πάσης δὲ θηλυδριώδους φύσεως ἀφέστηκεν, οὔτε ἄῤῥεν, οὔτε θῆλυ κατ' οὐσίαν ὑπάρχουσα. Καὶ λόγος δὲ ὁμοίως ὁ πρὸς αὐτῆς ἀποκυϊσκόμενος, ἀῤῥε νικὸν μὲν ἔχει τοὔνομα, πάσης δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς, ὥς φαμεν, ἀῤῥενοθήλεος ἐκτός ἐστι σωματότητος.

Εἰ δὲ τὰ τῶν νοητῶν ἔσχατα, ψυχὴ καὶ λόγος, κύριον οὐ κέκτηται τοὔνομα, πῶς ἂν τὰ πρῶτα καὶ πάντων ἐπέκεινα τῶν νοητῶν νοητὰ κυρίοις ὀνόμασιν ἐπι