John of Damascus, Against Manichaeans

Contra Manichaeos Of our father among the saints John the monk and presbyter of the

Damascene Against the Manichaeans 1 Orthodox: Since we have come together to hold a rational discussion with one another, I ask you: What is the subject of our inquiry? The Manichaean: To exercise our reason concerning faith, so that we may find the truth. Orthodox: For what is truth? Manichaean: The discernment and confession of what is. Orthodox: Is falsehood contrary to truth? Manichaean: In every way. Orthodox: How do you say this? Manichaean: Because truth is the knowledge of things that are, but falsehood is of what is not. Orthodox: You have not answered well. Truth is the knowledge of things that are, but falsehood is the knowledge of what is not; for what is not cannot be known. Manichaean: What then is falsehood? Orthodox: The ignorance of things that are. Manichaean: You have spoken correctly. Orthodox: If, then, truth is the knowledge of things that are, and falsehood is the ignorance of what is, tell me: Is knowledge a state? Manichaean: Yes. Orthodox: If knowledge is a state, then ignorance is certainly a privation. Manichaean: Ignorance is also a state. Orthodox: What is ignorance? Manichaean: The not having of knowledge. Orthodox: Is "not" privative or declarative and possessive? Manichaean: "Not" is privative. Orthodox: Do we call that which is deprived of being "non-being"? Manichaean: Obviously. Orthodox: Therefore, if ignorance is the "not having" of knowledge, and "not" is privative, then ignorance is a privation and not a state. Manichaean: You have spoken correctly. Orthodox: If, then, truth is knowledge, it is obviously a state; and if falsehood is ignorance, it is a privation in relation to truth. Therefore, truth will be a state and falsehood a privation, and truth will be being, and falsehood non-being. Manichaean: By all means. Orthodox: Is evil falsehood or truth? Manichaean: Falsehood. Orthodox: Therefore, evil is not being, but a privation of being and non-being, and as a privation of a state it is opposed to the good. But let us return to the subject at hand. Manichaean: Let us.

2 Orthodox: Do you say there is one principle of beings or two? Manichaean: Two, one good and one evil; and the good one I call a good tree, containing and producing all good, not able to produce bad fruit; and the evil one, darkness, corruption, an evil tree, containing all that is evil and all wickedness, not able to produce good fruit. Orthodox: Do these two principles have communion with one another or not? Manichaean: They are completely without communion and contrary to one another. Orthodox: Are they in one another and with one another or are they separate? Manichaean: They were separate from the beginning, each in its own boundaries. Orthodox: How then are they now intermingled? Manichaean: The good one was in its own place, in all goodness and blessedness, but matter, that is, evil, was lifeless, motionless, shameful, ugly darkness, without sensation for many ages. But later matter fell into strife with itself, and its fruits made war upon one another, and while some were pursuing and others fleeing, they reached the boundaries of the light, and seeing the light they desired its beauty and they ceased their war against one another and, agreeing with one another, they attacked the light. And the good one sent a power from himself, and when a conflict occurred, the rulers of darkness ate a part of the light. For the good one allowed a power from himself to be seized, fearing that they might gain mastery over his place. And this he did, so that through the portion which he surrendered, he might gain mastery over evil. And thus a mixture of the good and the evil came to be; for from the portion of the good came the souls, but from the substance of evil, the bodies. Orthodox: For now, concerning these things

Contra Manichaeos Τοῦ ἐν ἁγίοις πατρὸς ἡμῶν Ἰωάννου μοναχοῦ πρεσβυτέρου τοῦ

∆αμασκηνοῦ κατὰ Μανιχαίων 1 Ὀρθόδοξος· Ἐπειδὴ συνεληλύθαμεν ἀλλήλοις λογικὴν συζήτησιν ποιήσασθαι, ἐρωτῶ σε· Τί τὸ ζητούμενον; Ὁ Μανιχαῖος· Τὸν περὶ πίστεως γυμνάσαι λόγον, ὅπως ἂν εὕρωμεν τὴν ἀλήθειαν. Ὀρθόδοξος· Τί γάρ ἐστιν ἡ ἀλήθεια; Μανιχαῖος· Ἡ τοῦ ὄντος διάγνωσις καὶ ὁμολογία. Ὀρθόδοξος· Τὸ ψεῦδος τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἐναντίον; Μανιχαῖος· Παντὶ τρόπῳ. Ὀρθόδοξος· Πῶς τοῦτο φῄς; Μανιχαῖος· Ἐπειδὴἡ μὲν ἀλήθεια τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶ γνῶσις, τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος τοῦ μὴ ὄντος. Ὀρθόδοξος· Οὐ καλῶς ἀπεκρίθης· ἡ μὲν ἀλήθεια τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶ γνῶσις, τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος μὴ ὄντος γνῶσις· τὸ γὰρ μὴ ὂν οὐ γινώσκεται. Μανιχαῖος· Τί οὖν ἐστι τὸ ψεῦδος; Ὀρθόδοξος· Τῶν ὄντων ἀγνωσία. Μανιχαῖος· Ὀρθῶς εἴρηκας. Ὀρθόδοξος· Εἰ οὖν ἡ μὲν ἀλήθεια τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶ γνῶσις, τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος ἄγνοια τοῦ ὄντος, εἰπέ μοι· Ἡ γνῶσις ἕξις; Μανιχαῖος· Ναί. Ὀρθόδοξος· Εἰ ἡ γνῶσις ἕξις, ἡ ἄγνοια πάντως στέρησις. Μανιχαῖος· Καὶ ἡ ἄγνοια ἕξις. Ὀρθόδοξος· Τί ἐστιν ἄγνοια; Μανιχαῖος· Τὸ μὴ ἔχειν γνῶσιν. Ὀρθόδοξος· Τὸ μὴ στερητικόν ἐστιν ἢ ἀποφαντικὸν καὶ ἑκτικόν; Μανιχαῖος· Τὸ μὴ στερητικόν ἐστιν. Ὀρθόδοξος· Μὴ ὂν λέγομεν τὸ ἐστερημένον τοῦ εἶναι; Μανιχαῖος· ∆ηλονότι. Ὀρθόδοξος· Οὐκοῦν εἰ ἡ ἄγνοια τὸ μὴ ἔχειν γνῶσίν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ μὴ στερητικόν, ἡ ἄγνοια ἄρα στέρησις καὶ οὐχ ἕξις. Μανιχαῖος· Ὀρθῶς εἴρηκας. Ὀρθόδοξος· Εἰ οὖν ἡ ἀλήθεια γνῶσις, ἕξις δηλονότι· καὶ εἰ τὸ ψεῦδος ἄγνοια, στέρησις κατὰ τὸν τῆς ἀληθείας λόγον. Ἔσται οὖν ἡ μὲν ἀλήθεια ἕξις, τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος στέρησις, καὶ ἔσται ἡ μὲν ἀλήθεια ὄν, τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος μὴ ὄν. Μανιχαῖος· Ἐκ παντός. Ὀρθόδοξος· Ψεῦδος ἡ κακία ἢ ἀλήθεια; Μανιχαῖος· Ψεῦδος. Ὀρθόδοξος· Οὐκ ὂν ἄρα ἡ κακία, ἀλλ' ὄντος στέρησις καὶ μὴ ὂν καὶ ὡς στέρησις ἕξει ἀντίκειται τῷ ἀγαθῷ. Ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τὸ προκείμενον ἐπανέλθωμεν. Μανιχαῖος· Ἔλθωμεν. 2 Ὀρθόδοξος· Μίαν ἀρχὴν λέγεις τῶν ὄντων ἢ δύο; Μανιχαῖος· ∆ύο, μίαν ἀγαθὴν καὶ μίαν πονηράν· καὶ τὴν μὲν ἀγαθὴν ὀνομάζω δένδρον ἀγαθόν, παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ περιεκτικὸν καὶ ποιητικόν, μὴ δυνάμενον καρπὸν κακὸν ποιεῖν· τὴν δὲ πονηρὰν σκότος, φθοράν, δένδρον πονηρόν, παντὸς πονηροῦ καὶ πάσης κακίας περιεκτικόν, μὴ δυνάμενον καρπὸν ἀγαθὸν ποιεῖν. Ὀρθόδοξος· Κοινωνοῦσιν ἀλλήλαις αὗται αἱ δύο ἀρχαὶ ἢ οὔ; Μανιχαῖος· Παντελῶς ἀκοινώνητοι καὶ ἐναντίαι ἀλλήλαις ὑπάρχουσιν. Ὀρθόδοξος· Ἐν ἀλλήλαις καὶ σὺν ἀλλήλαις εἰσὶν ἢ κεχωρισμέναι; Μανιχαῖος· Κεχωρισμέναι ἦσαν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ἑκάστη ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις ὅροις. Ὀρθόδοξος· Πῶς οὖν νῦν εἰσι συμμεμιγμέναι; Μανιχαῖος· Ἦν ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἐν τῷ ἰδίῳ τόπῳ, ἐν πάσῃ ἀγαθοσύνῃ καὶ μακαριότητι, ἡ δὲ ὕλη ἤγουν ἡ κακία ἄζως, ἀκίνητος, αἰσχρά, σκότος δυσειδές, ἀναίσθητος ἐπὶ πολλοὺς αἰῶνας· ὕστερον δὲ ἐστασίασεν ἡ ὕλη πρὸς ἑαυτήν, καὶ οἱ καρποὶ αὐτῆς ἐπολέμησαν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, καὶ τῶν μὲν διωκόντων, τῶν δὲ φευγόντων ἔφθασαν εἰς τὰ ὅρια τοῦ φωτὸς καὶ ἰδόντες τὸ φῶς ἐπεθύμησαν τοῦ κάλλους αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐπαύσαντο τοῦ πρὸς ἀλλήλους πολέμου καὶ συμφωνήσαντες πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐπέθεντο τῷ φωτί· καὶ ἀπέστειλεν ὁ ἀγαθὸς δύναμιν παρ' αὐτοῦ, καὶ συμπλοκῆς γενομένης ἔφαγον μέρος τοῦ φωτὸς οἱ ἄρχοντες τοῦ σκότους. Παρεχώρησε γὰρ ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἁρπαγῆναι δύναμιν ἐξ αὐτοῦ φοβηθείς, ἵνα μὴ κατακυριεύσωσι τοῦ τόπου αὐτοῦ. Τοῦτο δὲ ἐποίησεν, ἵνα διὰ τῆς μοίρας, ἧς παρέδωκε, κατακυριεύσῃ τῆς κακίας. Καὶ οὕτως ἐγένετο σύγκρασις τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦ πονηροῦ· ἐκ γὰρ τῆς μοίρας τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐγένοντο αἱ ψυχαί, ἐκ δὲ τῆς οὐσίας τῆς κακίας τὰ σώματα. Ὀρθόδοξος· Τέως περὶ τούτων