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Fragmenta philosophica

PHILOSOPHICAL MATTERS On Voice Since our aim is to discuss every philosophical voice simply, and we must first know what sort of voices philosophy deals with, making the beginning of our account from voice itself, we say that voice is either insignificant or significant. And insignificant is that which signifies nothing, but significant is that which signifies something. Then again, the insignificant voice is either inarticulate or articulate. Inarticulate, then, is that which cannot be written, while articulate is that which can be written. An insignificant and inarticulate voice, then, is for instance a sound or a noise coming from perhaps a stone or a piece of wood, for it is neither written nor does it signify anything; but an insignificant and articulate one is for instance 'goat-stag,' 'skindapsos'; for these are written, but signify nothing, for neither has a goat-stag or a skindapsos ever existed nor does it exist. Regarding, therefore, the insignificant voice, both the inarticulate and the articulate, there is no discussion for philosophy. The significant voice, again, is either inarticulate or articulate. An inarticulate significant voice, then, is like the barking of dogs; for this signifies the dog, that it is the voice of a dog, and it also signifies the presence of something. But it is inarticulate, because it is not written. Therefore, there is no discussion for philosophy concerning this either. But the significant and articulate is either particular or universal; particular, for example Peter, Paul, but universal, for example man. Therefore, there is no discussion for philosophy concerning the particular, but concerning the significant and articulate and universal, that is, the common and that which is predicated of many. This, again, is either essential or non-essential. Essential, then, is that which declares the essence, that is, the nature of things. Non-essential, however, is that which declares the accidents, for instance, man is a rational mortal animal. These are all essential. For if you take away any of these from man, he will not be a man. For if you say that he is not an animal, he is no longer a man. And if you say "he is not rational," he is not a man. Likewise also, if you say "he is not mortal," he is not a man; for every man is an animal and rational and mortal. Therefore, they are called essential, because they themselves complete the nature of man and it is impossible for man to subsist apart from them. Likewise also for each thing, the things constituting its nature are called essential, but non-essential are the accidents, which may be in man and may not be, such as whiteness; for even if someone is not white, he has not lost being a man. Likewise also blackness and such things. The essential voice, therefore, declares either what it is or what kind of thing it is; for instance, being asked "what is man?" we say "an animal," then being asked "what kind of animal?" we say "rational, mortal." The essential voice, therefore, which declares what kind of thing it is, is called difference. But that which declares what it is either signifies many species and makes the genus, such as substance (for substance signifies man and horse and ox; for each of them is both called and is a substance, but is a different species), or it declares many things differing from one another in number, but not at all in species, and makes the species; for instance, man signifies many, that is, all individual men, who differ from one another in number (for Peter is one and Paul is another and they are not one but two) but do not differ in species; for all are both called and are men. The more particular, therefore, such as Peter, is an individual and a person and a hypostasis, which signifies a certain one. For when asked "who is this?", we say

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Fragmenta philosophica

ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΑ Περὶ φωνῆς Ἐπειδὴ σκοπὸς ἡμῖν ἐστι διαλαβεῖν περὶ πάσης ἁπλῶς φιλοσόφου φωνῆς, δεῖ δὲ ἡμᾶς πρότερον γνῶναι, περὶ ποίας φωνὰς ἡ φιλοσοφία καταγίνεται, ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς φωνῆς τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ λόγου ποιούμενοί φαμεν, ὅτι ἡ φωνὴ ἢ ἄσημός ἐστιν ἢ σημαντική. Καὶ ἄσημος μέν ἐστιν ἡ μηδὲν σημαίνουσα, σημαντικὴ δὲ ἡ σημαίνουσά τι. Εἶτα πάλιν ἡ ἄσημος φωνὴ ἢ ἄναρθρός ἐστιν ἢ ἔναρθρος. Ἄναρθρος μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἡ μὴ δυναμένη γραφῆναι, ἔναρθρος δὲ ἡ δυναμένη γραφῆναι. Ἔστιν οὖν ἄσημος καὶ ἄναρθρος φωνὴ οἷον ὁ ψόφος ἢ ὁ κτύπος ὁ γινόμενος ἀπὸ λίθου τυχὸν ἢ ξύλου, οὔτε γὰρ γράφεται οὔτε σημαίνει τι, ἄσημος δὲ καὶ ἔναρθρος οἷον τραγέλαφος, σκινδαψός· ταῦτα γὰρ γράφεται μέν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν σημαίνει, οὔτε γὰρ ἐγένετό ποτε τραγέλαφος ἢ σκινδαψὸς οὔτε ἐστί. Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἀσήμου φωνῆς καὶ τῆς ἀνάρθρου καὶ ἐνάρθρου οὐδεὶς λόγος τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ. Ἡ σημαντικὴ φωνὴ πάλιν ἢ ἄναρθρός ἐστιν ἢ ἔναρθρος. Ἄναρθρος μὲν οὖν σημαντικὴ φωνή ἐστιν ὡς ἡ ὑλακτικὴ τῶν κυνῶν· αὕτη γὰρ σημαίνει μὲν τὸν κύνα, ὅτι κυνὸς φωνή ἐστι, σημαίνει δὲ καί τινος παρουσίαν. Ἄναρθρος δέ ἐστι, δίοτι οὐ γράφεται. Οὔτε οὖν περὶ ταύτης ἐστί τις λόγος τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ. Ἡ δὲ σημαντικὴ καὶ ἔναρθρος ἢ μερική ἐστιν ἢ καθόλου· μερικὴ μὲν οἷον Πέτρος, Παῦλος, καθόλου δὲ οἷον ἄνθρωπος. Οὔτε οὖν περὶ τῆς μερικῆς ἐστι λόγος τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῆς σημαντικῆς καὶ ἐνάρθρου καὶ καθόλου ἤγουν κοινῆς καὶ ἐπὶ πολλῶν λεγομένης. Αὕτη δὲ πάλιν ἢ οὐσιώδης ἐστὶν ἢ ἐπουσιώδης. Οὐσιώδης οὖν ἐστιν ἡ δηλωτικὴ τῆς οὐσίας ἤγουν τῆς φύσεως τῶν πραγμάτων. Ἐπουσιώδης δὲ ἡ δηλοῦσα τὰ συμβεβηκότα, οἷον ὁ ἄνθρωπός ἐστι ζῷον λογικὸν θνητόν. Ταῦτα ὅλα οὐσιώδη εἰσίν. Ἐὰν γὰρ ἀφέλῃς τι τούτων ἐκ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, οὐκ ἔσται ἄνθρωπος. Ἐὰν γὰρ εἴπῃς, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι ζῷον, οὐκέτι ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος. Καὶ ἐὰν εἴπῃς «οὐκ ἔστιν λογικόν», οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος. Ὁμοίως καί, ἐὰν εἴπῃς «οὐκ ἔστιν θνητόν», οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος· πᾶς γὰρ ἄνθρωπος καὶ ζῷόν ἐστι καὶ λογικὸν καὶ θνητόν. ∆ιὰ τοῦτο οὖν λέγονται οὐσιώδη, ὅτι αὐτὰ συμπληροῦσι τὴν φύσιν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἀδύνατον συστῆναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐκτὸς αὐτῶν. Ὁμοίως καὶ ἐπὶ ἑκάστου πράγματος τὰ συνιστῶντα τὴν φύσιν αὐτοῦ οὐσιώδη λέγονται, ἐπουσιώδη δὲ τὰ συμβεβηκότα, ἅτινα ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ μὴ εἶναι, οἷον τὸ λευκόν· κἂν γὰρ μή ἐστί τις λευκός, οὐκ ἀπώλεσεν τὸ εἶναι ἄνθρωπος. Ὁμοίως καὶ τὸ μέλαν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. Ἡ οὖν οὐσιώδης φωνὴ ἢ τὸ τί ἐστι δηλοῖ ἢ τὸ ὁποῖόν τί ἐστιν, οἷον ἐρωτώμενοι «τί ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος» φαμὲν «ζῷον», εἶτα ἐρωτώμενοι «ὁποῖον ζῷον» λέγομεν «λογικὸν θνητόν». Ἡ οὖν οὐσιώδης φωνὴ ἡ δηλοῦσα τὸ ὁποῖόν τί ἐστι λέγεται διαφορά. Ἡ δὲ δηλοῦσα τὸ τί ἐστιν ἢ πολλὰ εἴδη σημαίνει καὶ ποιεῖ τὸ γένος οἷον ἡ οὐσία (ἡ γὰρ οὐσία σημαίνει καὶ ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἵππον καὶ βοῦν· ἕκαστον γὰρ αὐτῶν οὐσία λέγεταί τε καὶ ἔστιν, ἄλλο δὲ εἶδος ὑπάρχει) ἢ πολλοὺς δηλοῖ τῷ μὲν ἀριθμῷ διαφέροντας ἀλλήλων, τῷ δὲ εἴδει οὐδαμῶς, καὶ ποιεῖ τὸ εἶδος· οἷον ἄνθρωπος σημαίνει μὲν πολλοὺς ἤγουν πάντας τοὺς κατὰ μέρος ἀνθρώπους, οἵτινες τῷ μὲν ἀριθμῷ διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων (ἄλλος γάρ ἐστιν ὁ Πέτρος καὶ ἄλλος ὁ Παῦλος καὶ οὔκ εἰσιν εἷς ἀλλὰ δύο) τῷ δὲ εἴδει οὐ διαφέρουσιν· πάντες γὰρ ἄνθρωποι καὶ λέγονται καί εἰσιν. Ἔστιν οὖν τὸ μερικώτερον οἷον ὁ Πέτρος ἄτομον καὶ πρόσωπον καὶ ὑπόστασις, ὅπερ τὸν τινὰ σημαίνει. Ἐρωτώμενοι γὰρ «τίς ἐστιν οὗτος», λέγομεν