1

De natura hominis

A comprehensive treatise of Nemesius, bishop of Emesa, concerning the nature of man

1 It has seemed to many good men that man is composed of an intellectual soul and a body, most excellently constructed and so well that it was not possible for it to be otherwise. But from the fact that the soul is called intellectual, a doubt arises whether the intellect, coming to the soul as one thing to another, made it intellectual, or whether the soul possesses the intellectual principle from itself and by nature, and this is its most beautiful part, as the eye is in the body, some, among whom is Plotinus, having laid it down as a dogma that the soul is one thing and the intellect another, wish man to be composed of three things: body, soul, and intellect, whom Apollinarius, who became bishop of Laodicea, also followed, for having fixed this as the foundation of his own opinion, he built up the rest according to his own dogma; but some have not distinguished the intellect from the soul, but consider the intellectual principle to be the ruling part of its substance. Aristotle, however, holds the opinion that the potential intellect is co-created with man, but the actual intellect comes to us from without, not contributing to the being and existence of man, but contributing to the advancement of natural knowledge and theory. At any rate, he affirms that very few men, and only those who have philosophized, possess the actual intellect. Plato, however, does not seem to say that man is the composite of both, soul and body, but a soul using such a body, conceiving what pertains to man more worthily and thereby turning us to the divinity and care of the soul alone, so that, believing ourselves to be the soul, we may pursue only the goods of the soul, the virtues and piety, and not love the desires of the body, as not belonging to man as man, but primarily to the animal, and secondarily to man, since man is also an animal. And in other ways too, the soul is acknowledged by all men to be more master of the body, for the body is moved by it as by an instrument. Death makes this clear; for when the soul is separated, the body remains completely motionless and inactive, just as when the craftsman is separated, the tools remain motionless. It is well known that he also partakes with inanimate things and shares in the life of irrational animals and has a share in the intelligence of rational beings. For he partakes with inanimate things in respect of the body and the mixture of the four elements; with plants in respect of these and the nutritive and spermatic power; with irrational beings in these respects too, and additionally in respect of movement by impulse, and appetite and temper, and the sensitive and respiratory power, for all these things are common to men and irrational beings, even if not all things are to all; and through the rational principle he is joined to the incorporeal and intellectual natures, by reasoning and thinking and judging each thing and pursuing the virtues and embracing piety, the crown of the virtues. Wherefore he is, as it were, on the borderline of intelligible and sensible substance, being joined in respect of the body and the bodily powers to the other animals and inanimate things, but in respect of the rational principle to the incorporeal substances, as was said before. For the Creator seems to join the different natures to one another by degrees, so that the whole creation is one and kindred. From which it is especially shown that the creator of all beings is one; for He not only unified the existence of the individual parts, but also fitted each thing to one another appropriately. For just as in each of the animals He united the non-sentient with the sentient, bone and fat and hairs and

1

De natura hominis

Νεμεσίου ἐπισκόπου Ἐμέσης λόγος κεφαλαίωδης περὶ φύσεως ἀνθρώπου

1 Τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐκ ψυχῆς νοερᾶς καὶ σώματος ἄριστα κατεσκευασμένον καὶ οὕτω καλῶς ὡς οὐκ ἐνεδέχετο ἄλλως γενέσθαι συνεστάναι, πολλοῖς καὶ ἀγαθοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἔδοξεν. ἐκ τοῦ δὲ νοερὰν λέγεσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν ἀμφιβολίαν ἔχοντος πότερον προσελθὼν ὁ νοῦς τῇ ψυχῇ ὡς ἄλλος ἄλλῃ νοερὰν αὐτὴν ἐποίησεν, ἢ τὸ νοερὸν ἀφ' ἑαυτῆς ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ φύσει κέκτηται καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν αὐτῆς τὸ κάλλιστον μέρος ὡς ὀφθαλμὸς ἐν σώματι, τινὲς μέν, ὧν ἐστιν καὶ Πλωτῖνος, ἄλλην εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ἄλλον τὸν νοῦν δογματίσαντες, ἐκ τριῶν τὸν ἄνθρωπον συνεστάναι βούλονται, σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς καὶ νοῦ, οἷς ἠκολούθησε καὶ Ἀπολινάριος ὁ τῆς Λαοδικείας γενόμενος ἐπίσκοπος, τοῦτον γὰρ πηξάμενος τὸν θεμέλιον τῆς ἰδίας δόξης καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ προσωκοδόμησεν κατὰ τὸ οἰκεῖον δόγμα· τινὲς δὲ οὐ διεστείλαντο ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸν νοῦν, ἀλλὰ τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῆς ἡγεμονικὸν εἶναι τὸ νοερὸν ἡγοῦνται. Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ τὸν μὲν δυνάμει νοῦν συγκατεσκευάσθαι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, τὸν δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ θύραθεν ἡμῖν ἐπεισιέναι δοξάζει, οὐκ εἰς τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὕπαρξιν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου συντελοῦντα ἀλλ' εἰς προκοπὴν τῆς τῶν φυσικῶν γνώσεως καὶ θεωρίας συμβαλλόμενον. κομιδῆ γοῦν ὀλίγους τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ μόνους τοὺς φιλοσοφήσαντας τὸν ἐνεργείᾳ νοῦν ἔχειν διαβεβαιοῦται. Πλάτων δὲ οὐ δοκεῖ λέγειν τὸν ἄνθρωπον εἶναι τὸ συναμφότερον, ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα, ἀλλὰ ψυχὴν σώματι τοιῷδε χρωμένην, ἀξιοπρεπέστερον φανταζόμενος τὰ κατὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ αὐτόθεν ἡμᾶς ἐπιστρέφων ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς μόνης θειότητα καὶ ἐπιμέλειαν, ἵνα τὴν ψυχὴν ἑαυτοὺς εἶναι πιστεύοντες τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀγαθὰ μόνα μεταδιώκωμεν, τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὴν εὐσέβειαν, καὶ μὴ τὰς τοῦ σώματος ἐπιθυμίας ἀγαπήσωμεν, ὡς οὐκ οὔσας ἀνθρώπου ᾗ ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλὰ ζῴου μὲν προηγουμένως, ἀνθρώπου δὲ ἑπομένως, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ζῷον ὁ ἄνθρωπος. καὶ ἄλλως δὲ κυριωτέρα τοῦ σώματος ἡ ψυχὴ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις εἶναι καθωμολόγηται, ἀπὸ ταύτης γὰρ ὡς ὄργανον κινεῖται τὸ σῶμα. δηλοῖ δὲ ὁ θάνατος· χωρισθείσης γὰρ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀκίνητον μένει τὸ σῶμα παντελῶς καὶ ἀνενέργητον, ὡς τεχνίτου χωρισθέντος ἀκίνητα μένει τὰ ὄργανα. γνώριμον δὲ ὅτι καὶ τοῖς ἀψύχοις κοινωνεῖ καὶ τῆς τῶν ἀλόγων ζῴων μετέχει ζωῆς καὶ τῆς τῶν λογικῶν μετείληφε νοήσεως. κοινωνεῖ γὰρ τοῖς μὲν ἀψύχοις κατὰ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων κρᾶσιν· τοῖς δὲ φυτοῖς κατά τε ταῦτα καὶ τὴν θρεπτικὴν καὶ σπερματικὴν δύναμιν· τοῖς δὲ ἀλόγοις καὶ ἐν τούτοις μέν, ἐξ ἐπιμέτρου δὲ κατά τε τὴν καθ' ὁρμὴν κίνησιν καὶ κατὰ τὴν ὄρεξιν καὶ τὸν θυμὸν καὶ τὴν αἰσθητικὴν καὶ ἀναπνευστικὴν δύναμιν, ταῦτα γὰρ ἅπαντα κοινὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ τοῖς ἀλόγοις ἐστίν, εἰ καὶ μὴ πᾶσιν πάντα· συνάπτεται δὲ διὰ τοῦ λογικοῦ ταῖς ἀσωμάτοις καὶ νοεραῖς φύσεσιν, λογιζόμενος καὶ νοῶν καὶ κρίνων ἕκαστα καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς μεταδιώκων καὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν τὸν κολοφῶνα τὴν εὐσέβειαν ἀσπαζόμενος. διὸ καὶ ὥσπερ ἐν μεθορίοις ἐστὶν νοητῆς καὶ αἰσθητῆς οὐσίας, συναπτόμενος κατὰ μὲν τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὰς σωματικὰς δυνάμεις τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις τε καὶ ἀψύχοις, κατὰ δὲ τὸ λογικὸν ταῖς ἀσωμάτοις οὐσίαις, ὡς εἴρηται πρότερον. ὁ γὰρ δημιουργὸς ἐκ τοῦ κατ' ὀλίγον ἔοικεν ἐπισυνάπτειν ἀλλήλαις τὰς διαφόρους φύσεις, ὥστε μίαν εἶναι καὶ συγγενῆ τὴν πᾶσαν κτίσιν. ἐξ οὗ μάλιστα δείκνυται εἷς ὢν ὁ πάντων τῶν ὄντων δημιουργός· οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἥνωσε τὴν ὕπαρξιν τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀτόμων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἕκαστα πρὸς ἄλληλα συνήρμοσεν οἰκείως. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν ἑκάστῳ τῶν ζῴων ἥνωσε τὰ ἀναίσθητα τοῖς αἰσθητικοῖς, ὀστοῦν καὶ πιμελὴν καὶ τρίχας καὶ