Chapter 6.—How the Man Not Yet Righteous Can Know the Righteous Man Whom He Loves.

9. Return then with me, and let us consider why we love the apostle. Is it at all on account of his human kind, which we know right well, in that we believe him to have been a man? Assuredly not; for if it were so, he now is not him whom we love, since he is no longer that man, for his soul is separated from his body. But we believe that which we love in him to be still living, for we love his righteous mind. From what general or special rule then, except that we know both what a mind is, and what it is to be righteous? And we say, indeed, not unfitly, that we therefore know what a mind is, because we too have a mind. For neither did we ever see it with our eyes, and gather a special or general notion from the resemblance of more minds than one, which we had seen; but rather, as I have said before, because we too have it. For what is known so intimately, and so perceives itself to be itself, as that by which also all other things are perceived, that is, the mind itself? For we recognize the movements of bodies also, by which we perceive that others live besides ourselves, from the resemblance of ourselves; since we also so move our body in living as we observe those bodies to be moved. For even when a living body is moved, there is no way opened to our eyes to see the mind, a thing which cannot be seen by the eyes; but we perceive something to be contained in that bulk, such as is contained in ourselves, so as to move in like manner our own bulk, which is the life and the soul. Neither is this, as it were, the property of human foresight and reason, since brute animals also perceive that not only they themselves live, but also other brute animals interchangeably, and the one the other, and that we ourselves do so. Neither do they see our souls, save from the movements of the body, and that immediately and most easily by some natural agreement. Therefore we both know the mind of any one from our own, and believe also from our own of him whom we do not know. For not only do we perceive that there is a mind, but we can also know what a mind is, by reflecting upon our own: for we have a mind. But whence do we know what a righteous man is? For we said above that we love the apostle for no other reason except that he is a righteous mind. We know, then, what a righteous man also is, just as we know what a mind is. But what a mind is, as has been said, we know from ourselves, for there is a mind in us. But whence do we know what a righteous man is, if we are not righteous? But if no one but he who is righteous knows what is a righteous man, no one but a righteous man loves a righteous man; for one cannot love him whom one believes to be righteous, for this very reason that one does believe him to be righteous, if one does not know what it is to be righteous; according to that which we have shown above, that no one loves what he believes and does not see, except by some rule of a general or special notion. And if for this reason no one but a righteous man loves a righteous man, how will any one wish to be a righteous man who is not yet so? For no one wishes to be that which he does not love. But, certainly, that he who is not righteous may be so, it is necessary that he should wish to be righteous; and in order that he may wish to be righteous, he loves the righteous man. Therefore, even he who is not yet righteous, loves the righteous man.665    [The “wish” and “love” which Augustin here attributes to the non-righteous man is not true and spiritual, but selfish. In chapter vii. 10, he speaks of true love as distinct from that kind of desire which is a mere wish. The latter he calls cupiditas. “That is to be called love which is true, otherwise it is desire (cupiditas); and so those who desire (cupidi) are improperly said to love (diligere), just as they who love (diligunt) are said improperly to desire (cupere).”—W.G.T.S.]    Gal. v. 6    Ecclus. xxiv. 5. and 1 Cor. i. 24 But he cannot love the righteous man, who is ignorant what a righteous man is. Accordingly, even he who is not yet righteous, knows what a righteous man is. Whence then does he know this? Does he see it with his eyes? Is any corporeal thing righteous, as it is white, or black, or square, or round? Who could say this? Yet with one’s eyes one has seen nothing except corporeal things. But there is nothing righteous in a man except the mind; and when a man is called a righteous man, he is called so from the mind, not from the body. For righteousness is in some sort the beauty of the mind, by which men are beautiful; very many too who are misshapen and deformed in body. And as the mind is not seen with the eyes, so neither is its beauty. From whence then does he who is not yet righteous know what a righteous man is, and love the righteous man that he may become righteous? Do certain signs shine forth by the motion of the body, by which this or that man is manifested to be righteous? But whence does any one know that these are the signs of a righteous mind when he is wholly ignorant what it is to be righteous? Therefore he does know. But whence do we know what it is to be righteous, even when we are not yet righteous? If we know from without ourselves, we know it by some bodily thing. But this is not a thing of the body. Therefore we know in ourselves what it is to be righteous. For I find this nowhere else when I seek to utter it, except within myself; and if I ask another what it is to be righteous, he seeks within himself what to answer; and whosoever hence can answer truly, he has found within himself what to answer. And when indeed I wish to speak of Carthage, I seek within myself what to speak, and I find within myself a notion or image of Carthage; but I have received this through the body, that is, through the perception of the body, since I have been present in that city in the body, and I saw and perceived it, and retained it in my memory, that I might find within myself a word concerning it, whenever I might wish to speak of it. For its word is the image itself of it in my memory, not that sound of two syllables when Carthage is named, or even when that name itself is thought of silently from time to time, but that which I discern in my mind, when I utter that dissyllable with my voice, or even before I utter it. So also, when I wish to speak of Alexandria, which I never saw, an image of it is present with me. For whereas I had heard from many and had believed that city to be great, in such way as it could be told me, I formed an image of it in my mind as I was able; and this is with me its word when I wish to speak of it, before I utter with my voice the five syllables which make the name that almost every one knows. And yet if I could bring forth that image from my mind to the eyes of men who know Alexandria, certainly all either would say, It is not it; or if they said, It is, I should greatly wonder; and as I gazed at it in my mind, that is, at the image which was as it were its picture, I should yet not know it to be it, but should believe those who retained an image they had seen. But I do not so ask what it is to be righteous, nor do I so find it, nor do I so gaze upon it, when I utter it; neither am I so approved when I am heard, nor do I so approve when I hear; as though I have seen such a thing with my eyes, or learned it by some perception of the body, or heard it from those who had so learned it. For when I say, and say knowingly, that mind is righteous which knowingly and of purpose assigns to every one his due in life and behavior, I do not think of anything absent, as Carthage, or imagine it as I am able, as Alexandria, whether it be so or not; but I discern something present, and I discern it within myself, though I myself am not that which I discern; and many if they hear will approve it. And whoever hears me and knowingly approves, he too discerns this same thing within himself, even though he himself be not what he discerns. But when a righteous man says this, he discerns and says that which he himself is. And whence also does he discern it, except within himself? But this is not to be wondered at; for whence should he discern himself except within himself? The wonderful thing is, that the mind should see within itself that which it has seen nowhere else, and should see truly, and should see the very true righteous mind, and should itself be a mind, and yet not a righteous mind, which nevertheless it sees within itself. Is there another mind that is righteous in a mind that is not yet righteous? Or if there is not, what does it there see when it sees and says what is a righteous mind, nor sees it anywhere else but in itself, when itself is not a righteous mind? Is that which it sees an inner truth present to the mind which has power to behold it? Yet all have not that power; and they who have power to behold it, are not all also that which they behold, that is, they are not also righteous minds themselves, just as they are able to see and to say what is a righteous mind. And whence will they be able to be so, except by cleaving to that very same form itself which they behold, so that from thence they may be formed and may be righteous minds; not only discerning and saying that the mind is righteous which knowingly and of purpose assigns to every one that which is his due in life and behavior, but so likewise that they themselves may live righteously and be righteous in character, by assigning to every one that which is his due, so as to owe no man anything, but to love one another.666    Rom. xiii. 8    Acts iv. 32    C. 14. And whence can any one cleave to that form but by loving it? Why then do we love another whom we believe to be righteous, and do not love that form itself wherein we see what is a righteous mind, that we also may be able to be righteous? Is it that unless we loved that also, we should not love him at all, whom through it we love; but whilst we are not righteous, we love that form too little to allow of our being able to be righteous? The man therefore who is believed to be righteous, is loved through that form and truth which he who loves discerns and understands within himself; but that very form and truth itself cannot be loved from any other source than itself. For we do not find any other such thing besides itself, so that by believing we might love it when it is unknown, in that we here already know another such thing. For whatsoever of such a kind one may have seen, is itself; and there is not any other such thing, since itself alone is such as itself is. He therefore who loves men, ought to love them either because they are righteous, or that they may become righteous. For so also he ought to love himself, either because he is righteous, or that he may become righteous; for in this way he loves his neighbor as himself without any risk. For he who loves himself otherwise, loves himself wrongfully, since he loves himself to this end that he may be unrighteous; therefore to this end that he may be wicked; and hence it follows next that he does not love himself; for, “He who loveth iniquity,667    Violence—A.V.    Eph. iv. 5    Job xxviii. 28 hateth his own soul.”668    Ps. xi. 6    Matt. xv. 28    Disciplina, disco

CAPUT VI.

9. Quomodo nondum justus justum cognoscat quem diligit. Redi ergo mecum, et consideremus cur diligamus Apostolum. Numquidnam propter humanam speciem, quam notissimam habemus, eo quod credimus eum hominem fuisse? Non utique: alioquin nunc non est quem diligamus, quandoquidem homo ille jam non est; anima enim ejus a corpore separata est. Sed id quod in illo amamus, etiam nunc vivere credimus: amamus enim animum justum. Ex qua ergo generali aut speciali regula, nisi quia scimus et quid sit animus, et quid sit justus? Et animus quidem quid sit, non incongrue nos dicimus ideo nosse, quia et nos habemus animum. Neque enim unquam oculis vidimus, et ex similitudine visorum plurium notionem generalem specialemve percepimus; sed potius, ut dixi, quia et nos habemus. Quid enim tam intime scitur, seque ipsum esse sentit; quam id quo etiam caetera sentiuntur, id est, ipse animus? Nam et motus corporum, quibus praeter nos alios vivere sentimus, ex nostra similitudine agnoscimus: quia et nos ita movemus corpus vivendo, sicut illa corpora moveri advertimus. Neque enim cum corpus vivum movetur, aperitur ulla via oculis nostris ad videndum animum, rem quae oculis videri non potest: sed illi moli aliquid inesse sentimus quale nobis inest ad movendum similiter 0954 molem nostram, quod est vita et anima. Neque quasi humanae prudentiae rationisque proprium est. Et bestiae quippe sentiunt vivere, non tantum se ipsas, sed etiam se invicem atque alterutrum, et nos ipsos. Nec animas nostras vident, sed ex motibus corporis, idque statim et facillime quadam conspiratione naturali. Animum igitur cujuslibet et ex nostro novimus, et ex nostro credimus quem non novimus. Non enim tantum sentimus animum, sed etiam scire possumus quid sit animus consideratione nostri: habemus enim animum. Sed quid sit justus, unde novimus? Dixeramus enim nos Apostolum non alia causa diligere, nisi quod sit justus animus. Novimus ergo et quid sit justus, sicut et quid sit animus. Sed quid sit animus, ut dictum est, novimus ex nobis: inest enim animus nobis. Quid autem sit justus unde novimus, si justi non sumus? Quod si nemo novit quid sit justus nisi qui justus est, nemo diligit justum nisi justus: non enim potest diligere quem justum esse credit, ob hoc ipsum quia justum esse credit, si quid sit justus ignorat; secundum quod superius demonstravimus, neminem diligere quod credit et non videt, nisi ex aliqua regula notitiae generalis sive specialis. Ac per hoc si non diligit justum nisi justus, quomodo volet quisque justus esse qui nondum est? Non enim vult quisquam esse quod non diligit. Ut autem sit justus qui nondum est, volet utique justus esse: ut autem velit, diligit justum. Diligit ergo justum et qui nondum justus est. Diligere autem justum non potest, qui quid sit justus, ignorat. Proinde novit quid sit justus, etiam qui nondum est: ubi ergo novit? num oculis vidit? An ullum corpus justum, velut album, aut nigrum, aut quadrum, aut rotundum? Quis hoc dixerit? At oculis non vidit nisi corpora. Justus autem in homine non est, nisi animus: et cum homo justus dicitur, ex animo dicitur, non ex corpore. Est enim quaedam pulchritudo animi justitia, qua pulchri sunt homines, plerique etiam qui corpore distorti atque deformes sunt. Sicut autem animus non videtur oculis, ita nec pulchritudo ejus. Ubi ergo novit quid sit justus, qui nondum est, atque ut sit diligit justum? An signa quaedam per motum corporis emicant, quibus ille aut ille homo esse justus apparet? Sed unde novit illa signa esse animi justi, nesciens quid omnino sit justus? Novit ergo. Sed ubi novimus quid sit justus, etiam cum justi nondum sumus? Si extra nos novimus , in corpore aliquo novimus. Sed non est ista res corporis. In nobis igitur novimus quid sit justus. Non enim alibi hoc invenio, cum quaero ut hoc eloquar, nisi apud me ipsum: et si interrogem alium quid sit justus, apud se ipsum quaerit quid respondeat; et quisquis hinc verum respondere potuit, apud se ipsum quid responderet invenit. Et Carthaginem quidem cum eloqui volo, apud me ipsum quaero ut eloquar, et apud me ipsum invenio phantasiam Carthaginis: sed eam per corpus accepi, id est per corporis sensum, quoniam praesens in ea corpore 0955 fui, et eam vidi atque sensi, memoriaque retinui, ut apud me invenirem de illa verbum, cum eam vellem dicere. Ipsa enim phantasia ejus in memoria mea verbum ejus, non sonus iste trisyllabus cum Carthago nominatur, vel etiam tacite nomen ipsum per spatia temporum cogitatur; sed illud quod in animo meo cerno, cum hoc trisyllabum voce profero, vel antequam proferam. Sic et Alexandriam cum eloqui volo, quam nunquam vidi, praesto est apud me phantasma ejus. Cum enim a multis audissem et credidissem magnam esse illam urbem, sicut mihi narrari potuit, finxi animo meo imaginem ejus quam potui: et hoc est apud me verbum ejus, cum eam volo dicere, antequam voce quinque syllabas proferam, quod nomen ejus fere omnibus notum est. Quam tamen imaginem si ex animo meo proferre possem ad oculos hominum qui Alexandriam noverunt, profecto aut omnes dicerent, Non est ipsa; aut si dicerent, Ipsa est, multum mirarer, atque intuens in animo meo ipsam, id est imaginem quasi picturam ejus, ipsam tamen esse nescirem, sed eis crederem qui visam tenerent. Non autem ita quaero quid sit justus, nec ita invenio, nec ita intueor, cum id eloquor; nec ita probor, cum audior; nec ita probo, cum audio; quasi tale aliquid ocultis viderim, aut ullo corporis sensu didicerim, aut ab eis qui ita didicissent audierim. Cum enim dico et sciens dico, Justus est animus qui scientia atque ratione in vita ac moribus sua cuique distribuit; non aliquam rem absentem cogito, sicut Carthaginem, aut fingo ut possum, sicut Alexandriam, sive ita sit, sive non ita: sed praesens quiddam cerno, et cerno apud me, etsi non sum ipse quod cerno, et multi si audiant approbabunt. Et quisquis me audit atque scienter approbat, apud se et ipse hoc idem cernit, etiamsi non sit et ipse quod cernit. Justus vero cum id dicit, id quod ipse est cernit et dicit. Et ubi etiam ipse cernit, nisi apud se ipsum? Sed hoc mirum non est: ubi enim se cerneret, nisi apud se ipsum? Illud mirabile est ut apud se animus videat quod alibi nusquam vidit, et verum videat, et ipsum verum justum animum videat, et sit ipse animus et non sit justus animus, quem apud se ipsum videt. Num est alius animus justus in animo nondum justo? Aut si non est, quem ibi videt, cum videt et dicit quid sit animus justus, nec alibi quam in se ipso videt, cum ipse non sit animus justus? An illud quod videt, veritas est interior praesens animo qui eam valet intueri? Neque omnes valent: et qui intueri valent, hoc etiam quod intuentur non omnes sunt, hoc est, non sunt etiam ipsi justi animi, sicut possunt videre ac dicere quid sit justus animus. Quod unde esse poterunt , nisi inhaerendo eidem ipsi formae quam intuentur, ut inde formentur et sint justi animi; non tantum cernentes et dicentes justum esse animum qui scientia atque ratione in vita ac moribus sua cuique distribuit, sed etiam ut ipsi juste vivant justeque morati sint, sua cuique distribuendo, ut nemini quidquam debeant, nisi ut invicem diligant (Rom. XIII, 8). Et unde inhaeretur illi formae, nisi amando? 0956 Cur ergo alium diligimus quem credimus justum, et non diligimus ipsam formam ubi videmus quid sit justus animus, ut et nos justi esse possimus? An vero nisi et istam diligeremus, nullo modo eum diligeremus quem diligimus ex ista, sed dum justi non sumus, minus eam diligimus quam ut justi esse valeamus? Homo ergo qui creditur justus, ex ea forma et veritate diligitur, quam cernit et intelligit apud se ille qui diligit: ipsa vero forma et veritas non est quomodo aliunde diligatur. Neque enim invenimus aliquid tale praeter ipsam, ut eam, cum incognita est, credendo diligamus, ex eo quod jam tale aliquid novimus. Quidquid enim tale aspexeris, ipsa est: et non est quidquam tale, quoniam sola ipsa talis est, qualis ipsa est. Qui ergo amat homines, aut quia justi sunt, aut ut justi sint, amare debet. Sic enim et semetipsum amare debet, aut quia justus est, aut ut justus sit: sic enim diligit proximum tanquam se ipsum sine ullo periculo. Qui enim aliter se diligit, injuste se diligit, quoniam se ad hoc diligit ut sit injustus: ad hoc ergo ut sit malus, ac per hoc jam non se diligit. Qui enim diligit iniquitatem, odit animam suam (Psal. X, 6).