Chapter 2.—A Certain Trinity in the Sight. That There are Three Things in Sight, Which Differ in Their Own Nature. In What Manner from a Visible Thing Vision is Produced, or the Image of that Thing Which is Seen. The Matter is Shown More Clearly by an Example. How These Three Combine in One.

2. When, then, we see any corporeal object, these three things, as is most easy to do, are to be considered and distinguished: First, the object itself which we see; whether a stone, or flame, or any other thing that can be seen by the eyes; and this certainly might exist also already before it was seen; next, vision or the act of seeing, which did not exist before we perceived the object itself which is presented to the sense; in the third place, that which keeps the sense of the eye in the object seen, so long as it is seen, viz. the attention of the mind. In these three, then, not only is there an evident distinction, but also a diverse nature. For, first, that visible body is of a far different nature from the sense of the eyes, through the incidence of which sense upon it vision arises. And what plainly is vision itself other than perception informed by that thing which is perceived? Although there is no vision if the visible object be withdrawn, nor could there be any vision of the kind at all if there were no body that could be seen; yet the body by which the sense of the eyes is informed, when that body is seen, and the form itself which is imprinted by it upon the sense, which is called vision, are by no means of the same substance. For the body that is seen is, in its own nature, separable; but the sense, which was already in the living subject, even before it saw what it was able to see, when it fell in with something visible,—or the vision which comes to be in the sense from the visible body when now brought into connection with it and seen,—the sense, then, I say, or the vision, that is, the sense informed from without, belongs to the nature of the living subject, which is altogether other than that body which we perceive by seeing, and by which the sense is not so formed as to be sense, but as to be vision. For unless the sense were also in us before the presentation to us of the sensible object, we should not differ from the blind, at times when we are seeing nothing, whether in darkness, or when our eyes are closed. But we differ from them in this, that there is in us, even when we are not seeing, that whereby we are able to see, which is called the sense; whereas this is not in them, nor are they called blind for any other reason than because they have it not. Further also, that attention of the mind which keeps the sense in that thing which we see, and connects both, not only differs from that visible thing in its nature; in that the one is mind, and the other body; but also from the sense and the vision itself: since this attention is the act of the mind alone; but the sense of the eyes is called a bodily sense, for no other reason than because the eyes themselves also are members of the body; and although an inanimate body does not perceive, yet the soul commingled with the body perceives through a corporeal instrument, and that instrument is called sense. And this sense, too, is cut off and extinguished by suffering on the part of the body, when any one is blinded; while the mind remains the same; and its attention, since the eyes are lost, has not, indeed, the sense of the body which it may join, by seeing, to the body without it, and so fix its look thereupon and see it, yet by the very effort shows that, although the bodily sense be taken away, itself can neither perish nor be diminished. For there remains unimpaired a desire [appetitus] of seeing, whether it can be carried into effect or not. These three, then, the body that is seen, and vision itself, and the attention of mind which joins both together, are manifestly distinguishable, not only on account of the properties of each, but also on account of the difference of their natures.

3. And since, in this case, the sensation does not proceed from that body which is seen, but from the body of the living being that perceives, with which the soul is tempered together in some wonderful way of its own; yet vision is produced, that is, the sense itself is informed, by the body which is seen; so that now, not only is there the power of sense, which can exist also unimpaired even in darkness, provided the eyes are sound, but also a sense actually informed, which is called vision. Vision, then, is produced from a thing that is visible; but not from that alone, unless there be present also one who sees. Therefore vision is produced from a thing that is visible, together with one who sees; in such way that, on the part of him who sees, there is the sense of seeing and the intention of looking and gazing at the object; while yet that information of the sense, which is called vision, is imprinted only by the body which is seen, that is, by some visible thing; which being taken away, that form remains no more which was in the sense so long as that which was seen was present: yet the sense itself remains, which existed also before anything was perceived; just as the trace of a thing in water remains so long as the body itself, which is impressed on it, is in the water; but if this has been taken away, there will no longer be any such trace, although the water remains, which existed also before it took the form of that body. And therefore we cannot, indeed, say that a visible thing produces the sense; yet it produces the form, which is, as it were, its own likeness, which comes to be in the sense, when we perceive anything by seeing. But we do not distinguish, through the same sense, the form of the body which we see, from the form which is produced by it in the sense of him who sees; since the union of the two is so close that there is no room for distinguishing them. But we rationally infer that we could not have sensation at all, unless some similitude of the body seen was wrought in our own sense. For when a ring is imprinted on wax, it does not follow that no image is produced, because we cannot discern it unless when it has been separated. But since, after the wax is separated, what was made remains, so that it can be seen; we are on that account easily persuaded that there was already also in the wax a form impressed from the ring before it was separated from it. But if the ring were imprinted upon a fluid, no image at all would appear when it was withdrawn; and yet none the less for this ought the reason to discern that there was in that fluid before the ring was withdrawn a form of the ring produced from the ring, which is to be distinguished from that form which is in the ring, whence that form was produced which ceases to be when the ring is withdrawn, although that in the ring remains, whence the other was produced. And so the [sensuous] perception of the eyes may not be supposed to contain no image of the body, which is seen as long as it is seen, [merely] because when that is withdrawn the image does not remain. And hence it is very difficult to persuade men of duller mind that an image of the visible thing is formed in our sense, when we see it, and that this same form is vision.

4. But if any perhaps attend to what I am about to mention, they will find no such trouble in this inquiry. Commonly, when we have looked for some little time at a light, and then shut our eyes, there seem to play before our eyes certain bright colors variously changing themselves, and shining less and less until they wholly cease; and these we must understand to be the remains of that form which was wrought in the sense, while the shining body was seen, and that these variations take place in them as they slowly and step by step fade away. For the lattices, too, of windows, should we happen to be gazing at them, appear often in these colors; so that it is evident that our sense is affected by such impressions from that thing which is seen. That form therefore existed also while we were seeing, and at that time it was more clear and express. But it was then closely joined with the species of that thing which was being perceived, so that it could not be at all distinguished from it; and this was vision itself. Why, even when the little flame of a lamp is in some way, as it were, doubled by the divergent rays of the eyes, a twofold vision comes to pass, although the thing which is seen is one. For the same rays, as they shoot forth each from its own eye, are affected severally, in that they are not allowed to meet evenly and conjointly, in regarding that corporeal thing, so that one combined view might be formed from both. And so, if we shut one eye, we shall not see two flames, but one as it really is. But why, if we shut the left eye, that appearance ceases to be seen, which was on the right; and if, in turn, we shut the right eye, that drops out of existence which was on the left, is a matter both tedious in itself, and not necessary at all to our present subject to inquire and discuss. For it is enough for the business in hand to consider, that unless some image, precisely like the thing we perceive, were produced in our sense, the appearance of the flame would not be doubled according to the number of the eyes; since a certain way of perceiving has been employed, which could separate the union of rays. Certainly nothing that is really single can be seen as if it were double by one eye, draw it down, or press, or distort it as you please, if the other is shut.

5. The case then being so, let us remember how these three things, although diverse in nature, are tempered together into a kind of unity; that is, the form of the body which is seen, and the image of it impressed on the sense, which is vision or sense informed, and the will of the mind which applies the sense to the sensible thing, and retains the vision itself in it. The first of these, that is, the visible thing itself, does not belong to the nature of the living being, except when we discern our own body. But the second belongs to that nature to this extent, that it is wrought in the body, and through the body in the soul; for it is wrought in the sense, which is neither without the body nor without the soul. But the third is of the soul alone, because it is the will. Although then the substances of these three are so different, yet they coalesce into such a unity that the two former can scarcely be distinguished, even with the intervention of the reason as judge, namely the form of the body which is seen, and the image of it which is wrought in the sense, that is, vision. And the will so powerfully combines these two, as both to apply the sense, in order to be informed, to that thing which is perceived, and to retain it when informed in that thing. And if it is so vehement that it can be called love, or desire, or lust, it vehemently affects also the rest of the body of the living being; and where a duller and harder matter does not resist, changes it into like shape and color. One may see the little body of a chameleon vary with ready change, according to the colors which it sees. And in the case of other animals, since their grossness of flesh does not easily admit change, the offspring, for the most part, betray the particular fancies of the mothers, whatever it is that they have beheld with special delight. For the more tender, and so to say, the more formable, are the primary seeds, the more effectually and capably they follow the bent of the soul of the mother, and the phantasy that is wrought in it through that body, which it has greedily beheld. Abundant instances might be adduced, but one is sufficient, taken from the most trustworthy books; viz. what Jacob did, that the sheep and goats might give birth to offspring of various colors, by placing variegated rods before them in the troughs of water for them to look at as they drank, at the time they had conceived.723    Gen. xxx. 37–41

CAPUT II.

2. Trinitas quaedam in visione. Tria quae in visione sunt, natura sua differre. Quomodo ex re visibili gignatur visio, seu imago ejus rei quae videtur. Exemplo clarius res demonstratur. Quomodo tria illa in unum coeunt. Cum igitur aliquod corpus videmus, haec tria, quod facillimum est, consideranda sunt et dignoscenda. Primo, ipsa res quam videmus, sive lapidem, sive aliquam flammam, sive quid aliud quod videri oculis potest; quod utique jam esse poterat, et antequam videretur: deinde, visio, quae non erat priusquam rem illam objectam sensui sentiremus: tertio, quod in ea re quae videtur, quamdiu videtur sensum detinet oculorum, id est, animi intentio. In his igitur tribus, non solum est manifesta distinctio, sed etiam discreta natura. Primum quippe illud corpus visibile longe alterius naturae est, quam sensus oculorum, quo sibimet incidente fit visio. Ipsaque visio quid aliud, quam sensus ex ea re quae sentitur informatus apparet? Quamvis re visibili detracta nulla sit, nec ulla omnino esse possit talis visio, si corpus non sit quod videri queat: nullo modo tamen ejusdem substantiae est corpus quo formatur sensus oculorum, cum idem corpus videtur, et ipsa forma quae ab eodem imprimitur sensui, quae visio vocatur. Corpus enim visum in sua natura separabile est: sensus autem qui jam erat in animante, etiam priusquam videret quod videre posset, cum in aliquid visibile incurreret, vel visio quae fit in sensu ex visibili corpore, cum jam conjunctum est et videtur; sensus ergo vel visio, id est sensus formatus extrinsecus ad animantis naturam pertinet, omnino aliam quam est illud corpus quod videndo sentimus, quo sensus non ita formatur ut sensus sit, sed ut visio sit. Nam sensus et ante objectum rei sensibilis nisi esset in nobis, non distaremus a caecis, dum nihil videmus, sive in tenebris, sive clausis luminibus. Hoc autem distamus, quod nobis inest et non videntibus, quo videre possimus, qui sensus vocatur: illis vero non 0986 inest; nec aliunde, nisi quod eo carent, caeci appellantur. Itemque illa animi intentio, quae in ea re quam videmus sensum tenet, atque utrumque conjungit, non tantum ab ea re visibili natura differt; quandoquidem iste animus, illud corpus est: sed ab ipso quoque sensu atque visione: quoniam solius animi est haec intentio: sensus autem oculorum non ob aliud sensus corporis dicitur, nisi quia et ipsi oculi membra sunt corporis: et quamvis non sentiat corpus exanime, anima tamen commixta corpori per instrumentum sentit corporeum, et idem instrumentum sensus vocatur. Qui etiam passione corporis, cum quisque excaecatur, interceptus exstinguitur, cum idem maneat animus, et ejus intentio, luminibus amissis, non habeat quidem sensum corporis quem videndo extrinsecus corpori adjungat atque in eo viso figat aspectum, nisu tamen ipso indicet se adempto corporis sensu, nec perire potuisse, nec minui. Manet enim quidam videndi appetitus integer, sive id possit fieri, sive non possit. Haec igitur tria, corpus quod videtur, et ipsa visio, et quae utrumque conjungit intentio, manifesta sunt ad dignoscendum, non solum propter propria singulorum, verum etiam propter differentiam naturarum.

3. Atque in his cum sensus non procedat ex corpore illo quod videtur, sed ex corpore sentientis animantis, cui anima suo quodam miro modo contemperatur: tamen ex corpore quod videtur gignitur visio, id est, sensus ipse formatur; ut jam non tantum sensus qui etiam in tenebris esse integer potest, dum est incolumitas oculorum, sed etiam sensus informatus sit, quae visio vocatur. Gignitur ergo ex re visibili visio, sed non ex sola, nisi adsit et videns. Quocirca ex visibili et vidente gignitur visio, ita sane ut ex vidente sit sensus oculorum, et aspicientis atque intuentis intentio: illa tamen informatio sensus, quae visio dicitur, a solo imprimatur corpore quod videtur, id est, a re aliqua visibili: qua detracta, nulla remanet forma quae inerat sensui, dum adesset illud quod videbatur: sensus tamen ipse remanet qui erat et priusquam aliquid sentiretur; velut in aqua vestigium tamdiu est, donec ipsum corpus quod imprimitur inest; quo ablato nullum erit, cum remaneat aqua, quae erat et antequam illam formam corporis caperet. Ideoque non possumus quidem dicere quod sensum gignat res visibilis: gignit tamen formam velut similitudinem suam, quae fit in sensu, cum aliquid videndo sentimus. Sed formam corporis quod videmus, et formam quae ab illa in sensu videntis fit, per eumdem sensum non discernimus; quoniam tanta conjunctio est, ut non pateat discernendi locus. Sed ratione colligimus nequaquam nos potuisse sentire, nisi fieret in sensu nostro aliqua similitudo conspecti corporis. Neque enim cum annulus cerae imprimitur, ideo nulla imago facta est, quia non discernitur, nisi cum fuerit separata. Sed quoniam post ceram separatam manet quod factum est ut videri possit, propterea facile persuadetur, quod inerat jam cerae forma impressa ex annulo et antequam ab illa separaretur. Si autem liquido 0987 humori adjungeretur annulus, eo detracto nihil imaginis appareret: nec ideo tamen discernere ratio non deberet, fuisse in illo humore, antequam detraheretur, annuli formam factam ex annulo, quae distinguenda est ab ea forma quae in annulo est, unde ista facta est quae detracto annulo non erit, quamvis illa in annulo maneat unde ista facta est. Sic sensus oculorum non ideo non habet imaginem corporis quod videtur quamdiu videtur, quia eo detracto non remanet. Ac per hoc tardioribus ingeniis difficillime persuaderi potest, formari in sensu nostro imaginem rei visibilis, cum eam videmus, et eamdem formam esse visionem.

4. Sed qui forte adverterint quod commemorabo, non ita in hac inquisitione laborabunt. Plerumque cum diuscule attenderimus quaeque luminaria, et deinde oculos clauserimus, quasi versantur in conspectu quidam lucidi colores varie sese commutantes, et minus minusque fulgentes, donec omnino desistant: quos intelligendum est reliquias esse formae illius quae facta erat in sensu, cum corpus lucidum videretur, paulatimque et quodam modo gradatim deficiendo variari. Nam et insertarum fenestrarum cancelli, si eos forte intuebamur, saepe in illis apparuere coloribus: ut manifestum sit, hanc affectionem nostro sensui ex ea re quae videbatur impressam. Erat ergo etiam cum videremus, et illa erat clarior et expressior; sed multum conjuncta cum specie rei ejus quae cernebatur, ut discerni omnino non posset; et ipsa erat visio. Quin etiam cum lucernae flammula modo quodam divaricatis radiis oculorum quasi geminatur, duae visiones fiunt, cum sit res una quae videtur. Singillatim quippe afficiuntur idem radii de suo quisque oculo emicantes, dum non sinuntur in illud corpus intuendum pariter conjuncteque concurrere, ut unus fiat ex utroque contuitus. Et ideo si unum oculum clauserimus, non geminum ignem, sed sicuti est unum videbimus. Cur autem sinistro clauso illa species desinit videri quae ad dextrum erat, vicissimque dextro clauso illa intermoritur quae ad sinistrum erat, et longum est et rei praesenti non necessarium modo quaerere atque disserere. Quod enim ad susceptam quaestionem satis est; nisi fieret in sensu nostro quaedam imago simillima rei ejus quam cernimus, non secundum oculorum numerum flammae species geminaretur, cum quidam cernendi modus adhibitus fuerit, qui possit concursum separare radiorum. Ex uno quippe oculo quolibet modo deducto, aut impresso, aut intorto, si alter clausus est, dupliciter videri aliquid quod sit unum nullo pacto potest.

5. Quae cum ita sint, tria haec quamvis diversa natura, quemadmodum in quamdam unitatem contemperentur meminerimus; id est, species corporis quae videtur, et impressa ejus imago sensui quod est visio sensusve formatus, et voluntas animi quae rei sensibili sensum admovet, in eoque ipsam visionem tenet. 0988 Horum primum, id est, res ipsa visibilis non pertinet ad animantis naturam, nisi cum corpus nostrum cernimus. Alterum autem ita pertinet, ut in corpore fiat, et per corpus in anima: fit enim in sensu, qui neque sine corpore est, neque sine anima. Tertium vero solius animae est, quia voluntas est. Cum igitur horum trium tam diversae substantiae sint, tamen in tantam coeunt unitatem, ut duo priora vix intercedente judice ratione discerni valeant, species videlicet corporis quod videtur, et imago ejus quae fit in sensu, id est, visio. Voluntas autem tantam vim habet copulandi haec duo, ut et sensum formandum admoveat ei rei quae cernitur, et in ea formatum teneat. Et si tam violenta est, ut possit vocari amor, aut cupiditas, aut libido, etiam caeterum corpus animantis vehementer afficit: et ubi non resistit pigrior duriorque materies, in similem speciem coloremque commutat. Licet videre corpusculum chamaeleontis ad colores quos videt facillima conversione variari. Aliorum autem animalium quia non est ad conversionem facilis corpulentia, fetus plerumque produnt libidines matrum, quid cum magna delectatione conspexerint. Quam enim teneriora, atque, ut ita dixerim, formabiliora sunt primordia seminum, tam efficaciter et capaciter sequuntur intentionem maternae animae, et quae in ea facta est phantasiam per corpus quod cupide aspexit. Sunt exempla quae copiose commemorari possint: sed unum sufficit de fidelissimis Libris, quod fecit Jacob, ut oves et caprae varios coloribus parerent, supponendo eis variata virgulta in canalibus aquarum, quae potantes intuerentur eo tempore quo conceperant (Gen. XXX, 37-41).