On Lying.

 1. There is a great question about Lying, which often arises in the midst of our every day business, and gives us much trouble, that we may not either

 2. Setting aside, therefore, jokes, which have never been accounted lies, seeing they bear with them in the tone of voice, and in the very mood of the

 3. For which purpose we must see what a lie is. For not every one who says a false thing lies, if he believes or opines that to be true which he says.

 4. But it may be a very nice question whether in the absence of all will to deceive, lying is altogether absent. Thus, put the case that a person shal

 5. But whether a lie be at some times useful, is a much greater and more concerning question. Whether, as above, it be a lie, when a person has no wil

 6. On the other hand, those who say that we must never lie, plead much more strongly, using first the Divine authority, because in the very Decalogue

 7. Neither do they confess that they are awed by those citations from the Old Testament which are alleged as examples of lies: for there, every incide

 8. For this reason, from the books of the New Testament, except the figurative pre-significations used by our Lord, if thou consider the life and mann

 9. But if no authority for lying can be alleged, neither from the ancient Books, be it because that is not a lie which is received to have been done o

 10. As concerning purity of body here indeed a very honorable regard seems to come in the way, and to demand a lie in its behalf to wit, that if the

 11. But if any man supposes that the reason why it is right for a person to tell a lie for another is, that he may live the while, or not be offended

 12. Thus has the question been on both sides considered and treated and still it is not easy to pass sentence: but we must further lend diligent hear

 13. In which proposition these points may well deserve to be questioned: whether such consent is to be accounted as a deed: or whether that is to be c

 14. “How,” sayest thou, “is it not his doing as well as theirs, when they would not do this, if he would do that?” Why, at this rate we go housebreaki

 15. The whole stress, then, of this question comes to this whether it be true universally that no sin of another, committed upon thee, is to be imput

 16. Or, are some lies, also, to be excepted, so that it were better to suffer this than to commit those? If so, then not every thing that is done in o

 17. But yet if the option were proposed to the man who chose to burn incense to idols rather than yield his body to abominable lust, that, if he wishe

 18. This being from the very first and most firmly established, touching other lies the question proceeds more securely. But by consequence we must al

 19. These sorts of lies having been without any hesitation condemned, next follows a sort, as it were by steps rising to something better, which is co

 20. But haply some may think that there is an exception to be added that there be some honest lies which not only hurt no man, but profit some man, e

 21. If this be absurd, what shall we say? Is it so, that there is no “false witness,” but when one tells a lie either to invent a crime against some m

 22. What then, if a homicide seek refuge with a Christian, or if he see where the homicide have taken refuge, and be questioned of this matter by him

 23. This did a former Bishop of the Church of Thagasta, Firmus by name, and even more firm in will. For, when he was asked by command of the emperor,

 24. But one sometimes comes to a case of this kind, that we are not interrogated where the person is who is sought, nor forced to betray him, if he is

 25. For first to be eschewed is that capital lie and far to be fled from, which is done in doctrine of religion to which lie a man ought by no consid

 26. Touching which matter, there will be some place open for consideration, if first the divine authorities which forbid a lie be diligently discussed

 27. As, when we read in the Gospel, “Thou hast received a blow in the face, make ready the other cheek.” Now as an example of patience can none be fou

 28. It is also written, “But I say unto you, Swear not at all.” But the Apostle himself has used oaths in his Epistles. And so he shows how that is to

 29. As that, “Take no thought for the morrow,” and, “Take therefore no thought what ye shall eat, or what ye shall drink, or what ye shall put on.” No

 30. Moreover, it was said to the Apostles that they should take nothing with them for their journey, but should live by the Gospel. And in a certain p

 31. Thus then what is written, “The mouth that lieth, slayeth the soul ” of what mouth it speaketh, is the question. For in general when the Scripture

 32. Manifestly also in the Gospel we find the mouth of the heart: so that in one place the Lord is found to have mentioned the mouth both of the body

 33. But, like as it is asked of what mouth the Scripture saith, “The mouth that lieth, slayeth the soul,” so it may be asked, of what lie. For it seem

 34. For what is written in another place, “Wish not to use every lie ” they say is not of force for this, that a person is not to use any lie. Therefo

 35. Moreover what is written “Thou wilt destroy all that speak leasing:” one saith that no lie is here excepted, but all condemned. Another saith: Yea

 36. For, concerning false witness, which is set down in the ten commands of the Law, it can indeed in no wise be contended that love of truth may at h

 37. Likewise, touching that which is written, “A son which receiveth the word shall be far from destruction: but receiving, he receiveth it for himsel

 38. Certain it is, albeit all this disputation go from side to side, some asserting that it is never right to lie, and to this effect reciting divine

 39. And all these sins, truly, whether such whereby an injury is done to men in the comforts of this life, or whereby men corrupt themselves and hurt

 40. Now the things which are to be kept safe for sanctity’s sake are these: pudicity of body, and chastity of soul, and verity of doctrine. Pudicity o

 41. There resulteth then from all these this sentence, that a lie which doth not violate the doctrine of piety, nor piety itself, nor innocence, nor b

 42. It clearly appears then, all being discussed, that those testimonies of Scripture have none other meaning than that we must never at all tell a li

 43. So great blindness, moreover, hath occupied men’s minds, that to them it is too little if we pronounce some lies not to be sins but they must nee

19. These sorts of lies having been without any hesitation condemned, next follows a sort, as it were by steps rising to something better, which is commonly attributed to well-meaning and good people, when the person who lies not only does no harm to another, but even benefits somebody. Now it is on this sort of lies that the whole dispute turns, whether that person does harm to himself, who benefits another in such sort as to act contrary to the truth. Or, if that alone may be called truth which illustrateth the very minds of men with an intimate and incommutable light, at least he acts contrary to some true thing, because although the bodily senses are deceived, yet he acts contrary to a true thing who says that a thing is so or not so, whereof neither his mind nor senses nor his opinion or belief giveth him any report. Whether therefore he does not hurt himself in so profiting another, or in that compensation not hurt himself in which he profiteth the other, is a great question. If it be so, it should follow that he ought to profit himself by a lie which damages no man. But these things hang together, and if you concede that point, it necessarily draws in its train some very embarrassing consequences. For should it be asked, what harm it does to a person rolling in superfluous wealth, if from countless thousands of bushels of wheat he lose one bushel, which bushel may be profitable as necessary food to the person stealing it; it will follow that theft also may be committed without blame, and false witness borne without sin. Than which, what can be mentioned more perverse? Or truly, if another had stolen the bushel, and thou sawest it done, and wert questioned, wouldest thou tell a lie with honesty for the poor man, and if thou do it for thine own poverty wilt thou be blamed? As if it were thy duty to love another more than thyself. Both then are disgraceful, and must be avoided.

CAPUT XII.

19. Mendacium quod et nulli obest et alicui prodest an adhibendum. An mendacia quaedam honesta, quae nonnulli prosunt et nulli obsunt. Mentiri annon semper sit falsum testimonium dicere. Istis generibus sine ulla dubitatione damnatis, sequitur genus mendacii tanquam gradatim ad meliora surgentibus, quod benevolis et bonis vulgo tribui solet, cum ille qui mentitur, non solum alteri non obest, sed etiam prodest alicui. De isto genere est tota contentio, utrumne sibi obsit, qui sic prodest alteri, ut faciat contra veritatem. Aut si veritas illa sola dicenda est, quae ipsas mentes intimo atque incommutabili lumine illustrat; facit certe contra aliquod verum, quia etsi falluntur corporis sensus, contra verum tamen facit, qui dicit aliquid ita esse, vel non ita, quod ei nec 0502 mens nec sensus nec opinatio sua fidesve renuntiat. Utrum ergo non sibi obsit, qui hoc modo alteri prodest; an illa compensatione non obsit sibi, qua prodest alteri, magna quaestio est. Si ita est, consequenter etiam sibi prodesse debet per mendacium quod nulli obest. Sed ea connexa sunt, et istis concessis necessario trahuntur quae multum conturbant. Si enim quaeratur quid obsit homini copiis superfluis redundanti, si de innumeris millibus frumentorum amittat unum modium, qui tamen modius possit ad necessarium victum prodesse furanti; consequens erit ut et furtum sine reprehensione fieri possit, et falsum testimonium sine peccato dici. Quo quid dici potest perversius? An vero si alius furatus esset illum modium, et tu videres, interrogatusque esses, mentireris honeste pro paupere, et si id pro tua paupertate facias, culpaberis? quasi amplius alium quam te diligere debeas. Utrumque ergo turpe atque vitandum est.