Augustine of Hippo. On Christian Doctrine

 Book I.

 Chapter 1.—The Interpretation of Scripture Depends on the Discovery and Enunciation of the Meaning, and is to Be Undertaken in Dependence on God’s Aid

 Chapter 2.—What a Thing Is, and What A Sign.

 Chapter 3.—Some Things are for Use, Some for Enjoyment.

 Chapter 4.—Difference of Use and Enjoyment.

 Chapter 5.—The Trinity the True Object of Enjoyment.

 Chapter 6.—In What Sense God is Ineffable.

 Chapter 7.—What All Men Understand by the Term God.

 Chapter 8.—God to Be Esteemed Above All Else, Because He is Unchangeable Wisdom.

 Chapter 9.—All Acknowledge the Superiority of Unchangeable Wisdom to that Which is Variable.

 Chapter 10.—To See God, the Soul Must Be Purified.

 Chapter 11.—Wisdom Becoming Incarnate, a Pattern to Us of Purification.

 Chapter 12.—In What Sense the Wisdom of God Came to Us.

 Chapter 13.—The Word Was Made Flesh.

 Chapter 14.—How the Wisdom of God Healed Man.

 Chapter 15.—Faith is Buttressed by the Resurrection and Ascension of Christ, and is Stimulated by His Coming to Judgment.

 Chapter 16.—Christ Purges His Church by Medicinal Afflictions.

 Chapter 17.—Christ, by Forgiving Our Sins, Opened the Way to Our Home.

 Chapter 18.—The Keys Given to the Church.

 Chapter 19.—Bodily and Spiritual Death and Resurrection.

 Chapter 20.—The Resurrection to Damnation.

 Chapter 21.—Neither Body Nor Soul Extinguished at Death.

 Chapter 22.—God Alone to Be Enjoyed.

 Chapter 23.—Man Needs No Injunction to Love Himself and His Own Body.

 Chapter 24.—No Man Hates His Own Flesh, Not Even Those Who Abuse It.

 Chapter 25.—A Man May Love Something More Than His Body, But Does Not Therefore Hate His Body.

 Chapter 26.—The Command to Love God and Our Neighbor Includes a Command to Love Ourselves.

 Chapter 27.—The Order of Love.

 Chapter 28.—How We are to Decide Whom to Aid.

 Chapter 29.—We are to Desire and Endeavor that All Men May Love God.

 Chapter 30.—Whether Angels are to Be Reckoned Our Neighbors.

 Chapter 31.—God Uses Rather Than Enjoys Us.

 Chapter 32.—In What Way God Uses Man.

 Chapter 33.—In What Way Man Should Be Enjoyed.

 Chapter 34.—Christ the First Way to God.

 Chapter 35.—The Fulfillment and End of Scripture is the Love of God and Our Neighbor.

 Chapter 36.—That Interpretation of Scripture Which Builds Us Up in Love is Not Perniciously Deceptive Nor Mendacious, Even Though It Be Faulty.  The I

 Chapter 37.—Dangers of Mistaken Interpretation.

 Chapter 38.—Love Never Faileth.

 Chapter 39.—He Who is Mature in Faith, Hope and Love, Needs Scripture No Longer.

 Chapter 40.—What Manner of Reader Scripture Demands.

 Book II.

 Chapter 1.—Signs, Their Nature and Variety.

 Chapter 2.—Of the Kind of Signs We are Now Concerned with.

 Chapter 3.—Among Signs, Words Hold the Chief Place.

 Chapter 4.—Origin of Writing.

 Chapter 5.—Scripture Translated into Various Languages.

 Chapter 6.—Use of the Obscurities in Scripture Which Arise from Its Figurative Language.

 Chapter 7.—Steps to Wisdom:  First, Fear Second, Piety Third, Knowledge Fourth, Resolution Fifth, Counsel Sixth, Purification of Heart Seventh,

 Chapter 8.—The Canonical Books.

 Chapter 9.—How We Should Proceed in Studying Scripture.

 Chapter 10.—Unknown or Ambiguous Signs Prevent Scripture from Being Understood.

 Chapter 11.—Knowledge of Languages, Especially of Greek and Hebrew, Necessary to Remove Ignorance or Signs.

 Chapter 12.—A Diversity of Interpretations is Useful.  Errors Arising from Ambiguous Words.

 Chapter 13.—How Faulty Interpretations Can Be Emended.

 Chapter 14.—How the Meaning of Unknown Words and Idioms is to Be Discovered.

 Chapter 15.—Among Versions a Preference is Given to the Septuagint and the Itala.

 Chapter 16.—The Knowledge Both of Language and Things is Helpful for the Understanding of Figurative Expressions.

 Chapter 17.—Origin of the Legend of the Nine Muses.

 Chapter 18.—No Help is to Be Despised, Even Though It Come from a Profane Source.

 Chapter 19.—Two Kinds Of Heathen Knowledge.

 Chapter 20.—The Superstitious Nature of Human Institutions.

 Chapter 21.—Superstition of Astrologers.

 Chapter 22 .—The Folly of Observing the Stars in Order to Predict the Events of a Life.

 Chapter 23.—Why We Repudiate Arts of Divination.

 Chapter 24.—The Intercourse and Agreement with Demons Which Superstitious Observances Maintain.

 Chapter 25.—In Human Institutions Which are Not Superstitious, There are Some Things Superfluous and Some Convenient and Necessary.

 Chapter 26.—What Human Contrivances We are to Adopt, and What We are to Avoid.

 Chapter 27.—Some Departments of Knowledge, Not of Mere Human Invention, Aid Us in Interpreting Scripture.

 Chapter 28.—To What Extent History is an Aid.

 Chapter 29.—To What Extent Natural Science is an Exegetical Aid.

 Chapter 30.—What the Mechanical Arts Contribute to Exegetics.

 Chapter 31.—Use of Dialectics.  Of Fallacies.

 Chapter 32.—Valid Logical Sequence is Not Devised But Only Observed by Man.

 Chapter 33.—False Inferences May Be Drawn from Valid Reasonings, and Vice Versa.

 Chapter 34.—It is One Thing to Know the Laws of Inference, Another to Know the Truth of Opinions.

 Chapter 35 .—The Science of Definition is Not False, Though It May Be Applied to Falsities.

 Chapter 36.—The Rules of Eloquence are True, Though Sometimes Used to Persuade Men of What is False.

 Chapter 37.—Use of Rhetoric and Dialectic.

 Chapter 38.—The Science of Numbers Not Created, But Only Discovered, by Man.

 Chapter 39.—To Which of the Above-Mentioned Studies Attention Should Be Given, and in What Spirit.

 Chapter 40.—Whatever Has Been Rightly Said by the Heathen, We Must Appropriate to Our Uses.

 Chapter 41.—What Kind of Spirit is Required for the Study of Holy Scripture.

 Chapter 42.—Sacred Scripture Compared with Profane Authors.

 Book III.

 Chapter 1 .—Summary of the Foregoing Books, and Scope of that Which Follows.

 Chapter 2.—Rule for Removing Ambiguity by Attending to Punctuation.

 Chapter 3.—How Pronunciation Serves to Remove Ambiguity.  Different Kinds of Interrogation.

 Chapter 4.—How Ambiguities May Be Solved.

 Chapter 5.—It is a Wretched Slavery Which Takes the Figurative Expressions of Scripture in a Literal Sense.

 Chapter 6.—Utility of the Bondage of the Jews.

 Chapter 7.—The Useless Bondage of the Gentiles.

 Chapter 8.—The Jews Liberated from Their Bondage in One Way, the Gentiles in Another.

 Chapter 9.—Who is in Bondage to Signs, and Who Not.

 Chapter 10.—How We are to Discern Whether a Phrase is Figurative.

 Chapter 11.—Rule for Interpreting Phrases Which Seem to Ascribe Severity to God and the Saints.

 Chapter 12.—Rule for Interpreting Those Sayings and Actions Which are Ascribed to God and the Saints, and Which Yet Seem to the Unskillful to Be Wicke

 Chapter 13.—Same Subject, Continued.

 Chapter 14.—Error of Those Who Think that There is No Absolute Right and Wrong.

 Chapter 15.—Rule for Interpreting Figurative Expressions.

 Chapter 16.—Rule for Interpreting Commands and Prohibitions.

 Chapter 17.—Some Commands are Given to All in Common, Others to Particular Classes.

 Chapter 18.—We Must Take into Consideration the Time at Which Anything Was Enjoyed or Allowed.

 Chapter 19.—Wicked Men Judge Others by Themselves.

 Chapter 20.—Consistency of Good Men in All Outward Circumstances.

 Chapter 21.—David Not Lustful, Though He Fell into Adultery.

 Chapter 22.—Rule Regarding Passages of Scripture in Which Approval is Expressed of Actions Which are Now Condemned by Good Men.

 Chapter 23.—Rule Regarding the Narrative of Sins of Great Men.

 Chapter 24.—The Character of the Expressions Used is Above All to Have Weight.

 Chapter 25.—The Same Word Does Not Always Signify the Same Thing.

 Chapter 26.—Obscure Passages are to Be Interpreted by Those Which are Clearer.

 Chapter 27.—One Passage Susceptible of Various Interpretations.

 Chapter 28.— It is Safer to Explain a Doubtful Passage by Other Passages of Scripture Than by Reason.

 Chapter 29.—The Knowledge of Tropes is Necessary.

 Chapter 30.—The Rules of Tichonius the Donatist Examined.

 Chapter 31.—The First Rule of Tichonius.

 Chapter 32.—The Second Rule of Tichonius.

 Chapter 33.—The Third Rule of Tichonius.

 Chapter 34.—The Fourth Rule of Tichonius.

 Chapter 35.—The Fifth Rule of Tichonius.

 Chapter 36.—The Sixth Rule of Tichonius.

 Chapter 37.—The Seventh Rule of Tichonius.

 Book IV.

 Chapter 1.—This Work Not Intended as a Treatise on Rhetoric.

 Chapter 2.—It is Lawful for a Christian Teacher to Use the Art of Rhetoric.

 Chapter 3.—The Proper Age and the Proper Means for Acquiring Rhetorical Skill.

 Chapter 4.—The Duty of the Christian Teacher.

 Chapter 5.—Wisdom of More Importance Than Eloquence to the Christian Teacher.

 Chapter 6.—The Sacred Writers Unite Eloquence with Wisdom.

 Chapter 7.—Examples of True Eloquence Drawn from the Epistles of Paul and the Prophecies of Amos.

 Chapter 8.—The Obscurity of the Sacred Writers, Though Compatible with Eloquence, Not to Be Imitated by Christian Teachers.

 Chapter 9.—How, and with Whom, Difficult Passages are to Be Discussed.

 Chapter 10.—The Necessity for Perspicuity of Style.

 Chapter 11.—The Christian Teacher Must Speak Clearly, But Not Inelegantly.

 Chapter 12.—The Aim of the Orator, According to Cicero, is to Teach, to Delight, and to Move.  Of These, Teaching is the Most Essential.

 Chapter 13.—The Hearer Must Be Moved as Well as Instructed.

 Chapter 14.—Beauty of Diction to Be in Keeping with the Matter.

 Chapter 15.—The Christian Teacher Should Pray Before Preaching.

 Chapter 16.—Human Directions Not to Be Despised, Though God Makes the True Teacher.

 Chapter 17.—Threefold Division of The Various Styles of Speech.

 Chapter 18.—The Christian Orator is Constantly Dealing with Great Matters.

 Chapter 19.—The Christian Teacher Must Use Different Styles on Different Occasions.

 Chapter 20.—Examples of the Various Styles Drawn from Scripture.

 Chapter 21.—Examples of the Various Styles, Drawn from the Teachers of the Church, Especially Ambrose and Cyprian.

 Chapter 22.—The Necessity of Variety in Style.

 Chapter 23.—How the Various Styles Should Be Mingled.

 Chapter 24.—The Effects Produced by the Majestic Style.

 Chapter 25.—How the Temperate Style is to Be Used.

 Chapter 26.—In Every Style the Orator Should Aim at Perspicuity, Beauty, and Persuasiveness.

 Chapter 27.—The Man Whose Life is in Harmony with His Teaching Will Teach with Greater Effect.

 Chapter 28.—Truth is More Important Than Expression.  What is Meant by Strife About Words.

 Chapter 29.—It is Permissible for a Preacher to Deliver to the People What Has Been Written by a More Eloquent Man Than Himself.

 Chapter 30.—The Preacher Should Commence His Discourse with Prayer to God.

 Chapter 31.—Apology for the Length of the Work.

Chapter 13.—How Faulty Interpretations Can Be Emended.

19.  But since we do not clearly see what the actual thought is which the several translators endeavor to express, each according to his own ability and judgment, unless we examine it in the language which they translate; and since the translator, if he be not a very learned man, often departs from the meaning of his author, we must either endeavor to get a knowledge of those languages from which the Scriptures are translated into Latin, or we must get hold of the translations of those who keep rather close to the letter of the original, not because these are sufficient, but because we may use them to correct the freedom or the error of others, who in their translations have chosen to follow the sense quite as much as the words.  For not only single words, but often whole phrases are translated, which could not be translated at all into the Latin idiom by any one who wished to hold by the usage of the ancients who spoke Latin.  And though these sometimes do not interfere with the understanding of the passage, yet they are offensive to those who feel greater delight in things when even the signs of those things are kept in their own purity.  For what is called a solecism is nothing else than the putting of words together according to a different rule from that which those of our predecessors who spoke with any authority followed.  For whether we say inter homines (among men) or inter hominibus, is of no consequence to a man who only wishes to know the facts.  And in the same way, what is a barbarism but the pronouncing of a word in a different way from that in which those who spoke Latin before us pronounced it?  For whether the word ignoscere (to pardon) should be pronounced with the third syllable long or short, is not a matter of much concern to the man who is beseeching God, in any way at all that he can get the words out, to pardon his sins.  What then is purity of speech, except the preserving of the custom of language established by the authority of former speakers?

20.  And men are easily offended in a matter of this kind, just in proportion as they are weak; and they are weak just in proportion as they wish to seem learned, not in the knowledge of things which tend to edification, but in that of signs, by which it is hard not to be puffed up,79    Comp. 1 Cor. viii. 1. seeing that the knowledge of things even would often set up our neck, if it were not held down by the yoke of our Master.  For how does it prevent our understanding it to have the following passage thus expressed:  “Quæ est terra in quo isti insidunt super eam, si bona est an nequam; et quæ sunt civitates, in quibus ipsi inhabitant in ipsis?80    “And what the land is that they dwell in, whether it be good or bad; and what cities they be that they dwell in.”— Num. xiii.19 (A.V.).  And I am more disposed to think that this is simply the idiom of another language than that any deeper meaning is intended.  Again, that phrase, which we cannot now take away from the lips of the people who sing it:  “Super ipsum autem floriet sanctificatio mea,”81    “But upon himself shall my holiness flourish.”— Ps. cxxxii. 18 (see LXX.).  “But upon himself shall his crown flourish” (A.V.). surely takes away nothing from the meaning.  Yet a more learned man would prefer that this should be corrected, and that we should say, not floriet, but florebit.  Nor does anything stand in the way of the correction being made, except the usage of the singers.  Mistakes of this kind, then, if a man do not choose to avoid them altogether, it is easy to treat with indifference, as not interfering with a right understanding.  But take, on the other hand, the saying of the apostle:  “Quod stultum est Dei, sapientius est hominibus, et quod infirmum est Dei, fortius est hominibus.”82    “Because the foolishness of God is wiser than men, and the weakness of God is stronger than men” (1 Cor. i. 25).  If any one should retain in this passage the Greek idiom, and say, “Quod stultum est Dei, sapientius est hominum et quod infirmum est Dei fortius est hominum,”83    “What is foolish of God is wiser of men, and what is weak of God is stronger of men.” a quick and careful reader would indeed by an effort attain to the true meaning, but still a man of slower intelligence either would not understand it at all, or would put an utterly false construction upon it.  For not only is such a form of speech faulty in the Latin tongue, but it is ambiguous too, as if the meaning might be, that the folly of men or the weakness of men is wiser or stronger than that of God.  But indeed even the expression sapientius est hominibus (stronger than men) is not free from ambiguity, even though it be free from solecism.  For whether hominibus is put as the plural of the dative or as the plural of the ablative, does not appear, unless by reference to the meaning.  It would be better then to say, sapientius est quam homines, and fortius est quam homines.

CAPUT XIII. Interpretationis vitium unde emendari possit.

19. Sed quoniam et quae sit ipsa sententia, quam plures interpretes pro sua quisque facultate atque judicio conantur eloqui, non apparet, nisi in ea lingua inspiciatur quam interpretantur; et plerumque a sensu auctoris devius aberrat interpres, si non sit doctissimus: aut linguarum illarum, ex quibus in latinam Scriptura pervenit, petenda cognitio est; aut habendae interpretationes eorum qui se verbis nimis obstrinxerunt; non quia sufficiunt, sed ut ex eis veritas vel error detegatur aliorum , qui non magis verba quam sententias interpretando sequi maluerunt. Nam non solum verba singula, sed etiam locutiones saepe transferuntur, quae omnino in latinae linguae usum, si quis consuetudinem veterum qui latine locuti sunt, tenere voluerit, transire non possunt. Quae aliquando intellectui nihil adimunt, sed offendunt tamen eos qui plus delectantur rebus, cum etiam in earum signis sua quaedam servatur integritas. Nam soloecismus qui dicitur, nihil aliud est quam cum verba non ea lege sibi coaptantur, qua coaptaverunt qui priores nobis non sine auctoritate aliqua locuti sunt. Utrum enim Inter homines, an, Inter hominibus dicatur, ad rerum non pertinet cognitorem. Item barbarismus quid aliud est, nisi verbum non eis litteris vel sono enuntiatum, quo ab eis qui latine ante nos locuti sunt, enuntiari solet? Utrum enim Ignoscere producta an correpta tertia syllaba dicatur, non multum curat qui peccatis suis Deum ut ignoscat petit, quolibet modo illud verbum sonare potuerit. Quid est ergo integritas locutionis, nisi alienae consuetudinis conservatio, loquentium veterum auctoritate firmatae.

20. Sed tamen eo magis inde offenduntur homines, quo infirmiores sunt; et eo sunt infirmiores, quo doctiores videri volunt, non rerum scientia qua aedificamur, 0045 sed signorum qua non inflari omnino difficile est, cum et ipsa rerum scientia saepe cervicem erigat, nisi dominico reprimatur jugo. Quid enim obest intellectori, quod ita scriptum est: Quae est terra in qua isti insidunt super eam, si bona est an nequam; et quae sunt civitates in quibus ipsi inhabitant in ipsis (Num. XIII, 20)? Quam locutionem magis alienae linguae esse arbitror, quam sensum aliquem altiorem. Illud etiam quod jam auferre non possumus de ore cantantium populorum, Super ipsum autem floriet sanctificatio mea (Psal. CXXXI, 18), nihil profecto sententiae detrahit: auditor tamen peritior mallet hoc corrigi, ut non floriet, sed florebit diceretur; nec quidquam impedit correctionem, nisi consuetudo cantantium. Ista ergo facile etiam contemni possunt, si quis ea cavere noluerit, quae sano intellectui nihil detrahunt. At vero illud quod ait Apostolus, Quod stultum est Dei, sapientius est hominibus; et quod infirmum est Dei, fortius est hominibus (I Cor. I, 25): si quis in eo graecam locutionem servare voluisset, ut diceret, Quod stultum est Dei, sapientius est hominum; et quod infirmum est Dei, fortius est hominum; iret quidem vigilantis lectoris intentio in sententiae veritatem, sed tamen aliquis tardior aut non intelligeret, aut etiam perverse intelligeret. Non enim tantum vitiosa locutio est in latina lingua talis, verum et in ambiguitatem cadit; ut quasi hominum stultum vel hominum infirmum sapientius vel fortius videatur esse quam Dei. Quanquam et illud, sapientius est hominibus, non caret ambiguo, etiamsi soloecismo caret. Utrum enim his hominibus ab eo quod est, Huic homini; an his hominibus ab eo quod est, Ab hoc homine, dictum sit, non apparet nisi illuminatione sententiae. Melius itaque dicitur, Sapientius est quam homines, et fortius est quam homines.