Against Eunomius.

 Contents of Book I.

 Contents of Book II.

 Contents of Book III.

 Contents of Book IV.

 Contents of Book V.

 Contents of Book VI.

 Contents of Book VII.

 Contents of Book VIII.

 Contents of Book IX.

 Contents of Book X.

 Contents of Book XI.

 Contents of Book XII.

 §1. Preface.—It is useless to attempt to benefit those who will not accept help.

 §2. We have been justly provoked to make this Answer, being stung by Eunomius’ accusations of our brother.

 §3. We see nothing remarkable in logical force in the treatise of Eunomius, and so embark on our Answer with a just confidence.

 §4. Eunomius displays much folly and fine writing, but very little seriousness about vital points.

 §5. His peculiar caricature of the bishops, Eustathius of Armenia and Basil of Galatia, is not well drawn.

 §6. A notice of Aetius, Eunomius’ master in heresy, and of Eunomius himself, describing the origin and avocations of each.

 §7. Eunomius himself proves that the confession of faith which He made was not impeached.

 §8. Facts show that the terms of abuse which he has employed against Basil are more suitable for himself.

 §9. In charging Basil with not defending his faith at the time of the ‘Trials,’ he lays himself open to the same charge.

 §10. All his insulting epithets are shewn by facts to be false.

 §11. The sophistry which he employs to prove our acknowledgment that he had been tried, and that the confession of his faith had not been unimpeached,

 §12. His charge of cowardice is baseless: for Basil displayed the highest courage before the Emperor and his Lord-Lieutenants.

 §13. Résumé of his dogmatic teaching. Objections to it in detail.

 §14. He did wrong, when mentioning the Doctrines of Salvation, in adopting terms of his own choosing instead of the traditional terms Father, Son, and

 §15. He does wrong in making the being of the Father alone proper and supreme, implying by his omission of the Son and the Spirit that theirs is impro

 §16. Examination of the meaning of ‘subjection:’ in that he says that the nature of the Holy Spirit is subject to that of the Father and the Son. It i

 §17. Discussion as to the exact nature of the ‘energies’ which, this man declares, ‘follow’ the being of the Father and of the Son.

 §18. He has no reason for distinguishing a plurality of beings in the Trinity. He offers no demonstration that it is so.

 §19. His acknowledgment that the Divine Being is ‘single’ is only verbal.

 §20. He does wrong in assuming, to account for the existence of the Only-Begotten, an ‘energy’ that produced Christ’s Person.

 §21. The blasphemy of these heretics is worse than the Jewish unbelief.

 §22. He has no right to assert a greater and less in the Divine being. A systematic statement of the teaching of the Church.

 §23. These doctrines of our Faith witnessed to and confirmed by Scripture passages .

 §24. His elaborate account of degrees and differences in ‘works’ and ‘energies’ within the Trinity is absurd .

 §25. He who asserts that the Father is ‘prior’ to the Son with any thought of an interval must perforce allow that even the Father is not without begi

 §26. It will not do to apply this conception, as drawn out above, of the Father and Son to the Creation, as they insist on doing: but we must contempl

 §27. He falsely imagines that the same energies produce the same works, and that variation in the works indicates variation in the energies.

 §28. He falsely imagines that we can have an unalterable series of harmonious natures existing side by side.

 §29. He vainly thinks that the doubt about the energies is to be solved by the beings, and reversely.

 §30. There is no Word of God that commands such investigations: the uselessness of the philosophy which makes them is thereby proved.

 §31. The observations made by watching Providence are sufficient to give us the knowledge of sameness of Being.

 §32. His dictum that ‘the manner of the likeness must follow the manner of the generation’ is unintelligible.

 §33. He declares falsely that ‘the manner of the generation is to be known from the intrinsic worth of the generator’.

 §34. The Passage where he attacks the ‘ Ομοούσιον , and the contention in answer to it.

 §35. Proof that the Anomœan teaching tends to Manichæism.

 §36. A passing repetition of the teaching of the Church.

 §37. Defence of S. Basil’s statement, attacked by Eunomius, that the terms ‘Father’ and ‘The Ungenerate’ can have the same meaning .

 §38. Several ways of controverting his quibbling syllogisms .

 §39. Answer to the question he is always asking, “Can He who is be begotten?”

 §40. His unsuccessful attempt to be consistent with his own statements after Basil has confuted him.

 §41. The thing that follows is not the same as the thing that it follows.

 §42. Explanation of ‘Ungenerate,’ and a ‘study’ of Eternity.

 Book II

 Book II.

 §2. Gregory then makes an explanation at length touching the eternal Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.

 §3. Gregory proceeds to discuss the relative force of the unnameable name of the Holy Trinity and the mutual relation of the Persons, and moreover the

 §4. He next skilfully confutes the partial, empty and blasphemous statement of Eunomius on the subject of the absolutely existent.

 §5. He next marvellously overthrows the unintelligible statements of Eunomius which assert that the essence of the Father is not separated or divided,

 §6. He then shows the unity of the Son with the Father and Eunomius’ lack of understanding and knowledge in the Scriptures.

 §7. Gregory further shows that the Only-Begotten being begotten not only of the Father, but also impassibly of the Virgin by the Holy Ghost, does not

 §8. He further very appositely expounds the meaning of the term “Only-Begotten,” and of the term “First born,” four times used by the Apostle.

 §9. Gregory again discusses the generation of the Only-Begotten, and other different modes of generation, material and immaterial, and nobly demonstra

 §10. He explains the phrase “The Lord created Me,” and the argument about the origination of the Son, the deceptive character of Eunomius’ reasoning,

 §11. After expounding the high estate of the Almighty, the Eternity of the Son, and the phrase “being made obedient,” he shows the folly of Eunomius i

 §12. He thus proceeds to a magnificent discourse of the interpretation of “Mediator,” “Like,” “Ungenerate,” and “generate,” and of “The likeness and s

 §13. He expounds the passage of the Gospel, “The Father judgeth no man,” and further speaks of the assumption of man with body and soul wrought by the

 §14. He proceeds to discuss the views held by Eunomius, and by the Church, touching the Holy Spirit and to show that the Father, the Son, and the Hol

 §15. Lastly he displays at length the folly of Eunomius, who at times speaks of the Holy Spirit as created, and as the fairest work of the Son, and at

 Book III

 Book III.

 §2. He then once more excellently, appropriately, and clearly examines and expounds the passage, “The Lord Created Me.”

 §3. He then shows, from the instance of Adam and Abel, and other examples, the absence of alienation of essence in the case of the “generate” and “ung

 §4. He thus shows the oneness of the Eternal Son with the Father the identity of essence and the community of nature (wherein is a natural inquiry int

 §5. He discusses the incomprehensibility of the Divine essence, and the saying to the woman of Samaria, “Ye worship ye know not what.”

 §6. Thereafter he expounds the appellation of “Son,” and of “product of generation,” and very many varieties of “sons,” of God, of men, of rams, of pe

 §7. Then he ends the book with an exposition of the Divine and Human names of the Only-Begotten, and a discussion of the terms “generate” and “ungener

 Book IV

 Book IV.

 §2. He convicts Eunomius of having used of the Only-begotten terms applicable to the existence of the earth, and thus shows that his intention is to p

 §3. He then again admirably discusses the term πρωτότοκος as it is four times employed by the Apostle.

 §4. He proceeds again to discuss the impassibility of the Lord’s generation and the folly of Eunomius, who says that the generated essence involves t

 §5. He again shows Eunomius, constrained by truth, in the character of an advocate of the orthodox doctrine, confessing as most proper and primary, no

 §6. He then exposes argument about the “Generate,” and the “product of making,” and “product of creation,” and shows the impious nature of the languag

 §7. He then clearly and skilfully criticises the doctrine of the impossibility of comparison with the things made after the Son, and exposes the idola

 §8. He proceeds to show that there is no “variance” in the essence of the Father and the Son: wherein he expounds many forms of variation and harmony,

 §9. Then, distinguishing between essence and generation, he declares the empty and frivolous language of Eunomius to be like a rattle. He proceeds to

 Book V

 Book V.

 §2. He then explains the phrase of S. Peter, “Him God made Lord and Christ.” And herein he sets forth the opposing statement of Eunomius, which he mad

 §3. A remarkable and original reply to these utterances, and a demonstration of the power of the Crucified, and of the fact that this subjection was o

 §4. He shows the falsehood of Eunomius’ calumnious charge that the great Basil had said that “man was emptied to become man,” and demonstrates that th

 §5. Thereafter he shows that there are not two Christs or two Lords, but one Christ and one Lord, and that the Divine nature, after mingling with the

 Book VI

 Book VI.

 §2. Then he again mentions S. Peter’s word, “made,” and the passage in the Epistle to the Hebrews, which says that Jesus was made by God “an Apostle a

 §3. He then gives a notable explanation of the saying of the Lord to Philip, “He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father ” and herein he excellently di

 §4. Then returning to the words of Peter, “God made Him Lord and Christ,” he skilfully explains it by many arguments, and herein shows Eunomius as an

 Book VII

 Book VII.

 §2. He then declares that the close relation between names and things is immutable, and thereafter proceeds accordingly, in the most excellent manner,

 §3. Thereafter he discusses the divergence of names and of things, speaking, of that which is ungenerate as without a cause, and of that which is non-

 §4. He says that all things that are in creation have been named by man, if, as is the case, they are called differently by every nation, as also the

 §5. After much discourse concerning the actually existent, and ungenerate and good, and upon the consubstantiality of the heavenly powers, showing the

 Book VIII

 Book VIII.

 §2. He then discusses the “willing” of the Father concerning the generation of the Son, and shows that the object of that good will is from eternity,

 §3. Then, thus passing over what relates to the essence of the Son as having been already discussed, he treats of the sense involved in “generation,”

 §4. He further shows the operations of God to be expressed by human illustrations for what hands and feet and the other parts of the body with which

 §5. Then, after showing that the Person of the Only-begotten and Maker of things has no beginning, as have the things that were made by Him, as Eunomi

 Book IX

 Book IX.

 §2. He then ingeniously shows that the generation of the Son is not according to the phrase of Eunomius, “The Father begat Him at that time when He ch

 §3. He further shows that the pretemporal generation of the Son is not the subject of influences drawn from ordinary and carnal generation, but is wit

 §4. Then, having shown that Eunomius’ calumny against the great Basil, that he called the Only-begotten “Ungenerate,” is false, and having again with

 Book X

 Book X.

 §2. He then wonderfully displays the Eternal Life, which is Christ, to those who confess Him not, and applies to them the mournful lamentation of Jere

 §3. He then shows the eternity of the Son’s generation, and the inseparable identity of His essence with Him that begat Him, and likens the folly of E

 §4. After this he shows that the Son, who truly is, and is in the bosom of the Father, is simple and uncompounded, and that, He Who redeemed us from b

 Book XI

 Book XI.

 §2. He also ingeniously shows from the passage of the Gospel which speaks of “Good Master,” from the parable of the Vineyard, from Isaiah and from Pau

 §3. He then exposes the ignorance of Eunomius, and the incoherence and absurdity of his arguments, in speaking of the Son as “the Angel of the Existen

 §4. After this, fearing to extend his reply to great length, he passes by most of his adversary’s statements as already refuted. But the remainder, fo

 §5. Eunomius again speaks of the Son as Lord and God, and Maker of all creation intelligible and sensible, having received from the Father the power a

 Book XII

 Book XII.

 §2. Then referring to the blasphemy of Eunomius, which had been refuted by the great Basil, where he banished the Only-begotten God to the realm of da

 §3. He further proceeds notably to interpret the language of the Gospel, “In the beginning was the Word,” and “Life” and “Light,” and “The Word was ma

 §4. He then again charges Eunomius with having learnt his term ἀγεννησία from the hieroglyphic writings, and from the Egyptian mythology and idolatry,

 §5. Then, again discussing the true Light and unapproachable Light of the Father and of the Son, special attributes, community and essence, and showin

§35. Proof that the Anomœan teaching tends to Manichæism.

We hear our Lord saying. “I and My Father are one,” and we are taught in that utterance the dependence of our Lord on a cause, and yet the absolute identity of the Son’s and the Father’s nature; we do not let our idea about them be melted down into One Person, but we keep distinct the properties of the Persons, while, on the other hand, not dividing in the Persons the oneness of their substance; and so the supposition of two diverse principles in the category of Cause is avoided, and there is no loophole for the Manichæan heresy to enter. For the created and the uncreate are as diametrically opposed to each other as their names are; and so if the two are to be ranked as First Causes, the mischief of Manichæism will thus under cover be brought into the Church. I say this, because my zeal against our antagonists makes me scrutinize their doctrine very closely. Now I think that none would deny that we were bringing this scrutiny very near the truth, when we said, that if the created be possessed of equal power with the uncreate, there will be some sort of antagonism between these things of diverse nature, and as long as neither of them fails in power, the two will be brought into a certain state of mutual discord for we must perforce allow that will corresponds with, and is intimately joined to nature; and that if two things are unlike in nature, they will be so also in will. But when power is adequate in both, neither will flag in the gratification of its wish; and if the power of each is thus equal to its wish, the primacy will become a doubtful point with the two: and it will end in a drawn battle from the inexhaustibleness of their powers. Thus will the Manichæan heresy creep in, two opposite principles appearing with counter claims in the category of Cause, parted and opposed by reason of difference both in nature and in will. They will find, therefore, that assertion of diminution (in the Divine being) is the beginning of Manichæism; for their teaching organizes a discord within that being, which comes to two leading principles, as our account of it has shewn; namely the created and the uncreated.

But perhaps most will blame this as too strong a reductio ad absurdum, and will wish that we had not put it down at all along with our other objections. Be it so; we will not contradict them. It was not our impulse, but our adversaries themselves, that forced us to carry our argument into such minuteness of results. But if it is not right to argue thus, it was more fitting still that our opponents’ teaching, which gave occasion to such a refutation, should never have been heard. There is only one way of suppressing the answer to bad teaching, and that is, to take away the subject-matter to which a reply has to be made. But what would give me most pleasure would be to advise those, who are thus disposed, to divest themselves a little of the spirit of rivalry, and not be such exceedingly zealous combatants on behalf of the private opinions with which they have become possessed, and convinced that the race is for their (spiritual) life, to attend to its interests only, and to yield the victory to Truth. If, then, one were to cease from this ambitious strife, and look straight into the actual question before us, he would very soon discover the flagrant absurdity of this teaching.

For let us assume as granted what the system of our opponents demands, that the having no generation is Being, and in like manner again that generation is admitted into Being. If, then, one were to follow out carefully these statements in all their meaning, even this way the Manichæan heresy will be reconstructed seeing that the Manichees are wont to take as an axiom the oppositions of good and bad, light and darkness, and all such naturally antagonistic things. I think that any who will not be satisfied with a superficial view of the matter will be convinced that I say true. Let us look at it thus. Every subject has certain inherent characteristics, by means of which the specialty of that underlying nature is known. This is so, whether we are investigating the animal kingdom, or any other. The tree and the animal are not known by the same marks; nor do the characteristics of man extend in the animal kingdom to the brutes; nor, again, do the same symptoms indicate life and death; in every case, without exception, as we have said, the distinction of subjects resists any effort to confuse them and run one into another; the marks upon each thing which we observe cannot be communicated so as to destroy that distinction. Let us follow this out in examining our opponents’ position. They say that the state of having no generation is Being; and they likewise make the having generation Being. But just as a man and a stone have not the same marks (in defining the essence of the animate and that of the inanimate you would not give the same account of each), so they must certainly grant that one who is non-generated is to be known by different signs to the generated. Let us then survey those peculiar qualities of the non-generated Deity, which the Holy Scriptures teach us can be mentioned and thought of, without doing Him an irreverence.

What are they? I think no Christian is ignorant that He is good, kind, holy, just and hallowed, unseen and immortal, incapable of decay and change and alteration, powerful, wise, beneficent, Master, Judge, and everything like that. Why lengthen our discussion by lingering on acknowledged facts? If, then, we find these qualities in the ungenerate nature, and the state of having been generated is contrary127    ὑπεναντίως, i.e. as logical “contraries” differ from each other. This is not an Aristotelian, but a Neo-Platonic use of the word (i.e. Ammonius, a.d. 390, &c.). It occurs so again in this Book frequently. in its very conception to the state of having not been generated, those who define these two states to be each of them Being, must perforce concede, that the characteristic marks of the generated being, following this opposition existing between the generated and non-generated, must be contrary to the marks observable in the non-generated being; for if they were to declare the marks to be the same, this sameness would destroy the difference between the two beings who are the subject of these observations. Differing things must be regarded as possessing differing marks; like things are to be known by like signs. If, then, these men testify to the same marks in the Only-begotten, they can conceive of no difference whatever in the subject of the marks. But if they persist in their blasphemous position, and maintain in asserting the difference of the generated and the non-generated the variation of the natures, it is readily seen what must result: viz., that, as in following out the opposition of the names, the nature of the things which those names indicate must be considered to be in a state of contrariety to itself, there is every necessity that the qualities observed in each should be drawn out opposite each other; so that those qualities should be applied to the Son which are the reverse of those predicated of the Father, viz., of divinity, holiness, goodness, imperishability, eternity, and of every other quality that represents God to the devout mind; in fact, every negation128    ἀπεμφαίνοντα of these, every conception that ranks opposite to the good, must be considered as belonging to the generated nature.

To ensure clearness, we must dwell upon this point. As the peculiar phænomena of heat and cold—which are themselves by nature opposed to each other (let us take fire and ice as examples of each), each being that which the other is not—are at variance with each other, cooling being the peculiarity of ice, heating of fire; so if in accordance with the antithesis expressed by the names, the nature revealed by those names is parted asunder, it is not to be admitted that the faculties attending these natural “subcontraries129    ὑπεναντίων” are like each other, any more than cooling can belong to fire, or burning to ice. If, then, goodness is inseparable from the idea of the non-generated nature, and that nature is parted on the ground of being, as they declare, from the generated nature, the properties of the former will be parted as well from those of the latter: so that if the good is found in the first, the quality set against the good is to be perceived in the last. Thus, thanks to our clever systematizers, Manes lives again with his parallel line of evil in array over against the good, and his theory of opposite powers residing in opposite natures.

Indeed, if we are to speak the truth boldly, without any reserve, Manes, who for having been the first, they say, to venture to entertain the Manichæan view, gave his name to that heresy, may fairly be considered the less offensive of the two. I say this, just as if one had to choose between a viper and an asp for the most affection towards man; still, if we consider, there is some difference between brutes130    πλὴν ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδή ἐστι καὶ ἐν θηριοις κρίοις.. Does not a comparison of doctrines show that those older heretics are less intolerable than these? Manes thought he was pleading on the side of the Origin of Good, when he represented that Evil could derive thence none of its causes; so he linked the chain of things which are on the list of the bad to a separate Principle, in his character of the Almighty’s champion, and in his pious aversion to put the blame of any unjustifiable aberrations upon that Source of Good; not perceiving, with his narrow understanding, that it is impossible even to conceive of God as the fashioner of evil, or on the other hand, of any other First Principle besides Him. There might be a long discussion on this point, but it is beside our present purpose. We mentioned Manes’ statements only in order to show, that he at all events thought it his duty to separate evil from anything to do with God. But the blasphemous error with regard to the Son, which these men systematize, is much more terrible. Like the others, they explain the existence of evil by a contrariety in respect of Being; but when they declare, besides this, that the God of the universe is actually the Maker of this alien production, and say that this “generation” formed by Him into a substance possesses a nature foreign to that of its Maker, they exhibit therein more of impiety than the aforesaid sect; for they not only give a personal existence to that which in its nature is opposed to good, but they say that a Good Deity is the Cause of another Deity who in nature diverges from His; and they all but openly exclaim in their teaching, that there is in existence something opposite to the nature of the good, deriving its personality from the good itself. For when we know the Father’s substance to be good, and therefore find that the Son’s substance, owing to its being unlike the Father’s in its nature (which is the tenet of this heresy), is amongst the contrary predicables, what is thereby proved? Why, not only that the opposite to the good subsists, but that this contrary comes from the good itself. I declare this to be more horrible even than the irrationality of the Manichees.

But if they repudiate this blasphemy from their system, though it is the logical carrying out of their teaching, and if they say that the Only-begotten has inherited the excellences of the Father, not as being really His Son, but—so does it please these misbelievers—as receiving His personality by an act of creation, let us look into this too, and see whether such an idea can be reasonably entertained. If, then, it were granted that it is as they think, viz., that the Lord of all things has not inherited as being a true Son, but that He rules a kindred of created things, being Himself made and created, how will the rest of creation accept this rule and not rise in revolt, being thus thrust down from kinship to subjection and condemned, though not a whit behind Him in natural prerogative (both being created), to serve and bend beneath a kinsman after all. That were like a usurpation, viz. not to assign the command to a superiority of Being, but to divide a creation that retains by right of nature equal privileges into slaves and a ruling power, one part in command, the other in subjection; as if, as the result of an arbitrary distribution131    arbitrary distribution, ἀποκληρώσεως: κατ᾽ ἀποκλήρωσιν “at random,” is also used by Sextus Empiric. (a.d. 200), Clem. Alex., and Greg Naz., these same privileges had been piled at random on one who after that distribution got preferred to his equals. Even man did not share his honour with the brutes, before he received his dominion over them; his prerogative of reason gave him the title to command; he was set over them, because of a variance of his nature in the direction of superiority. And human governments experience such quickly-repeated revolutions for this very reason, that it is impracticable that those to whom nature has given equal rights should be excluded from power, but her impulse is instinct in all to make themselves equal with the dominant party, when all are of the same blood.

How, too, will it be true that “all things were made by Him,” if it is true that the Son Himself is one of the things made? Either He must have made Himself, for that text to be true, and so this unreasonableness which they have devised to harm our Faith will recoil with all its force upon themselves; or else, if this is absurdly unnatural, that affirmation that the whole creation was made by Him will be proved to have no ground to stand on. The withdrawal of one makes “all” a false statement. So that, from this definition of the Son as a created being, one of two vicious and absurd alternatives is inevitable; either that He is not the Author of all created things, seeing that He, who, they insist, is one of those works, must be withdrawn from the “all;” or else, that He is exhibited as the maker of Himself, seeing that the preaching that ‘without Him was not anything (made) that was made’ is not a lie. So much for their teaching.

Ἀκούσαντες τοίνυν ὅτι Ἐγὼ καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἕν ἐσμεν, τό τε ἐξ αἰτίου τὸν κύριον καὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν ἀπαράλλακτον τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐκ τῆς φωνῆς ἐπαιδεύθημεν, οὐκ εἰς μίαν ὑπόστασιν τὴν περὶ αὐτῶν ἔννοιαν συναλείφοντες, ἀλλὰ φυλάσσοντες μὲν διῃρημένην τὴν τῶν ὑποστάσεων ἰδιότητα, οὐ συνδιαιροῦντες δὲ τοῖς προσώποις τὴν τῆς οὐσίας ἑνότητα, ὡς ἂν μὴ δύο ἑτερογενῆ πράγματα ἐν τῷ τῆς ἀρχῆς λόγῳ ὑπολαμβάνοιτο καὶ διὰ τούτου πάροδον λάβοι τῶν Μανιχαίων τὸ δόγμα. τὸ γὰρ κτιστὸν καὶ τὸ ἄκτιστον ἐκ διαμέτρου πρὸς ἄλληλα τὴν κατὰ τὸ σημαινόμενον ἐναντίωσιν ἔχει. εἰ οὖν τὰ δύο « ἐν » ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ταχθείη, κατὰ τὸ λεληθὸς ἡμῖν ὁ μανιχαϊσμὸς εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν τοῦ θεοῦ εἰσφθαρήσεται. λέγω δὲ ταῦτα ζήλῳ τῶν ἐναντίων περιεργότερον κατεξετάζων τὸν λόγον. καὶ οὐδεὶς ἂν ἴσως ἀντείποι μὴ ἐγγὺς τοῦ εἰκότος τὴν θεωρίαν προάγεσθαι, ὅτι δυνατοῦ ὄντος τοῦ κτιστοῦ κατὰ τὸ ἴσον τῷ ἀκτίστῳ ἀντιστήσεταί πως τὸ ἑτερογενὲς τῇ φύσει τῷ μὴ ὡσαύτως κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ἔχοντι, καὶ ἕως ἂν μηθετέρῳ αὐτῶν ἐπιλίπῃ ἡ δύναμις, εἰς ἀσύμφωνόν τινα στάσιν πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ δύο διενεχθήσεται: πᾶσα γὰρ ἀνάγκη κατάλληλον εἶναι καὶ οἰκείαν ὁμολογεῖν τῇ φύσει καὶ τὴν προαίρεσιν, καὶ εἰ ἀνομοίως ἔχοιεν κατὰ τὴν φύσιν, ἀνόμοια εἶναι καὶ τὰ θελήματα. τῆς δὲ δυνάμεως ἐφ' ἑκατέρων ἱκανῶς ἐχούσης, οὐθέτερον ἀτονήσει πρὸς τὴν ἐκπλήρωσιν τοῦ ἰδίου θελήματος: καὶ εἰ τοσοῦτον ἑκάτερον δύναιτο, ὅσον καὶ βούλεται, εἰς ἀμφήριστον ἑκατέροις ἡ ἀρχὴ καταστήσεται, τῷ ἀνενδεεῖ τῆς δυνάμεως εἰς τὸ ἀντίπαλον προϊοῦσα. καὶ οὕτω τὸ τῶν Μανιχαίων δόγμα παρεισδύσεται, δύο τινῶν ἐναντίων ἀλλήλοις ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀντιφανέντων, τῷ διαλλάσσοντι τῆς φύσεως καὶ τῆς προαιρέσεως πρὸς τὸ ἀντικείμενον διατμηθέντων. καὶ γίνεται αὐτοῖς ἡ τῆς ἐλαττώσεως κατασκευὴ τῶν Μανιχαϊκῶν δογμάτων ἀρχή. τὸ γὰρ τῆς οὐσίας ἀσύμφωνον εἰς δύο ἀρχὰς περιΐστησι τὸ δόγμα, καθὼς ὁ λόγος ὑπέδειξε, τῷ κτιστῷ καὶ τῷ ἀκτίστῳ διῃρημένας.
Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἴσως βεβιασμένην ἔχοντα τὴν τοῦ ἀτόπου κατασκευὴν οἱ πολλοὶ αἰτιάσονται καὶ οὐδὲ γεγράφθαι τὸ παράπαν μετὰ τῶν λοιπῶν ἀξιώσουσιν. ἔστω ταῦτα: οὐδὲ ἡμεῖς ἀντιλέγομεν. οὐδὲ γὰρ κατ' οἰκείαν ὁρμήν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τοὺς ἀντιμαχομένους εἰς τὴν τοιαύτην περιεργίαν ἐκβαλεῖν τὸν λόγον ἐκ τῆς ἀκολουθίας προήχθημεν. εἰ δὲ οὐ χρὴ ταῦτα λέγειν, πολὺ πρότερον σιωπᾶσθαι προσήκει τῶν ἐναντίων τὸν λόγον τὸν τῆς τοιαύτης ἀντιρρήσεως τὰς ἀφορμὰς παρεχόμενον. οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἑτέρως ἐπισχεῖν τὸν τοῖς πονηροῖς ἀντιλέγοντα, μὴ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἐξελόντα τῆς ἀντιρρήσεως. πλὴν ἡδέως ἂν συμβουλεύσαιμι τοῖς οὕτω διακειμένοις μικρόν τι τῆς φιλονεικίας ἔξω γενέσθαι καὶ μὴ λίαν ἐκθύμως τῶν οἰκείων ὑπερμαχεῖν ὑπολήψεων, αἷς ἤδη προειλημμένοι τυγχάνουσι, μηδὲ πανταχόθεν ἀναζητεῖν, ὅπως ἂν τὸ πλέον ἔχοιεν τῶν ἀντιτεταγμένων, ἀλλ' ὡς ὑπὲρ ψυχῆς ὄντος τοῦ δρόμου, μόνῳ τῷ συμφέροντι πείθεσθαι καὶ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ διδόναι τὰ νικητήρια. εἰ τοίνυν τοῦ φιλονεικεῖν τις ἀποστὰς αὐτὸν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ διασκοποῖτο τὸν λόγον, οὐ χαλεπῶς εὑρήσει τὴν ἐμφαινομένην ἀτοπίαν τῷ δόγματι.
Ὑποθώμεθα γὰρ συγχωρεῖσθαι κατὰ τὸν λόγον τῶν ὑπεναντίων τὴν « ἀγεννησίαν » οὐσίαν εἶναι καὶ πάλιν ὡσαύτως τὴν γέννησιν εἰς οὐσίαν ἀναλαμβάνεσθαι. οὐκοῦν εἴ τις ἀκριβῶς τῇ διανοίᾳ τῶν λεγομένων ἀκολουθήσειε, τὸ Μανιχαϊκὸν αὐτοῖς δόγμα διὰ τῆς ὁδοῦ ταύτης ἀναπλασθήσεται, εἴπερ κακοῦ πρὸς ἀγαθὸν καὶ φωτὸς πρὸς σκότος καὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων κατὰ τὸ ἐναντίον τῆς φύσεως τὴν ἀντίθεσιν δογματίζειν τοῖς Μανιχαίοις δοκεῖ. καὶ ὅτι ταῦτα ἀληθῆ λέγω, ῥᾳδίως οἶμαι συνθήσεσθαι τὸν μὴ ῥᾳθύμως παραδραμόντα τὸν λόγον. οὑτωσὶ δὲ διασκεψώμεθα. ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὑποκειμένων προσφυῆ τινα πάντως ἐπιθεωρεῖται γνωρίσματα, δι' ὧν τὸ ἰδιάζον τῆς ὑποκειμένης ἐπιγινώσκεται φύσεως, εἴτε ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν ζῴων διαφορᾶς ἐξετάζοις τὸν λόγον εἴτε καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων. οὐ γὰρ τοῖς αὐτοῖς τὸ ξύλον καὶ τὸ ζῷον χαρακτηρίζεται, οὐδὲ ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις ἐπικοινωνεῖ τὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου γνωριστικὰ σημεῖα πρὸς τὴν ἄλογον φύσιν, οὐδ' αὖ πάλιν τὰ αὐτὰ δείκνυσι τήν τε ζωὴν καὶ τὸν θάνατον, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πάντων ἁπαξαπλῶς, καθὼς εἴρηται, ἄμικτός τίς ἐστι καὶ ἀκοινώνητος ἡ τῶν ὑποκειμένων διάκρισις, οὐδὲν τοῖς τῶν ἐπιθεωρουμένων γνωρίσμασι διά τινος κοινωνίας συγχεομένη. κατὰ τοίνυν τὴν ἀκολουθίαν ταύτην ἐξετασθήτω τῶν ὑπεναντίων ὁ λόγος. τὴν « ἀγεννησίαν » οὐσίαν φασὶ καὶ τὴν γέννησιν ὡσαύτως εἰς οὐσίαν ἀνάγουσιν. ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπου καὶ λίθου ἕτερα καὶ οὐ τὰ αὐτὰ γνωρίσματα (οὐ γὰρ ἂν τὸν αὐτὸν ἀποδοίης ἑκατέρου λόγον ἐμψύχου τε καὶ ἀψύχου τὸ τί ἐστιν ὁριζόμενος), οὕτω πάντως ἄλλοις μὲν γνωρίζεσθαι τὸν ἀγέννητον σημείοις δώσουσιν, ἑτέροις δὲ τὸν γεννητόν. οὐκοῦν θεωρήσωμεν τὰ ἰδιάζοντα τοῦ ἀγεννήτου θεοῦ ὅσα εὐσεβῶς λέγειν τε καὶ νοεῖν παρὰ τῆς ἁγίας γραφῆς περὶ αὐτοῦ μεμαθήκαμεν.
Τίνα οὖν ἔστι ταῦτα; οὐδένα οἶμαι τῶν Χριστιανῶν ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι ἀγαθὸς ὅτι χρηστὸς ὅτι ἅγιος δίκαιός τε καὶ ὅσιος ἀόρατός τε καὶ ἀθάνατος, φθορᾶς τε καὶ τροπῆς καὶ ἀλλοιώσεως ἀνεπίδεκτος, δυνατὸς σοφὸς εὐεργέτης κύριος κριτὴς πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα. τί γὰρ δεῖ τοῖς ὁμολογουμένοις ἐνδιατρίβοντα παρατείνειν τὸν λόγον; εἰ οὖν ταῦτα ἐν τῇ ἀγεννήτῳ φύσει καταλαμβάνομεν, τὸ δὲ γεννηθῆναι τῷ μὴ γεννηθῆναι ὑπεναντίως ἔχει κατὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν, ἀνάγκη πᾶσα συνθέσθαι τοὺς τὴν ἀγεννησίαν καὶ τὴν γέννησιν οὐσίαν εἶναι ὁριζομένους κατὰ λόγον τῆς τοῦ γεννητοῦ πρὸς τὸ ἀγέννητον ἀντιθέσεως καὶ τὰ γνωριστικὰ σημεῖα τῆς γεννητῆς οὐσίας ὑπεναντίως ἔχειν τοῖς ἐπιθεωρουμένοις τῇ ἀγεννήτῳ φύσει. εἰ γὰρ τὰ αὐτὰ λέγοιεν, οὐκέτι τὸ ἑτεροῖον τῆς τῶν ὑποκειμένων φύσεως διὰ τῆς ταὐτότητος τῶν ἐπιθεωρουμένων συστήσεται. τῶν γὰρ ἑτεροίως ἐχόντων ἕτερα χρὴ πάντως εἶναι καὶ τὰ γνωρίσματα οἴεσθαι, ὅσα δὲ ὡσαύτως κατὰ τὸν λόγον τῆς οὐσίας ἔχει, τοῖς αὐτοῖς δηλαδὴ σημείοις χαρακτηρίζεται. εἰ μὲν οὖν τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ τῷ μονογενεῖ προσμαρτυροῦσιν, οὐδεμίαν, καθὼς εἴρηται, περὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον διαφορὰν ἐννοοῦσιν. εἰ δὲ τοῖς βλασφήμοις ἐπιμένοιεν λόγοις καὶ τὸ παρηλλαγμένον τῆς φύσεως ἐν τῇ διαφορᾷ τοῦ γεννητοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀγεννήτου κατασκευάζοιεν, εὔκολον συνιδεῖν πάντως τὸ ἐκ τῆς ἀκολουθίας ἀναφαινόμενον, ὅτι, κατὰ τὴν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀντίθεσιν καὶ τῆς φύσεως τῶν ὑπὸ τῶν ὀνομάτων σημαινομένων ὑπεναντίως ἔχειν πρὸς ἑαυτὴν νομισθείσης, ἀνάγκη πᾶσα καὶ τὰ ἐπιθεωρούμενα ἑκατέροις πρὸς τὸ ἐναντίον διενεχθῆναι, ὥστε τῶν ἐπὶ τοῦ πατρὸς λεγομένων τὰ ἀντικείμενα τῷ μονογενεῖ ἐφαρμόζεσθαι, θεότητος ἁγιασμοῦ ἀγαθότητος ἀφθαρσίας ἀϊδιότητος καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο τὸν ἐπὶ πάντων θεὸν διὰ τῶν εὐσεβῶν ἡμῖν νοημάτων παρίστησιν: ὥστε πάντα τὰ ἀπεμφαίνοντα καὶ ἑκάστῳ τῶν πρὸς τὸ κρεῖττον ὑπειλημμένων ἀντιδιαστελλόμενα τῆς γεννητῆς ἴδια νομίζειν οὐσίας εἶναι.
Σαφηνείας δὲ χάριν προσδιατριπτέον ἡμῖν ἐστι τῷ τόπῳ. ὥσπερ τῷ θερμῷ καὶ τῷ ψυχρῷ ἐναντίοις οὖσι κατὰ τὴν φύσιν (ὑποκείσθω δὲ τῷ λόγῳ πῦρ τε καὶ κρύσταλλος, ἐκεῖνο ἑκάτερον ὂν ὅπερ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἕτερον) καὶ τὰ ἰδίως ἑκατέρῳ τούτων ἐπιφαινόμενα παρηλλαγμένως ἔχει πάντως πρὸς ἄλληλα (ἴδιον γὰρ τοῦ μὲν κρυστάλλου ἡ ψῦξις, τοῦ δὲ πυρὸς ἡ θερμότης), οὕτως εἴπερ κατὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἐναντίωσιν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀγεννήτου καὶ γεννητοῦ καὶ ἡ διὰ τῶν ὀνομάτων δηλουμένη φύσις πρὸς τὸ ἀντικείμενον διασταίη, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὰς δυνάμεις τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ὑπεναντίων ὁμοίας ἀλλήλαις εἶναι, ὡς οὐκ ἐνδέχεται οὔτε ἐν πυρὶ τὴν ψύξιν οὔτε ἐν κρυστάλλῳ γενέσθαι τὴν πύρωσιν. εἰ οὖν ἐν τῇ ἀγεννήτῳ οὐσίᾳ ἡ ἀγαθότης νοεῖται, διέστηκε δέ, καθὼς ἐκεῖνοί φασιν, ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῆς φύσεως πρὸς τὴν γεννητὴν ἡ ἀγέννητος, συνδιαστήσεται πάντως καὶ τοῦ ἀγεννήτου τὸ ἴδιον ἀπὸ τοῦ κατὰ τὸ γεννητὸν ἰδιάζοντος: ὥστε εἰ ἐν ἐκείνῳ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἐν τούτῳ νοεῖσθαι τὸ τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἀντικείμενον. καὶ οὕτως ἡμῖν διὰ τῶν σοφῶν τούτων δογματιστῶν πάλιν ὁ Μάνης ἀναβιώσεται, τὴν τῆς κακίας φύσιν ἀντιπαρεξάγων τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ τῇ τῶν οὐσιῶν ἑτερότητι δογματίζων τὸ ἐν ταῖς δυνάμεσιν αὐτῶν ἀντικείμενον.
Εἰ δὲ χρὴ μηδὲν ὑποστειλάμενον μετὰ παρρησίας εἰπεῖν, συγγνωστότερος τούτων ὁ Μάνης εἰκότως ἂν εἶναι νομίζοιτο, ὃν πρῶτόν φασι τοῖς δόγμασι τῶν Μανιχαίων ἐπιτολμήσαντα ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ κατονομάσαι τὴν αἵρεσιν. λέγω δὲ ταῦτα, ὡς ἂν εἴ τις ἐχίδνης καὶ ἀσπίδος τὴν φιλανθρωποτέραν ἐκλέγοιτο: πλὴν ἀλλ' ἐπειδή ἐστι καὶ ἐν θηρίοις τοῦ χείρονος κρίσις, οὐχὶ τούτων ἐκείνους ἀνεκτοτέρους εἶναι δοκιμαζόμενα τὰ δόγματα δείκνυσιν; ὁ μὲν γὰρ συναγορεύειν ᾤετο τῷ τῶν ἀγαθῶν αἰτίῳ, ὡς οὐδεμιᾶς κακῶν αἰτίας ἀπ' ἐκείνου τὴν ἀρχὴν λαβούσης, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εἰς ἑτέραν ἀρχὴν ἰδιάζουσαν τῶν πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον ἀριθμουμένων πάντων τὴν αἰτίαν ἀνῆψεν οἷον ἀπολογούμενος ὑπὲρ τοῦ θεοῦ τῶν ὅλων, ὡς οὐκ εὐαγὲς ὂν τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν πηγὴν καὶ τῶν παρὰ λόγον πλημμελουμένων ἐπαιτιᾶσθαι, οὐ συνιεὶς ὑπὸ μικροψυχίας, ὅτι δυνατὸν ἦν μήτε κακῶν δημιουργὸν τὸν θεὸν οἴεσθαι μήτε ἄλλο τι ἄναρχον παρὰ τὸν θεὸν φαντασθῆναι. περὶ ὧν πολὺς ὁ λόγος καὶ οὐ τοῦ παρόντος ἂν εἴη καιροῦ. καὶ οὗ χάριν τῶν εἰρημένων ἐμνήσθημεν, ὅτι ἐκεῖνος μὲν ἀφιστᾶν ᾤετο δεῖν ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ τῶν ὅλων τὴν τῆς κακίας ἀρχήν, οὗτοι δὲ κἀκείνων χαλεπωτέραν κατασκευάζουσι τὴν ἔκτοπον ταύτην κατὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ βλασφημίαν. τῶν μὲν γὰρ κακῶν τὴν φύσιν παραπλησίως ἐκείνοις διὰ τῆς κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ἐναντιότητος δογματίζουσιν [ὃν υἱὸν ὀνομάζουσιν:] ἐν ᾧ δὲ πάλιν τοῦ τοιούτου πλάσματος τὸν θεὸν τῶν ὅλων δημιουργὸν ἀποφαίνονται, παρ' οὗ φασι τὴν « γέννησιν » ἐργασθεῖσαν οὐσίαν ἀλλοτρίως ἔχειν κατὰ τὴν φύσιν πρὸς τὸν ποιήσαντα, ἐν τούτῳ τὸ πλέον εἰς ἀσέβειαν παρὰ τοὺς μνημονευθέντας ἔχουσιν, ὅτι οὐ μόνον ὑπόστασιν διδόασι τῷ ἐναντίως πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν κατὰ τὴν φύσιν ἔχοντι, ἀλλ' ὅτι τὸν ἀγαθὸν θεὸν ἄλλου θεοῦ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν διηλλαγμένου λέγουσιν αἴτιον εἶναι, μονονουχὶ φανερῶς βοῶντες ἐν τῷ δόγματι, ὅτι ἔστι τι ὑπεναντίον τῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσει, παρ' αὐτοῦ ἔχον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τὴν ὑπόστασιν. τῆς γὰρ τοῦ πατρὸς οὐσίας ἀγαθῆς εἶναι πεπιστευμένης, τῆς δὲ τοῦ υἱοῦ διὰ τὸ μὴ ὡσαύτως ἔχειν τῷ πατρὶ κατὰ τὸν τῆς φύσεως λόγον, καθὼς δοκεῖ τῇ αἱρέσει, ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις κατὰ τὸ ἀκόλουθον εὑρισκομένης, τί διὰ τούτων κατασκευάζεται; τὸ καὶ ὑφεστάναι τὸ τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἀντικείμενον καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὑποστῆναι τὸ ὑπεναντίον τῇ φύσει. τοῦτό φημι καὶ τῆς τῶν Μανιχαίων ἀτοπίας εἶναι φρικτότερον.
Εἰ δὲ ἀρνοῦνται τῷ λόγῳ τὸ βλάσφημον, ὅπερ ἡ ἀκολουθία τοῦ δόγματος δείκνυσι, φασὶ δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τοῦ πατρὸς τὸν μονογενῆ κεκληρονομηκέναι, μὴ υἱὸν ἀληθῶς ὄντα κατὰ τὴν τῶν εὐσεβῶν δόξαν, ἀλλὰ διὰ κτίσεως τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχοντα, καὶ τοῦτο πάλιν κατεξετάσωμεν, εἰ δυνατόν ἐστι συστῆναι κατὰ τὸν εἰκότα λόγον τὴν τοιαύτην ὑπόνοιαν. ἐὰν γὰρ δοθῇ κατὰ τὸν λόγον αὐτὼν μὴ ἀληθῶς υἱὸν ὄντα κεκληρονομηκέναι τῶν πάντων τὸν κύριον, ἀλλὰ κτισθέντα καὶ ποιηθέντα τῶν ὁμογενῶν ἄρχειν, πῶς καταδέξεται καὶ οὐ συστασιάσει ἡ λοιπὴ κτίσις ἐκ τοῦ ὁμοφύλου πρὸς τὸ ὑποχείριον ἀπωσθεῖσα, εἰ μηδὲν κατὰ τὴν φύσιν ἔλαττον ἔχουσα (κτιστὴ γὰρ καὶ αὐτὴ ὥσπερ κἀκεῖνος) ἔπειτα τῷ ὁμοφύλῳ δουλεύειν καὶ ὑποκύπτειν καταδικάζοιτο; τυραννίδι γὰρ ὅμοιον τὸ τοιοῦτο, μὴ τῇ τῆς οὐσίας ὑπεροχῇ τὸ κράτος νέμειν, ἀλλὰ μενούσης ἐν τῷ ὁμοτίμῳ τῆς φύσεως μερισθῆναι τὴν κτίσιν εἰς δουλείαν καὶ κυριότητα, ὥστε ἐν αὐτῇ τὸ μέν τι ἄρχειν, τὸ δὲ ὑποχείριον εἶναι, καθάπερ ἐκ διακληρώσεως τούτου τοῦ ἀξιώματος συντυχικῶς προσγενομένου τῷ κατὰ τὸν κλῆρον λαβόντι τὴν τῶν ὁμοίων προτίμησιν. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος ὁμοτίμως ἔχων πρὸς τὴν ὑποχείριον φύσιν τὴν κατὰ τῶν ἀλόγων ἀρχὴν ἐκληρώσατο, ἀλλὰ προτερεύων τῷ λόγῳ κυριεύει τῶν ἄλλων, τῷ πρὸς τὸ κρεῖττον αὐτῷ παρηλλάχθαι τὴν φύσιν προτεταγμένος. αἱ δὲ ἀνθρώπιναι δυναστεῖαι τούτου χάριν ἀγχιστρόφους ἔχουσι τὰς μεταβολάς, ὅτι οὐ δέχεται τὸ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν ὁμότιμον μὴ ἰσομοιρεῖν [ἐν] τῷ κρείττονι, ἀλλά τις ἔγκειται φυσικὴ πᾶσιν ἐπιθυμία πρὸς τὸ ἐπικρατοῦν ἐξισάζεσθαι, ὅταν ὁμόφυλον ᾖ. πῶς δὲ ἀληθὲς ἔσται τὸ πάντα δι' αὐτοῦ γεγενῆσθαι, ἐὰν ἀληθὲς ᾖ τὸ καὶ αὐτὸν νὸν υἱὸν ἕν τι τῶν γεγονότων εἶναι; ἤτοι γὰρ καὶ ἑαυτὸν πεποιηκὼς ἔσται, ἵνα μὴ ψεῦδος τὸ γεγραμμένον ᾖ ὅτι Πάντα δι' αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο, καὶ οὕτω κατ' αὐτῶν ἰσχύσει τὸ ἄτοπον ὃ κατὰ τοῦ δόγματος ἡμῶν ἐσοφίσαντο τὸ αὐτὸν ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ γενέσθαι λέγειν, ἢ εἴπερ τοῦτο παράλογον καὶ φύσιν οὐκ ἔχον, ἀσύστατον πάντως ἐκεῖνο δειχθήσεται, τὸ τὴν κτίσιν πᾶσαν δι' αὐτοῦ γεγενῆσθαι διϊσχυρίζεσθαι. ἡ γὰρ τοῦ ἑνὸς ὑπεξαίρεσις ψευδῆ τὸν περὶ πάντων κατασκευάζει λόγον, ὥστε ἐκ μὲν τοῦ κτιστὸν εἶναι τὸν μονογενῆ διορίζεσθαι δύο πονηρῶν καὶ ἀτόπων τὸ ἕτερον πάντως ὁ λόγος οὐ διαφεύξεται, ἢ τὸ μὴ εἶναι πάντων αὐτὸν τῶν γεγονότων αἴτιον, εἴπερ αὐτὸς ἐκεῖνος ὑπεξαιροῖτο τῶν πάντων, ὃν ἓν τῶν ἔργων διϊσχυρίζονται, ἢ τὸ καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ποιητὴν ἀποδείκνυσθαι, εἴπερ μὴ ψεύδεται ὁ μηδὲν τῶν γεγονότων χωρὶς ἐκείνου γεγενῆσθαι κηρύξας.