§5. After much discourse concerning the actually existent, and ungenerate and good, and upon the consubstantiality of the heavenly powers, showing the uncharted character of their essence, yet the difference of their ranks, he ends the book.

Now in saying these things we do not intend to deny that the Father exists without generation, and we have no intention of refusing to agree to the statement that the Only-begotten God is generated;—on the contrary the latter has been generated, the former has not been generated. But what He is, in His own Nature, Who exists apart from generation, and what He is, Who is believed to have been generated, we do not learn from the signification of “having been generated,” and “not having been generated.” For when we say “this person was generated” (or “was not generated”), we are impressed with a two-fold thought, having our eyes turned to the subject by the demonstrative part of the phrase, and learning that which is contemplated in the subject by the words “was generated” or “was not generated,”—as it is one thing to think of that which is, and another to think of what we contemplate in that which is. But, moreover, the word “is” is surely understood with every name that is used concerning the Divine Nature,—as “just,” “incorruptible,” “immortal,” and “ungenerate,” and whatever else is said of Him; even if this word does not happen to occur in the phrase, yet the thought both of the speaker and the hearer surely makes the name attach to “is,” so that if this word were not added, the appellation would be uttered in vain. For instance (for it is better to present an argument by way of illustration), when David says, “God, a righteous judge, strong and patient789    Cf. Ps. vii. 8,” if “is” were not understood with each of the epithets included in the phrase, the enumerations of the appellations will seem purposeless and unreal, not having any subject to rest upon; but when “is” is understood with each of the names, what is said will clearly be of force, being contemplated in reference to that which is. As, then, when we say “He is a judge,” we conceive concerning Him some operation of judgment, and by the “is” carry our minds to the subject, and are hereby clearly taught not to suppose that the account of His being is the same with the action, so also as a result of saying, “He is generated (or ungenerate),” we divide our thought into a double conception, by “is” understanding the subject, and by “generated,” or “ungenerate,” apprehending that which belongs to the subject. As, then, when we are taught by David that God is “a judge,” or “patient,” we do not learn the Divine essence, but one of the attributes which are contemplated in it, so in this case too when we hear of His being not generated, we do not by this negative predication understand the subject, but are guided as to what we must not think concerning the subject, while what He essentially is remains as much as ever unexplained. So too, when Holy Scripture predicates the other Divine names of Him Who is, and delivers to Moses the Being without a name, it is for him who discloses the Nature of that Being, not to rehearse the attributes of the Being, but by his words to make manifest to us its actual Nature. For every name which you may use is an attribute of the Being, but is not the Being,—“good,” “ungenerate,” “incorruptible,”—but to each of these “is” does not fail to be supplied. Any one, then, who undertakes to give the account of this good Being, of this ungenerate Being, as He is, would speak in vain, if he rehearsed the attributes contemplated in Him, and were silent as to that essence which he undertakes by his words to explain. To be without generation is one of the attributes contemplated in the Being, but the definition of “Being” is one thing, and that of “being in some particular way” is another; and this790    What “this” means is not clear: it may be “the Being,” but most probably is the distinction which S. Gregory is pointing out between the Being and Its attributes, which he considers has not been sufficiently recognized. has so far remained untold and unexplained by the passages cited. Let him then first disclose to us the names of the essence, and then divide the Nature by the divergence of the appellations;—so long as what we require remains unexplained, it is in vain that he employs his scientific skill upon names, seeing that the names791    Reading τῶν ὀνομάτων οὐκ ὄντων with the Paris editions. Oehler reads νοημάτων, but does not give any authority for the change. have no separate existence.

Such then is Eunomius’ stronger handle against the truth, while we pass by in silence many views which are to be found in this part of his composition; for it seems to me right that those who run in this armed race792    The metaphor seems slightly confused, being partly taken from a tournament, or gladiatorial contest, partly from a race in armour. against the enemies of the truth should arm themselves against those who are fairly fenced about with the plausibility of falsehood, and not defile their argument with such conceptions as are already dead and of offensive odour. His supposition that whatever things are united in the idea of their essence793    The word οὐσία seems to have had in Eunomius’ mind something of the same idea of corporeal existence attaching to it which has been made to attach to the Latin “substantia,” and to the English “substance.” must needs exist corporeally and be joined to corruption (for this he says in this part of his work), I shall willingly pass by like some cadaverous odour, since I think every reasonable man will perceive how dead and corrupt such an argument is. For who knows not that the multitude of human souls is countless, yet one essence underlies them all, and the consubstantial substratum in them is alien from bodily corruption? so that even children can plainly see the argument that bodies are corrupted and dissolved, not because they have the same essence one with another, but because of their possessing a compound nature. The idea of the compound nature is one, that of the common nature of their essence is another, so that it is true to say, “corruptible bodies are of one essence,” but the converse statement is not true at all, if it be anything like, “this consubstantial nature is also surely corruptible,” as is shown in the case of the souls which have one essence, while yet corruption does not attach to them in virtue of the community of essence. And the account given of the souls might properly be applied to every intellectual existence which we contemplate in creation. For the words brought together by Paul do not signify, as Eunomius will have them do, some mutually divergent natures of the supra-mundane powers; on the contrary, the sense of the names clearly indicates that he is mentioning in his argument, not diversities of natures, but the varied peculiarities of the operations of the heavenly host: for there are, he says, “principalities,” and “thrones,” and “powers,” and “mights,” and “dominions794    Cf. Col. i. 16, and Eph. i. 21..” Now these names are such as to make it at once clear to every one that their significance is arranged in regard to some operation. For to rule, and to exercise power and dominion, and to be the throne of some one,—all these conceptions would not be held by any one versed in argument to apply to diversities of essence, since it is clearly operation that is signified by every one of the names: so that any one who says that diversities of nature are signified by the names rehearsed by Paul deceives himself, “understanding,” as the Apostle says, “neither what he says, nor whereof he affirms795    1 Tim. i. 7.,” since the sense of the names clearly shows that the Apostle recognizes in the intelligible powers distinctions of certain ranks, but does not by these names indicate varieties of essences.

Ταῦτα δέ φαμεν οὐχ ὡς ἀρνούμενοι τὸ ἀγεννήτως εἶναι τὸν πατέρα οὐδ' ὡς μὴ συντιθέμενοι τὸ γεννητὸν εἶναι τὸν μονογενῆ θεόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ οὗτος γεγέννηται κἀκεῖνος οὐ γεγέννηται. τί δὲ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν ἐστὶν ὁ δίχα γεννήσεως ὢν καὶ ὁ γεγεννῆσθαι πεπιστευμένος, ἐκ τῆς τοῦ γεννηθῆναι καὶ μὴ γεννηθῆναι σημασίας οὐκ ἐδιδάχθημεν. εἰπόντες γὰρ ὅτι οὗτος ἢ γεγέννηται ἢ οὐ γεγέννηται, διπλῆν ἐντυπούμεθα διὰ τῶν εἰρημένων διάνοιαν, τῷ μὲν δεικτικῷ τοῦ λόγου πρὸς τὸ ὑποκείμενον βλέποντες, τῷ δὲ γεγέννηται ἢ οὐ γεγέννηται τὸ τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ προσθεωρούμενον διδασκόμενοι, ὡς ἄλλο μέν τι περὶ τοῦ ὄντος νοεῖν, ἄλλο δέ τι περὶ τοῦ ἐπιθεωρουμένου τῷ ὄντι. ἀλλὰ καὶ παντὶ ὀνόματι τῷ περὶ τὴν θείαν λεγομένῳ φύσιν τὸ ἐστὶ πάντως συνυπακούεται, οἷον δίκαιος ἄφθαρτος ἀθάνατός τε καὶ ἀγέννητος καὶ εἴ τι ἕτερον λέγεται: κἂν μὴ τῇ φωνῇ συμπαρομαρτοῦν τύχῃ τὸ ῥῆμα τοῦτο, ἀλλ' ἡ διάνοια πάντως τοῦ φθεγγομένου καὶ τοῦ ἀκούοντος τῷ ἐστί προσαπαρτίζει τὸ ὄνομα, ὡς εἰ μὴ τοῦτο προσκέοιτο, κατὰ κενοῦ τὴν προσηγορίαν πίπτειν. οἷον (κρεῖττον γὰρ ἐν ὑποδείγματι παραστῆσαι τὸν λόγον) εἰπόντος τοῦ Δαβὶδ ὅτι ὁ θεὸς κριτὴς δίκαιος καὶ ἰσχυρὸς καὶ μακρόθυμος, εἰ μὴ συνυπακούοιτο τῶν κατειλημμένων ὀνομάτων ἑκάστῳ τὸ ἐστί, ματαία δόξει καὶ ἀνυπόστατος ἡ τῶν προσηγοριῶν ἀπαρίθμησις, πρὸς οὐδὲν ὑποκείμενον ἐρειδομένη: συνυπακουομένου δὲ τοῦ ἐστὶν ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὀνομάτων, ἰσχύσει πάντως τὰ εἰρημένα περὶ τὸ ὂν θεωρούμενα. ὥσπερ τοίνυν εἰπόντες ὅτι κριτής ἐστι διὰ μὲν τῆς κρίσεως ἐνέργειάν τινα περὶ αὐτὸν ἐνοήσαμεν, διὰ δὲ τοῦ ἐστὶ τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ τὸν νοῦν ἐπεβάλομεν, σαφῶς διδασκόμενοι διὰ τούτων μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν νομίζειν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ τὸν τοῦ εἶναι λόγον, οὕτως καὶ ἐκ τοῦ εἰπεῖν ὅτι γεννητὸς ἢ ἀγέννητός ἐστι μερίζομεν πρὸς διπλῆν ὑπόληψιν τὴν διάνοιαν, διὰ μὲν τοῦ ἐστί νοοῦντες τὸ ὑποκείμενον, διὰ δὲ τοῦ γεννητὸς ἢ ἀγέννητος τὸ προσὸν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ καταλαμβάνοντες. καθάπερ τοίνυν κριτὴν ἢ μακρόθυμον παρὰ τοῦ Δαβὶδ εἶναι τὸν θεὸν διδαχθέντες οὐ τὴν θείαν οὐσίαν, ἀλλά τι τῶν περὶ αὐτὴν θεωρουμένων ἐμάθομεν, οὕτως καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὸ μὴ γεγεννῆσθαι ἀκούσαντες οὐ τὸ ὑποκείμενον διὰ τῆς ἀπεμφάσεως ἔγνωμεν, ἀλλὰ τί οὐ χρὴ περὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον νοεῖν ὡδηγήθημεν, τὸ δὲ κατ' οὐσίαν ὅ τι ποτέ ἐστιν οὐδὲν ἧττον ἐν ἀδήλῳ μένει, οὕτω καὶ τῆς ἁγίας γραφῆς τὰ μὲν λοιπὰ τῶν θείων ὀνομάτων κατὰ τοῦ ὄντος κατηγορούσης, αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ὂν ἀκατονόμαστον τῷ Μωϋσῇ παραδούσης. ὁ τοίνυν τοῦ ὄντος ἐκκαλύπτων τὴν φύσιν μὴ τὰ περὶ τὸ ὂν διεξίτω, ἀλλ' αὐτὴν ἡμῖν φανερούτω δι' ὧν λέγει τὴν φύσιν. πᾶν γὰρ ὅτιπερ ἂν εἴπῃς ὄνομα περὶ τὸ ὄν ἐστιν, οὐκ ἐκεῖνό ἐστιν, ἀγαθὸς « ἀγέννητος » ἄφθαρτος: ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐστὶν ἑκάστῳ τούτων οὐκ ἀπολείπεται. τούτου τοίνυν τοῦ ὄντος ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ὄντος « ἀγεννήτου », καθὸ ἔστι, τὸν λόγον τις ἀποδώσειν ἐπαγγειλάμενος μάταιος ἂν εἴη τὰ μὲν ἐπιθεωρούμενα λέγων, αὐτὴν δὲ σιωπῶν τὴν οὐσίαν ἣν ἑρμηνεύειν τῷ λόγῳ κατεπαγγέλλεται. τὸ γὰρ ἀγεννήτως εἶναι ἓν τῶν ἐπιθεωρουμένων ἐστὶ τῷ ὄντι, ἄλλος δὲ τοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἄλλος τοῦ πως εἶναι ὁ λόγος: ὃ μέχρι τοῦ νῦν ἄρρητόν τε καὶ ἀνερμήνευτον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ἐστίν. οὐκοῦν φανερωσάτω πρότερον ἡμῖν τὰ τῆς οὐσίας ὀνόματα, καὶ τότε τῇ παραλλαγῇ τῶν προσηγοριῶν διατεμνέτω τὴν φύσιν: ἕως δ' ἂν τὸ ζητούμενον ἀνεκφώνητον μένῃ, μάτην αὐτῷ τὰ περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων τετεχνολόγηται, τῶν ὀνομάτων οὐκ ὄντων.
Ἡ μὲν οὖν « ἰσχυροτέρα » τῶν Εὐνομίου κατὰ τῆς ἀληθείας λαβὴ τοιαύτη, πολλῶν κατὰ τὸ μέρος τοῦτο τῆς λογογραφίας σιωπηθέντων δογμάτων. δοκεῖ γάρ μοι πρέπειν τοῖς τὸν ἐνόπλιον τοῦτον κατὰ τῶν ἐχθρῶν τῆς ἀληθείας τρέχουσι δρόμον πρὸς τοὺς πεφραγμένους ποσῶς τῇ πιθανότητι τοῦ ψεύδους ὁπλίζεσθαι, τοῖς δὲ νεκροῖς καὶ ὀδωδόσι τῶν νοημάτων μὴ ἐμμολύνειν τὸν λόγον. τὸ γὰρ οἴεσθαι « πάντα ὅσα τῷ τῆς οὐσίας ἥνωται λόγῳ πάντως ἐν σώμασιν εἶναι καὶ φθορᾷ συνεζεῦχθαι » (τοῦτο γὰρ ἐν τῷ μέρει τούτῳ φησίν) ὡς νεκρώδη δυσωδίαν ἑκὼν ὑπερβήσομαι, παντὸς οἶμαι τοῦ γε νοῦν ἔχοντος ἐκ τοῦ προχείρου κατιδεῖν δυναμένου τὸ τεθνηκός τε καὶ διαπεπτωκὸς τοῦ λόγου. τίς γὰρ οὐκ οἶδεν ὅτι πλῆθος μὲν ἄπειρον τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἐστὶ ψυχῶν, οὐσία δὲ πάσαις ὑπόκειται μία καὶ τὸ ὁμοούσιον ὑποκείμενον ἐν αὐταῖς τῆς σωματικῆς διαφθορᾶς ἠλλοτρίωται; ὥστε νηπίοις φανερὸν εἶναι τὸν λόγον, ὅτι τὰ σώματα οὐ διὰ τὸ ὁμοούσια εἶναι ἀλλήλοις διὰ τοῦτο φθείρεταί τε καὶ διαλύεται, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ σύνθετον εἰληφέναι τὴν φύσιν. ἄλλος δὲ τοῦ συνθέτου καὶ ἕτερος τοῦ κοινοῦ τῆς οὐσίας λόγος: ὥστε τὸ μὲν ὁμοούσια τὰ φθαρτὰ σώματα λέγειν ἀληθές ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ ἀναστροφὴ τὸ ἀληθὲς οὐκ ἔχει: εἴ τι ὁμοούσιον, τοῦτο καὶ φθαρτόν ἐστι πάντως, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν ψυχῶν ἀποδείκνυται, ὧν καὶ οὐσία μία καὶ φθορὰ τῇ κοινότητι τῆς οὐσίας οὐ πρόσεστιν. ὁ δὲ περὶ τῶν ψυχῶν ἀποδοθεὶς λόγος καὶ περὶ πάσης νοερᾶς ὑποστάσεως τῆς ἐν τῇ κτίσει θεωρουμένης οἰκείως ἂν ἔχοι. οὐ γάρ, καθὼς Εὐνόμιος βούλεται, αἱ παρὰ τοῦ Παύλου κατειλεγμέναι φωναὶ τῶν ὑπερκοσμίων δυνάμεων φύσεις τινὰς ἀλλήλων παρηλλαγμένας σημαίνουσιν, ἀλλ' ἡ τῶν προσηγοριῶν σημασία σαφῶς ἐνδείκνυται τὸ μὴ φύσεων διαφοράς, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἐπουρανίου στρατιᾶς τὰς ποικίλας τῶν ἐνεργειῶν ἰδιότητας τῷ λόγῳ παρίστασθαι. ἀρχαὶ γάρ, φησί, καὶ θρόνοι καὶ ἐξουσίαι καὶ δυνάμεις καὶ κυριότητες. ταῦτα δὲ τὰ ὀνόματα τοιαῦτά ἐστιν ὡς αὐτόθεν παντὶ πρόδηλον εἶναι τὸ κατ' ἐνεργείας τινὸς τετάχθαι τὰ σημαινόμενα. τὸ γὰρ ἄρχειν καὶ τὸ ἐξουσιάζειν καὶ τὸ κυριεύειν καὶ τὸ θρόνον εἶναί τινος, ταῦτα πάντα οὐκ ἂν ὁ λελογισμένος εἰς οὐσιῶν διαφορὰς ἀπαγάγοι, προδήλως τῆς ἐνεργείας ὑφ' ἑκάστου τῶν ὀνομάτων σημαινομένης. ὥστε ὁ λέγων φύσεων διαφορὰς ἐν τοῖς κατειλεγμένοις ὀνόμασι παρὰ τοῦ Παύλου σημαίνεσθαι φρεναπατᾷ ἑαυτόν, καθώς φησιν ὁ ἀπόστολος, μὴ εἰδὼς μήτε ἃ λέγει μήτε περὶ τίνων διαβεβαιοῦται, σαφῶς ἐνδεικνυμένης τῆς τῶν ὀνομάτων σημασίας ὅτι ἀξιωμάτων τινῶν διαφορὰς ὁ ἀπόστολος ἐν ταῖς νοηταῖς δυνάμεσιν οἶδεν, οὐκ οὐσιῶν ἑτερότητας διὰ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐνδείκνυται.