Against Eunomius.

 Contents of Book I.

 Contents of Book II.

 Contents of Book III.

 Contents of Book IV.

 Contents of Book V.

 Contents of Book VI.

 Contents of Book VII.

 Contents of Book VIII.

 Contents of Book IX.

 Contents of Book X.

 Contents of Book XI.

 Contents of Book XII.

 §1. Preface.—It is useless to attempt to benefit those who will not accept help.

 §2. We have been justly provoked to make this Answer, being stung by Eunomius’ accusations of our brother.

 §3. We see nothing remarkable in logical force in the treatise of Eunomius, and so embark on our Answer with a just confidence.

 §4. Eunomius displays much folly and fine writing, but very little seriousness about vital points.

 §5. His peculiar caricature of the bishops, Eustathius of Armenia and Basil of Galatia, is not well drawn.

 §6. A notice of Aetius, Eunomius’ master in heresy, and of Eunomius himself, describing the origin and avocations of each.

 §7. Eunomius himself proves that the confession of faith which He made was not impeached.

 §8. Facts show that the terms of abuse which he has employed against Basil are more suitable for himself.

 §9. In charging Basil with not defending his faith at the time of the ‘Trials,’ he lays himself open to the same charge.

 §10. All his insulting epithets are shewn by facts to be false.

 §11. The sophistry which he employs to prove our acknowledgment that he had been tried, and that the confession of his faith had not been unimpeached,

 §12. His charge of cowardice is baseless: for Basil displayed the highest courage before the Emperor and his Lord-Lieutenants.

 §13. Résumé of his dogmatic teaching. Objections to it in detail.

 §14. He did wrong, when mentioning the Doctrines of Salvation, in adopting terms of his own choosing instead of the traditional terms Father, Son, and

 §15. He does wrong in making the being of the Father alone proper and supreme, implying by his omission of the Son and the Spirit that theirs is impro

 §16. Examination of the meaning of ‘subjection:’ in that he says that the nature of the Holy Spirit is subject to that of the Father and the Son. It i

 §17. Discussion as to the exact nature of the ‘energies’ which, this man declares, ‘follow’ the being of the Father and of the Son.

 §18. He has no reason for distinguishing a plurality of beings in the Trinity. He offers no demonstration that it is so.

 §19. His acknowledgment that the Divine Being is ‘single’ is only verbal.

 §20. He does wrong in assuming, to account for the existence of the Only-Begotten, an ‘energy’ that produced Christ’s Person.

 §21. The blasphemy of these heretics is worse than the Jewish unbelief.

 §22. He has no right to assert a greater and less in the Divine being. A systematic statement of the teaching of the Church.

 §23. These doctrines of our Faith witnessed to and confirmed by Scripture passages .

 §24. His elaborate account of degrees and differences in ‘works’ and ‘energies’ within the Trinity is absurd .

 §25. He who asserts that the Father is ‘prior’ to the Son with any thought of an interval must perforce allow that even the Father is not without begi

 §26. It will not do to apply this conception, as drawn out above, of the Father and Son to the Creation, as they insist on doing: but we must contempl

 §27. He falsely imagines that the same energies produce the same works, and that variation in the works indicates variation in the energies.

 §28. He falsely imagines that we can have an unalterable series of harmonious natures existing side by side.

 §29. He vainly thinks that the doubt about the energies is to be solved by the beings, and reversely.

 §30. There is no Word of God that commands such investigations: the uselessness of the philosophy which makes them is thereby proved.

 §31. The observations made by watching Providence are sufficient to give us the knowledge of sameness of Being.

 §32. His dictum that ‘the manner of the likeness must follow the manner of the generation’ is unintelligible.

 §33. He declares falsely that ‘the manner of the generation is to be known from the intrinsic worth of the generator’.

 §34. The Passage where he attacks the ‘ Ομοούσιον , and the contention in answer to it.

 §35. Proof that the Anomœan teaching tends to Manichæism.

 §36. A passing repetition of the teaching of the Church.

 §37. Defence of S. Basil’s statement, attacked by Eunomius, that the terms ‘Father’ and ‘The Ungenerate’ can have the same meaning .

 §38. Several ways of controverting his quibbling syllogisms .

 §39. Answer to the question he is always asking, “Can He who is be begotten?”

 §40. His unsuccessful attempt to be consistent with his own statements after Basil has confuted him.

 §41. The thing that follows is not the same as the thing that it follows.

 §42. Explanation of ‘Ungenerate,’ and a ‘study’ of Eternity.

 Book II

 Book II.

 §2. Gregory then makes an explanation at length touching the eternal Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.

 §3. Gregory proceeds to discuss the relative force of the unnameable name of the Holy Trinity and the mutual relation of the Persons, and moreover the

 §4. He next skilfully confutes the partial, empty and blasphemous statement of Eunomius on the subject of the absolutely existent.

 §5. He next marvellously overthrows the unintelligible statements of Eunomius which assert that the essence of the Father is not separated or divided,

 §6. He then shows the unity of the Son with the Father and Eunomius’ lack of understanding and knowledge in the Scriptures.

 §7. Gregory further shows that the Only-Begotten being begotten not only of the Father, but also impassibly of the Virgin by the Holy Ghost, does not

 §8. He further very appositely expounds the meaning of the term “Only-Begotten,” and of the term “First born,” four times used by the Apostle.

 §9. Gregory again discusses the generation of the Only-Begotten, and other different modes of generation, material and immaterial, and nobly demonstra

 §10. He explains the phrase “The Lord created Me,” and the argument about the origination of the Son, the deceptive character of Eunomius’ reasoning,

 §11. After expounding the high estate of the Almighty, the Eternity of the Son, and the phrase “being made obedient,” he shows the folly of Eunomius i

 §12. He thus proceeds to a magnificent discourse of the interpretation of “Mediator,” “Like,” “Ungenerate,” and “generate,” and of “The likeness and s

 §13. He expounds the passage of the Gospel, “The Father judgeth no man,” and further speaks of the assumption of man with body and soul wrought by the

 §14. He proceeds to discuss the views held by Eunomius, and by the Church, touching the Holy Spirit and to show that the Father, the Son, and the Hol

 §15. Lastly he displays at length the folly of Eunomius, who at times speaks of the Holy Spirit as created, and as the fairest work of the Son, and at

 Book III

 Book III.

 §2. He then once more excellently, appropriately, and clearly examines and expounds the passage, “The Lord Created Me.”

 §3. He then shows, from the instance of Adam and Abel, and other examples, the absence of alienation of essence in the case of the “generate” and “ung

 §4. He thus shows the oneness of the Eternal Son with the Father the identity of essence and the community of nature (wherein is a natural inquiry int

 §5. He discusses the incomprehensibility of the Divine essence, and the saying to the woman of Samaria, “Ye worship ye know not what.”

 §6. Thereafter he expounds the appellation of “Son,” and of “product of generation,” and very many varieties of “sons,” of God, of men, of rams, of pe

 §7. Then he ends the book with an exposition of the Divine and Human names of the Only-Begotten, and a discussion of the terms “generate” and “ungener

 Book IV

 Book IV.

 §2. He convicts Eunomius of having used of the Only-begotten terms applicable to the existence of the earth, and thus shows that his intention is to p

 §3. He then again admirably discusses the term πρωτότοκος as it is four times employed by the Apostle.

 §4. He proceeds again to discuss the impassibility of the Lord’s generation and the folly of Eunomius, who says that the generated essence involves t

 §5. He again shows Eunomius, constrained by truth, in the character of an advocate of the orthodox doctrine, confessing as most proper and primary, no

 §6. He then exposes argument about the “Generate,” and the “product of making,” and “product of creation,” and shows the impious nature of the languag

 §7. He then clearly and skilfully criticises the doctrine of the impossibility of comparison with the things made after the Son, and exposes the idola

 §8. He proceeds to show that there is no “variance” in the essence of the Father and the Son: wherein he expounds many forms of variation and harmony,

 §9. Then, distinguishing between essence and generation, he declares the empty and frivolous language of Eunomius to be like a rattle. He proceeds to

 Book V

 Book V.

 §2. He then explains the phrase of S. Peter, “Him God made Lord and Christ.” And herein he sets forth the opposing statement of Eunomius, which he mad

 §3. A remarkable and original reply to these utterances, and a demonstration of the power of the Crucified, and of the fact that this subjection was o

 §4. He shows the falsehood of Eunomius’ calumnious charge that the great Basil had said that “man was emptied to become man,” and demonstrates that th

 §5. Thereafter he shows that there are not two Christs or two Lords, but one Christ and one Lord, and that the Divine nature, after mingling with the

 Book VI

 Book VI.

 §2. Then he again mentions S. Peter’s word, “made,” and the passage in the Epistle to the Hebrews, which says that Jesus was made by God “an Apostle a

 §3. He then gives a notable explanation of the saying of the Lord to Philip, “He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father ” and herein he excellently di

 §4. Then returning to the words of Peter, “God made Him Lord and Christ,” he skilfully explains it by many arguments, and herein shows Eunomius as an

 Book VII

 Book VII.

 §2. He then declares that the close relation between names and things is immutable, and thereafter proceeds accordingly, in the most excellent manner,

 §3. Thereafter he discusses the divergence of names and of things, speaking, of that which is ungenerate as without a cause, and of that which is non-

 §4. He says that all things that are in creation have been named by man, if, as is the case, they are called differently by every nation, as also the

 §5. After much discourse concerning the actually existent, and ungenerate and good, and upon the consubstantiality of the heavenly powers, showing the

 Book VIII

 Book VIII.

 §2. He then discusses the “willing” of the Father concerning the generation of the Son, and shows that the object of that good will is from eternity,

 §3. Then, thus passing over what relates to the essence of the Son as having been already discussed, he treats of the sense involved in “generation,”

 §4. He further shows the operations of God to be expressed by human illustrations for what hands and feet and the other parts of the body with which

 §5. Then, after showing that the Person of the Only-begotten and Maker of things has no beginning, as have the things that were made by Him, as Eunomi

 Book IX

 Book IX.

 §2. He then ingeniously shows that the generation of the Son is not according to the phrase of Eunomius, “The Father begat Him at that time when He ch

 §3. He further shows that the pretemporal generation of the Son is not the subject of influences drawn from ordinary and carnal generation, but is wit

 §4. Then, having shown that Eunomius’ calumny against the great Basil, that he called the Only-begotten “Ungenerate,” is false, and having again with

 Book X

 Book X.

 §2. He then wonderfully displays the Eternal Life, which is Christ, to those who confess Him not, and applies to them the mournful lamentation of Jere

 §3. He then shows the eternity of the Son’s generation, and the inseparable identity of His essence with Him that begat Him, and likens the folly of E

 §4. After this he shows that the Son, who truly is, and is in the bosom of the Father, is simple and uncompounded, and that, He Who redeemed us from b

 Book XI

 Book XI.

 §2. He also ingeniously shows from the passage of the Gospel which speaks of “Good Master,” from the parable of the Vineyard, from Isaiah and from Pau

 §3. He then exposes the ignorance of Eunomius, and the incoherence and absurdity of his arguments, in speaking of the Son as “the Angel of the Existen

 §4. After this, fearing to extend his reply to great length, he passes by most of his adversary’s statements as already refuted. But the remainder, fo

 §5. Eunomius again speaks of the Son as Lord and God, and Maker of all creation intelligible and sensible, having received from the Father the power a

 Book XII

 Book XII.

 §2. Then referring to the blasphemy of Eunomius, which had been refuted by the great Basil, where he banished the Only-begotten God to the realm of da

 §3. He further proceeds notably to interpret the language of the Gospel, “In the beginning was the Word,” and “Life” and “Light,” and “The Word was ma

 §4. He then again charges Eunomius with having learnt his term ἀγεννησία from the hieroglyphic writings, and from the Egyptian mythology and idolatry,

 §5. Then, again discussing the true Light and unapproachable Light of the Father and of the Son, special attributes, community and essence, and showin

§4. Then, having shown that Eunomius’ calumny against the great Basil, that he called the Only-begotten “Ungenerate,” is false, and having again with much ingenuity discussed the eternity, being, and endlessness of the Only-begotten, and the creation of light and of darkness, he concludes the book.

With regard to his attempting to show that we say the Only-begotten God is ungenerate, it is as though he should say that we actually define the Father to be begotten: for either statement is of the same absurdity, or rather of the same blasphemous character. If, therefore, he has made up his mind to slander us, let him add the other charge as well, and spare nothing by which it may be in his power more violently to exasperate his hearers against us. But if one of these charges is withheld because its calumnious nature is apparent, why is the other made? For it is just the same thing, as we have said, so far as the impiety goes, to call the Son ungenerate and to call the Father generated. Now if any such phrase can be found in our writings, in which the Son is spoken of as ungenerate, we shall give the final vote against ourselves: but if he is fabricating false charges and calumnies at his pleasure, making any fictitious statement he pleases to slander our doctrines, this fact may serve with sensible men for an evidence of our orthodoxy, that while truth itself fights on our side, he brings forward a lie to accuse our doctrine and makes up an indictment for unorthodoxy that has no relation to our statements. To these charges, however, we can give a concise answer. As we judge that man accursed who says that the Only-begotten God is ungenerate, let him in turn anathematize the man who lays it down that He who was in the beginning “once was not.” For by such a method it will be shown who brings his charges truly, and who calumniously. But if we deny his accusations, if, when we speak of a Father, we understand as implied in that word a Son also, and if, when we use the name “Son,” we declare that He really is what He is called, being shed forth by generation from the ungenerate Light, how can the calumny of those who persist that we say the Only-begotten is ungenerate fail to be manifest? Yet we shall not, because we say that He exists by generation, therefore admit that He “once was not.” For every one knows that the contradiction between “being” and “not being” is immediate, so that the affirmation of one of these terms is absolutely the destruction of the other, and that, just as “being” is the same in regard to every time at which any of the things that “are” is supposed to have its existence (for the sky, and stars, and sun, and the rest of the things that “are,” are not more in a state of being now than they were yesterday, or the day before, or at any previous time), so the meaning of “not being” expresses non-existence equally at every time, whether one speaks of it in reference to what is earlier or to what is later. For any of the things that do not exist867    Reading τῶν μὴ ὑφεστώτων, as the sense seems to require, unless we connect τῶν ὑφεστώτων with οὐκ ἔστιν. In this case the sense will be practically the same, but the sentence will be extremely involved. The point which S. Gregory desires to enforce is that “not being,” or “non-existence,” is one and the same thing, whether it is regarded as past, present, or future, and that it is, in any of these aspects, an idea which we cannot without impiety attach to the Divine Person of the Son. is no more in a state of “not being” now than if it were non-existent before, but the idea of “not being” is one applied to that which “is not” at any distance of time. And for this reason, in speaking of living creatures, while we use different words to denote the dissolution into a state of “not being” of that which has been, and the condition of non-existence of that which has never had an entrance into being, and say either that a thing has never come into being at all, or that which was generated has died, yet by either form of speech we equally represent by our words “non-existence.” For as day is bounded on each side by night, yet the parts of the night which bound it are not named alike, but we speak of one as “after night-fall,” and of the other as “before dawn,” while that which both phrases denote is night, so, if any one looks on that which is not in contrast to that which is, he will give different names to that state which is antecedent to formation and to that which follows the dissolution of what was formed, yet will conceive as one the condition which both phrases signify—the condition which is antecedent to formation and the condition following on dissolution after formation. For the state of “not being” of that which has not been generated, and of that which has died, save for the difference of the names, are the same,—with the exception of the account which we take of the hope of the resurrection. Now since we learn from Scripture that the Only-begotten God is the Prince of Life, the very life, and light, and truth, and all that is honourable in word or thought, we say that it is absurd and impious to contemplate, in conjunction with Him Who really is, the opposite conception, whether of dissolution tending to corruption, or of non-existence before formation: but as we extend our thought in every direction to what is to follow, or to what was before the ages, we nowhere pause in our conceptions at the condition of “not being,” judging it to tend equally to impiety to cut short the Divine being by non-existence at any time whatever. For it is the same thing to say that the immortal life is mortal, that the truth is a lie, that light is darkness, and that that which is is not. He, accordingly, who refuses to allow that He will at some future time cease to be, will also refuse to allow that He “once was not,” avoiding, according to our view, the same impiety on either hand: for, as no death cuts short the endlessness of the life of the Only-begotten, so, as we look back, no period of nonexistence will terminate His life in its course towards eternity, that that which in reality is may be clear of all community with that which in reality is not. For this cause the Lord, desiring that His disciples might be far removed from this error (that they might never, by themselves searching for something antecedent to the existence of the Only-begotten, be led by their reasoning to the idea of non-existence), saith, “I am in the Father, and the Father in Me868    S. John xiv. 10,” in the sense that neither is that which is not conceived in that which is, nor that which is in that which is not. And here the very order of the phrase explains the orthodox doctrine; for because the Father is not of the Son, but the Son of the Father, therefore He says, “I am in the Father,” showing the fact that He is not of another but of Him, and then reverses the phrase to, “and the Father in Me,” indicating that he who, in his curious speculation, passes beyond the Son, passes also beyond the conception of the Father: for He who is in anything cannot be found outside of that in which He is: so that the man who, while not denying that the Father is in the Son, yet imagines that he has in any degree apprehended the Father as external to the Son, is talking idly. Idle too are the wanderings of our adversaries’ fighting about shadows touching the matter of “ungeneracy,” proceeding without solid foundation by means of nonentities. Yet if I am to bring more fully to light the whole absurdity of their argument, let me be allowed to spend a little longer on this speculation. As they say that the Only-begotten God came into existence “later,” after the Father, this “unbegotten” of theirs, whatever they imagine it to be, is discovered of necessity to exhibit with itself the idea of evil. Who knows not, that, just as the non-existent is contrasted with the existent, so with every good thing or name is contrasted the opposite conception, as “bad” with “good,” “falsehood” with “truth,” “darkness” with “light,” and all the rest that are similarly opposed to one another, where the opposition admits of no middle term, and it is impossible that the two should co-exist, but the presence of the one destroys its opposite, and with the withdrawal of the other takes place the appearance of its contrary?

Now these points being conceded to us, the further point is also clear to any one, that, as Moses says darkness was before the creation of light, so also in the case of the Son (if, according to the heretical statement, the Father “made Him at that time when He willed”), before He made Him, that Light which the Son is was not; and, light not yet being, it is impossible that its opposite should not be. For we learn also from the other instances that nothing that comes from the Creator is at random, but that which was lacking is added by creation to existing things. Thus it is quite clear that if God did make the Son, He made Him by reason of a deficiency in the nature of things. As, then, while sensible light was still lacking, there was darkness, and darkness would certainly have prevailed had light not come into being, so also, when the Son “as yet was not,” the very and true Light, and all else that the Son is, did not exist. For even according to the evidence of heresy, that which exists has no need of coming into being; if therefore He made Him, He assuredly made that which did not exist. Thus, according to their view, before the Son came into being, neither had truth come into being, nor the intelligible Light, nor the fount of life, nor, generally, the nature of any thing that is excellent and good. Now, concurrently with the exclusion of each of these, there is found to subsist the opposite conception: and if light was not, it cannot be denied that darkness was; and so with the rest,—in place of each of these more excellent conceptions it is clearly impossible that its opposite did not exist in place of that which was lacking. It is therefore a necessary conclusion, that when the Father, as the heretics say, “had not as yet willed to make the Son,” none of those things which the Son is being yet existent, we must say that He was surrounded by darkness instead of Light, by falsehood instead of truth, by death instead of life, by evil instead of good. For He Who creates, creates things that are not; “That which is,” as Eunomius says, “needs not generation”; and of those things which are considered as opposed, the better cannot be non-existent, except by the existence of the worse. These are the gifts with which the wisdom of heresy honours the Father, by which it degrades the eternity of the Son, and ascribes to God and the Father, before the “production” of the Son, the whole catalogue of evils!

And let no one think to rebut by examples from the rest of creation the demonstration of the doctrinal absurdity which results from this argument. One will perhaps say that, as, when the sky was not, there was no opposite to it, so we are not absolutely compelled to admit that if the Son, Who is Truth, had not come into existence, the opposite did exist. To him we may reply that to the sky there is no corresponding opposite, unless one were to say that its non-existence is opposed to its existence. But to virtue is certainly opposed that which is vicious (and the Lord is virtue); so that when the sky was not, it does not follow that anything was; but when good was not, its opposite was; thus he who says that good was not, will certainly allow, even without intending it, that evil was. “But the Father also,” he says869    The words are probably those of the imaginary objector; but they may be a citation from Eunomius., “is absolute virtue, and life, and light unapproachable, and all that is exalted in word or thought: so that there is no necessity to suppose, when the Only-begotten Light was not, the existence of that darkness which is His corresponding opposite.” But this is just what I say, that darkness never was; for the light never “was not,” for “the light,” as the prophecy says, “is always in the light870    The reference is probably to Ps. xxxvi. 9..” If, however, according to the heretical doctrine, the “ungenerate light” is one thing, and the “generated light” another, and the one is eternal, while the other comes into existence at a later time, it follows of absolute necessity that in the eternal light we should find no place for the establishment of its opposite; (for if the light always shines, the power of darkness has no place in it;) and that in the case of the light which comes into being, as they say, afterwards, it is impossible that the light should shine forth save out of darkness; and the interval of darkness between eternal light and that which arises later will be clearly marked in every way.871    i.e.the “later light” must have arisen from darkness; therefore darkness must have intervened between the “eternal light” and the “later light.” For there would have been no need of the making of the later light, if that which was created had not been of utility for some purpose: and the one use of light is that of the dispersion by its means of the prevailing gloom. Now the light which exists without creation is what it is by nature by reason of itself; but the created light clearly comes into being by reason of something else. It must be then that its existence was preceded by darkness, on account of which the light was of necessity created, and it is not possible by any reasoning to make plausible the view that darkness did not precede the manifestation of the Only-begotten Light,—on the supposition, that is, that He is believed to have been “made” at a later time. Surely such a doctrine is beyond all impiety! It is therefore clearly shown that the Father of truth did not make the truth at a time when it was not; but, being the fountain of light and truth, and of all good, He shed forth from Himself that Only-begotten Light of truth by which the glory of His Person is expressly imaged; so that the blasphemy of those who say that the Son was a later addition to God by way of creation is at all points refuted.

Τὸ δὲ κατασκευάζειν αὐτὸν ἀγέννητον παρ' ἡμῶν λέγεσθαι τὸν μονογενῆ θεὸν ἴσον ἐστὶ τῷ λέγειν ὅτι καὶ γεννητὸν εἶναι τὸν πατέρα διοριζόμεθα. τῆς γὰρ αὐτῆς ἀτοπίας, μᾶλλον δὲ βλασφημίας ἑκάτερον: ὥστε εἰ μὲν συκοφαντεῖν ἔγνωκε, προστιθέτω καὶ τὸ ἕτερον ἔγκλημα, μηδενὸς φειδόμενος δι' ὧν ἂν ᾖ δυνατὸν χαλεπώτερον ἐκτραχύνειν καθ' ἡμῶν τοὺς ἀκούοντας. εἰ δὲ τὸ ἕτερον τούτων διὰ τὸ περιφανὲς τῆς συκοφαντίας οὐκ αἰτιᾶται, ἀφιέτω καὶ τὸ λειπόμενον: ἴσον γὰρ εἰς ἀσέβειαν, καθὼς εἴρηται, καὶ τὸν υἱὸν ἀγέννητον λέγειν καὶ γεννητὸν τὸν πατέρα. εἰ μὲν οὖν εὑρίσκεταί τις ἐν τοῖς παρ' ἡμῶν γεγραμμένοις φωνὴ τοιαύτη, δι' ἧς ἀγέννητος ὁ υἱὸς ὀνομάζεται, καθ' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τὴν ἐσχάτην ψῆφον ἐξοίσομεν: εἰ δὲ ψευδεῖς αἰτίας τε καὶ συκοφαντίας κατ' ἐξουσίαν συμπλάσσει, τὸ δοκοῦν ἐπὶ διαβολῇ τῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς δογμάτων λογοποιῶν, γένοιτ' ἂν ἴσως τοῖς γε νοῦν ἔχουσι καὶ αὕτη τῆς ἐν ἡμῖν εὐσεβείας ἀπόδειξις, ὅτι τῆς ἀληθείας ἡμῶν ὑπερμαχούσης τὸ ψεῦδος εἰς κατηγορίαν τοῦ δόγματος ἡμῶν προεστήσατο, ἀλλοτρίαν τοῦ ἡμετέρου λόγου κατασκευάζων τὴν τῆς ἀσεβείας γραφήν. ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἐν συντόμῳ πρὸς τὰς αἰτίας ταύτας ἀπολογήσασθαι. ὡς γὰρ ἡμεῖς τὸν ἀγεννήτως εἶναι λέγοντα τὸν μονογενῆ θεὸν ἐπάρατον κρίνομεν, οὕτω κἀκεῖνος ἐπαράσθω τὸν μὴ εἶναί ποτε τὸν ἐν ἀρχῇ ὄντα διοριζόμενον. ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ τοιούτου δειχθήσεται τρόπου ὅ τε κατὰ ἀλήθειαν καὶ ὁ συκοφαντικῶς τὰς αἰτίας ἐπάγων. εἰ δὲ ἡμεῖς ἀρνούμεθα τὰ ἐγκλήματα, καὶ πατέρα λέγοντες τῇ φωνῇ υἱὸν συνεπινοοῦμεν, καὶ υἱὸν ὀνομάσαντες ἀληθῶς εἶναί φαμεν ὃ λέγεται, γεννητῶς ἐκ τοῦ ἀγεννήτου φωτὸς ἀπαυγασθέντα, πῶς οὐ πρόδηλος ἡ συκοφαντία τῶν ἀγέννητον λέγειν ἡμᾶς τὸν μονογενῆ θρυλούντων; οὐ μὴν ἐπειδὴ γεννητῶς αὐτὸν εἶναί φαμεν, τὸ μὴ εἶναι αὐτόν ποτε διὰ τούτου παραδεξόμεθα. τίς γὰρ οὐκ οἶδεν ὅτι ἄμεσός ἐστιν ἡ κατὰ τὸ σημαινόμενον ἐναντίωσις τοῦ ὄντος καὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, ὥστε τὴν τοῦ ἑτέρου τῶν εἰρημένων θέσιν ἀναίρεσιν τοῦ ἐναντίου γίνεσθαι πάντως, καὶ ὅτι καθάπερ τὸ εἶναι κατὰ πάντα χρόνον ταὐτόν ἐστιν, ἐν ᾧπερ ἄν τις ὑφεστάναι τι τῶν ὄντων ὑπόθηται (οὐ γὰρ μᾶλλον νῦν ἔστιν οὐρανὸς καὶ ἄστρα καὶ ἥλιος καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν ὄντων ἢ χθὲς καὶ πρώην καὶ ἐν παντὶ τῷ προάγοντι χρόνῳ), τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι τὸ σημαινόμενον ἐπίσης ἐν παντὶ τὸ ἀνύπαρκτον ἔχει, εἴτε κατὰ τὸ πρότερόν τις εἴτε κατὰ τὸ ὕστερον λέγοι. οὐ γὰρ μᾶλλον νῦν τι τῶν ὑφεστώτων οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ εἰ πρότερον ἀνύπαρκτον ἦν, ἀλλὰ εἷς ὁ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι λόγος ἐπὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἐν παντὶ χρονικῷ διαστήματι. διὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ζῴων τήν τε τοῦ γεγονότος εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν ἀνάλυσιν καὶ τοῦ μηδέπω τὴν εἰς τὸ γενέσθαι πάροδον ἐσχηκότος ὀνόμασι μὲν διαφόροις τὴν ἀνυπαρξίαν σημαίνομεν, ἢ μὴ γεγενῆσθαι τὴν ἀρχὴν ἢ τεθνάναι τὸ γενόμενον λέγοντες, ἐπίσης δὲ δι' ἑκατέρας φωνῆς τὸ ἀνύπαρκτον παριστῶμεν τῷ λόγῳ. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡ ἡμέρα νυκτὶ περιέχεται καθ' ἑκάτερον μέρος, λέγεται δὲ οὐχ ὡσαύτως τὰ περιέχοντα, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν μετὰ τὴν ἑσπέραν, τὸ δὲ πρὸ τοῦ ὄρθρου, νὺξ δὲ τὸ δηλούμενόν ἐστι κατ' ἀμφότερα, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον εἰ ἐκ τοῦ παραλλήλου πρὸς τὸ ὂν ἀντιθεωροίη τις τὸ μὴ ὄν, κατονομάσει μὲν διαφόρως τό τε πρὸ τῆς συστάσεως καὶ τὸ μετὰ τὴν τοῦ συστάντος διάλυσιν, ἓν δὲ νοήσει δι' ἀμφοτέρων τὸ σημαινόμενον [τό τε πρὸ τῆς συστάσεως καὶ τὸ μετὰ τὴν τοῦ συστάντος διάλυσιν]. τὸ γὰρ μὴ εἶναι τοῦ τε μὴ γεννηθέντος καὶ τοῦ τεθνηκότος πλὴν τῆς διαφορᾶς τῶν ὀνομάτων ἴσον ἐστὶν ὑπεξῃρημένου τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα τῆς ἀναστάσεως λόγου. ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν ἀρχηγὸν ζωῆς καὶ αὐτοζωὴν τὸν μονογενῆ θεὸν παρὰ τῆς γραφῆς μεμαθήκαμεν καὶ φῶς καὶ ἀλήθειαν καὶ πᾶν ὅτιπέρ ἐστιν ἐν ὀνόματι καὶ νοήματι τίμιον, ἄτοπον καὶ δυσσεβὲς εἶναί φαμεν τῷ ὄντως ὄντι συνθεωρεῖν καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἐναντίου νοούμενον, ἢ διάλυσιν εἰς φθορὰν ἢ ἀνυπαρξίαν πρὸ τῆς συστάσεως, ἀλλὰ πανταχόθεν πρὸς τὸ ἐφεξῆς καὶ πρὸς τὸ προαιώνιον ἐπεκτείνοντες ἑαυτῶν τὴν διάνοιαν οὐδαμοῦ πρὸς τὸ μὴ ὂν ταῖς ἐννοίαις λήγομεν, ἴσον εἰς ἀσέβειαν κρίνοντες οἱῳδήποτε χρόνῳ δι' ἀνυπαρξίας περικόπτειν τὸ θεῖον. ταὐτὸν γάρ ἐστιν καὶ θνητὴν εἰπεῖν τὴν ἀθάνατον ζωὴν καὶ ψευδῆ τὴν ἀλήθειαν καὶ σκοτεινὸν τὸ φῶς καὶ μὴ εἶναι τὸ ὄν. ὁ τοίνυν τὸ μὴ ἔσεσθαί ποτε μὴ διδοὺς οὐδὲ τὸ μὴ εἶναί ποτε συνθήσεται κατὰ τὸν ἡμέτερον λόγον, τὴν αὐτὴν ἀτοπίαν φεύγων καθ' ἑκάτερον μέρος: ὡς γὰρ τὸ ἀτελεύτητον τῆς ζωῆς τοῦ μονογενοῦς οὐκ ἐπικόπτει θάνατος, οὕτως οὐδὲ κατὰ τὸ ἄνω ἡ ἀνυπαρξία στήσει πρὸς τὸ ἀΐδιον αὐτοῦ τὴν ζωὴν προϊοῦσαν, ὡς ἂν πανταχόθεν καθαρεύοι τὸ ὄντως ὂν τῆς πρὸς τὸ μὴ ὂν κοινωνίας. διὰ τοῦτο πόρρω γίνεσθαι τῆς τοιαύτης πλάνης τοὺς μαθητὰς θέλων ὁ κύριος, ὡς ἂν μή ποτε καὶ αὐτοὶ τὸ πρεσβύτερον τῆς τοῦ μονογενοῦς ὑποστάσεως ἀναζητοῦντες πρὸς τὸ ἀνύπαρκτον τοῖς λογισμοῖς ἀπενεχθεῖεν. Ἐγώ, φησίν, ἐν τῷ πατρὶ καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἐν ἐμοί, ὡς οὔτε τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἐν τῷ ὄντι νοουμένου οὔτε τοῦ ὄντος ἐν τῷ μὴ ὄντι. καὶ αὐτὴ δὲ ἡ τοῦ λόγου τάξις τὸ εὐσεβὲς ἑρμηνεύει τοῦ δόγματος. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ υἱοῦ ὁ πατήρ, ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς ὁ υἱός, διὰ τοῦτο πρῶτόν φησιν Ἐγὼ ἐν τῷ πατρί, δεικνὺς τὸ μὴ ἄλλως ἀλλ' ἐξ ἐκείνου εἶναι, εἶτα ἀναστρέφει τὸν λόγον ὅτι Καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἐν ἐμοί, σημαίνων ὅτι ὁ ὑπερβὰς τὸν υἱὸν τῇ πολυπραγμοσύνῃ καὶ τὴν περὶ τοῦ πατρὸς ἔννοιαν συμπαρέρχεται. ὁ γὰρ ἔν τινι ὢν ἔξω τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἐστιν εὑρεθῆναι οὐ δύναται: ὥστε μάταιος ὁ ἐν τῷ υἱῷ μὲν εἶναι τὸν πατέρα μὴ ἀντιλέγων, ἔξω δὲ τοῦ υἱοῦ κατειληφέναι τι τοῦ πατρὸς φανταζόμενος, καὶ μάτην διαπλανᾶται τῶν πολεμούντων ἡμῖν ἡ περὶ τὸ ῥῆμα τῆς « ἀγεννησίας » σκιαμαχία διὰ τῶν ἀνυπάρκτων κενεμβατοῦσα.
Μᾶλλον δὲ εἰ χρὴ πᾶσαν εἰς τὸ ἐμφανὲς ἀγαγεῖν τὴν ἀτοπίαν τοῦ λόγου, μικρὸν ἔτι συγχωρηθήτω προσδιατρίψαι τῷ θεωρήματι. τοῦ γὰρ μονογενοῦς θεοῦ ὕστερον μετὰ τὸν πατέρα γεγεννῆσθαι παρ' αὐτῶν λεγομένου, εὑρίσκεται κατ' ἀνάγκην τὸ ἀγέννητον αὐτῶν, ὅ τι ποτὲ καὶ εἶναι φαντάζονται, τῶν κακῶν τὴν ἔννοιαν συνεμφαῖνον. τίς γὰρ οὐκ οἶδεν ὅτι ὥσπερ τῷ ὄντι τὸ μὴ ὂν ἀντιδιαιρεῖται, οὕτω καὶ παντὶ ἀγαθῷ πράγματί τε καὶ ὀνόματι τὸ ἐξ ἐναντίου νοούμενον, οἷον τῷ καλῷ τὸ κακὸν καὶ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τὸ ψεῦδος, τῷ φωτὶ τὸ σκότος καὶ πάντα ὅσα τούτοις ὁμοιοτρόπως πρὸς τὸ ἐναντίον ἀλλήλοις ἀντικαθίσταται, ἐφ' ὧν ἄμεσός ἐστιν ἡ ἐναντίωσις καὶ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται κατὰ ταὐτὸν τὰ δύο μετ' ἀλλήλων εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἥ τε παρουσία τοῦ ἑνὸς ὑπεξαιρεῖ τὸ ἀντίθετον καὶ ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἑτέρου ὑποχωρήσει γίνεται τοῦ ἐναντίου ἡ γένεσις. τούτων δὲ ἡμῖν οὕτω διωμολογημένων κἀκεῖνο παντὶ δῆλόν ἐστιν, ὅτι ὥσπερ φησὶ Μωϋσῆς σκότος εἶναι πρὸ τῆς τοῦ φωτὸς κτίσεως, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ, εἰ κατὰ τὸν λόγον τῆς αἱρέσεως τότε ἐποίησεν αὐτὸν ὁ πατὴρ ὅτε ἠθέλησε, πρὶν ποιῆσαι αὐτὸν οὐκ ἦν ἐκεῖνο τὸ φῶς, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὁ υἱός. φωτὸς δὲ μήπω ὄντος οὐκ ἐνδέχεται μὴ τὸ ἀντικείμενον εἶναι. καὶ γὰρ διὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἐμάθομεν ὅτι οὐδὲν εἰκῇ τῶν παρὰ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ γεγονότων ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ λεῖπον ἐπεισάγεται τοῖς οὖσι διὰ τῆς κτίσεως. δῆλον οὖν ἐστι πάντως ὅτι εἴπερ ἐποίησε τὸν υἱὸν ὁ θεός, διὰ τὸ λείπειν τῇ φύσει τῶν ὄντων ἐποίησεν. ὥσπερ οὖν τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ φωτὸς λείποντος σκότος ἦν καί, εἰ μὴ ἐγεγόνει τὸ φῶς, ἐπεκράτει πάντως τὸ σκότος, οὕτως καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ μήπω ὄντος αὐτό τε τὸ ἀληθινὸν φῶς καὶ πάντα ὅσα ἐστὶν ὁ υἱὸς οὔπω ἦν. τὸ γὰρ ὂν καὶ κατὰ τὴν τῆς αἱρέσεως μαρτυρίαν τοῦ γενέσθαι οὐ δέεται. οὐκοῦν εἰ ἐποίησε, τὸ μὴ ὂν πάντως ἐποίησε. πρὶν οὖν γενέσθαι κατ' αὐτοὺς τὸν υἱὸν οὐδὲ ἡ ἀλήθεια δηλονότι ἐγεγόνει οὔτε τὸ νοητὸν φῶς οὔτε ἡ πηγὴ τῆς ζωῆς οὔτε τινὸς καθόλου καλοῦ τε καὶ ἀγαθοῦ φύσις. ἀλλὰ μὴν τούτων ἑκάστου τῇ ὑπεξαιρέσει τὸ ἐξ ἐναντίου νοούμενον παρυφίσταται, καὶ φωτὸς μὴ ὄντος οὐκ ἔστι μὴ σκότος εἶναι, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡσαύτως ἀνθ' ἑκάστου τῶν πρὸς τὸ κρεῖττον νοουμένων, ὅταν μὴ παρῇ τι τούτων, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται μὴ τὸ ἐναντίον πάντως εἶναι ἀντὶ τοῦ λείποντος. ἀνάγκη οὖν πᾶσα, ὡς ἔμελλε θέλειν ὁ πατὴρ τὸν υἱὸν „ποιῆσαι„ κατὰ τὸν τῆς αἱρέσεως λόγον, μηδενὸς ὄντος τῶν ὅσα ὁ υἱός ἐστιν, πάντα τὰ ἐναντία περὶ αὐτὸν εἶναι λέγειν, ἀντὶ τοῦ φωτὸς τὸ σκότος, ἀντὶ τῆς ἀληθείας τὸ ψεῦδος, ἀντὶ τῆς ζωῆς τὸν θάνατον, ἀντὶ τοῦ καλοῦ τὸ κακόν. ὁ γὰρ κτίζων τὰ μὴ ὄντα κτίζει: « τῷ γὰρ ὄντι », καθώς φησιν ὁ Εὐνόμιος, « οὐ δεῖ γεννήσεως ». τῶν δὲ κατὰ ἀντίθεσιν θεωρουμένων οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλως τὰ κρείττω μὴ εἶναι ἢ ἐκ τοῦ τὰ χείρονα εἶναι. ταῦτα τοίνυν ἡ σοφία τῆς αἱρέσεως δωροφορεῖ τῷ πατρὶ δι' ὧν ἀτιμάζει τοῦ υἱοῦ τὸ ἀΐδιον, τὸν τῶν κακῶν κατάλογον πρὸ τῆς τοῦ υἱοῦ ἀναδείξεως προσάγουσα τῷ θεῷ καὶ πατρί.
Καὶ μηδεὶς ἐκ τῆς ἄλλης κτίσεως ἀνατρέπειν οἰέσθω τὴν ἐκ τῆς ἀκολουθίας ταύτης ἀναδειχθεῖσαν ἀτοπίαν τοῦ δόγματος. ἐρεῖ γάρ τις ἴσως ὅτι ὥσπερ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ μὴ ὄντος οὐδὲν ἐναντίον τούτῳ, οὕτως καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ μήπω γενομένου, ὅς ἐστιν ἀλήθεια, οὐ πάντως ἀναγκαζόμεθα τὸ ἐναντίον εἶναι συντίθεσθαι. πρὸς ὃν ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ὅτι οὐρανῷ μὲν τὸ ἀντικείμενον ἔστιν οὐδέν, εἰ μὴ ἄρα τῷ εἶναι αὐτὸν τὸ μὴ εἶναί τις λέγοι ἀντίθετον. τῇ δὲ ἀρετῇ τὸ κατὰ κακίαν πάντως ἀντικαθέστηκεν, ἀρετὴ δὲ ὁ κύριος, ὥστε οὐρανοῦ μὲν μὴ ὄντος οὐδὲν ἦν, ἀγαθοῦ δὲ μὴ ὄντος τὸ ἐναντίον ἦν. ὁ οὖν τὸ ἀγαθὸν λέγων μὴ εἶναι τὸ κακὸν εἶναι καὶ μὴ βουλόμενος πάντως συνθήσεται. « ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ πατήρ », φησί, « καὶ παντελής ἐστιν ἀρετὴ καὶ ζωὴ καὶ ἀπρόσιτον φῶς καὶ πάντα τὰ ὑψηλὰ νοήματά τε καὶ ὀνόματα: ὡς μὴ εἶναι ἀνάγκην, ὅτε τὸ μονογενὲς φῶς οὔπω ἦν, τὸ κατάλληλον ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου νοεῖσθαι σκότος ». ἀλλ' οὗτος ὁ ἐμός ἐστι λόγος, ὅτι οὐδέποτε σκότος ἦν. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἦν ποτε ὅτε τὸ φῶς οὐκ ἦν: ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ φωτὶ πάντως ἐστὶ τὸ φῶς, καθὼς ἡ προφητεία λέγει. εἰ δὲ κατὰ τὸν λόγον τῆς αἱρέσεως ἄλλο τὸ ἀγέννητον καὶ ἕτερον τὸ γεννητόν ἐστι φῶς καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐξ ἀϊδίου τοῦτο δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα γενόμενον, ἀνάγκη πᾶσα τῷ μὲν ἀϊδίῳ φωτὶ μηδέποτε χώραν εὑρεῖν ἀντικαταστῆναι τὸ ἀντικείμενον: ἀεὶ γὰρ λάμποντος τοῦ φωτὸς ἡ ἐνέργεια τοῦ σκότους ἐπ' αὐτοῦ χώραν οὐκ ἔχει: ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ μετὰ ταῦτα, καθὼς ἐκεῖνοί φασι, γεγονότος ἀμήχανον εἶναι μὴ ἐκ σκότους τὸ φῶς λάμψαι, ἀλλὰ πάντῃ καὶ πάντως τοῦ τε ἀϊδίου φωτὸς καὶ τοῦ ὕστερον γενομένου σκότος τὸ μέσον διαληφθήσεται. οὐ γὰρ ἂν τῆς κατασκευῆς τοῦ μετὰ ταῦτα φωτὸς χρεία ἐγίνετο, εἰ μὴ πρός τι χρήσιμον ἦν τὸ κτιζόμενον. μία δὲ φωτὸς χρῆσις τοῦ λύεσθαι δι' αὐτοῦ τὸν ἐπικρατοῦντα ζόφον. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀκτίστως ὂν φῶς αὐτὸ δι' ἑαυτό ἐστιν ὅπερ ἐστὶν τῇ φύσει, τὸ δὲ κτιζόμενον διά τι γίνεται πάντως. οὐκοῦν προϋπάρχειν ἀνάγκη τὸ σκότος, οὗ χάριν ἀναγκαίως δημιουργεῖται τὸ φέγγος, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδενὶ λόγῳ παραμυθήσασθαι τὸ μὴ προτερεύειν τῆς τοῦ γεννητοῦ φωτὸς ἀναδείξεως τὸ σκότος, ὅταν μετὰ ταῦτα κατεσκευάσθαι πιστεύηται. ἀλλὰ μὴν πάσης ἀσεβείας τὸ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ἐπέκεινα. ἄρα σαφῶς πεφανέρωται ὅτι οὐχὶ μὴ οὖσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ὁ πατὴρ τῆς ἀληθείας ἐποίησεν, ἀλλὰ πηγὴ ὢν φωτὸς καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ τὸ μονογενὲς φῶς τῆς ἀληθείας ἀπηύγασε, δι' οὗ πάντοτε ἡ τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτοῦ δόξα χαρακτηρίζεται, ὡς πανταχόθεν τῶν ὕστερον τῷ θεῷ διὰ κτίσεως τὸν υἱὸν προγεγενῆσθαι λεγόντων τὴν βλασφημίαν ἐλέγχεσθαι.