The first part of my contentions against Eunomius has with God’s help been sufficiently established in the preceding work, as all who will may see fro
And let no one suppose that it is through pride or desire of human reputation that I go down to this truceless and implacable warfare to engage with t
First of all, however, I think it advisable to run briefly over our own doctrinal views and our opponent’s disagreement with them, so that our review
But to the best of my ability I will raise my voice to rebut our enemies’ argument. They say that God is declared to be without generation, that the G
Now if the term ungenerate did not signify the being without origin, but the idea of simplicity entered into the meaning of such a term, and He were c
But, saith he, He is without both quantity and magnitude. Granted: for the Son also is unlimited by quantity and magnitude, and yet is He the Son. But
But this thing he leaves untold, and only says that ungeneracy should not be predicated of God as a mere conception. For what is so spoken, saith he,
But before we examine what he has written, it may be better to enquire with what purpose it is that he refuses to admit that ungenerate can be predica
For after saying that the Only-begotten God is not the same in essence with the true Father, and after sophistically inferring this from the oppositio
Accordingly, enveloping his former special-pleading in the mazy evolutions of his sophistries, and dealing subtly with the term ungenerate, he steals
Seeing, then, the mischief resulting to the dupes of this fallacious reasoning—that to assent to His not being very God is a departure from our confes
It will presently be time to bring to their own recollection the method of this argument. Suffice it first to say this. There is no faculty in human n
If, then, the lower creation which comes under our organs of sense transcends human knowledge, how can He, Who by His mere will made the worlds, be wi
How pitiable are they for their cleverness! how wretched, how fatal is their over-wise philosophy! Who is there who goes of his own accord to the pit
This, then, was the meaning of his safe guidance on the way to what he sought—that he was not blindly led by any of the means ready to hand for his in
He shows, I think, by the relation of these elements to each other, or rather by their distance, how far the divine nature is above the speculations o
Knowing, then, how widely the Divine nature differs from our own, let us quietly remain within our proper limits. For it is both safer and more revere
And on other accounts also it may be called safe to let alone the Divine essence, as unspeakable, and beyond the scope of human reasoning. For the des
Wherefore Holy Scripture omits all idle inquiry into substance as superfluous and unnecessary. And methinks it was for this that John, the Son of Thun
But, nevertheless, with only such a nature for their base of operations, they open their mouths wide against the unspeakable Power, and encompass by o
I have said, then (for I make my master’s words my own), that reason supplies us with but a dim and imperfect comprehension of the Divine nature neve
But although our great master has thus cleared away all unworthy notions respecting the Divine nature, and has urged and taught all that may be revere
And yet it is plain to every one who has given any attention to the uses of words, that the word incorruption denotes by the privative particle that n
While, however, we strenuously avoid all concurrence with absurd notions in our thoughts of God, we allow ourselves in the use of many diverse appella
And if any one would distinguish such notions by words, he would find it absolutely necessary to call that which admits of no changing to the worse un
I say, then, that men have a right to such word-building, adapting their appellations to their subject, each man according to his judgment and that t
For God is not an expression, neither hath He His essence in voice or utterance. But God is of Himself what also He is believed to be, but He is named
But in applying such appellations to the Divine essence, “which passeth all understanding,” we do not seek to glory in it by the names we employ, but
But let us hear how, “in the way most needed, and the form that preceded” (for with such rhymes he again gives us a taste of the flowers of style), le
If, then, the creation is of later date than its Creator, and man is the latest in the scale of creation, and if speech is a distinctive characteristi
He says that God was what He is, before the creation of man. Nor do we deny it. For whatsoever we conceive of God existed before the creation of the w
But that we might gain some sort of comprehension of what with reverence may be thought respecting Him, we have stamped our different ideas with certa
They say that God is ungenerate, and in this we agree. But that ungeneracy itself constitutes the Divine essence, here we take exception. For we maint
With such gibes at the term “conception,” he shows, to the best of his ability, that it is useless and unprofitable for the life of man. What, then, w
But why enumerate the greater and more splendid results of this faculty? For every one who is not unfriendly to truth can see for himself that all els
Now that He did not teach us such things by some visible operation, Himself presiding over the work, as we may see in matters of bodily teaching, no o
For that one who proposes to himself to terrify or charm an audience should have plenty of conception to effect such a purpose, and should display to
For it is not the case that, while the intelligence implanted in us by the Giver is fully competent to conjure up non-realities, it is endowed with no
But as far as possible to elucidate the idea, I will endeavour to illustrate it by a still plainer example. Let us suppose the inquiry to be about som
This example being understood, it is time to go on to the thing which it illustrates. This much we comprehend, that the First Cause has His existence
Such are his charges against us not indeed his notions as expressed in his own phraseology, for we have made such alterations as were required to cor
If, then, God gives things their names as our new expositor of the Divine record assures us, naming germ, and grass, and tree, and fruit, He must of n
Such is the nature of this new-fangled Deity, as deducible from the words of our new God-maker. But he takes his stand on the Scriptures, and maintain
But it may be said that the voice of the Father was addressed to the Holy Spirit. But neither does the Holy Spirit require instruction by speech, for
But, says he, the record of Moses does not lie, and from it we learn that God spake. No! nor is great David of the number of those who lie, and he exp
What, then, do we think of this passage? For it may be that, if we understand it, we shall also understand the meaning of Moses. It often happens that
But to return to the matter in question. We assert that the words “He said” do not imply voice and words on the part of God but the writer, in showin
For the case is different from that of men endowed by nature with practical ability, where you may look at capability and execution apart from each ot
But if any one would give a more sensuous interpretation to the words “God said,” as proving that articulate speech was His creation, by a parity of r
And the futility of such assertions may be seen also by this. For as the natures of the elements, which are the work of the Creator, appear alike to a
And if any one cites the confusion of tongues that took place at the building of the tower, as contradicting what I have said, not even there is God s
But some who have carefully studied the Scriptures tell us that the Hebrew tongue is not even ancient like the others, but that along with other mirac
For to suppose that God used the Hebrew tongue, when there was no one to hear and understand such a language, methinks no reasonable being will consen
But this is denied by Eunomius, the author of all this contumely with which we are assailed, and the companion and adviser of this impious band. For,
On these passages it is probable that our opponents will take their stand. And I will agree for them with what is said, and will myself take advantage
But since the nature of most things that are seen in Creation is not simple, so as to allow of all that they connote being comprehended in one word, a
In like manner before him Jacob, having taken hold of his brother’s heel, was called a supplanter , from the attitude in which he came to the birth. F
But I will pass over his other babblings against the truth, possessing as they do no force against our doctrines, for I deem it superfluous to linger
To pass on, then, to what remains. He brings forward once more some of the Master’s words, to this effect: “And it is in precisely the same manner tha
But to return. Such names are used of our Lord, and no one familiar with the inspired Scriptures can deny the fact. What then? Does Eunomius affirm th
But, like a mighty wrestler, he will not relinquish his irresistible hold on us, and affirms in so many words, that “these names are the work of human
“But God,” he says, “gave the weakest of terrestrial things a share in the most honourable names, though not giving them an equal share of dignity, an
This it is that our strong-minded opponent, who accuses us of dishonesty, and charges us with being irrational in judgment,—this it is that he pretend
But what is our author’s meaning, and what is the object of this argument of his? For no one need imagine that, for lack of something to say, in order
He does not, in fact, partake of that dignity which the meaning of those names indicates and whereas wise Daniel, in setting right the Babylonians’ e
But in dwelling on such nonsense I fear that I am secretly gratifying our adversaries. For in setting the truth against their vain and empty words, I
But I fear that all we shall find in the discourse of Eunomius will turn out to be mere tumours and sea lungs, so that what has been said must necessa
Basil, he says, asserts that after we have obtained our first idea of a thing, the more minute and accurate investigation of the thing under considera
And Moses, seeing God in the light, and John calling Him the true Light , and in the same way Paul, when our Lord first appeared to him, and a Light s
I have deluged my discourse with much nonsense of his, but I trust my hearers will pardon me for not leaving unnoticed even the most glaring of his in
Then going farther, as if his object were thus far attained, he takes up other charges against us, more difficult, as he thinks, to deal with than the
But all this is beside our purpose. Would that our charges against him were limited to this, and that he could be thought to err only in his delivery,
But it is time to examine the argument that leads to this profanity, and see how, as regards itself, it is logically connected with his whole discours
But in His very essence, he says, God is indestructible. Well, what other conceivable attribute of God does not attach to the very essence of the Son,
Now that the idea of ungeneracy and the belief in the Divine essence are quite different things may be seen by what he himself has put forward. God, h
But it will be well, I think, to pass over his nauseating observations (for such we must term his senseless attacks on the method of conception), and
But if it were in any way possible by some other means to lay bare the movements of thought, abandoning the formal instrumentality of words, we should
All his argument, then, in opposition to the doctrine of conception I think it best to pass over, though he charge with madness those who think that t
But, like some viscous and sticky clay, the nonsense he has concocted in contravention of our teaching of conception seems to hold us back, and preven
But I will pass over both this and their reading of Epicurus’ nature-system, which he says is equivalent to our conception, maintaining that the doctr
But, says he, since God condescends to commune with His servants, we may consequently suppose that from the very beginning He enacted words appropriat
But our pious opponent will not allow of God’s using our language, because of our proneness to evil, shutting his eyes (good man!) to the fact that fo
But most people, perhaps, will think this too far removed from the scope of our present inquiry. This, however, no one will regard as out of keeping w
Since, then, it is improper to regard God as the inventor of such names, lest the names even of these idol gods should seem to have had their origin f
And if we set forth the opinion of most commentators on these words of the Psalmist, that of Eunomius regarding them will be still more convicted of f
But the names which the Lord gives to such stars we may plainly learn from the prophecy of Esaias, which says, “I have called thee by thy name thou a
I will pass over, then, the abuse with which he has prefaced his discussion of these matters, as when he uses such terms as “alteration of seed,” and
I pass in silence his blasphemy in reducing God the Only-begotten to a level with all created things, and, in a word, allowing to the Son of God no hi
For, proceeding with his discourse, he asks us what we mean by the ages. And yet we ourselves might more reasonably put such questions to him. For it
But I think we must pass over this and all that follows. For it is the mere trifling of children who amuse themselves with beginning to build houses i
Such is our position our adversary’s, with regard to the precise meaning of this term , is such as can derive no help from any reasonings he only sp
He says, “The Life that is the same, and thoroughly single, must have one and the same outward expression for it, even though in mere names, and manne
But why do we linger over these follies, when we ought rather to put Eunomius’ book itself into the hands of the studious, and so, apart from any exam
But if he should still answer with regard to this opposition (of the Divine names), that it is only the term Father, and the term Creator, that are ap
But let us examine a still more vehement charge of his against us it is this: “If one must proceed to say something harsher still, he does not even k
What, then, does Eunomius say to this? “If He is imperishable only by reason of the unending in His Life, and ungenerate only by reason of the unbegin
What, then, out of all that we have said, has stirred him up to this piece of childish folly, in which he returns to the charge and repeats himself in
Such are the clever discoveries of Eunomius against the truth. For what need is there to go through all his argument with trifling prolixity? For in e
Either, he says, that which is endless is distinct in meaning from that which is imperishable, or else the two must make one. But if he call both one,
But that he himself also may be brought to the knowledge of his own trifling, we will convict him from his own statements. For in the course of his ar
Thus far our argument goes with him. But the riddle with which he accompanies his words we must leave to those trained in the wisdom of Prunicus to in
But let us leave this, and along with it the usual foul deluge of calumny in his words and let us go on to his subsequent quotations (of Basil). But
But who, pray, is so simple as to be harmed by such arguments, and to imagine that if names are once believed to be an outcome of the reasoning facult
But I do not think that we need linger on this, nor minutely examine that which follows. To the more attentive reader, the argument elaborated by our
But now I do not know which it is best to do to pursue step by step this subject, or to put an end here to our contest with such folly. Well, as in t
When, then, he is on the point of introducing this treatment of terms of “privation,” he takes upon himself to show “the incurable absurdity,” as he c
Every term—every term, that is, which is really such—is an utterance expressing some movement of thought. But every operation and movement of sound th
Well, then, if God did not exist formerly, or if there be a time when He will not exist, He cannot be called either unending or without beginning and
Thus much, then, is known to us about the names uttered in any form whatever in reference to the Deity. We have given a simple explanation of them, un
How it is possible, then, to assign one’s gratuities to the non-subsistent, let this man, who claims to be using words and phrases in their natural fo
Well, if the term imperishable or indestructible is not considered by this maker of an empty system to be privative of destruction, then by a stern ne
“But I do not see,” he rejoins, “how God can be above His own works simply by virtue of such things as do not belong to Him .” And on the strength of
He declares that God surpasses mortal beings as immortal, destructible beings as indestructible, generated beings as ungenerate, just in the same degr
Therefore let us again handle this dictum of his: “God is not called immortal by virtue of the absence of death.” How are we to accept this statement,
Still I cannot see what profit there is in deigning to examine such nonsense. For a man like myself, who has lived to gray hairs , and whose eyes are
But it is time now to expose that angry accusation which he brings against us at the close of his treatise, saying that we affirm the Father to be fro
“The evangelist Luke, when giving the genealogy according to the flesh of our God and Saviour Jesus Christ, and stepping up from the last to the first
With what eyes will you now dare to gaze upon your guide? I speak to you, O flock of perishing souls! How can you still turn to listen to this man who
Such, to use your own words, is the “evil,” as one might expect, not indeed “of valuing the character for being clever before one is really such” (for
But I think we must pass over this and all that follows. For it is the mere trifling of children who amuse themselves with beginning to build houses in sand. For having composed a portion of a paragraph, and not yet brought it to a conclusion, he shows that the same life is without beginning and without end, thus in his eagerness working out our own conclusion. For this is just what we say; that the Divine life is one and continuous in itself, infinite and eternal, in no wise bounded by any limit to its infinity. Thus far our opponent devotes his labours and exertions to the truth as we represent it, showing that the same life is on no side limited, whether we look at that part of it which was before the ages, or at that which succeeds them. But in his next remarks he returns to his old confusion. For after saying that the same life is without beginning and without end, leaving the subject of life, and ranging all the ideas we entertain about the Divine life under one head, he unifies everything. If, says he, the life is without beginning and without end, ungenerate and indestructible, then indestructibility and ungeneracy will be the same thing, as will also the being without beginning and without end. And to this he adds the aid of arguments. It is not possible, he says, for the life to be one, unless indestructibility and ungeneracy are identical terms. An admirable “addition” on the part of our friend. It would seem, then, that we may hold the same language in regard to righteousness, wisdom, power, goodness, and all such attributes of God. Let, then, no word have a meaning peculiar to itself, but let one signification underlie every word in a list, and one form of description serve for the definition of all. If you are asked to define the word judge, answer with the interpretation of “ungeneracy”; if to define justice, be ready with “the incorporeal” as your answer. If asked to define incorruptibility, say that it has the same meaning as mercy or judgment. Thus let all God’s attributes be convertible terms, there being no special signification to distinguish one from another. But if Eunomius thus prescribes, why do the Scriptures vainly assign various names to the Divine nature, calling God a Judge, righteous, powerful, long-suffering, true, merciful and so on? For if none of these titles is to be understood in any special or peculiar sense, but, owing to this confusion in their meaning, they are all mixed up together, it would be useless to employ so many words for the same thing, there being no difference of meaning to distinguish them from one another. But who is so much out of his wits as not to know that, while the Divine nature, whatever it is in its essence, is simple, uniform, and incomposite, and that it cannot be viewed under any form of complex formation, the human mind, grovelling on earth, and buried in this life on earth, in its inability to behold clearly the object of its search, feels after the unutterable Being in divers and many-sided ways, and never chases the mystery in the light of one idea alone. Our grasping of Him would indeed be easy, if there lay before us one single assigned path to the knowledge of God: but as it is, from the skill apparent in the Universe, we get the idea of skill in the Ruler of that Universe, from the large scale of the wonders worked we get the impression of His Power; and from our belief that this Universe depends on Him, we get an indication that there is no cause whatever of His existence; and again, when we see the execrable character of evil, we grasp His own unalterable pureness as regards this: when we consider death’s dissolution to be the worst of ills, we give the name of Immortal and Indissoluble at once to Him Who is removed from every conception of that kind: not that we split up the subject of such attributes along with them, but believing that this thing we think of, whatever it be in substance, is One, we still conceive that it has something in common with all these ideas. For these terms are not set against each other in the way of opposites, as if, the one existing there, the other could not co-exist in the same subject (as, for instance, it is impossible that life and death should be thought of in the same subject); but the force of each of the terms used in connection with the Divine Being is such that, even though it has a peculiar significance of its own, it implies no opposition to the term associated with it. What opposition, for instance, is there between “incorporeal” and “just,” even though the words do not coincide in meaning: and what hostility is there between goodness and invisibility? So, too, the eternity of the Divine Life, though represented under the double name and idea of “the unending” and “the unbeginning,” is not cut in two by this difference of name; nor yet is the one name the same in meaning as the other; the one points to the absence of beginning, the other to the absence of end, and yet there is no division produced in the subject by this difference in the actual terms applied to it.
Ἀλλὰ παραδραμεῖν οἶμαι χρῆναι καὶ ταῦτα καὶ ὅσα τούτων κατὰ τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἔχεται. παιδίων γὰρ ἄντικρύς ἐστιν ἀθύρματα κατασκευάς τινας οἰκοδομημάτων ἐν ψάμμῳ διατιθέντων. συνθεὶς γάρ τινα κώλου περίοδον καὶ μόλις ἐπὶ τὸ πέρας διεξελθὼν « τὴν αὐτὴν ζωὴν » ἀποδείκνυσιν « ἄναρχόν τε εἶναι καὶ ἀτελεύτητον », ἡμετέραν πληρῶν εὐχὴν ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ σπουδῇ. οὐδὲ γὰρ παρ' ἡμῶν ἄλλο τι λέγεται ἢ ὅτι μία ἐστὶ καὶ συνεχὴς αὐτὴ πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ἡ θεία ζωή, ἄπειρός τε καὶ ἀΐδιος καὶ οὐδαμόθεν οὐδενὶ πέρατι κωλυομένη πρὸς τὸ ἀόριστον. μέχρι τούτων ὁ λογογράφος τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ πόνους καὶ τοὺς ἱδρῶτας τῇ ἀληθείᾳ χαρίζεται, δεικνὺς τὴν αὐτὴν ζωὴν κατ' οὐδέτερον μέρος περατουμένην, οὔτε εἰ τὸ πρὸ αἰώνων τις ἐξετάζοι οὔτε εἰ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο λογίζοιτο. ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς ἐφεξῆς πάλιν πρὸς τὴν ἰδίαν ἐπανέρχεται σύγχυσιν. εἰπὼν γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι ζωὴν ἄναρχόν τε καὶ ἀτελεύτητον, ἀφεὶς τὸν περὶ τῆς ζωῆς λόγον καὶ τὰς ἐπιθεωρουμένας ὑπολήψεις τῇ θείᾳ ζωῇ εἰς μίαν τὰς πάσας ἔννοιαν συντάξας ἓν τὰ πάντα ἐποίησεν. « εἰ γὰρ ἡ ζωή », φησίν, « ἄναρχός τε καὶ ἀτελεύτητος καὶ ἄφθαρτός ἐστι καὶ ἀγέννητος, ταὐτὸν ἂν εἴη τῷ ἀγεννήτῳ ἡ ἀφθαρσία καὶ τῷ ἀτελευτήτῳ τὸ ἄναρχον ». καὶ προστίθησι τούτοις τὴν ἐκ τῶν λογισμῶν συμμαχίαν: « οὐ γὰρ δυνατόν », φησί, « τὴν μὲν ζωὴν εἶναι μίαν, τὸν δὲ τοῦ ἀφθάρτου λόγον μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι τῷ τοῦ ἀγεννήτου λόγῳ ». καλῶς ὁ γενναῖος προστίθησι. δοκεῖ δὲ μηδὲ τὸν τῆς δικαιοσύνης λόγον ἕτερον παρὰ τὰ εἰρημένα τυγχάνειν μηδὲ τὸν τῆς σοφίας καὶ τὸν τῆς δυνάμεως καὶ τὸν τῆς ἀγαθότητος καὶ ἑκάστου τῶν θεοπρεπῶν ὀνομάτων, καὶ μηδεὶς ἔστω λόγος κατὰ τὸ ἰδιάζον νοούμενος, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ παντὶ τῷ καταλόγῳ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἓν ὑποκείσθω τὸ σημαινόμενον, καὶ εἷς ὑπογραφῆς λόγος τὸν περὶ ἑκάστου τῶν λεγομένων ὅρον ἀποπληρούτω: κἂν ἐρωτηθῇς τὸ τοῦ κριτοῦ σημαινόμενον, τὴν τῆς ἀγεννησίας ἑρμηνείαν ἀπόκριναι, κἂν τῆς δικαιοσύνης δέῃ τὸν ὁρισμὸν ἀποδοῦναι, τὸ ἀσώματόν σοι πρόχειρον εἰς τὴν ἀπόκρισιν ἔστω, τί δὲ σημαίνει ἡ ἀφθαρσία, ὅπερ ἡ τοῦ ἐλέου πάντως ἐρεῖς ἢ ἡ τῆς κρίσεως σημασία παρίστησιν. οὕτω καὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα πάντα πρὸς ἄλληλα μεταχωρείτω, μηδεμιᾶς ἰδιαζούσης ἐμφάσεως τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου διαστελλούσης. καὶ εἰ ταῦτα νομοθετεῖ ὁ Εὐνόμιος, τί μάτην αἱ γραφαὶ πολυωνύμως τὴν θείαν φύσιν ἀνακαλοῦσιν, θεὸν κριτὴν δίκαιον ἰσχυρὸν μακρόθυμον ἀληθινὸν ἐλεήμονα καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα κατονομάζουσαι; εἰ γὰρ οὐδὲν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐπί τινος ἰδιαζούσης ἐννοίας καταλαμβάνεται, πάντα δὲ ἀλλήλοις διὰ τῆς κατὰ τὸ σημαινόμενον συγχύσεως ἀναπέφυρται, μάταιον ἂν εἴη πολλαῖς ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ταῖς ἐπωνυμίαις κεχρῆσθαι, μηδεμιᾶς τῆς κατὰ τὸ σημαινόμενον διαφορᾶς ἀπ' ἀλλήλων τὰ ὀνόματα διαστελλούσης. ἀλλὰ τίς οὕτως ἀπόπληκτος ὡς ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι ἡ μὲν θεία φύσις, ὅ τι ποτὲ κατ' οὐσίαν ἐστί, μία ἐστὶν ἁπλῆ τις καὶ μονοειδὴς καὶ ἀσύνθετος καὶ κατ' οὐδένα τρόπον ἐν ποικίλῃ τινὶ συνθέσει θεωρουμένη, ἡ δὲ ἀνθρωπίνη ψυχὴ χαμαὶ κειμένη καὶ ἐν τῷ γηίνῳ τούτῳ βίῳ κατορωρυγμένη διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι τηλαυγῶς κατιδεῖν τὸ ζητούμενον πολλαῖς ἐννοίαις τῆς ἀφράστου φύσεως πολυτρόπως καὶ πολυμερῶς ἐπορέγεται, οὐ κατὰ μίαν τινὰ διάνοιαν τὸ κεκρυμμένον θηρεύουσα; ἦ γὰρ ἂν εὔκολος ἦν ἡ κατάληψις, εἰ μία τις ἡμῖν ἔφοδος πρὸς τὴν θείαν ἀποκέκριτο γνῶσιν: νυνὶ δὲ διὰ μὲν τῆς ἐμφαινομένης τῷ παντὶ σοφίας σοφὸν εἶναι τὸ τοῦ παντὸς ἐπιστατοῦν ἐνοήσαμεν, διὰ δὲ τῆς τῶν θαυμάτων μεγαλουργίας δυνάμεως ἔμφασιν ἐδεξάμεθα, τὸ δὲ ἐξ ἐκείνου πᾶν ἐξῆφθαι πιστεύειν τοῦ μηδεμίαν αὐτοῦ τῆς ὑπάρξεως αἰτίαν εἶναι τεκμήριον γίνεται.
Πάλιν τὸ βδελυκτὸν τῆς κακίας νοήσαντες τὸ ἀναλλοίωτον αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀμιγὲς πρὸς κακίαν καταλαμβάνομεν τήν τε τοῦ θανάτου διαφθορὰν κακῶν ἔσχατον εἶναι νομίσαντες ἀθάνατόν τε καὶ ἄφθαρτον τὸν ἀλλότριον παντὸς τοιούτου νοήματος ὠνομάσαμεν, οὐ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ταῖς ἐννοίαις ταύταις συνδιασχίζοντες, ἀλλ' ὅ τι ποτὲ κατ' οὐσίαν ἐστίν, ἓν εἶναι πεπιστευκότες πρὸς πάσας τὰς τοιαύτας ὑπολήψεις οἰκείως ἔχειν τὸ νοηθὲν ὑπειλήφαμεν. οὐ γὰρ μάχεται πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ ὀνόματα κατὰ τὴν τῶν ἀντιθέτων φύσιν, ὡς εἰ τὸ ἓν ὑπάρχοι, μὴ ἂν αὐτῷ συνθεωρηθῆναι τὸ ἕτερον, ὡς οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ζωὴν ἅμα καὶ θάνατον περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν νοηθῆναι, ἀλλὰ τοιαύτη ἐστὶν ἑκάστου τῶν ἐπὶ τῆς θείας φύσεως λεγομένων ἡ ἔμφασις, ὥστε κἂν ἰδιάζῃ τῷ σημαινομένῳ, μηδεμίαν ἴσχειν πρὸς τὸ συνονομαζόμενον ἐναντίωσιν. τί γὰρ ἐναντιοῦται τῷ ἀσωμάτῳ τὸ δίκαιον, κἂν μὴ συμβαίνῃ κατὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν ἀλλήλοις τὰ ῥήματα; ποίαν δὲ μάχην ἡ ἀγαθότης ἔχει πρὸς τὸ ἀόρατον; οὕτως οὐδὲ τὸ ἀΐδιον τῆς θείας ζωῆς διπλοῖς ὀνόμασί τε καὶ νοήμασι γνωριζόμενον, τῷ ἀτελευτήτῳ καὶ τῷ ἀνάρχῳ, τῇ διαφορᾷ τῶν ὀνομάτων συνδιατέμνεται: καὶ οὔτε ταὐτόν ἐστι τῷ ἑτέρῳ κατὰ τὴν σημασίαν τὸ ἕτερον (τὸ μὲν γὰρ τὴν τῆς ἀρχῆς τὸ δὲ τὴν τοῦ τέλους ἀλλοτρίωσιν ἔδειξεν) οὔτε μερισμόν τινα τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ἡ τῶν ἐπιθεωρουμένων αὐτῷ νοημάτων διαφορὰ παρεσκεύασε.
