On “Not Three Gods.” To Ablabius.

 Ye that are strong with all might in the inner man ought by rights to carry on the struggle against the enemies of the truth, and not to shrink from t

 In truth, the question you propound to us is no small one, nor such that but small harm will follow if it meets with insufficient treatment. For by th

 The argument which you state is something like this:—Peter, James, and John, being in one human nature, are called three men: and there is no absurdit

 What, then, is the reason that when we count one by one those who are exhibited to us in one nature, we ordinarily name them in the plural and speak o

 We say, then, to begin with, that the practice of calling those who are not divided in nature by the very name of their common nature in the plural, a

 Most men think that the word “Godhead” is used in a peculiar degree in respect of nature: and just as the heaven, or the sun, or any other of the cons

 But some one will say that the proof of our argument does not yet regard the question. For even if it were granted that the name of “Godhead” is a com

 As we have to a certain extent shown by our statement that the word “Godhead” is not significant of nature but of operation, perhaps one might reasona

 Since, then, the character of the superintending and beholding power is one, in Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, as has been said in our previous argumen

 If, then, every good thing and every good name, depending on that power and purpose which is without beginning, is brought to perfection in the power

 It does not seem to me absolutely necessary, with a view to the present proof of our argument, to contend against those who oppose us with the asserti

 But if it pleases our adversaries to say that the significance of the term is not operation, but nature, we shall fall back upon our original argument

 As, then, the golden staters are many, but the gold is one, so too those who are exhibited to us severally in the nature of man, as Peter, James, and

 Indeed, it would be a lengthy task to set out in detail from the Scriptures those constructions which are inexactly expressed, in order to prove the s

 If, however, any one cavils at our argument, on the ground that by not admitting the difference of nature it leads to a mixture and confusion of the P

 But in speaking of “cause,” and “of the cause,” we do not by these words denote nature (for no one would give the same definition of “cause” and of “n

 Thus, since on the one hand the idea of cause differentiates the Persons of the Holy Trinity, declaring that one exists without a Cause, and another i

But if it pleases our adversaries to say that the significance of the term is not operation, but nature, we shall fall back upon our original argument, that custom applies the name of a nature to denote multitude erroneously: since according to true reasoning neither diminution nor increase attaches to any nature, when it is contemplated in a larger or smaller number. For it is only those things which are contemplated in their individual circumscription which are enumerated by way of addition. Now this circumscription is noted by bodily appearance, and size, and place, and difference figure and colour, and that which is contemplated apart from these conditions is free from the circumscription which is formed by such categories. That which is not thus circumscribed is not enumerated, and that which is not enumerated cannot be contemplated in multitude. For we say that gold, even though it be cut into many figures, is one, and is so spoken of, but we speak of many coins or many staters, without finding any multiplication of the nature of gold by the number of staters; and for this reason we speak of gold, when it is contemplated in greater bulk, either in plate or in coin, as “much,” but we do not speak of it as “many golds” on account of the multitude of the material,—except when one says there are “many gold pieces” (Darics, for instance, or staters), in which case it is not the material, but the pieces of money to which the significance of number applies: indeed, properly, we should not call them “gold” but “golden.”

Πλὴν εἰ τοῦτο τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἀρέσκοι, τὸ μὴ ἐνεργείας ἀλλὰ φύσεως εἶναι τὴν σημασίαν, ἐπαναδραμούμεθα πρὸς τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς λόγον, ὅτι τὸ τῆς φύσεως ὄνομα ἡμαρτημένως ἡ συνήθεια εἰς πλήθους σημασίαν ἀνάγει, οὔτε μειώσεως οὔτε αὐξήσεως κατὰ τὸν ἀληθῆ λόγον προσγινομένης τῇ φύσει, ὅταν ἐν πλείοσιν ἢ ἐλάττοσι θεωρῆται. μόνα γὰρ κατὰ σύνθεσιν ἀριθμεῖται, ὅσα κατ' ἰδίαν περιγραφὴν θεωρεῖται: ἡ δὲ περιγραφὴ ἐν ἐπιφανείᾳ σώματος καὶ μεγέθει καὶ τόπῳ καὶ τῇ διαφορᾷ τῇ κατὰ τὸ σχῆμα καὶ χρῶμα καταλαμβάνεται: τὸ δὲ ἔξω τούτων θεωρούμενον ἐκφεύγει τὴν διὰ τῶν τοιούτων περιγραφήν. ὃ δὲ μὴ περιγράφεται οὐκ ἀριθμεῖται, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀριθμούμενον ἐν πλήθει θεωρηθῆναι οὐ δύναται. ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸν χρυσόν φαμεν, κἂν εἰς πολλοὺς διακερματίζηται τύπους, ἕνα καὶ εἶναι καὶ λέγεσθαι: πολλὰ δὲ νομίσματα καὶ πολλοὺς στατῆρας ὀνομάζομεν, οὐδένα τῆς φύσεως τοῦ χρυσοῦ πλεονασμὸν ἐν τῷ πλήθει τῶν στατήρων εὑρίσκοντες. διὸ καὶ πολὺς ὁ χρυσὸς λέγεται, ὅταν ἐν ὄγκῳ πλείονι ἢ σκεύεσιν ἢ νομίσμασι θεωρῆται, πολλοὶ δὲ οἱ χρυσοὶ διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῆς ὕλης οὐκ ὀνομάζονται: εἰ μή τις οὕτω λέγοι, χρυσοὺς πολλούς, ὡς τοὺς δαρεικοὺς ἢ τοὺς στατῆρας, ἐφ' ὧν οὐχ ἡ ὕλη ἀλλὰ τὰ κέρματα τὴν τοῦ πλήθους σημασίαν ἐδέξατο. κυρίως γὰρ ἔστιν οὐχὶ χρυσοὺς ἀλλὰ χρυσέους τούτους εἰπεῖν.