Gregory of Nyssa, On the Making of Man

XVII. What we must answer to those who raise the question—“If procreation is after sin, how would souls have come into being if the first of mankind h

XVIII. That our irrational passions have their rise from kindred with irrational nature.

XIX. To those who say that the enjoyment of the good things we look for will again consist in meat and drink, because it is written that by these mean

XX. What was the life in Paradise, and what was the forbidden tree ?

XXI. That the resurrection is looked for as a consequence, not so much from the declaration of Scripture as from the very necessity of things .

XXII. To those who say, “If the resurrection is a thing excellent and good, how is it that it has not happened already, but is hoped for in some perio

XXIII. That he who confesses the beginning of the world’s existence must necessarily also agree as to its end .

XXIV. An argument against those who say that matter is co-eternal with God.

XXV. How one even of those who are without may be brought to believe the Scripture when teaching of the resurrection .

XXVI. That the resurrection is not beyond probability .

XXVII. That it is possible, when the human body is dissolved into the elements of the universe, that each should have his own body restored from the c

XXVIII. To those who say that souls existed before bodies, or that bodies were formed before souls wherein there is also a refutation of the fables c

XXIX. An establishment of the doctrine that the cause of the existence of soul and body is one and the same.

XXX. A brief examination of the construction of our bodies from a medical point of view.

XV. That the soul proper, in fact and name, is the rational soul, while the others are called so equivocally; wherein also is this statement, that the power of the mind extends throughout the whole body in fitting contact with every part57 Otherwise chap. xvi. The Bodleian ms. of the Latin version gives the title:—“That the vital energy of the irrational creatures is not truly but equivocally called ‘soul’, and of the unspeakable communion of body and soul.”.

1. Now, if some things in creation possess the nutritive faculty, and others again are regulated by the perceptive faculty, while the former have no share of perception nor the latter of the intellectual nature, and if for this reason any one is inclined to the opinion of a plurality of souls, such a man will be positing a variety of souls in a way not in accordance with their distinguishing definition. For everything which we conceive among existing things, if it be perfectly that which it is, is also properly called by the name it bears: but of that which is not every respect what it is called, the appellation also is vain. For instance:—if one were to show us true bread, we say that he properly applies the name to the subject: but if one were to show us instead that which had been made of stone to resemble the natural bread, which had the same shape, and equal size, and similarity of colour, so as in most points to be the same with its prototype, but which yet lacks the power of being food, on this account we say that the stone receives the name of “bread,” not properly, but by a misnomer, and all things which fall under the same description, which are not absolutely what they are called, have their name from a misuse of terms.

2. Thus, as the soul finds its perfection in that which is intellectual and rational, everything that is not so may indeed share the name of “soul,” but is not really soul, but a certain vital energy associated with the appellation of “soul58 τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς κλήσει συγκεκριμένη. The meaning is apparently something like that given; but if we might read συγκεχρημένη the sense of the passage would be much plainer..” And for this reason also He Who gave laws on every matter, gave the animal nature likewise, as not far removed from this vegetative life59 Reading φυτικής for φυσικῆς as before, ch. 8, §4 (where see note)., for the use of man, to be for those who partake of it instead of herbs:—for He says, “Ye shall eat all kinds of flesh even as the green herb60 Cf. Gen. ix. 3. The quotation, except the last few words, is not verbally from the LXX.;” for the perceptive energy seems to have but a slight advantage over that which is nourished and grows without it. Let this teach carnal men not to bind their intellect closely to the phenomena of sense, but rather to busy themselves with their spiritual advantages, as the true soul is found in these, while sense has equal power also among the brute creation.

3. The course of our argument, however, has diverged to another point: for the subject of our speculation was not the fact that the energy of mind is of more dignity among the attributes we conceive in man than the material element of his being, but the fact that the mind is not confined to any one part of us, but is equally in all and through all, neither surrounding anything without, nor being enclosed within anything: for these phrases are properly applied to casks or other bodies that are placed one inside the other; but the union of the mental with the bodily presents a connection unspeakable and inconceivable,—not being within it (for the incorporeal is not enclosed in a body), nor yet surrounding it without (for that which is incorporeal does not include61 It does not seem of much consequence whether we read περιλαμβάνεται with Forbes and the mss., and treat it as of the middle voice, or περιλαμβάνει τι with the Paris Editt. The reading περιλαμβάνεται, taken passively, obscures the sense of the passage. anything), but the mind approaching our nature in some inexplicable and incomprehensible way, and coming into contact with it, is to be regarded as both in it and around it, neither implanted in it nor enfolded with it, but in a way which we cannot speak or think, except so far as this, that while the nature prospers according to its own order, the mind is also operative; but if any misfortune befalls the former, the movement of the intellect halts correspondingly.

ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ ΙΕʹ. Ὅτι κυρίως ψυχὴ, ἡ λογικὴ καὶ ἔστι καὶ λέγεται: αἱ δ' ἄλλαι ὁμωνύμως κατονομάζονται. Ἐν ᾧ καὶ τὸ, διὰ παντὸς τοῦ σώματος διήκειν τὴν τοῦ νοῦ δύναμιν, καταλλήλως ἑκάστου μέρους προσαπτομένην.

Εἰ δέ τινα τῆς κτίσεως τὴν θρεπτικὴν ἐνέργειαν ἔχει, ἢ πάλιν ἕτερα τῇ αἰσθητικῇ διοικεῖται δυνάμει, μήτε ἐκεῖνα αἰσθήσεως, μήτε ταῦτα τῆς νοερᾶς μετέχοντα φύσεως, καὶ διὰ τοῦτό τις ψυχῶν πλῆθος καθυποπτεύει: οὐ κατὰ τὸν διαιροῦντα λόγον ὁ τοιοῦτος τὴν τῶν ψυχῶν διαφορὰν δογματίσει: διότι πᾶν τὸ ἐν τοῖς οὖσι νοούμενον, εἰ μὲν τελείως εἴη ὅπερ ἐστὶ, κυρίως καὶ ὀνομάζεται ὅπερ λέγεται: τὸ δὲ μὴ διὰ πάντων ὂν ἐκεῖνο, ὃ κατωνόμασται, ματαίαν καὶ τὴν προσηγορίαν ἔχει. Οἷον εἴ τις τὸν ἀληθῆ δείξειεν ἄρτον, φαμὲν τὸν τοιοῦτον κυρίως ἐπιλέγειν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ τὸ ὄνομα. Εἰ δέ τις τὸν ἀπὸ λίθου τεχνηθέντα τῷ κατὰ φύσιν ἀντιπαραδείξειεν, ᾧ σχῆμα μὲν τὸ αὐτὸ, καὶ τὸ μέγεθος ἶσον, καὶ ἡ τοῦ χρώματος ὁμοιότης, ὥστε διὰ τῶν πλείστων τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι τῷ πρωτοτύπῳ δοκεῖν, ἐπιλείπει δὲ αὐτῷ τὸ καὶ τροφὴν δύνασθαι εἶναι: παρὰ τοῦτο οὐ κυρίως, ἀλλ' ἐκ καταχρήσεως τῆς ἐπωνυμίας τοῦ ἄρτου τετυχηκέναι τὸν λίθον λέγωμεν. Καὶ πάντα τὰ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, ἂ μὴ δι' ὅλων ἐστὶν ὅπερ λέγεται, ἐκ καταχρήσεως ἔχει τὴν κλῆσιν. Οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῷ νοερῷ τε καὶ λογικῷ τὸ τέλειον ἐχούσης, πᾶν ὁ μὴ τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὁμώνυμον μὲν εἶναι δύναται τῇ ψυχῇ, οὐ μὴν καὶ ὄντως ψυχὴ, ἀλλά τις ἐνέργεια ζωτικὴ, τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς κλήσει συγκεκριμένη. Διὸ καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀλόγων φύσιν, ὡς οὐ πόῤῥω τῆς φυσικῆς ταύτης ζωῆς κειμένην, ὁμοίως ἔδωκε τῇ χρήσει τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ὁ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον νομοθετήσας, ὡς ἀντὶ λαχάνου τοῖς μετέχουσιν εἶναι. Πάντα γὰρ, φησὶ, τὰ κρέα φάγεσθε, ὡς λάχανα χόρτου. Μικρὸν γάρ τι πλεονεκτεῖν δοκεῖ τῇ αἰσθητικῇ ἐνεργείᾳ τοῦ δίχα ταύτης τρεφομένου τε καὶ αὐξανομένου. Παιδευσάτω τοῦτο τοὺς φιλοσάρκους, μὴ πολὺ τοῖς κατ' αἴσθησιν φαινομένοις προσδραμεῖν τὴν διάνοιαν, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς ψυχικοῖς προτερήμασι προσασχολεῖσθαι, ὡς τῆς ἀληθοῦς ψυχῆς ἐν τούτοις θεωρουμένης, τῆς δὲ αἰσθήσεως καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀλόγοις τὸ ἴσον ἐχούσης. Ἀλλ' ἐφ' ἕτερον ἡ ἀκολουθία παρηνέχθη τοῦ λόγου. Οὐ γὰρ τοῦτο τῇ θεωρίᾳ προέκειτο, ὅτι προτιμώτερον τῶν ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ νοουμένων ἐστὶν ἡ κατὰ νοῦν ἐνέργεια ἢ τὸ ὑλικὸν τῆς ὑποστάσεως: ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐχὶ μέρει τινὶ τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν ὁ νοῦς περιέχεται, ἀλλ' ἐπίσης ἐν πᾶσι καὶ διὰ πάντων ἐστίν: οὔτε ἔξωθεν περιλαμβάνων, οὔτε ἔνδοθεν κρατούμενος. Ταῦτα γὰρ ἐπὶ κάδων ἢ ἄλλων τινῶν σωμάτων ἀλλήλοις ἐντιθεμένων κυρίως λέγεται. Ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ πρὸς τὸ σωματικὸν κοινωνία ἄφραστόν τε καὶ ἀνεπινόητον τὴν συνάφειαν ἔχει, οὔτε ἐντὸς οὖσα (οὔτε γὰρ ἐγκρατεῖται σώματι τὸ ἀσώματον), οὔτε ἐκτὸς περιέχουσα (οὐ γὰρ περιλαμβάνει τι τὰ ἀσώματα): ἀλλὰ κατά τινα τρόπον ἀμήχανόν τε καὶ ἀκατανόητον ἐγγίζων ὁ νοῦς τῇ φύσει, καὶ προσαπτόμενος, καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ περὶ αὐτὴν θεωρεῖται, οὔτε ἐγκαθήμενος, οὔτε περιπτυσσόμενος: ἀλλὰ ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ἢ νοῆσαι, πλὴν ὅτι κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον αὐτῆς εἱρμὸν εὐοδουμένης τῆς φύσεως, καὶ ὁ νοῦς ἐνεργὸς γίνεται. Εἰ δέ τι πλημμέλημα περὶ ταύτην συμπέσοι, σκάζει κατ' ἐκεῖνο καὶ τῆς διανοίας ἡ κίνησις.