On the Making of Man.

 I. Wherein is a partial inquiry into the nature of the world, and a more minute exposition of the things which preceded the genesis of man

 II. Why man appeared last, after the creation

 III. That the nature of man is more precious than all the visible creation

 IV. That the construction of man throughout signifies his ruling power .

 V. That man is a likeness of the Divine sovereignty .

 VI. An examination of the kindred of mind to nature: wherein, by way of digression, is refuted the doctrine of the Anomœans .

 VII. Why man is destitute of natural weapons and covering

 VIII. Why man’s form is upright and that hands were given him because of reason wherein also is a speculation on the difference of souls .

 IX. That the form of man was framed to serve as an instrument for the use of reason .

 X. That the mind works by means of the senses.

 XI. That the nature of mind is invisible.

 XII. An examination of the question where the ruling principle is to be considered to reside wherein also is a discussion of tears and laughter, and

 XIII. A Rationale of sleep, of yawning, and of dreams .

 XIV. That the mind is not in a part of the body wherein also is a distinction of the movements of the body and of the soul .

 XV. That the soul proper, in fact and name, is the rational soul, while the others are called so equivocally wherein also is this statement, that the

 XVI. A contemplation of the Divine utterance which said—“Let us make man after our image and likeness” wherein is examined what is the definition of

 XVII. What we must answer to those who raise the question—“If procreation is after sin, how would souls have come into being if the first of mankind h

 XVIII. That our irrational passions have their rise from kindred with irrational nature.

 XIX. To those who say that the enjoyment of the good things we look for will again consist in meat and drink, because it is written that by these mean

 XX. What was the life in Paradise, and what was the forbidden tree ?

 XXI. That the resurrection is looked for as a consequence, not so much from the declaration of Scripture as from the very necessity of things .

 XXII. To those who say, “If the resurrection is a thing excellent and good, how is it that it has not happened already, but is hoped for in some perio

 XXIII. That he who confesses the beginning of the world’s existence must necessarily also agree as to its end .

 XXIV. An argument against those who say that matter is co-eternal with God.

 XXV. How one even of those who are without may be brought to believe the Scripture when teaching of the resurrection .

 XXVI. That the resurrection is not beyond probability .

 XXVII. That it is possible, when the human body is dissolved into the elements of the universe, that each should have his own body restored from the c

 XXVIII. To those who say that souls existed before bodies, or that bodies were formed before souls wherein there is also a refutation of the fables c

 XXIX. An establishment of the doctrine that the cause of the existence of soul and body is one and the same.

 XXX. A brief examination of the construction of our bodies from a medical point of view.

XXIII. That he who confesses the beginning of the world’s existence must necessarily also agree as to its end120    Otherwise Chap. xxiv. The Bodleian ms. of the Latin version has a title corresponding to that of the following chapter in the other mss.:—“Against those who say that matter is co-eternal with God.”.

But if some one, beholding the present course of the world, by which intervals of time are marked, going on in a certain order, should say that it is not possible that the predicted stoppage of these moving things should take place, such a man clearly also does not believe that in the beginning the heaven and the earth were made by God; for he who admits a beginning of motion surely does not doubt as to its also having an end; and he who does not allow its end, does not admit its beginning either; but as it is by believing that “we understand that the worlds were framed by the word of God,” as the apostle says, “so that things which are seen were not made of things which do appear121    Cf. Heb. xi. 3. The mss. give somewhat the same variations which are observable in the N.T. Codices. The reading which Forbes adopts coincides with the Textus Receptus.,” we must use the same faith as to the word of God when He foretells the necessary stoppage of existing things.

2. The question of the “how” must, however, be put beyond the reach of our meddling; for even in the case mentioned it was “by faith” that we admitted that the thing seen was framed from things not yet apparent, omitting the search into things beyond our reach. And yet our reason suggests difficulties on many points, offering no small occasions for doubt as to the things which we believe.

3. For in that case too, argumentative men might by plausible reasoning upset our faith, so that we should not think that statement true which Holy Scripture delivers concerning the material creation, when it asserts that all existing things have their beginning of being from God. For those who abide by the contrary view maintain that matter is co-eternal with God, and employ in support of their own doctrine some such arguments as these. If God is in His nature simple and immaterial, without quantity122    Reading, with some of Forbes’ mss., ἄποσος, which seems on the whole the better reading so far as sense is concerned. ἄποιος may be the result of a sense of the awkwardness of employing both ἄποσος and ἀμεγέθης: but further on in the section we find ἄποσος where the mss. seem to agree. Further, the connecting particles seem to show a closer connection of sense between ἀποσὸς and ἀμεγέθης than between ἀμεγέθης and ἀσύνθετος, or size, or combination, and removed from the idea of circumscription by way of figure, while all matter is apprehended in extension measured by intervals, and does not escape the apprehension of our senses, but becomes known to us in colour, and figure, and bulk, and size, and resistance, and the other attributes belonging to it, none of which it is possible to conceive in the Divine nature,—what method is there for the production of matter from the immaterial, or of the nature that has dimensions from that which is unextended? for if these things are believed to have their existence from that source, they clearly come into existence after being in Him in some mysterious way; but if material existence was in Him, how can He be immaterial while including matter in Himself? and similarly with all the other marks by which the material nature is differentiated; if quantity exists in God, how is God without quantity? if the compound nature exists in Him, how is He simple, without parts and without combination? so that the argument forces us to think either that He is material, because matter has its existence from Him as a source; or, if one avoids this, it is necessary to suppose that matter was imported by Him ab extra for the making of the universe.

4. If, then, it was external to God, something else surely existed besides God, conceived, in respect of eternity, together with Him Who exists ungenerately; so that the argument supposes two eternal and unbegotten existences, having their being concurrently with each other—that of Him Who operates as an artificer, and that of the thing which admits this skilled operation; and if any one under pressure of this argument should assume a material substratum for the Creator of all things, what a support will the Manichæan find for his special doctrine, who opposes by virtue of ungenerateness a material existence to a Good Being. Yet we do believe that all things are of God, as we hear the Scripture say so; and as to the question how they were in God, a question beyond our reason, we do not seek to pry into it, believing that all things are within the capacity of God’s power—both to give existence to what is not, and to implant qualities at His pleasure in what is.

5. Consequently, as we suppose the power of the Divine will to be a sufficient cause to the things that are, for their coming into existence out of nothing, so too we shall not repose our belief on anything beyond probability in referring the World-Reformation to the same power. Moreover, it might perhaps be possible, by some skill in the use of words, to persuade those who raise frivolous objections on the subject of matter not to think that they can make an unanswerable attack on our statement.

ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ ΚΓʹ. Ὅτι ὁ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς τοῦ κόσμου συστάσεως ὁμολογῶν, ἀναγκαίως καὶ περὶ τοῦ τέλους συνθήσεται.

Εἰ δέ τις τὴν νῦν τοῦ κόσμου φορὰν εἱρμῷ τινι διεξαγομένην βλέπων, δι' ἦς τὸ χρονικὸν θεωρεῖται διάστημα, μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι λέγοι τὴν προαγγελθεῖσαν τῶν κινουμένων στάσιν γενήσεσθαι: δῆλος ὁ τοιοῦτός ἐστι, μηδὲ ἐν ἀρχῇ γεγενῆσθαι παρὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν πιστεύων. Ὁ γὰρ ἀρχὴν τῇ κινήσει διδοὺς, οὐκ ἀμφιβάλλει πάντως καὶ περὶ τέλους; καὶ ὁ τὸ τέλος μὴ προσδεχόμενος, οὐδὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν παρεδέξατο. Ἀλλ' ὥσπερ κατηρτίσθαι τοὺς αἰῶνας τῷ ῥήματι νοοῦμεν τοῦ Θεοῦ, πιστεύοντες, καθώς φησιν ὁ Ἀπόστολος, ἐκ τῶν μὴ φαινομένων τὰ βλεπόμενα γεγονέναι: τῇ αὐτῇ πίστει χρησόμεθα περὶ τὸ ῥῆμα τοῦ Θεοῦ, τοῦ τὴν ἀναγκαίαν τῶν ὄντων στάσιν προαγορεύσαντος. Τὸ δὲ πῶς, ἐξαιρετέον τῆς πολυπραγμοσύνης: καὶ γὰρ κἀκεῖ πίστει κατηρτίσθαι τὸ βλεπόμενον ἐκ τῶν μηδέπω φαινομένων κατεδεξάμεθα, παραδραμόντες τῶν ἀνεφίκτων τὴν ζήτησιν. Καίτοι περὶ πολλῶν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ἀπορεῖν ὑπετίθετο, οὐ μικρὰς παρέχων ἀφορμὰς πρὸς τὴν τῶν πεπιστευμένων ἀμφιβολίαν. Ἐξῆν γὰρ κἀκεῖ τοῖς ἐριστικοῖς ἐκ τῶν εὐλόγων κατὰ τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἀνατρέπειν τὴν πίστιν, πρὸς τὸ μὴ νομίζειν ἀληθῆ τὸν περὶ τῆς ὑλικῆς κτίσεως εἶναι λόγον, ὃν ἡ ἁγία πρεσβεύει Γραφὴ, πάντων τῶν ὄντων ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ εἶναι διαβεβαιουμένη τὴν γένεσιν. Οἱ γὰρ τῷ ἐναντίῳ παριστάμενοι λόγῳ, συναΐδιον εἶναι τῷ Θεῷ τὴν ὕλην κατασκευάζουσι, τοιούτοις ἐπιχειρήμασι πρὸς τὸ δόγμα χρώμενοι: Εἰ ἁπλοῦς ὁ Θεὸς τῇ φύσει, καὶ ἄϋλος, ἀποιός τε καὶ ἀμεγέθης, καὶ ἀσύνθετος, καὶ τῆς κατὰ τὸ σχῆμα περιγραφῆς ἀλλοτρίως ἔχων πᾶσα δὲ ὕλη ἐν διαστηματικῇ παρατάσει καταλαμβάνεται, καὶ τὰς διὰ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων καταλήψεις οὐ διαπέφευγεν, ἐν χρώματι, καὶ σχήματι, καὶ ὄγκῳ, καὶ πηλικότητι, καὶ ἀντιτυπίᾳ, καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς τοῖς περὶ αὐτὴν θεωρουμένοις γινωσκομένη, ὧν οὐδὲν ἐν τῇ θεία φύσει δυνατόν ἐστι κατανοῆσαι: τίς μηχανὴ ἐκ τοῦ ἀῦλον τὴν ὕλην ἀποτεχθῆναι; ἐκ τοῦ ἀδιαστάτου τὴν διαστηματικὴν φύσιν; Εἰ γὰρ ἐκεῖθεν ὑποστῆναι ταῦτα πεπίστευται, δηλονότι ἐν αὐτῷ ὄντα κατὰ τὸν ἄῤῥητον λόγον οὕτω προῆλθεν εἰς γένεσιν. Εἰ δὲ ἐν ἐκείνῳ τὸ ὑλῶδες ἦν, πῶς ἄϋλος ὁ ἐν αὑτῷ τὴν ὕλην ἔχων; Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα, δι' ὧν ἡ ὑλικὴ φύσις χαρακτηρίζεται: εἰ ἐν τῷ Θεῷ ἡ ποσότης, πῶς ἄποσος ὁ Θεός; εἰ ἐν ἐκείνῳ τὸ σύνθετον, πῶς ἀπλοῦς καὶ ἀμερὴς καὶ ἀσύνθετος; ὥστε ἢ ὑλικὸν εἶναι κατ' ἀνάγκην αὐτὸν, διὰ τὸ ἐκεῖθεν ὑποστῆναι τὴν ὕλην, ὁ λόγος βιάζεται: ἢ εἰ τοῦτό τις φεύγοι, ἔξωθεν ἐπεισενεχθῆναι τὴν ὕλην αὐτῷ πρὸς τὴν κατασκευὴν τοῦ παντὸς ὑπολαμβάνειν ἐπάναγκες. Εἰ οὖν ἔξω τοῦ Θεοῦ ἦν, ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὸν Θεὸν πάντως ἦν συνεπινοούμενον κατὰ τὸν τῆς ἀϊδιότητος λόγον τῷ ἀγεννήτως ὄντι: ὥστε δύο ἄναρχα καὶ ἀγέννητα κατὰ ταὐτὸν ἀλλήλοις τῷ λόγῳ συγκαταλαμβάνεσθαι, τοῦ τεχνικῶς ἐνεργοῦντος, καὶ τοῦ δεχομένου τὴν ἐπιστημονικὴν ταύτην ἐνέργειαν. Καὶ εἴ τις ἐκ τῆς ἀνάγκης ταύτης ἀΐδιον ὑποτίθοιτο τῷ Δημιουργῷ τῶν ἁπάντων ὑποκεῖσθαι τὴν ὕλην, ὅσην ὁ Μανιχαῖος εὑρήσει τῶν ἰδίων δογμάτων τὴν συνηγορίαν, ὃς τὴν ὑλικὴν αἰτίαν κατὰ τὸ ἀγέννητον ἀντιπαρεξάγει τῇ ἀγαθῇ φύσει! Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ τὰ πάντα, τῆς Γραφῆς λεγούσης ἀκούοντες, πεπιστεύκαμεν: καὶ τὸ ὅπως ἦν ἐν τῷ Θεῷ, τὸ ὑπὲρ τὸν ἡμέτερον λόγον, οὐκ ἀξιοῦμεν περιεργάζεσθαι, πάντα τῇ θείᾳ δυνάμει χωρητὰ πεπιστευκότες: καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν ὑποστήσασθαι, καὶ τῷ ὄντι πρὸς τὸ δοκοῦν ἐπιβαλεῖν τὰς ποιότητας. Οὐκοῦν ἀκολούθως, ὡς ἀρκεῖν ἡγούμεθα τοῖς οὖσι πρὸς τὴν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ὑπόστασιν, τὴν τοῦ θείου θελήματος δύναμιν: οὕτω καὶ τὴν ἀναστοιχείωσιν τῶν συνεστώτων εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν ἀνάγοντες δύναμιν, εἰς οὐδὲν ἔξω τοῦ εἰκότος τὴν πίστιν παραληψόμεθα. Καίτοι γε δυνατὸν ἴσως ἦν, εὑρεσιλογίᾳ τινὶ τοὺς περὶ τῆς ὕλης ἐρεσχελοῦντας πεῖσαι, μὴ δοκεῖν ἐρήμην κατατρέχειν τοῦ λόγου.