Three Books on the Duties of the Clergy.

 Book I.

 Chapter I.

 Chapter II.

 Chapter III.

 Chapter IV.

 Chapter V.

 Chapter VI.

 Chapter VII.

 Chapter VIII.

 Chapter IX.

 Chapter X.

 Chapter XI.

 Chapter XII.

 Chapter XIII.

 Chapter XIV.

 Chapter XV.

 Chapter XVI.

 Chapter XVII.

 Chapter XVIII.

 Chapter XIX.

 Chapter XX.

 Chapter XXI.

 Chapter XXII.

 Chapter XXIII.

 Chapter XXIV.

 Chapter XXV.

 Chapter XXVI.

 Chapter XXVII.

 Chapter XXVIII.

 Chapter XXIX.

 Chapter XXX.

 Chapter XXXI.

 Chapter XXXII.

 Chapter XXXIII.

 Chapter XXXIV.

 Chapter XXXV.

 Chapter XXXVI.

 Chapter XXXVII.

 Chapter XXXVIII.

 Chapter XXXIX.

 Chapter XL.

 Chapter XLI.

 Chapter XLII.

 Chapter XLIII.

 Chapter XLIV.

 Chapter XLV.

 Chapter XLVI.

 Chapter XLVII.

 Chapter XLVIII.

 Chapter XLIX.

 Chapter L.

 Book II.

 Chapter I.

 Chapter II.

 Chapter III.

 Chapter IV.

 Chapter V.

 Chapter VI.

 Chapter VII.

 Chapter VIII.

 Chapter IX.

 Chapter X.

 Chapter XI.

 Chapter XII.

 Chapter XIII.

 Chapter XIV.

 Chapter XV.

 Chapter XVI.

 Chapter XVII.

 Chapter XVIII.

 Chapter XIX.

 Chapter XX.

 Chapter XXI.

 Chapter XXII.

 Chapter XXIII.

 Chapter XXIV.

 Chapter XXV.

 Chapter XXVI.

 Chapter XXVII.

 Chapter XXVIII.

 Chapter XXIX.

 Chapter XXX.

 Book III.

 Chapter I.

 Chapter II.

 Chapter III.

 Chapter IV.

 Chapter V.

 Chapter VI.

 Chapter VII.

 Chapter VIII.

 Chapter IX.

 Chapter X.

 Chapter XI.

 Chapter XII.

 Chapter XIII.

 Chapter XIV.

 Chapter XV.

 Chapter XVI.

 Chapter XVII.

 Chapter XVIII.

 Chapter XIX.

 Chapter XX.

 Chapter XXI.

 Chapter XXII.

Chapter IX.

Though justice and prudence are inseparable, we must have respect to the ideas of people in general, for they make a distinction between the different cardinal virtues.

48. It is clear also, according to the sacred Scriptures, which are the older, that wisdom cannot exist without justice, for where one of these two is, there the other must be also. With what wisdom did Daniel expose the lie in the false accusation brought against him by his thorough examination, so that those false informers had no answer ready to hand!427    Bel and the Dragon 44. It was a mark of prudence to convict the criminals by the witness of their own words, and a sign of justice to give over the guilty to punishment, and to save the innocent from it.

49. There is therefore an inseparable union between wisdom and justice; but, generally speaking,428    Cic. de Off. II. 10, § 35. the one special form of virtue is divided up. Thus temperance lies in despising pleasures, fortitude may be seen in undergoing labours and dangers, prudence in the choice of what is good, by knowing how to distinguish between things useful and the reverse; justice, in being a good guardian of another’s rights and protector of its own, thus maintaining for each his own. We can make this fourfold division in deference to commonly received ideas; and so, whilst deviating from those subtle discussions of philosophic learning which are brought forth as though from some inner recess for the sake of investigating the truth, can follow the commonly received use and their ordinary meaning. Keeping, then, to this division, let us return to our subject.

CAPUT IX.

Quamvis individuae sint justitia atque prudentia, vulgi tamen cardinales virtutes distinguentis ingenio serviendum esse.

48. Liquet igitur etiam secundum scripturam divinam, quae antiquior est, sapientiam sine justitia esse non posse; quia ubi una earum virtutum, ibi utraque est. Daniel quoque 82 quam sapienter alta interrogatione fraudulentae accusationis deprehendit mendacium, ut calumniatorum sibi responsio non conveniret! Prudentiae igitur fuit vocis suae testimonio reos prodere: justitiae quoque, nocentes supplicio dare, innocentem subducere (Dan. XIII, 54 et seq.).

0116B 49. Est ergo individuum sapientiae atque justitiae conturbernium: sed vulgi usu dividitur una quaedam forma virtutum, ut temperantia sit in despiciendis voluptatibus: fortitudo spectetur in laboribus et periculis: prudentia in delectu bonorum, sciens commoda et adversa distinguere: justitia quae sit bona custos juris alieni, et vindex proprietatis, suum cuique conservans. Sit ergo nobis communis opinionis gratia quadripartita haec facta divisio, ut ab illa subtili disputatione philosophicae sapientiae, quae limandae veritatis causa quasi ex adyto quodam eruitur, retrahentes pedem, forensem usum ac popularem sensum sequamur. Hac igitur divisione servata, revertamur ad propositum.