ARTICLE I

Whether Charity Is Something Created in the Soul, or Is it the Holy Spirit Itself?

It seems that charity is not something created in the soul.

             1. For, as Augustine says, just as the soul is the life of the body, so God is the life of the soul. But the soul is immediately the life of the body. Therefore God is immediately the life of the soul. Therefore, since a soul is said to be alive from the fact that it has charity, as is said (I John iii. 14), He that loveth not, abideth in death, man is not in charity through something which is a medium between God and man, but through God Himself. Charity, therefore, is not something created in the soul, but is God Himself.

             2. But it was objected that the comparison is applied only in this respect, that the soul is the life of the body as a mover, and not insofar as it is the life of the body as a form. But on the contrary, in proportion as any agent is more powerful, to that extent it requires less of a disposition in the patient; e.g., the less dry the wood is, the greater must be the fire sufficient to burn it. But God is an agent of infinite power. Therefore, if He is the life of the soul, as moving it to love, it seems that no created disposition on the part of this soul is required.

             3. Moreover, there is no medium among those things which are the same. But the soul loving God is the same as God, as is said (I Cor. vi. 17), He who is joined to the Lord, is one in spirit. Therefore no created charity comes as a medium between the soul loving and God being loved.

             4. Moreover, the love by which we love our neighbor is charity. But the love by which we love our neighbor is God Himself, for Augustine says in Book VIII of the De Trinit., He who loves his neighbor loves the same love. But God is love. It follows, therefore, that he especially loves God. Therefore charity is not something created, but is God Himself.

             5. But it was said that God, as a cause, is the love by which we love our neighbor. On the contrary, Augustine says in the same place, and he clearly proved it with the testimony of the words of St. John, that that very celestial love by which we love each other is not only from God but also is God. Therefore God is love not only causally, but essentially.

             6. Moreover, Augustine says in Book V of the De Trinitate, For we are not going to say that God is called Love because love itself is a substance worthy of the name of God, but because it is a gift of God, as it is said of God, "Thou art my patience," in that He Himself gives it to us. For it is not said, O Lord You are my love; but it is said thus, "God is love," as it is said, "God is a Spirit." Therefore it is that God is called charity not only causally, but also essentially.

             7. Moreover, when the effect of God is known, He Himself is not known because of this, but He is known through the knowledge of the highest love. For Augustine says in Book VIII of the De Trinit., For he knows the love with which he loves, more than the brother whom he loves. So now he can know God more than he knows his brother. Embrace the love of God, and by love embrace God. Therefore God is called fraternal love not solely as a cause.

             8. But it was objected that when fraternal love is recognized, God is recognized as in His own likeness. On the contrary, man is made in the image and likeness of God according to the very substance of his soul. But this likeness is obscured through sin. Therefore, in order that God be able to be recognized in the soul as in His own image, it is only necessary that sin be taken away, and not that some created thing be superadded to the soul.

             9. Moreover, everything that is in the soul is either a potency, or a passion, or a habit, as is said in Book III of the Ethic. But charity is not a potency of the soul, because if it were it would be natural. Nor is it a passion, because it is not in a sensitive potency in which are all passions. Nor is it a habit, because a habit is removed with difficulty; charity, however, is easily lost through one act of mortal sin. Therefore charity is not something created in the soul.

             10. Moreover, no created thing has infinite power. But charity has infinite power because it joins what is infinitely far apart, viz., the soul to God, and it merits an infinite good. Therefore charity is not something created in the soul.

             11. Moreover, every creature is vanity, as is shown (Eccle. i. 2). Vanity, however, does not unite with truth. Therefore, since charity unites us to the First Truth, charity is not something created.

             12. Moreover, every created thing is a certain nature since it falls within one of the ten genera. Therefore, if charity is something created in the soul, it is a certain nature. Therefore, since we merit by charity, and if charity is a created thing, it follows that nature is the principle of meriting. This is the erroneous opinion of Pelagius.

             13. Moreover, man is closer to God according to his existence in grace than he is according to his existence in nature. But God created man without a medium according to his existence in nature. So, neither in man's existence in grace does God use a medium, viz., a created charity.

             14. Moreover, an agent which acts without a medium is more perfect than an agent which acts through a medium. But God is the most perfect agent. Therefore He acts without a medium. He does not, therefore, justify the soul through the medium of any created thing.

             15. Moreover, a rational creature is more excellent than other creatures. But other creatures attain their own end without anything superadded. Therefore even more is a rational creature moved by God to its end without some created thing superadded to it.

             16. But it was objected that a rational creature is not, through its own nature, proportionate to its end, and therefore it needs something superadded. On the contrary, the end of man is the infinite good. But no created thing is proportionate to an infinite good. Therefore that by which man is ordered to his end is not a good created in the soul.

             17. Moreover, as God is the first light, He is also the highest good. But the light which is God is present to the soul, because of which it is said (Ps. xxxv. 10), In thy light we shall see light. Therefore the highest good, which is God, is also present to the soul. But the good is that by which we love something. Therefore that by which we love is God.

             18. But it was objected that the good which is God is present to the soul not formally but efficiently. On the contrary, God is pure form. Therefore He is present formally in those things in which He is present.

             19. Moreover, nothing is loved unless it is known, as Augustine says in Book X of the De Trinitate. Therefore according to this, a thing is lovable according as it is knowable. But God is, through Himself, knowable as the first principle of knowledge. Therefore He is lovable through Himself and not through any created charity.

             20. Moreover, a thing is lovable according as it is good. But God is infinite good. Therefore He is infinitely lovable. But no created love is infinite. Therefore, since some who have charity love God because He is lovable, the love by which we love God is not something created.

             21. Moreover, God loves all things which exist, as is said (Wis. xi. 25). But He does not love irrational creatures through something superadded to them; therefore neither does He love rational creatures in this way. Thus the charity and grace according to which man is loved by God is not something created and superadded to the soul.

             22. Moreover, if charity is something created, it must be an accident. But charity is not an accident because no accident is more worthy than its subject. Charity, however, is more worthy than nature. Therefore charity is not something created in the soul.

             23. Moreover, as Bernard says, we love God and our neighbor by the same law by which the Father and the Son love Themselves. But the Father and the Son love Themselves with an uncreated love. Therefore we love God with an uncreated love.

             24. Moreover, that which can raise from death is of infinite power. But charity raises from death, for it is said (I John iii. 14), We know that we have passed from death to life, because we love the brethren. Therefore charity is of infinite power and is not something created.

             On the contrary, everything which is received in a thing is received in it according to the mode of the receiver. If, therefore, charity is received in us from God, it must be received finitely by us, according to our proper mode. However, every finite thing is created. Therefore charity is something created in us.

             I answer. It must be said that there are some who have maintained that the charity in us by which we love God and our neighbor is nothing more than the Holy Spirit, as is clear from the Master in the First Book of the Sent., dist. 17.

             In order that this opinion might be more clearly understood, it should be known that the Master placed this act of love by which we love God and our neighbor as a created thing in us, like the acts of the other virtues. But he set a difference between the act of charity and the acts of the other virtues. For, the Holy Spirit moves the soul to the acts of the other virtues by means of certain habitual means which are called virtues, but He moves the will immediately to the act of love through Himself without any habit, as is clear in Book I, dist. 17. It was the excellence of charity which moved him to posit this theory, and the words of Augustine and others were used in objections. However, it was ridiculous to say that the very act of love which we express when we love God and our neighbor is the Holy Spirit Itself.

             This opinion clearly cannot stand. For, just as natural actions and movements proceed from a certain intrinsic principle which is nature, so also it is necessary that actions of the will proceed from an intrinsic principle. And, just as the natural inclination in natural things is called the natural appetite, so also in rational beings, the inclination which follows the apprehension of the intellect is the act of the will.

             It is, however, possible that a natural thing be moved not by an intrinsic principle but by some extrinsic agent, as for instance when a stone is thrown into the air. But it is certainly impossible that such a movement or action which does not proceed from an intrinsic principle be called natural, for this would imply a contradiction in itself. Whence, since for contradictories to exist at the same time does not lie within the divine power, it cannot even be effected by God that the upward motion of a stone, which does not proceed from an intrinsic principle, be natural to it. Now it is possible to give a stone that power by which it would naturally move upward as from an intrinsic principle, but that motion would not be natural to the stone unless another nature be given to it.

             And likewise, it cannot be effected by God that any movement of man, either interior or exterior, which proceeds from an extrinsic principle be voluntary. Whence, all the acts of the will are reduced, as to a prime root, to that which man naturally wishes, which is the last end; and we wish the means for the sake of the end.

             Therefore an act which exceeds the entire capabilities of human nature cannot be voluntary to man unless there be added to human nature something intrinsic, perfecting the will, so that such an action would proceed from an intrinsic principle.

             If, therefore, the act of charity in man does not proceed from an interior habit superadded to a natural potency, but proceeds from the movement of the Holy Spirit, then one of these two alternatives follow: either that act of charity is not voluntary, which is impossible because to love something is to will it; or it does not exceed the capability of nature, and this view is heretical.

             This difficulty being removed, it will follow, first, that the act of charity is an act of the will. Secondly, if it is granted that the act of the will can be entirely from an extrinsic principle, as acts of the hands or feet, it will also follow that if the act of charity is only from the movement of an extrinsic principle, it cannot be meritorious. For, every agent which does not act according to its proper form but only because it is moved by another, is an agent only instrumentally, as an axe is an agent only inasmuch as it is moved by a woodsman.

             Therefore if the soul does not effect an act of charity through some proper form, but only because it is moved by an extrinsic agent, i.e., by the Holy Spirit, then it will follow that it is considered only as an instrument for this act. There would not be, then, in man the power to act or not to act, and he would not be able to gain merit. For, only those things are meritorious which are in us according to a certain manner. Thus human merit is entirely taken away, since love is the basis of meriting.

             Thirdly it cannot hold, because it would follow that a man who is in charity would not be inclined to an act of charity, nor would he perform it with any pleasure. For, the acts of virtue are enjoyable to us because we are conformed to them according to a habit, and we are inclined toward them through the manner of a natural inclination. However, the act of charity is especially enjoyable and especially inclines one to remain in charity, and through it everything we do or suffer is rendered pleasing. The conclusion, therefore, is that there must be a certain habit of charity created in us, which is the formal principle of the act of love.

             By this opinion it is not denied that the Holy Spirit, Who is Uncreated Charity, exists in man who has created charity, or that He moves man's soul to the act of love, as God moves all things to their own actions to which they are inclined by their own proper forms. And thus it is that He disposes all things sweetly, because to all things He gives forms and powers inclining them to that which He Himself moves them; so that they tend toward it not by force, but as if it were by their own free accord.

             To the first, it must be said that God is the life of the soul in the manner of a mover, and not in the manner of a formal principle.

             To the second, it must be said that although it pertains to the effectiveness of a mover that it does not require any disposition in the subject, however, that mover displays its effectiveness if it impresses a strong disposition in that which receives or is moved. For, a great fire causes not only substantial form to appear, but also a strong disposition. That agent which moves to action, and which also impresses a form through that which it moves, is stronger than that mover which so moves to action that it impresses no form. Therefore, because the Holy Spirit is the most powerful mover, He so moves to love that He also causes a habit of charity.

             To the third, it must be said that when it is written (I Cor. vi. 17), He who is joined to the Lord, is one in spirit, this is not meant a unity of substance, but a unity of affection between the lover and the loved. By this union the habit of charity is regarded more as a principle of love than as a medium between the lover and the loved, for the act of love passes immediately to God as to the loved, but not immediately into the habit of charity.

             To the fourth, it must be said that although the love by which we love our neighbor is God, it is however not denied that in addition to this uncreated love there is in us a created love by which we love formally, as has been said.

             To the fifth, it must be said that God is said to be love or charity not only causally, as He is said to be hope or patience only causally, but also essentially. This, however, does not deny that besides that love which God is essentially, there is also in us a created love.

             The answer to the sixth objection is clear from the above.

             To the seventh, it must be said that this text has the same difficulty whether a created habit of charity is posited in us or not. For, when Augustine said that he who loves his neighbor knows the love by which he loves more than he knows the neighbor whom he loves, he seemed to understand the very act of love. Now no one holds that this act is something uncreated; therefore it cannot be concluded that the love thus known is God. Therefore when we perceive in ourselves an act of love, we feel a certain participation of God because God Himself is love, not because He is that very act of love which we perceive.

             To the eighth, it must be said that a creature, insofar as it is more perfect, approaches more to a likeness to God. Whence, although any creature has a certain likeness to God in this, that it exists and is good, however a rational creature has, in addition, a further cause for similitude in this, that it is intellectual, and another in this, that it has been made. Thus in the act of charity God is more expressly perceived as in a closer likeness.

             To the ninth, it must be answered that charity is a habit and is moved with difficulty. For he who has charity is not easily inclined to sin, although charity is lost through sin.

             To the tenth, it must be said that charity unites one to the infinite good not efficiently but formally, whence infinite power does not strive after charity, but rather the author of charity. However, infinite power would strive after charity if man were infinitely ordered to the infinite good through charity, which is clearly false. For, the manner follows the form of the thing.

             To the eleventh, it must be said that a creature is vanity because it is created out of nothing, not because it is a likeness of God; and it is for this reason that created charity unites to First Truth.

             To the twelfth, it must be said that according to the Pelagian heresy, natural principles of man are sufficient for meriting eternal life. It is not, however, heretical to believe that we can merit by means of some created thing which exists as a certain nature in some category. For it is clear that we merit by our acts, and our acts, since they are certain created things, exist in some genus and are of a certain nature.

             To the thirteenth, it must be said that God created natural being without an efficient medium, but not without a formal medium. For, to each thing He gave the form through which it exists. And likewise He gives existence in grace through some superadded form. But existence in nature and existence in grace are not entirely similar for, as St. Augustine says in super Joan., He who created thee without thee will not justify thee without thee. Therefore in justification, some operation of justifying is needed, and thus it is necessary that there be present an active formal principle, which is not present in creation.

             To the fourteenth, it must be said that an agent acting mediately is less effective if he uses that medium because of its necessity. But God, in His acting, does not use a medium because He is in need of the help of any creature; He acts mediately in order that He might preserve order in things. But if we speak of a formal medium, it is clear that as the agent is more perfect, so much more will he induce a form. For an imperfect agent does not induce a form but only a disposition to the form, and the less perfect the agent is, the less is his power to induce that disposition.

             To the fifteenth, it must be said that man and rational creatures are able to attain a higher end than do the other creatures. Whence, although they lack more things necessary to attain this end, nevertheless they are more perfect; just as a man who can attain perfect health through the use of several medicines is better disposed than one who is not able to be completely cured, even though he needs only a few prescriptions.

             To the sixteenth, it must be said that the soul, through created charity, is raised above the possible limit of nature so that it might be ordered to a more perfect end than the capability of nature would supply. However, it is not so ordered to attain God perfectly, as He enjoys Himself perfectly. And this follows from the fact that no creature is proportionate to God.

             To the seventeenth, it must be said that although the good which is God is through itself present to the soul, nevertheless there is need of a formal medium--on the part of the soul, not however on the part of God--for the soul to be ordered perfectly to Him.

             To the eighteenth, it must be replied that God is form subsisting essentially; He is not that which is joined as form to something else.

             To the nineteenth, it must be said that, granted that God is known through Himself by the soul--but this introduces another question--He is loved through Himself in the same way as He is known through Himself. When I say through Himself, this is understood on the part of the one loved, not of the one loving. For, God is loved by the soul not because of some other thing, but only because of Himself; and still the soul needs some formal principle in order to love God perfectly.

             To the twentieth, it must be said that God cannot be loved by us to the extent that He is lovable, so that it does not follow that the love of charity by which we love God is infinite. This argument applies no less to an act than to a habit; but no one can say that the act of love by which we love God is something uncreated.

             To the twenty-first, it must be said that we have need of a habit of charity insofar as we love God; this is not necessary for other creatures, although all creatures are loved by God.

             To the twenty-second, it must be answered that no accident is more worthy than its subject as regards its manner of existing, because substance is being through itself, while accident is being existing in another. But when the accident is an act and the form of the substance, there is nothing to prevent the accident from being more worthy than the substance. For in this way the accident is related to the substance as act to potency, as the perfect to the perfectible; and it is thus that charity is more worthy than the soul.

             To the twenty-third, it must be said that although the law by which we love God and our neighbor is uncreated, that by which we formally love God and our neighbor is something created. For, the uncreated law is the first measure and rule of our love.

             To the twenty-fourth, it must be said that charity revives the dead in a spiritual way, formally, but not as an effective agent. Therefore it is not necessary that it be of infinite power, since neither was the soul of Lazarus which, as a form, revived Lazarus inasmuch as he was revived through a union of his soul with his body.