ARTICLE III

Whether Charity Is the Form of the Virtues?

It seems that charity is not the form of the virtues.

             1. For, the form confers being and species on that of which it is the form. But charity does not give being and species to any virtue. Therefore charity is not the form of the other virtues.

             2. Moreover, there is no form of a form. All virtues are forms, for they are certain perfections. Therefore charity is not the form of the virtues.

             3. Moreover, form is included in the definition of that of which it is the form. But charity is not included in the definition of the virtues. Therefore charity is not the form of the virtues.

             4. Moreover, those things which are separated by opposition are not so related that one is the form of the other. But charity is separated by opposition from the other virtues, as is clear (I Cor. xiii. 13), And now there remain faith, hope, and charity, these three. Therefore charity is not the form of the virtues.

             5. But it must be objected that charity is not the intrinsic form of the virtues, but the exemplar. On the contrary, that which is in imitation of something derives its species from the exemplar. Therefore, if charity is the exemplary form of all the virtues, all the virtues derive their species from it. Therefore all the virtues would be of one species, which is false.

             6. Moreover, the form of the exemplar is that in imitation of which something is made; therefore it is necessary only in order that a thing be made. If charity is the exemplary form of the virtues, charity itself will be necessary only for the generation of the virtues. Therefore, when the virtues are possessed, it will not be necessary to have charity, which is clearly false.

             7. Moreover, the exemplar is necessary to make something, but not to use what has already been made; just as the exemplar is necessary in transcribing a book, but not in using the book after it has been written. Therefore, if charity is the exemplary form of the virtues, it does not belong to us who use these virtues, but to God Who causes the virtues in us.

             8. Moreover, the exemplar can exist without that which is made in imitation of it. Therefore, if charity is the exemplary form of the virtues, it follows that it can exist without the other virtues, which is false.

             9. Moreover, each virtue has its form from its end and object. But that which is formed of itself has no need to be formed by another. Thus charity is not the form of the virtues.

             10. Moreover, nature always produces that which is better. Therefore even more so does God. But it is better to be something formed than to be something without form. Since, therefore, God causes virtues in us, it seems that He produces them already formed; thus they do not need to be informed by charity.

             11. Moreover, faith is a certain spiritual light. But light is the form of everything which is seen in the light. Therefore, just as corporeal light is the form of colors, so also faith, and not charity, is the form of charity and of the other virtues.

             12. Moreover, the order of perfections is according to the order of perfectibles. But the virtues are perfections of the powers of the soul. Therefore there is an order of virtues according to an order of powers. But among the powers of the soul, the intellect is higher than the will. Therefore faith is higher than charity. And thus faith is more the form of charity than charity is of faith.

             13. Moreover, just as the moral virtues are related to one another, so also are the theological virtues. But prudence, which is in the cognitive power, informs the other virtues, viz., justice, fortitude, temperance, and others of this kind which are in the appetitive power. Therefore faith, which is in the cognitive power, informs charity, which is related to the appetitive power; and not the other way around.

             14. Moreover, the form of a virtue is its measure. But it is the role of the reason to determine the measure for the appetitive powers; and not the other way around. Therefore faith, which is in the reason, is more the form of charity, which is in the appetitive part, than is charity of faith.

             15. Moreover, there is an interlinear note on this text (Matt. i. 2), Abraham begot Isaac. And Isaac begot Jacob, to this effect, that faith begot hope, and hope begot charity. But everything produced receives its form from that which produces it. Therefore charity receives its form from faith and hope; and not the other way around.

             16. Moreover, in one and the same thing, potency precedes act in time. Therefore, if charity is compared to the other virtues as act and form, it follows that in man the other virtues are prior in time to charity, which is false.

             17. Moreover, the informing of moral matters has a relation to the end. But all the virtues are ordered, as to their final end, to the vision of God Who is complete reward, as Augustine says, and Who takes the place of faith. Thus it seems that faith is the form of charity, rather than charity the form of faith.

             18. Moreover, the final, efficient and formal causes do not coincide in number with one another, according to the Philosopher in Book II of the Phys. But charity is the end and the mover of the virtues, therefore it is not the form of the virtues.

             19. Moreover, the form is that from which comes the principle of being. But the principle of spiritual being is grace (I Cor. xv. 10), By the grace of God, I am what I am. Therefore the grace of God, and not charity, is the form of the virtues.

             On the contrary, St. Ambrose writes that charity is the form and the mother of the virtues.

             I answer. It must be said that charity is the form, the mover, and the root of the virtues.

             To prove this, we should know that it is necessary to judge habits according to acts. Wherefore, when that which pertains to one habit is as a form in regard to the act of another habit, then that one habit is related to the other as a form. But in all voluntary acts, that which has relation to the end is formal; this is so because any act receives its form and species according to the form of the agent, as the act of heating is according to the heat.

             However, the form of the will is its object, which is the good and the end, just as the intelligible is the form of the intellect. Therefore, that which has relation to the end must be formally in the act of the will. Thus in species, the same act is considered under the form of a virtue if it is ordered to one end, or under the form of a vice if it is ordered to another end. This is clear from the example of one who gives alms either for the sake of God or for the sake of vainglory. For, the act of one vice, according as it is ordered to the end of another vice, receives the form of the second vice; e.g., he who would steal in order to commit adultery is a thief materially, but formally he is considered intemperate.

             It is clear that the act of all the other virtues is ordered to the proper end of charity, which is its object, viz., the highest good. This is certainly clear regarding the moral virtues, for virtues of this kind are concerned with certain created goods which are ordered to the uncreated good as to their final end. And the same is clearly evident regarding the theological virtues; for uncreated being as true is indeed the object of faith; and insofar as it is desirable, it has the aspect of the good. Thus faith is directed toward that good insofar as it is desirable, since no one believes unless he wishes to believe. Even though the object of this species (i.e., the theological virtues) is uncreated being considered as good, nevertheless the object is still derived from the object of charity; for, the good is the object of hope insofar as it can be desired and obtained, since no one desires to obtain some good unless he loves it.

             Therefore it is evident that in the acts of all the virtues there is the formal element which comes from charity; and it is called the form of all the virtues in that every act of all the virtues is ordered to the highest good that is loved, as has just been shown. And because the precepts of the law are concerned with the acts of the virtues, so it is that the Apostle writes (I Tim. i. 5), The end of the commandment is charity.

             Thus it is apparent how charity can be the mover of all the virtues; it is the mover because it influences the acts of all the other virtues. For, every higher act or power is said to move a lower act or power, so that the act of the lower is ordered to the end of the higher. For example, a house-builder commands a stone-mason so that the act of the stone-mason is ordered to the form of the house, which is the end of the builder. Since all the other virtues are ordered to the end of charity, charity commands the acts of all the virtues; and for this reason it is called their mover. And because the word "mother" signifies someone who receives and conceives within herself, charity is called the mother of the virtues. For this same reason, charity is called the root of the virtues.

             To the first, it must be said that although charity does not give the proper species to any virtue, it gives, however, a common species to each virtue, on account of which we speak of virtue considered as the principle of meriting.

             To the second, it must be said that there is no form of a form in the sense that one form is superior to the subject of another. But there is nothing to prevent several forms from existing in the same subject according to a certain order; so that one might be a proper form in respect to another, as color is the proper form in respect to what can be seen. It is in this way that charity can be the form of the other virtues.

             To the third, it must be said that charity is included in the definition of a meritorious virtue, as is shown by the definition of Augustine, who says that virtue is a good quality of the mind by which it lives rightly; for it does not live rightly unless it is through that which orders our life to God. This charity does.

             To the fourth, it must be said that this argument follows from the form which enters into the constitution of a thing. Charity is not called the form of the virtues in this way but in another way, as has been shown above.

             To the fifth, it must be replied that charity, since it is the common form of the virtues, does indeed bring the virtues into one common species, a very special species, but not, however, into a proper species.

             To the sixth, it must be said that charity can be called the exemplary form of the virtues; not an exemplar in whose likeness the virtues are generated, but an exemplar according to whose likeness the virtues operate in a certain way. Thus, whenever it is necessary to act according to virtue, charity is necessary.

             To the seventh, it must be said that, although to create the virtues belongs only to God, however, to act according to virtue belongs also to a man possessing virtue. Therefore he needs charity.

             To the eighth, it must be said that charity, considered as an act, not only is regarded as an exemplar, but also as a virtue which moves and causes. But the exemplar does not cause without producing that which is made in imitation of it, because it produces it in existence. And thus charity does not exist without the other virtues.

             To the ninth, it must be said that each virtue has a special form from its proper end and its proper object, by which it becomes this virtue. But it has from charity a certain common form, by which it can merit eternal life.

             To the tenth, it must be answered that God makes the virtues in us that are formed with a special form and a general form. The special form is derived from the object and the end, but the general form is derived from charity.

             To the eleventh, it must be said that light is the form of colors considered as visible in act through light; likewise, faith is the form of the virtues considered as knowable by us. For, we know by faith what is virtuous and what is not virtuous. But the virtues, insofar as they are operative, are informed by charity.

             To the twelfth, it must be said that the intellect, considered in itself, is prior to the will, because the known good is the object of the will. But in its operation and moving, the will is prior. For, the intellect does not understand or move unless the will gives its consent. Thus does the will move the intellect insofar as it is operative; for we use our intellect when we will. Therefore, since to believe is an act of the intellect as moved by the will--for we believe something because we wish to--it follows that charity gives form to faith more so than faith to charity.

             To the thirteenth, it must be said that the act of the will is considered according to the one who wills in relation to things as they are in themselves. But the act of the intellect is considered according as things known are in the one who understands. Whence, when things are below the one who understands, then the intellect is higher than the will, because things exist in a higher manner in the intellect than in themselves, since everything which is in another is in it according to the manner of that in which it is. But when the things are above the one who understands, then the will rises higher than the intellect is able to attain. Thus it is that in moral matters, which concern things below man, the cognitive virtue informs the appetitive virtues, just as prudence informs the other moral virtues. But in the theological virtues which concern God, the virtue of the will, viz., charity, informs the virtue of the intellect, viz., faith.

             To the fourteenth, it must be said that rational power confers a way of desiring on those things which are below us, but not in those which are above us, as was said in Article I of this Question and in the preceding Question, Articles 10 and 11.

             To the fifteenth, it must be answered that faith precedes hope, and hope precedes charity in the order of generation, as the imperfect precedes the perfect. But charity precedes both faith and hope in the order of perfection. For this reason charity is said to be the form of them, as the perfect is the form of the imperfect.

             To the sixteenth, it must be said that charity is not that form of the virtues which is a part of the essence of the virtues, so that it must follow the virtues or some matter of the virtues in time, as in the form of things generated. But charity is the form considered as informing; whence it must be, by its nature, prior to the other virtues.

             To the seventeenth, it must be said that the vision of God, inasmuch as it is the end considered as a certain good, is the object of charity.

             To the eighteenth, it must be said that the intrinsic form cannot be the end of a thing, although it is the end of the generation of a thing. But charity is not the intrinsic form, as has been said; but from the fact that it brings the other virtues to their end, it forms the virtues, as is clear from what has been said.

             To the nineteenth, it must be said that the grace of God is called the form of the virtues according as it gives spiritual existence to the soul, so that it is able to receive the virtues. But charity is the form of the virtues according as it forms their operations, as was said in the body of the Article.