ARTICLE VII

Whether the Object to Be Loved Out of Charity Is a Rational Nature?

It seems that the object to be loved out of charity is not a rational nature.

             1. That because of which a thing is so is itself more so. But man is loved in charity because of his virtue and blessedness. Therefore virtue and blessedness, which are not rational creatures, are more to be loved in charity; and thus a rational creature is not the proper object of charity.

             2. Moreover, through charity we are made especially like to God in our loving. But God loves all things that are, as is said (Wis. xi. 25), by loving Himself, Who is Love, in charity. Therefore not only a rational nature, but all things are to be loved in charity.

             3. Moreover, Origen says in Super Cantica, that it is one thing to love God and every other good. But God is loved in charity. Therefore, since all creatures are good, not only the rational nature but all creatures are to be loved in charity.

             4. Moreover, only the love of charity is meritorious. But we can merit in the love of any thing. Therefore we can love any thing out of charity.

             5. Moreover, God is loved out of charity. Therefore that ought to be more loved out of charity which is especially loved by Him. But among all created things, the good of the universe, in which all things are included, is especially loved by God. Therefore all things are to be loved in charity.

             6. Moreover, to love more pertains to charity than does to believe. But charity believes all things, as is said (I Cor. xiii. 7). Therefore much more should charity love all things.

             7. Moreover, rational nature is found most perfectly in God. If, therefore, a rational nature is the object of charity, it would be necessary that we love God in charity. But this seems impossible, since the love of charity is a perfect love. We cannot love God perfectly in this life because we do not know Him perfectly in this life; and we do not know what God is but only what He is not. But love presupposes knowledge, since nothing is loved unless it is known. Therefore a rational or intellectual nature is not the proper object of charity.

             8. Moreover, God is farther from man than is any creature other than man. If, then, we do not love other creatures in charity, much less are we able to love God out of charity.

             9. Moreover, intellectual nature is also found in angels. But it seems that angels do not have to be loved out of charity. Therefore intellectual nature is not the proper object of charity. The proof of the minor is given: friendship consists in a sharing of life, for, according to the Philosopher in the Ethicor., to live together is proper to friends. But there does not seem to be any sharing of life between the angels and us, because we do not share with the angels in the life of nature, for they are more excellent in nature than man. Nor, again, do we share with them in the life of glory, for the gifts of grace and of glory are given by God according to the active capacity of the one receiving, as is said (Matt. xxv. 15), To every one He gave according to his proper ability. But the capacity for action of the angel is much greater than that of man. Therefore the angels do not share with men in any life.

             10. Moreover, rational nature is also found in the same man loving out of charity. But it seems that man ought not to love himself out of charity. Therefore the object of charity is not a rational nature. The proof of the minor: the precepts of the law are given concerning the acts of the virtues. But there is no precept given that one should love himself. Therefore to love is not an act of charity.

             11. Moreover, Gregory says in one of his Homilies, it is not possible that there be charity between less than two. Therefore it is not possible for a person to love himself out of charity.

             12. Moreover, just as justice consists in a sharing, so does friendship, according to the Philosopher in Book VI of the Ethic. But justice, properly speaking, is not of a man toward himself, as is said in Book V of the Ethic. Therefore neither is friendship, and neither is charity.

             13. Moreover, nothing which is reckoned among the vices is an act of charity. But to love self is considered a vice in man, as is said (II Tim. iii. 1), In the last days, shall come dangerous times. Men shall be lovers of themselves. Therefore to love self is not an act of charity, and so rational nature is not the proper object of love.

             14. Moreover, the human body is a part of rational nature, viz., human nature. But it does not seem that the human body ought to be loved out of charity, since according to the Philosopher in Book IX of the Ethic., those who love themselves for what is exterior to their nature ought to be censured. Therefore rational nature is not the object of love.

             15. Moreover, no one who has charity flees from that which he loves out of charity. But the saints having charity flee the body, as is said (Rom. vii. 24), Who shall deliver me from the body of this death? Thus the body is not to be loved out of charity, and the same argument follows as in the previous objection.

             16. Moreover, no one is bound to fulfill that of which he is not capable. But no one can know that he has charity. Therefore no one is bound to love rational creatures out of charity.

             17. Moreover, when it is said that a rational creature is loved out of charity, this preposition out of designates the relation of a cause of some sort. But it cannot indicate the relation of a material cause, since charity is not something material, but is spiritual. Again, it does not indicate the relation of a final cause, because the end of the one loving out of charity is not charity, but rather it is God. Likewise, neither does it indicate the relation of an efficient cause, because it is the Holy Spirit Who moves us to love, as is said (Rom. v. 5), The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts, by the Holy Ghost, who is given to us. And again, it does not indicate the relation of a formal cause, because charity is not an intrinsic form since it does not come from the essence of a thing; nor is it the extrinsic exemplary form, for then all things which are loved out of charity would be located in the species of charity, just as imitations are located in the species of the exemplar. Therefore rational creatures are not to be loved out of charity.

             18. Moreover, Augustine says in I De Doctr. Christ., that our neighbor is he from whom some favor is received. But we receive favors from God. Therefore God is our neighbor. Thus it was not correctly posited by Augustine that God is one object of love out of charity, neighbor another.

             19. Moreover, since Christ is the Mediator between God and man, it seems that He ought to be posited as another object of love, in addition to God and neighbor. There are, therefore, five objects to be loved in charity, and not just four, as Augustine says.

             On the contrary, it is said (Levit. xix. 18), Love your neighbor as yourself. The Gloss is: Your neighbor is such not only by closeness of blood-relationship, but also by way of the fellowship of reason. Therefore, according as anything shares with us in the society of rational natures, so it is lovable out of charity. Therefore rational nature is the object of charity.

             I answer. It must be said that when there is question of those things which come under the act of any power or habit, the formal notion of the object of that power or habit must be considered. For, it is in terms of their relation to that notion that things come under that power or habit; just as in the case of things visible, it is in terms of their relationship to one and the same notion of being able to be seen, that they are either essentially or accidentally visible.

             However, since the object of love taken universally is the good taken commonly, it is necessary that there be some special good as the object of each special love. For example, the proper object of natural friendship, which is friendship toward blood-relatives, is a natural good considered as something produced from parents; in a political friendship, however, the object is the good of the state. Charity, therefore, has a certain special good as its proper object, viz., the good of divine beatitude, as was said above in Article IV of this Question. Thus, according as things are related to this good, so also are they lovable out of charity.

             But it should be considered that, since to love is to wish the good of someone, that which is said to be loved has a twofold consideration: it is considered either as one for whom we wish the good; or as the good which we wish for someone.

             Therefore, in this first way, only those things can be loved out of charity for which we are able to wish the good of eternal beatitude, for they are the things which were begotten to enjoy a good of this kind. Whence, since only intellectual nature was begotten to enjoy the good of eternal beatitude, then only intellectual nature is to be loved out of charity, according as those things for which we wish this good are said to be loved.

             And for this reason, Augustine distinguishes four objects to be loved out of charity according as various things can have eternal beatitude in various ways.

             For, there is that which has eternal beatitude through its own essence, and this is God; and that which has it through participation, and this is the rational creature; both that one that loves, as well as other creatures which can be associated with it in the sharing in beatitude. However, there is something else to which it pertains to have an eternal beatitude, but only through a certain return, viz., our body which is glorified through a redundance of glory from the soul to itself.

             Therefore God ought to be loved out of charity as the root of beatitude; however each man ought to love himself in charity in order that he may share in beatitude. He should also love his neighbor as his associate in the participation of beatitude, and his own body according as beatitude redounds to it.

             But in the second way, i.e., considered as those goods which we wish for others are said to be loved, everything can be loved out of charity insofar as these are goods of those who are able to enjoy beatitude. For, all creatures are a means for man to tend towards his beatitude, and, further, all creatures are ordered to the glory of God inasmuch as the divine goodness is manifested in them. At this time, therefore, we can love all things out of charity, but only by ordering them to those beings which have, or can have, beatitude.

             Now it must also be considered that loves are related to one another in accord with the relation among goods which are their objects. Accordingly, since all human goods are ordered to eternal beatitude as the ultimate end, the love of charity includes within itself all human loves, with the exception of those which are based on sin, which cannot be ordered to beatitude. Whence, that some who are relatives, or fellow-citizens, or fellow pilgrims, or any such, should love (diligant) one another, can be meritorious and out of charity; but that some be bound together (ament se invicem) for the sake of sharing in robbery or adultery, this cannot be meritorious nor out of charity.

             To the first, it must be said that we love virtue and beatitude out of charity inasmuch as we wish them for those for whom it is possible to have beatitude.

             To the second, it must be said that God loves all things out of charity, not because He wishes beatitude for them, but He orders these things to Himself and to the other creatures which are able to enjoy beatitude.

             To the third, it must be said that all goods are in God as in a first principle. In this way, Origen meant that it is one thing to love God and every other good.

             To the fourth, it must be said that all things can be loved meritoriously by ordering them to those which have a capacity for beatitude, not by wishing beatitude for them.

             To the fifth, it must be said that there is contained, as a principle, in the good of the universe, rational nature which is capable of beatitude, and to which all other creatures are ordered. According to this, it is fitting both for God and for us to especially love the good of the universe out of charity.

             To the sixth, it must be said that, just as charity believes all things that are worthy of belief, so does it love all things according as they are lovable out of charity.

             To the seventh, it must be said that we are not able to love God here with that perfection with which we will love Him in our home-land, seeing Him through His essence.

             To the eighth, it must be said that the distance separating other creatures is not the reason why they are not loved in charity, but it is because they are not capable of beatitude.

             To the ninth, it must be said that angels do not share with us in the life of nature as regards our species, but only as regards the genus of rational nature; but we are able to share with them in the life of glory. As to that which is said (Matt. xxv. 15), To every one He gave according to his proper ability, this must not be referred only to natural ability, for it is erroneous to say that the gifts of grace and glory are given according to natural measure, but rather here [in this text] must be understood also that ability which is by way of grace, through which it is granted to men that they can merit glory equal to that of the angels.

             To the tenth, it must be said that the written law has been given as an aid to the law of nature, which had been obscured by sin. But the law was not rendered so obscure that it would not move one to love, so that man would not love himself or his body; but it was obscured to this extent that it was not moving man to love God and his neighbor. Therefore, in the written law, there had to be given precepts about loving God and neighbor, in which is, nevertheless, also included the precept that each one love himself. The reason for this is that as we are induced to love God, we are induced to desire Him, by which we especially love ourselves and wish for ourselves the highest good. But in the precept of loving neighbor, it is said, Love your neighbor as yourself. In this is included the love of self.

             To the eleventh, it must be said that although, properly speaking, friendship cannot be had for self, on the other hand love is had for self. For, it is written in Book IX of the Ethic., that the feelings that constitute friendship for others are an extension of regard for self. But as charity signifies love, thus is one able to love himself in charity. But Gregory speaks of charity considered as it includes the aspect of friendship.

             To the twelfth, it must be said that although friendship consists in a sharing with another, just as does justice; love, however, does not necessarily relate to another, which is sufficient for the notion of charity.

             To the thirteenth, it must be said that those who love self are censured inasmuch as they love themselves more than they ought. Reproach, indeed, does not pertain to spiritual goods because no one is able to love virtue too much. But one can love himself to excess inasmuch as he loves external and corporeal goods.

             To the fourteenth, it must be said that not everyone who loves himself in terms of his exterior nature is at fault, but rather he who seeks exterior goods beyond the measure of virtue. Thus we are able to love our body in charity.

             To the fifteenth, it must be said that charity does not flee the body but the corruption of the body, inasmuch as it is said (Wis. ix. 15), For the corruptible body is a load upon the soul. Because of this the Apostle clearly has said the body of this death (Rom. vii. 24).

             To the sixteenth, it must be said that it does not follow from the fact that man does not know for certain whether he has charity that he is not able to love out of charity, but it does follow that he is not able to judge whether he loves out of charity. Thus, it can be required of us that we love out of charity, but not that we judge that we are loving out of charity. Whence the Apostle says (I Cor. iv. 3), Neither do I judge my own self. . . . but he that judgeth me, is the Lord.

             To the seventeenth, it must be said that when one is said to love his neighbor out of charity, this preposition out of can designate a relation of final, efficient and formal causes; the final cause inasmuch as the love of neighbor is ordered to the love of God as to an end, whence it is written (I Tim. i. 5), The end of the commandment is charity, because the love of God is the goal in observing the precepts. In the relationship of efficient cause, however, inasmuch as charity is a habit tending toward loving, being related to the act of loving as heat is to heating. In the relationship of formal cause, however, inasmuch as the act receives its species from the habit, as heating does from heat.

             To the eighteenth, it must be said that the notion of being a neighbor is preserved both in him who gives favors and in him who receives, but not that whoever gives favors is a neighbor since it is required among neighbors that there be a sharing in some order. Therefore God, although He gives favors, cannot be said to be our neighbor; but Christ, inasmuch as He is man, is called our neighbor according as He gives favors to us.

             From this the answer to the last objection is clear.