Chapter IV. Argument.—Moreover, He is Good, Always the Same, Immutable, One and Only, Infinite; And His Own Name Can Never Be Declared, and He is Incorruptible and Immortal.

Him alone the Lord rightly declares good, of whose goodness the whole world is witness; which world He would not have ordained if He had not been good. For if “everything was very good,”21    Gen. i. 31. consequently, and reasonably, both those things which were ordained have proved that He that ordained them is good, and those things which are the work of a good Ordainer cannot be other than good; wherefore every evil is a departure from God. For it cannot happen that He should be the originator or architect of any evil work, who claims to Himself the name of “the Perfect,” both Parent and Judge, especially when He is the avenger and judge of every evil work; because, moreover, evil does not occur to man from any other cause than by his departure from the good God. Moreover, this very thing is specified in man, not because it was necessary, but because he himself so willed it. Whence it manifestly appeared also what was evil; and lest there should seem to be envy in God, it was evident whence evil had arisen. He, then, is always like to Himself; nor does He ever turn or change Himself into any forms, lest by change He should appear to be mortal. For the change implied in turning from one thing to another is comprehended as a portion of a certain death.  Thus there is never in Him any accession or increase of any part or honour, lest anything should appear to have ever been wanting to His perfection, nor is any loss sustained in Him, lest a degree of mortality should appear to have been suffered by Him. But what He is, He always is; and who He is, He is always Himself; and what character He has, He always has.22    In other words, God is always the same in essence, in personality, and in attributes. For increasing argues beginning, as well as losses prove death and perishing. And therefore He says, “I am God, I change not;”23    Mal. iii. 6. in that, what is not born cannot suffer change, holding His condition always. For whatever it be in Him which constitutes Divinity, must necessarily exist always, maintaining itself by its own powers, so that He should always be God. And thus He says, “I am that I am.”24    Ex. iii. 14. [The ineffable name of the Self-Existent.] For what He is has this name, because it always maintains the same quality of Himself. For change takes away the force of that name “That I Am;” for whatever, at any time, is changed, is shown to be mortal in that very particular which is changed. For it ceases to be that which it had been, and consequently begins to be what it was not; and therefore, reasonably, there remains always in God His position, in that without any loss arising from change, He is always like and equal to Himself. And what is not born cannot be changed: for only those things undergo change which are made, or which are begotten; in that those things which had not been at one time, learn to be by coming into being, and therefore to suffer change by being born. Moreover, those things which neither have nativity nor maker, have excluded from themselves the capacity of change, not having a beginning wherein is cause of change. And thus He is declared to be one, having no equal. For whatever can be God, must as God be of necessity the Highest. But whatever is the Highest, must certainly be the Highest in such sense as to be without any equal. And thus that must needs be alone and one on which nothing can be conferred, having no peer; because there cannot be two infinites, as the very nature of things dictates. And that is infinite which neither has any sort of beginning nor end. For whatever has occupied the whole excludes the beginning of another. Because if He does not contain all which is, whatever it is—seeing that what is found in that whereby it is contained is found to be less than that whereby it is contained—He will cease to be God; being reduced into the power of another, in whose greatness He, being smaller, shall have been included. And therefore what contained Him would then rather claim to be God. Whence it results that God’s own name also cannot be declared, because He cannot be conceived. For that is contained in a name which is, in any way, comprehended from the condition of His nature. For the name is the signification of that thing which could be comprehended from a name. But when that which is treated of is such that it cannot be worthily gathered into one form by the very understanding itself, how shall it be set forth fittingly in the one word of an appellation, seeing that as it is beyond the intellect, it must also of necessity be above the significancy of the appellation? As with reason when He applies and prefers from certain reasons and occasions His name of God, we know that it is not so much the legitimate propriety of the appellation that is set forth, as a certain significancy determined for it, to which, while men betake themselves, they seem to be able thereby to obtain God’s mercy. He is therefore also both immortal and incorruptible, neither conscious of any kind of loss nor ending.  For because He is incorruptible, He is therefore immortal; and because He is immortal, He is certainly also incorruptible,—each being involved by turns in the other, with itself and in itself, by a mutual connection, and prolonged by a vicarious concatenation to the condition of eternity; immortality arising from incorruption, as well as incorruption coming from immortality.

CAPUT IV. Bonum quoque, semper sui similem, immutabilem, unum et solum, infinitum: cujus nec nomen proprium possit edici, et incorruptibilem, et immortalem.

0892C

Quem solum merito bonum pronuntiat Dominus (Luc. XVIII, 19): cujus bonitatis totus testis est mundus, quem non instituisset, nisi bonus fuisset. Nam si omnia bona valde (Gen. I, 31); consequenter ac merito et quae instituta sunt bona, bonum institutorem probaverunt: et quae a bono institutore sunt, aliud quam bona esse non possunt: ex quo omne malum facessat a Deo. Nec enim potest fieri, ut sit initiator aut artifex ullius mali operis, qui nomen 0892D sibi perfecti vindicat et parentis et judicis: maxime 0893A quum omnis mali operis vindex sit et judex; quoniam et non aliunde occurrit homini malum, nisi a bono Deo recessisset. Hoc autem ipsum in homine denotatur: non quia necesse fuit, sed quia ipse sic voluit. Unde manifeste et quid malum esset apparuit, et, ne invidia in Deo esse videretur, a quo malum ortum esset, eluxit. Hic ergo semper sui est similis, nec se umquam in aliquas formas vertit aut mutat (Jac. I, 17): ne per immutationem, etiam mortalis esse videatur. Immutatio enim conversionis, portio cujusdam comprehenditur mortis. Ideo nec adjectio in illo umquam ullius aut partis aut honoris accedit, ne quid umquam perfecto defuisse videatur: nec detrimentum in eo aliquod agitur, ne gradus mortalitatis receptus esse videatur: sed quod est, id 0893B semper est; et qui est, semper ipse est; et qualis est, semper talis est. Nam et incrementa originem monstrant, et detrimenta mortem atque interitum probant, et ideo: Ego, ait, sum Deus, et non sum mutatus (Malach. III, 6), statum suum tenens semper, dum id quod natum non est, converti non potest. Hoc enim in ipso quidquid illud potest quod est Deus, semper sit necesse est; ut semper sit Deus, servans sese virtutibus suis. Et ideo dicit (Exod. III, 14): Ego sum qui sum. Quod enim est, ideo hoc habet nomen, quoniam eamdem semper sui obtinet qualitatem. Immutatio enim tollit illud nomen quod est: quidquid enim aliquando vertitur, mortale ostenditur, hoc ipso quod convertitur. Desinit enim esse quod fuerat, et incipit consequenter esse quod non erat: idcirco 0893C et merito in Deo manet semper status suus, dum sine detrimento commutationis, semper sui et similis et aequalis est. Quod enim natum non est, nec mutari potest: ea enim sola in conversionem veniunt, quaecumque fiunt vel quaecumque gignuntur; dum quae aliquando non fuerant, discunt esse nascendo, atque ideo nascendo converti. At enim, illa quae nec nativitatem habent nec artificem, excluserunt a se demutationem, dum in qua conversionis causa est, non habent originem: ideo et unus pronuntiatus est, dum parem non habet: Deus enim, quidquid esse potest Deus est, summum sit necesse est. Summum autem quidquid est, ita demum summum esse oportet, dum extra comparem est. Et ideo solum et unum sit necesse est, cui conferri 0893D nihil potest, dum parem non habet. Quoniam nec duo infinita esse possunt; ut rerum dictat ipsa natura. Infinitum est autem, quidquid nec originem habet omnino, nec finem. Excludit enim alterius initium, 0894A quidquid occupaverit totum. Quoniam si non omne id quod est, quidquid est continet; dum intra id invenitur quo continetur, minus inventum eo quo continetur, Deus esse desierit, in alterius potestatem redactus, cujus magnitudine, qua minor, fuerit inclusus: et ideo quod continuit, Deus potius esse jam coeperit. Ex quo effectum est, ut nec nomen Dei proprium possit edici, quoniam non possit nec concipi. Id enim nomine continetur, quidquid etiam ex naturae suae conditione comprehenditur. Nomen enim significantia est ejus rei, quae comprehendi potuit ex nomine. At quando id de quo agitur tale est, ut condigne nec ipsis intellectibus colligatur; quomodo appellationis digne vocabulo pronuntiabitur, quod dum extra intellectum est, etiam supra appellationis significantiam 0894B sit necesse est? Ut merito quando nomen suum Deus, ex quibusdam rationibus et occasionibus adjicit et praefert, non tam legitimam proprietatem appellationis sciamus esse depromptam, quam significantiam quamdam constitutam; ad quam dum homines decurrunt, Dei misericordiam per ipsam impetrare posse videantur. Est ergo et immortalis et incorruptibilis, nec detrimenta sentiens omnino, nec finem. Nam et quia incorruptibilis, ideo et immortalis; et quia immortalis, utique et incorruptibilis; utroque invicem sibi et in se connexione mutua perplexo, et ad statum aeternitatis vicaria concatenatione producto, et immortalitate de incorruptione descendente, et incorruptione de immortalitate veniente.