LESSON 6

Love and Hate as Efficient Causes of Good and Evil

Chapter 4: 984b 32-985b 4

             50. But since there would seem to be in nature things which are contrary to those that are good, and not only order and good but also disorder and what is base, and evil things more numerous than good ones, and base things more numerous than noble ones, for this reason another thinker introduced love and strife as causes, each of its own type of effects. For if anyone grasps what Empedocles said, taking it according to its meaning rather than according to its faltering expression, he will find that love is the cause of things which come to be by aggregation, and strife the cause of evil things. Hence, if anyone were to say that Empedocles, in a sense, both said and was the first to say that good and evil are principles, he would perhaps speak correctly, i.e., if the cause of all good things is good and that of all evil things is evil.

             51. These thinkers, then, as we have said, to this extent have touched on two of the causes which we established in the Physics, -matter and the source of motion--though only obscurely and with no clarity, much as untrained men conduct themselves in battle. For the latter, though encircled, often deal telling blows, but without science. In the same way these thinkers do not seem to be aware of what they are saying. For it seems that they almost never make use of the causes except to a small degree.

             52. Anaxagoras uses "intellect" in an artificial way in generating the world. For when he is in difficulty as to what is necessarily the cause of something, he drags in this intellect; but in other cases he makes everything but intellect the cause of what comes to be.

             53. Empedocles, it is true, makes greater use of causes than Anaxagoras, though not sufficiently; nor does one find in his use of them what he professed. In many places he argues that love separates things, and that strife brings them together. For when being itself is separated out into its elements by strife, then fire and each of the other elements are brought together into a unity. But when they are united by love, the particles must again be separated out from each element.

             54. In contrast to the first philosophers, then, Empedocles was the first to introduce this cause, dividing it in such a way as to make the source of motion not a single principle but different and contrary ones. Moreover, he was the first to claim that the elements, which are said to belong to the class of matter, are four in number, although he does not use them as four but as two, taking fire by itself alone, and its opposites--earth, air, and water--as a single nature (46). But anyone may see this by studying his basic sayings. This philosopher, then, as we have said, has spoken in this way about the principles of things and their number.

COMMENTARY

             104. Here Aristotle gives the opinion of those who posited contrariety in beings of this kind, and the reason which moved them, which is as follows. There would seem to be in nature things which are contrary to those that are good, because in nature one finds not only things which are ordered and good, but sometimes things which are disordered and base. Now it cannot be said that evil things have no cause but happen by chance, because evil things are more numerous than good ones, and base things more numerous than those which are unqualifiedly noble. But those things which come to be by chance without a definite cause do not occur for the most part but in the smaller number of cases. Hence, since contrary effects have contrary causes, it was necessary to hold as a cause of things not only love, from which the order and good in things originate, but also hate, which is the source of disorder and baseness or evil in things, so that in this way particular instances of evil and good have their own type of causes.

             105. That this was the reason which moved Empedocles is evident if anyone grasps what he says, taking his statement according to its meaning rather than according to the words which he used imperfectly and, as it were, in a faltering way. For he said that it is the office of love to bring the elements together, and of hate to separate them. But since the generation of things is a result of the coming together [of the elements], by reason of which there is being and good in things, and their corruption a result of the separation [of the elements], which is the way to non-being and evil, it is now evident that he wanted love to be the cause of things which come to be by aggregation, i.e., of good things, and hate the cause of evil things. Thus if one were to say that Empedocles was the first to maintain that good and evil are principles, he would perhaps speak correctly.

             106. That is to say, this would follow if Empedocles did hold that good is the cause of all good things, and evil the cause of all evil things. For it is evident that he posited evil as the cause of some evil things, namely, of corruption, and good as the cause of some good things, namely, of generation. But because it would not follow that all good things would be caused by friendship or all evil things by hate, since the parts of the world would be differentiated by hate and fused together by friendship, therefore he did not always hold that good is the cause of good things, and evil the cause of evil things.

             107. These thinkers (51).

             Here he shows that in giving these causes the philosophers treated them inadequately. First (51:C 107), he mentions them in a general way. Second (52:C 108), he treats each one individually ("Anaxagoras").

             He says first (51), then, that these philosophers--Anaxagoras and Empedocles--arrived at a doctrine of two of the causes which have been established in the Physics, namely, matter and the cause of motion, although they treated these obscurely and with no clarity, because they did not explain that those principles which they held to be the causes of things could be reduced to these classes of causes. But insofar as they posited two of these causes, they may be likened to untrained warriors who, though encircled by the enemy, sometimes strike good blows, not by art but by chance. This is evident from the fact that, even though they happen to do this sometimes, this does not occur always or for the most part. In like manner, too, these philosophers were not accustomed to express themselves accurately, nor was it their custom to speak with awareness, i.e., as men who know. Hence another translation has, "But these men neither have science, nor are they to be compared with men who realize what they are saying." This is shown by the fact that, although they had proposed these causes, they hardly ever used them, because they employed them in few instances. Hence it seems that they introduced them not as a result of art but by accident, because they were moved to do so by necessity.

             108. Anaxagoras (52).

             Here he shows in what particular respect the view of each is unsatisfactory. First, he speaks of Anaxagoras; and second (53:C 109), of Empedocles ("Empedocles").

             He says first, then, that Anaxagoras uses "intellect" to generate the world, and in so doing he seems to speak of it in an artificial way. For when he inquires about the causes of the world's generation, he drags it in of necessity, i.e., he invents this intelligence only because he is unable to attribute the generation of the world to any other cause which would differentiate things except to one which is essentially distinct and unmixed, and intellect is a thing of this kind. But in all other cases he draws his causes from any other source rather than intellect, for example, in the case of the particular natures of things.

             109. Empedocles (53).

             Here he shows in what respect Empedocles' doctrine is inadequate; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he shows in what respect Empedocles' doctrine is inadequate. Second (54:C 111), he explains what Empedocles himself held in contrast to the other philosophers ("In contrast").

             He says, first (53), that Empedocles, in dealing with the particular natures of things, "makes greater use of the causes" posited by him (the four elements, and love and hate) than Anaxagoras did, because he reduced the generation and corruption of particular things to these causes, and not to intelligence as Anaxagoras did. But Empedocles failed in two ways.

             First, he failed because he does not treat causes of this kind adequately enough; for he uses things which are not self-evident as though they were self-evident axioms, as is stated in the Physics, Book I, that is, insofar as he assumed that they are self-evident, because at one definite time strife has dominion over the elements and at another, love.

             110. Second, he failed because in the matters which he investigates, one does not find what he has professed, i.e., what he held as a principle, namely, that love combines things and that strife separates them, because in many places love must on the contrary "separate" or divide things, and strife "bring them together," i.e., unite them. For when the universe itself "is separated out," i.e., divided into its parts, by hate, as occurs when the world is generated, all particles of fire are then combined into one whole, and so also are the individual particles of the other elements "brought together," i.e., joined to each other. Hence, strife not only separates the particles of fire from those of air, but also brings together the particles of fire. But, on the other hand, when the elements come together through love, which occurs when the universe is destroyed, the particles of fire must then be separated from each other, and so also must the particles of the other elements. For fire can be mixed with air only if the particles of fire are separated from each other; and the same is true of the particles of air only if these elements penetrate one another, so that love not only unites unlike things but also separates like things, according to what follows from his position.

             111. In contrast (54).

             Here he shows in what respect Empedocles' own doctrine differs from that of the other philosophers. He says that Empedocles maintained two things in contrast to the others. First, he divided the cause which is the source of motion into two contrary parts. Second, he held the material cause to be constituted of four elements--not that he uses the four elements as four, but rather as two, because he contrasts fire with the other three, saying that fire is active in nature and the others passive in nature. Anyone can gather this from the elements of things treated by him, or from his "basic sayings" in the sense of the rudiments of the doctrine which he propounded. Another version reads "from his verses," because he is said to have written his philosophy in meters. And still another version which says "from his statements," agrees with this. As has been stated, then, this philosopher was the first to stipulate in this way that the principles of things are so many in number, namely, four, and to speak of those which have been mentioned.