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The Discourses of Epictetus

Table of Contents

BOOK ONE

BOOK TWO

Confidence then ought to be employed against death, and caution against the fear of death. But now we do the contrary, and employ against death the at

Such will I show myself to you, faithful, modest, noble, free from perturbation. What, and immortal too, exempt from old age, and from sickness? No,

Well then the matter is not now very safe, and particularly at Rome for he who attempts to do it, must not do it in a corner, you may be sure, but m

For this reason when Zeno was going to meet Antigonus, he was not anxious, for Antigonus had no power over any of the things which Zeno admired and Z

See how tragedy is made when common things happen to silly men.

Of things some are good, some are bad, and others are indifferent. The good then are the virtues and the things which partake of the virtues the bad

Do you think that Admetus did not love his own child when he was little? that he was not in agony when the child had a fever? that he did not often sa

Such are the wishes that they utter.

Then having this purpose before you, if some little form of expression pleases you, if some theorems please you, do you abide among them and choose t

BOOK THREE

Was Hermes going to descend from heaven to say this to him? And now the Gods say this to you and send the messenger, the slayer of Argus, to warn you

And we ought to retain these verses in such way that we may use them, not that we may utter them aloud, as when we exclaim Paean Apollo. Again in fe

This, then, may be applied even to a father: I must not, even if a worse man than you should come, treat a father unworthily-, for all are from pater

And what does he say himself?

Wretch, which of your affairs goes badly? Your possessions? No. Your body? No. But you are rich in gold and copper. What then is the matter with you?

whose duty it is to look after others, the married and those who have children to see who uses his wife well, who uses her badly who quarrels what

he answered, when he was half-asleep,

But before all the Cynic's ruling faculty must be purer than the sun and, if it is not, he must be a cunning knave and a fellow of no principle, sinc

and also, If so it pleases the gods, so let it be why should he not have confidence to speak freely to his own brothers, to his children, in a word

So he was conscious of his own qualification, and knew her weakness.

And still earlier it was the fortune of Hercules to visit all the inhabited world

casting out and clearing away their lawlessness and introducing in their place good rules of law. And yet how many friends do you think that he had in

Relying on what? Not on reputation nor on wealth nor on the power of a magistrate, but on his own strength, that is, on his opinions about the things

BOOK FOUR

But what do you say, philosopher? The tyrant summons you to say something which does not become you. Do you say it or do you not? Answer me. Let me c

Is it your will that I should go to Rome? I will go to Rome. To Gyara? I will go to Gyara. I will go to Athens? I will go to Athens. To prison? I will

he transfers to these things. Where have I failed in the matters pertaining to flattery? What have I done? Anything like a free man, anything like

And not this only, but he neither desires nor seeks anything, nor man nor place nor amusement, as children seek the vintage or holidays always fortif

Why is this your ill? Do you, then, instead of removing it, blame your mother for not foretelling it to you that you might continue grieving from that

For Aristophanes says of Socrates that he also walked the air and stole clothes from the palaestra. But all who have written about Socrates bear exact

Chapter 8

That the faculties are not safe to the uninstructed

In as many ways as we can change things which are equivalent to one another, in just so many ways we can change the forms of arguments and enthymemes in argumentation. This is an instance: "If you have borrowed and not repaid, you owe me the money: you have not borrowed and you have not repaid; then you do not owe me the money." To do this skillfully is suitable to no man more than to the philosopher; for if the enthymeme is all imperfect syllogism. it is plain that he who has been exercised in the perfect syllogism must be equally expert in the imperfect also.

"Why then do we not exercise ourselves and one another in this manner?" Because, I reply, at present, though we are not exercised in these things and not distracted from the study of morality, by me at least, still we make no progress in virtue. What then must we expect if we should add this occupation? and particularly as this would not only be an occupation which would withdraw us from more necessary things, but would also be a cause of self conceit and arrogance, and no small cause. For great is the power of arguing and the faculty of persuasion, and particularly if it should be much exercised, and also receive additional ornament from language: and so universally, every faculty acquired by the uninstructed and weak brings with it the danger of these persons being elated and inflated by it. For by what means could one persuade a young man who excels in these matters that he ought not to become an appendage to them, but to make them an appendage to himself? Does he not trample on all such reasons, and strut before us elated and inflated, not enduring that any man should reprove him and remind him of what he has neglected and to what he has turned aside?

"What, then, was not Plato a philosopher?" I reply, "And was not Hippocrates a physician? but you see how Hippocrates speaks." Does Hippocrates, then, speak thus in respect of being a physician? Why do you mingle things which have been accidentally united in the same men? And if Plato was handsome and strong, ought I also to set to work and endeavor to become handsome or strong, as if this was necessary for philosophy, because a certain philosopher was at the same time handsome and a philosopher? Will you not choose to see and to distinguish in respect to what men become philosophers, and what things belong to belong to them in other respects? And if I were a philosopher, ought you also to be made lame? What then? Do I take away these faculties which you possess? By no means; for neither do I take away the faculty of seeing. But if you ask me what is the good of man, I cannot mention to you anything else than that it is a certain disposition of the will with respect to appearances.