The Discourses of Epictetus

 Table of Contents

 BOOK ONE

 Chapter 1

 Chapter 2

 Chapter 3

 Chapter 4

 Chapter 5

 Chapter 6

 Chapter 7

 Chapter 8

 Chapter 9

 Chapter 10

 Chapter 11

 Chapter 12

 Chapter 13

 Chapter 14

 Chapter 15

 Chapter 16

 Chapter 17

 Chapter 18

 Chapter 19

 Chapter 20

 Chapter 21

 Chapter 22

 Chapter 23

 Chapter 24

 Chapter 25

 Chapter 26

 Chapter 27

 Chapter 28

 Chapter 29

 Chapter 30

 BOOK TWO

 Chapter 1

 Confidence then ought to be employed against death, and caution against the fear of death. But now we do the contrary, and employ against death the at

 Chapter 2

 Chapter 3

 Chapter 4

 Chapter 5

 Chapter 6

 Chapter 7

 Chapter 8

 Such will I show myself to you, faithful, modest, noble, free from perturbation. What, and immortal too, exempt from old age, and from sickness? No,

 Chapter 9

 Chapter 10

 Chapter 11

 Chapter 12

 Well then the matter is not now very safe, and particularly at Rome for he who attempts to do it, must not do it in a corner, you may be sure, but m

 Chapter 13

 For this reason when Zeno was going to meet Antigonus, he was not anxious, for Antigonus had no power over any of the things which Zeno admired and Z

 Chapter 14

 Chapter 15

 Chapter 16

 See how tragedy is made when common things happen to silly men.

 Chapter 17

 Chapter 18

 Chapter 19

 Of things some are good, some are bad, and others are indifferent. The good then are the virtues and the things which partake of the virtues the bad

 Chapter 20

 Chapter 21

 Chapter 22

 Do you think that Admetus did not love his own child when he was little? that he was not in agony when the child had a fever? that he did not often sa

 Such are the wishes that they utter.

 Chapter 23

 Then having this purpose before you, if some little form of expression pleases you, if some theorems please you, do you abide among them and choose t

 Chapter 24

 Chapter 25

 Chapter 26

 BOOK THREE

 Chapter 1

 Was Hermes going to descend from heaven to say this to him? And now the Gods say this to you and send the messenger, the slayer of Argus, to warn you

 Chapter 2

 Chapter 3

 Chapter 4

 Chapter 5

 Chapter 6

 Chapter 7

 Chapter 8

 Chapter 9

 Chapter 10

 And we ought to retain these verses in such way that we may use them, not that we may utter them aloud, as when we exclaim Paean Apollo. Again in fe

 Chapter 11

 This, then, may be applied even to a father: I must not, even if a worse man than you should come, treat a father unworthily-, for all are from pater

 Chapter 12

 Chapter 13

 Chapter 14

 Chapter 15

 Chapter 16

 Chapter 17

 Chapter 18

 Chapter 19

 Chapter 20

 Chapter 21

 Chapter 22

 And what does he say himself?

 Wretch, which of your affairs goes badly? Your possessions? No. Your body? No. But you are rich in gold and copper. What then is the matter with you?

 whose duty it is to look after others, the married and those who have children to see who uses his wife well, who uses her badly who quarrels what

 he answered, when he was half-asleep,

 But before all the Cynic's ruling faculty must be purer than the sun and, if it is not, he must be a cunning knave and a fellow of no principle, sinc

 and also, If so it pleases the gods, so let it be why should he not have confidence to speak freely to his own brothers, to his children, in a word

 So he was conscious of his own qualification, and knew her weakness.

 Chapter 23

 Chapter 24

 And still earlier it was the fortune of Hercules to visit all the inhabited world

 casting out and clearing away their lawlessness and introducing in their place good rules of law. And yet how many friends do you think that he had in

 Chapter 25

 Chapter 26

 Relying on what? Not on reputation nor on wealth nor on the power of a magistrate, but on his own strength, that is, on his opinions about the things

 BOOK FOUR

 Chapter 1

 But what do you say, philosopher? The tyrant summons you to say something which does not become you. Do you say it or do you not? Answer me. Let me c

 Chapter 2

 Chapter 3

 Chapter 4

 Is it your will that I should go to Rome? I will go to Rome. To Gyara? I will go to Gyara. I will go to Athens? I will go to Athens. To prison? I will

 Chapter 5

 Chapter 6

 he transfers to these things. Where have I failed in the matters pertaining to flattery? What have I done? Anything like a free man, anything like

 Chapter 7

 Chapter 8

 And not this only, but he neither desires nor seeks anything, nor man nor place nor amusement, as children seek the vintage or holidays always fortif

 Chapter 9

 Chapter 10

 Why is this your ill? Do you, then, instead of removing it, blame your mother for not foretelling it to you that you might continue grieving from that

 Chapter 11

 For Aristophanes says of Socrates that he also walked the air and stole clothes from the palaestra. But all who have written about Socrates bear exact

 Chapter 12

 Chapter 13

Such are the wishes that they utter.

For universally, be not deceived, every animal is attached to nothing so much as to its own interest. Whatever then appears to it an impediment to this interest, whether this be a brother, or a father, or a child, or beloved, or lover, it hates, spurns, curses: for its nature is to love nothing so much as its own interest; this is father, and brother and kinsman, and country, and God. When, then, the gods appear to us to be an impediment to this, we abuse them and throw down their statues and burn their temples, as Alexander ordered the temples of AEsculapius to be burned when his dear friend died.

For this reason if a man put in the same place his interest, sanctity, goodness, and country, and parents, and friends, all these are secured: but if he puts in one place his interest, in another his friends, and his country and his kinsmen and justice itself, all these give way being borne down by the weight of interest. For where the "I" and the "Mine" are placed, to that place of necessity the animal inclines: if in the flesh, there is the ruling power: if in the will, it is there: and if it is in externals, it is there. If then I am there where my will is, then only shall I be a friend such as I ought to be, and son, and father; for this will he my interest, to maintain the character of fidelity, of modesty, of patience, of abstinence, of active cooperation, of observing my relations. But if I put myself in one place, and honesty in another, then the doctrine of Epicurus becomes strong, which asserts either that there is no honesty or it is that which opinion holds to be honest.

It was through this ignorance that the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians quarreled, and the Thebans with both; and the great king quarreled with Hellas, and the Macedonians with both; and the Romans with the Getae. And still earlier the Trojan war happened for these reasons. Alexander was the guest of Menelaus; and if any man had seen their friendly disposition, he would not have believed any one who said that they were not friends. But there was cast between them a bit of meat, a handsome woman, and about her war arose. And now when you see brothers to be friends appearing to have one mind, do not conclude from this anything about their friendship, not even if they say it and swear that it is impossible for them to be separated from one another. For the ruling principle of a bad man cannot be trusted, it is insecure, has no certain rule by which it is directed, and is overpowered at different times by different appearances. But examine, not what other men examine, if they are born of the same parents and brought up together, and under the same pedagogue; but examine this only, wherein they place their interest, whether in externals or in the will. If in externals, do not name them friends, no more than name them trustworthy or constant, or brave or free: do not name them even men, if you have any judgment. For that is not a principle of human nature which makes them bite one another, and abuse one another, and occupy deserted places or public places, as if they were mountains, and in the courts of justice display the acts of robbers; nor yet that which makes them intemperate and adulterers and corrupters, nor that which makes them do whatever else men do against one another through this one opinion only, that of placing themselves and their interests in the things which are not within the power of their will. But if you hear that in truth these men think the good to be only there, where will is, and where there is a right use of appearances, no longer trouble yourself whether they are father or son, or brothers, or have associated a long time and are companions, but when you have ascertained this only, confidently declare that they are friends, as you declare that they are faithful, that they are just. For where else is friendship than where there is fidelity, and modesty, where there is a communion of honest things and of nothing else?

"But," you may say, "such a one treated me with regard so long; and did he not love me?" How do you know, slave, if he did not regard you in the same way as he wipes his shoes with a sponge, or as he takes care of his beast? How do you know, when you have ceased to be useful as a vessel, he will not throw you away like a broken platter? "But this woman is my wife, and we have lived together so long." And how long did Eriphyle live with Amphiaraus, and was the mother of children and of many? But a necklace came between them. "And what is a necklace?" It is the opinion about such things. That was the bestial principle, that was the thing which broke asunder the friendship between husband and wife, that which did not allow the woman to be a wife nor the mother to be a mother. And let every man among you who has seriously resolved either to be a friend himself or to have another for his friend, cut out these opinions, hate them, drive them from his soul. And thus, first of all, he will not reproach himself, he will not be at variance with himself, will not change his mind, he will not torture himself. In the next place, to another also, who is like himself, he will be altogether and completely a friend. But he will bear with the man who is unlike himself, he will be kind to him, gentle, ready to pardon on account of his ignorance, on account of his being mistaken in things of the greatest importance; but he will be harsh to no man, being well convinced of Plato's doctrine that every mind is deprived of truth unwillingly. If you cannot do this, yet you can do in all other respects as friends do, drink together, and lodge together, and sail together, and you may be born of the same parents; for snakes also are: but neither will they be friends nor you, so long as you retain these bestial and cursed opinions.