CHAPTER V

             This amounts to saying (as we said before), either, under one aspect, the same as those who posit the soul as a body of very refined elements, or, under another aspect, what Democritus said of the movement of the soul,--a thing intrinsically absurd. For if the soul is in all the body as sentient, there must be two bodies in the same place, if the soul is some sort of body. And for those who say it is a number, there are many points in one point, or else every body has a soul; unless the soul's 'number' be other than that of the points in the body. The animal would then come to be moved by a number, precisely as Democritus said. What difference does it make whether one says small spheres or large units, or, in general, that units are in motion? In any case it must needs be that the animal moves when these are moving.§§ 175-6

             These and many other consequences result for those who would combine number and movement in a single principle. It is impossible for such to be not only a definition of the soul, but even one of its accidents--as is clear if one attempts by this procedure to account for the soul's activities and modifications, such as pleasure, pain and so forth. As we said before, on these principles it is not easy even to hazard a conjecture.§ 177