LECTIO NINE

             § 132. After rejecting Plato's theory the Philosopher goes on to dispose of another opinion rather similar to Plato's. For certain philosophers thought the soul was a harmony; agreeing so far with Plato's view that the soul was composed of harmonic numbers; yet differing from him in that, while he spoke only of a numerical harmony, they extended the principle to include harmonies of compounds, mixtures and contrary qualities.

             § 133. First then he tells us of a tradition handed down from the early philosophers concerning the soul, which seemed to contain some truth, not only about the soul, but about something common to all the principles of things. He says 'something common' because the early philosophers said nothing about formal causes, treating only of material causes. Democritus and Empedocles were the two who seem to have come nearest to treating of the formal cause. The latter reduced everything to six principles, of which four--the elements--were material and two were formal, namely the part-active and part-passive principles, Concord and Strife. And the material elements were, they said, linked together by a certain proportion, whence they had a certain unity without which they could not exist together. And this proportion they called the form and harmony of things; whence it followed that the soul was a harmony like other forms.

             § 134. Then, at 'And they say that harmony', he states the ground of this opinion: harmony is the combination and mixing in due proportion of contraries in compounds and mixtures. The proportion itself is called harmony and is the form of the compound; and because the soul is a kind of form it was reckoned a harmony. Such was apparently the view of Dynarchus, Simiates and Empedocles.

             § 135. Next, at 'Yet a harmony', he begins to criticise it: first in a general way, and then, at 'One might, etc.' with particular reference to Empedocles who formulated it. The general theory is attacked with four arguments. The first is as follows. Harmony, strictly speaking, pertains to sounds, but is transferred by these philosophers to mean any due proportion, whether in things composed of different parts or in mixtures of contrary elements. On this view, then, harmony is one of two things: either the compound or mixture itself, or the proportion existing in it. But the soul is clearly neither of these; therefore it is not a harmony. The reason why the soul cannot be, for these philosophers, either a compound or the proportion in a compound is that these are both accidental factors, whilst the soul, according to them, is a substance.

             § 136. The second argument begins at 'Further, movement'. All philosophers agree that the soul moves something. But harmony does not move anything; rather it is a result and trace of movement, just as in music the movement of strings leaves its trace in harmonious sound. Similarly, the putting together and coadaptation of parts by some composing agent results in a certain proportional composition. If then the soul were a harmony resulting from some producer of harmony, we should have to posit another soul in the producer.

             § 137. The third argument comes at 'It would be more appropriate'. In the Physics, Book IV, Aristotle had said that, if the definition of anything is to be adequate, it must answer to all that the given thing can do of itself or receive from other things; for the best definition states not only the substance and nature of a thing, but also its accidental qualities and capacities. If then the soul were a harmony, we ought to be able to work out its capacities and accidental qualities from our knowledge of this harmony. But this is extremely difficult; if, for example, we want to derive the operations of the soul from harmony, to what harmony does feeling or love, hating or understanding belong? It would be easier indeed to know the body through harmony. Thus we certainly can define good health as the duly proportioned and equally balanced commingling of the body's humours; and likewise with other bodily qualities. Thus harmony belongs apparently to the body rather than to the soul.

             § 138. The fourth argument starts at 'Further, we speak'. Harmony is sometimes found in things composed together and moving, when, that is, such things are so coapted and arranged 'that nothing becoming to them is missing', i.e. no defect occurs within the nature of the thing in question. The parts then are said to be well harmonised and the whole composition is called a harmony, e.g. of wood or stones or other natural bodies. In the same way when stringed instruments or flutes are well-tuned, so that agreeable sounds result, they are said to be well harmonised. This is the proper meaning of the word. Sometimes, again, 'harmony' is found in mixtures of contraries; as, when contrary elements are so combined and mixed that no incompatibility remains, nor any excess of any one of them, e.g. of heat or cold or moisture or dryness; then they are said to be harmonised well and their ratio or proportion is called a harmony. So, if the soul is called a harmony it must be in one of these ways. But in fact it cannot rationally be so called in either of these ways. Those philosophers therefore spoke amiss.

             § 139. Clearly, the soul should not be called a harmony precisely in the sense in which compounds and compositions are harmonious. For in the body the interrelation of the various parts is quite evident; we can easily tell how the bones or the nerves are interrelated, what the arm is to the hand and the flesh to the bone. On the other hand the principle according to which the parts of the soul are interrelated is obscure; nor does the correlation of parts in the body reveal to us how the parts of the soul, the understanding, and the senses, and desire, and so forth, are related to each other.

             § 140. Nor can the soul be called a harmony in the same way as the proportion in bodies compounded of a mixture of contrary qualities; and this for two reasons. One reason is that a different proportion is to be found in different parts of the living body; for the elements do not mix in the same ratio or proportion to  form flesh as to form bone; and consequently there would be different souls for the different parts of the same living body, according to the proportional diversity and multiplication of its parts. The other reason is that all bodies are compounded of elements and contrary qualities; hence if the proportion of each compound is a harmony, and each harmony is a soul, there will be no body without a soul; which is an awkward thesis to maintain. It is not therefore of much use to call the soul a harmony.

             § 141. Next, at 'One might at this point', Aristotle attacks Empedocles by drawing three unforeseen consequences from his account of the matter. The first is this. If you maintain that every body has a certain ratio or proportion, which you call harmony and identify with the soul, I put the question to you whether the soul itself is this ratio or proportion, or something else. If you answer that it is the proportion itself, then, since in the same body there are different proportions for the different parts, two difficulties arise; there will be many souls in the same body; and there will be a soul for every compound. But if you answer that the soul is not the proportion itself, then, since harmony is proportion, the soul will not be a harmony.

             § 142. The second argument begins at 'Or further'. Empedocles had asserted that the cause of union in things was Concord and the cause of disunion was Strife. Now union implies a certain proportion. I ask you, then, whether Concord is the cause of any and every union or only of such unions as are harmonious. If you answer 'of every union', then you must find some cause other than Concord for the harmony and proportion proper to harmonious unions--unless you say that the latter occur by chance. But if you say that Concord is the cause of harmonious unions, then it is not the cause of all unions.

             § 143. The third argument, at 'And whether this', runs as follows. Empedocles says that Concord is what unites things. I ask: is Concord the same as the actual union in harmony, or is it not? If it is the same, then, since nothing causes itself, love cannot be the cause of the union as Empedocles asserted. But suppose it is not the same. Still, harmonious union as such is only a kind of agreement, which seems to be precisely what Concord is too. So they are the same after all; and the preceding argument applies as before.

             § 144. Proceeding, Aristotle shows how plausible is the theory in question. Its plausibility, he says, relies on the argument that if you grant one thing another must follow, and if you remove one thing another is removed. Thus when a body loses its harmony it loses its soul, and while its harmony remains the soul too remains. Yet the conclusion does not follow; for this kind of proportion is not, as those philosophers thought, the form itself, but only a disposition of the matter in view of the form. And if the harmony of a composite being is taken in this its proper sense, i.e. to mean a disposition, then the consequence is quite correct, that, so long as the matter's disposition to the form remains, the form itself remains, and when the disposition goes, the form also goes. Not that the harmony is the form, but that it is a disposition of the matter in view of the form.

             § 145. Finally, where he says 'It is evident, then' Aristotle, concluding, summarises his rejection both of Plato's view that the soul moves in a circle and of Empedocles' that it is a harmony. The soul, as has been said, is moved indirectly, and it moves itself That it is moved indirectly is clear, for it moves when its body moves; but the body itself receives movement from the soul. Only indirectly, and in no other way, does the soul move from place to place.

408a 34-408b 31

THEORY OF SOUL AS A SELF-MOVER RECONSIDERED

             ONE MIGHT WITH MORE REASON ENQUIRE ABOUT the soul as in movement by considering such facts as these: that it is, as we say, sad, pleased, confident, frightened; or again, that it is angry, feels and understands. All these seem to be movements; from which one might suppose that the soul moves.§ 146

             This, however, is not a necessary conclusion. Even if feeling pain or being glad or understanding are in the fullest sense movements, and each of these is a 'being moved' (e.g. being angry or fearful occurs by some movement of the heart), this being moved is from the soul. But as for understanding, it is either of such a nature or perhaps something other.§§ 147-50

             Of these, however, some occur with a change of place in that which moves; others with an alteration,--of what sort or how is another question. To say that the soul is angry is like saying it builds or weaves. For it is perhaps better to say, not that the soul is compassionate, or learns, or understands, but a man by his soul. These modifications occur by movements not so much in the soul as, in some cases, proceeding to it, and in others, proceeding from it: as sensation proceeds from things, whilst remembering proceeds from the soul to the motions or rests which occur in the sensitive organs.§§ 151-62

             But intellect would seem to be a subsisting essence implanted in the soul, and not to corrupt. For it would corrupt [if it did], principally through the debility accompanying old age. But in fact what happens is similar to the case of the sensitive powers. If an old man could acquire the eye of a young man, he would see as a young man; hence, senility is not an affliction of the soul, but of that which it inhabits, like drunkenness or disease. Understanding and thinking, then, decay with the decay of something else within. Understanding itself cannot be affected. But reasoning and loving and hating are not affections of the intellect, but of that which has it, precisely in so far as it has it. Wherefore, when this decays, the soul ceases to remember or love. For these proceeded, not from it, but from what was common, which has disintegrated. But perhaps intellect is something more godlike and unalterable.

             Therefore, that the soul cannot be moved is manifest from these arguments. But if it cannot be moved, it is evident that it cannot be self-moving.§§ 163-7