Chapter XVI.—Plato; Threefold Classification of Principles; His Idea of God; Different Opinions Regarding His Theology and Psychology; His Eschatology and System of Metempsychosis; His Ethical Doctrines; Notions on the Free-Will Question.

Plato (lays down) that there are three originating principles of the universe, (namely) God, and matter, and exemplar; God as the Maker and Regulator of this universe, and the Being who exercises providence over it; but matter, as that which underlies all (phenomena), which (matter) he styles both receptive and a nurse, out of the arrangement of which proceeded the four elements of which the world consists; (I mean) fire, air, earth, water, from which all the rest of what are denominated concrete substances, as well as animals and plants, have been formed. And that the exemplar, which he likewise calls ideas, is the intelligence of the Deity, to which, as to an image in the soul, the Deity attending, fabricated all things.  God, he says, is both incorporeal and shapeless, and comprehensible by wise men solely; whereas matter is body potentially, but with potentiality not as yet passing into action, for being itself without form and without quality, by assuming forms and qualities, it became body. That matter, therefore, is an originating principle, and coeval with the Deity, and that in this respect the world is uncreated. For (Plato) affirms that (the world) was made out of it. And that (the attribute of) imperishableness necessarily belongs to (literally “follows”) that which is uncreated. So far forth, however, as body is supposed to be compounded out of both many qualities and ideas, so far forth it is both created and perishable. But some of the followers of Plato mingled both of these, employing some such example as the following: That as a waggon can always continue undestroyed, though undergoing partial repairs from time to time, so that even the parts each in turn perish, yet itself remains always complete; so after this manner the world also, although in parts it perishes, yet the things that are removed, being repaired, and equivalents for them being introduced, it remains eternal.

Some maintain that Plato asserts the Deity to be one, ingenerable and incorruptible, as he says in The Laws:91    De Legibus, iv. 7 (p. 109, vol. viii. ed. Bekker).  “God, therefore, as the ancient account has it, possesses both the beginning, and end, and middle of all things.” Thus he shows God to be one, on account of His having pervaded all things. Others, however, maintain that Plato affirms the existence of many gods indefinitely, when he uses these words:  “God of gods, of whom I am both the Creator and Father.”92    Timæus, c. xvi. (p. 277, vol. vii. ed. Bekker). The passage runs thus in the original: “Gods of gods, of whom I am Creator and Father of works, which having been formed by Me, are indissoluble, through, at all events, My will.” But others say that he speaks of a definite number of deities in the following passage: “Therefore the mighty Jupiter, wheeling his swift chariot in heaven;” and when he enumerates the offspring of the children of heaven and earth. But others assert that (Plato) constituted the gods as generable; and on account of their having been produced, that altogether they were subject to the necessity of corruption, but that on account of the will of God they are immortal, (maintaining this) in the passage already quoted, where, to the words, “God of gods, of whom I am Creator and Father,” he adds, “indissoluble through the fiat of My will;” so that if (God) were disposed that these should be dissolved, they would easily be dissolved.

And he admits natures (such as those) of demons, and says that some of them are good, but others worthless. And some affirm that he states the soul to be uncreated and immortal, when he uses the following words, “Every soul is immortal, for that which is always moved is immortal;” and when he demonstrates that the soul is self-moved, and capable of originating motion.  Others, however, (say that Plato asserted that the soul was) created, but rendered imperishable through the will of God. But some (will have it that he considered the soul) a composite (essence), and generable and corruptible; for even he supposes that there is a receptacle for it,93    The word is literally a cup or bowl, and, being employed by Plato in an allegorical sense, is evidently intended to signify the anima mundi (soul of the world), which constituted a sort of depository for all spiritual existences in the world. and that it possesses a luminous body, but that everything generated involves a necessity of corruption.94    Or, “that there exists a necessity for the corruption of everything created.” Those, however, who assert the immortality of the soul are especially strengthened in their opinion by those passages95    Or, “are confirmed by that (philosopher Plato), because he asserts,” etc.; or, “those who assert the soul’s immortality are especially confirmed in their opinion, as many as affirm the existence of a future state of retribution.” (in Plato’s writings), where he says, that both there are judgments after death, and tribunals of justice in Hades, and that the virtuous (souls) receive a good reward, while the wicked (ones) suitable punishment. Some notwithstanding assert, that he also acknowledges a transition of souls from one body to another, and that different souls, those that were marked out for such a purpose, pass into different bodies,96    Or, “that he changes different souls,” etc. according to the desert of each, and that after97    Or, “during.” certain definite periods they are sent up into this world to furnish once more a proof of their choice.  Others, however, (do not admit this to be his doctrine, but will have it that Plato affirms that the souls) obtain a place according to the desert of each; and they employ as a testimony the saying of his, that some good men are with Jove, and that others are ranging abroad (through heaven) with other gods; whereas that others are involved in eternal punishments, as many as during this life have committed wicked and unjust deeds.

And people affirm that Plato says, that some things are without a mean, that others have a mean, that others are a mean. (For example, that) waking and sleep, and such like, are conditions without an intermediate state; but that there are things that had means, for instance virtue and vice; and there are means (between extremes), for instance grey between white and black, or some other colour. And they say, that he affirms that the things pertaining to the soul are absolutely alone good, but that the things pertaining to the body, and those external (to it), are not any longer absolutely good, but reputed blessings. And that frequently he names these means also, for that it is possible to use them both well and ill. Some virtues, therefore, he says, are extremes in regard of intrinsic worth, but in regard of their essential nature means, for nothing is more estimable than virtue. But whatever excels or falls short of these terminates in vice. For instance, he says that there are four virtues—prudence, temperance, justice, fortitude—and that on each of these is attendant two vices, according to excess and defect: for example, on prudence, recklessness according to defect, and knavery according to excess; and on temperance, licentiousness according to defect, stupidity according to excess; and on justice, foregoing a claim according to defect, unduly pressing it according to excess; and on fortitude, cowardice according to defect, foolhardiness according to excess. And that these virtues, when inherent in a man, render him perfect, and afford him happiness. And happiness, he says, is assimilation to the Deity, as far as this is possible; and that assimilation to God takes place when any one combines holiness and justice with prudence.  For this he supposes the end of supreme wisdom and virtue. And he affirms that the virtues follow one another in turn,98    Diogenes Laertius, in describing the system of the Stoics, employs the same word in the case of their view of virtue. and are uniform, and are never antagonistic to each other; whereas that vices are multiform, and sometimes follow one the other, and sometimes are antagonistic to each other. He asserts that fate exists; not, to be sure, that all things are produced according to fate, but that there is even something in our power, as in the passages where he says, “The fault is his who chooses, God is blameless;” and “the following law99    This is supplied from the original; the passage occurs in the Phædrus, c. lx. (p. 86, vol. i. ed. Bekker). of Adrasteia.”100    The word Adrasteia was a name for Nemesis, and means here unalterable destiny. And thus some (contend for his upholding) a system of fate, whereas others one of free-will. He asserts, however, that sins are involuntary. For into what is most glorious of the things in our power, which is the soul, no one would (deliberately) admit what is vicious, that is, transgression, but that from ignorance and an erroneous conception of virtue, supposing that they were achieving something honourable, they pass into vice. And his doctrine on this point is most clear in The Republic,101    The passage occurs in Clilophon (p. 244, vol. vi. ed. Bekker). where he says, “But, again, you presume to assert that vice is disgraceful and abhorred of God; how then, I may ask, would one choose such an evil thing? He, you reply, (would do so) who is worsted by pleasures.102    The text, as given by Miller, is scarcely capable of any meaning. The translation is therefore conjectural, in accordance with alterations proposed by Schneidewin. Therefore this also is involuntary, if to gain a victory be voluntary; so that, in every point of view, the committing an act of turpitude, reason proves103    Or, “declares.” to be involuntary.” Some one, however, in opposition to this (Plato), advances the contrary statement, “Why then are men punished if they sin involuntary?” But he replies, that he himself also, as soon as possible, may be emancipated from vice, and undergo punishment. For that the undergoing punishment is not an evil, but a good thing, if it is likely to prove a purification of evils; and that the rest of mankind, hearing of it, may not transgress, but guard against such an error. (Plato, however, maintains) that the nature of evil is neither created by the Deity, nor possesses subsistence of itself, but that it derives existence from contrariety to what is good, and from attendance upon it, either by excess and defect, as we have previously affirmed concerning the virtues.  Plato unquestionably then, as we have already stated, collecting together the three departments of universal philosophy, in this manner formed his speculative system.

[19] [Πλάτων] Ἀρχὰς εἶναι τοῦ παντὸς θεὸν καὶ ὕλην καὶ παράδειγμα: θεὸν μὲν τὸν ποιητὴν καὶ διακοσμήσαντα τόδε τὸ πᾶν καὶ προνοούμενον αὐτοῦ: ὕλην δὲ τὴν πᾶσιν ὑποκειμένην, ἣν καὶ δεξαμενὴν καὶ τιθήνην καλεῖ. ἐξ ἧς διακοσμηθείσης γενέσθαι τὰ τέσσαρα στοιχεῖα, ἐξ ὧν συνέστηκεν ὁ κόσμος, πυρὸς ἀέρος γῆς ὕδατος, ἐξ ὧν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα συγκρίματα καλούμενα, ζῷά τε καὶ φυτά, συνεστηκέναι. τὸ δὲ παράδειγμα τὴν διάνοιαν τοῦ θεοῦ εἶναι: ὃ καὶ ἰδέαν καλεῖ, οἷον εἰκόνισμά τι, [ᾧ] προσέχων ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὁ θεὸς τὰ πάντα ἐδημιούργει. [Καὶ] τὸν μὲν θεόν φησιν ἀσώματόν τε καὶ ἀνείδεον καὶ μόνοις σοφοῖς ἀνδράσι καταληπτὸν εἶναι: τὴν δὲ ὕλην δυνάμει μὲν σῶμα, ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ οὐδέπω: ἀσχημάτιστον γὰρ αὐτὴν οὖσαν καὶ ἄποιον, προσλαβοῦσαν σχήματα καὶ ποιότητας γενέσθαι σῶμα. τὴν μὲν οὖν ὕλην [ᾗ] ἀρχὴν εἶναι καὶ σύγχρονον τῷ θεῷ, ταύτῃ καὶ ἀγένητον τὸν κόσμον: ἐκ γὰρ αὐτῆς συνεστάναι φησὶν αὐτόν, τῷ δὲ ἀγενήτῳ ἀκολουθεῖν πάντως καὶ τὸ ἄφθαρτον. ᾗ δὲ σῶμά τε καὶ ἐκ πολλῶν ποιοτήτων καὶ ἰδεῶν συγκείμενον ὑποτίθεται, ταύτῃ καὶ γενητὸν καὶ φθαρτόν. Τινὲς δὲ τῶν Πλατωνικῶν ἀμφότερα ἔμιξαν, χρησάμενοι παραδείγματι τοιούτῳ: ὅτι ὥσπερ ἅμαξα δύναται ἀεὶ διαμένειν ἄφθαρτος κατὰ μέρος ἐπισκευαζομένη_κἂν [γὰρ] τὰ μέρη φθείρηται ἑκάστοτε, αὐτὴ δὲ ὁλόκληρος ἀεὶ μένει_, τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον καὶ ὁ κόσμος κατὰ μέρη μὲν εἰ καὶ φθείρεται, ἐπισκευαζομένων [δὲ] καὶ ἀντανισουμένων τῶν ἀφαιρουμένων ἀίδιος μένει. Τὸν δὲ θεὸν οἱ μὲν ἕνα φασὶν αὐτὸν εἰπεῖν, ἀγένητον καὶ ἄφθαρτον, ὡς λέγει ἐν τοῖς Νόμοις: «ὁ μὲν δὴ θεός, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος, ἀρχήν τε καὶ τελευτὴν καὶ μέσα τῶν ὄντων ἁπάντων ἔχων»_οὕτως [γὰρ] ἕνα αὐτὸν τὸν διὰ πάντων κεχωρηκότα ἀποφαίνεσθαι_: οἱ δὲ καὶ πολλοὺς ἀορίστους, ὅταν λέγῃ: «θεοὶ θεῶν, [ὧν] ἐγὼ δημιουργός τε καὶ πατήρ»: οἱ δὲ καὶ ὡρισμένους, ὅταν λέγῃ: «ὁ μὲν δὴ μέγας ἐν οὐρανῷ Ζεύς, πτηνὸν ἅρμα ἐλαύνων» καὶ ὅταν γενεαλογῇ τοὺς Οὐρανοῦ παῖδας καὶ Γῆς. οἱ δὲ συστήσασθαι μὲν αὐτὸν θεοὺς γενητούς, καὶ διὰ μὲν τὸ γεγενῆσθαι πάντως αὐτοὺς φθαρῆναι ἀνάγκην ἔχειν, διὰ δὲ τὴν βούλησιν τοῦ θεοῦ ἀθανάτους εἶναι, ἐν ᾧ προσθεὶς λέγει: «θεοὶ θεῶν, ὧν ἐγὼ δημιουργός τε καὶ πατήρ, ἄλυτα ἐμοῦ γε θέλοντος», ὡς ἂν εἰ λυθῆναι αὐτὰ θέλει, ῥᾳδίως λυθησόμενα. δαιμόνων δὲ φύσεις ἀποδέχεται, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἀγαθοὺς εἶναί φησιν αὐτῶν, τοὺς δὲ φαύλους. Καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν οἱ μέν φασιν αὐτὸν ἀγένητον λέγειν καὶ ἄφθαρτον, ὅταν λέγῃ: «ψυχὴ πᾶσα ἀθάνατος: τὸ γὰρ ἀεικίνητον ἀθάνατον» καὶ ὅταν αὐτοκίνητον αὐτὴν ἀποδεικνύῃ καὶ ἀρχὴν κινήσεως: οἱ δὲ γενητὴν μέν, ἄφθαρτον δὲ διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ βούλησιν. οἱ δὲ σύνθετον καὶ γενητὴν καὶ φθαρτήν: καὶ γὰρ κρατῆρα αὐτῆς ὑποτίθεσθαι, καὶ σῶμα αὐτὴν ἔχειν αὐγοειδές, τὸ δὲ γενόμενον πᾶν ἀνάγκην ἔχειν φθαρῆναι. οἱ δὲ ἀθάνατον αὐτὴν εἶναι λέγοντες μάλιστα ἐκείνοι[ς] ἰσχυρίζονται, [ἐν] ὅσοι[ς] καὶ κρίσεις φησὶν εἶναι μετὰ τελευτὴν καὶ ἐν Ἅιδου δικαστήρια, καὶ τὰς μὲν ἀγαθὰς ἀγαθοῦ μισθοῦ τυγχάνειν, τὰς δὲ πονηρὰς ἀκολούθων δικῶν. τινὲς μὲν οὖν φασιν καὶ μετενσωμάτωσιν αὐτὸν ὁμολογεῖν καὶ μεταβαίνειν τὰς ψυχὰς ὡρισμένας οὔσας ἄλλας εἰς ἄλλα σώματα κατ' ἀξίαν ἑκάστη[ν], καὶ κατά τινας περιόδους ὡρισμένας ἀναπέμπεσθαι εἰς τοῦτον τὸν κόσμον πάλιν πεῖραν παρεξομένας τῆς ἑαυτῶν προαιρέσεως. οἱ δὲ οὔ, ἀλλὰ τόπον λαγχάνειν κατ' ἀξίαν ἑκάστη[ν], καὶ χρῶνται μαρτυρίῳ, ὅτι φησὶ μετὰ Διός τινας εἶναι, ἄλλους δὲ μετὰ ἄλλων θεῶν συμπεριπολοῦντας τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν, τοὺς δὲ ἐν κολάσεσιν ὑπάρχειν αἰωνίαις, ὅσοι πονηρὰ καὶ ἄδικα παρὰ τοῦτον τὸν βίον εἰσὶν ἐξειργασμένοι. Φασὶ δὲ αὐτὸν τὰ μὲν ἄμεσα λέγειν, τὰ δὲ ἔμμεσα, τὰ δὲ μέσα τῶν πραγμάτων: ἐγρήγορσιν μὲν καὶ ὕπνον ἄμεσα, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα: ἔμμεσα δὲ οἷον ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακά: καὶ μέσα οἷον τοῦ λευκοῦ καὶ μέλανος τὸ φαιὸν ἤ τι ἄλλο χρῶμα. ἀγαθὰ δὲ μόνα κυρίως λέγειν φασὶν αὐτὸν τὰ περὶ ψυχήν, τὰ δὲ περὶ σῶμα καὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς οὐκέτι κυρίως ἀγαθά, ἀλλὰ λεγόμενα ἀγαθά, πολλαχοῦ δὲ καὶ μέσα ὠνομακέναι αὐτά: εἶναι γὰρ αὐτοῖς καὶ καλῶς καὶ κακῶς χρῆσθαι. Τὰς μὲν οὖν ἀρετὰς κατὰ τιμὴν ἀκρότητας εἶναί φησιν_τιμιώτερον [μὲν] γὰρ οὐδὲν ἀρετῆς_, κατὰ δὲ οὐσίαν μεσότητας: τὸ γὰρ ὑπερβάλλον αὐτῶν ἢ ἐνδέον εἰς κακίαν τελευτᾶν. οἷον τέσσαράς φησιν εἶναι ἀρετάς, φρόνησιν σωφροσύνην δικαιοσύνην ἀνδρείαν: τούτων [δὲ] ἑκάστῃ παρακολουθεῖν δύο κακίας καθ' ὑπερβολὴν καὶ μείωσιν. οἷον τῇ μὲν φρονήσει ἀφροσύνη[ν] κατὰ μείωσιν, πανουργίαν δὲ καθ' ὑπερβολήν, τῇ δὲ σωφροσύνῃ σκαιότητα κατὰ μείωσιν, ἀκολασίαν καθ' ὑπερβολήν, τῇ δὲ δικαιοσύνῃ μειονεξίαν κατὰ μείωσιν, πλεονεξίαν καθ' ὑπερβολήν, τῇ δὲ ἀνδρείᾳ δειλίαν κατὰ μείωσιν, θρασύτητα καθ' ὑπερβολήν. Ταύτας δὲ ἐγγενομένας τὰς ἀρετὰς ἀνθρώπῳ ἀπεργάζεσθαι αὐτὸν τέλειον καὶ παρέχειν αὐτῷ εὐδαιμονίαν. τὴν δὲ εὐδαιμονίαν εἶναί φησιν ὁμοίωσιν θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν: τὴν δὲ ὁμοίωσιν τῷ θεῷ, ὅταν τις ὅσιός τε καὶ δίκαιος γένηται μετὰ φρονήσεως: τέλος γὰρ τοῦτο τῆς ἄκρας σοφίας καὶ ἀρετῆς ὑποτίθεται. λέγει δὲ ἀντακολουθεῖν τὰς ἀρετὰς ἀλλήλαις καὶ μονοειδεῖς εἶναι καὶ μηδέποτε ἐναντιοῦσθαι ἀλλήλαις: τὰς δὲ κακίας πολυτρόπους τε εἶναι καὶ ποτὲ μὲν ἀντακολουθεῖν, ποτὲ δὲ ἐναντιοῦσθαι ἀλλήλαις. εἱμαρμένην [δέ] φησιν εἶναι, οὐ μὴν πάντα καθ' εἱμαρμένην γίνεσθαι, ἀλλ' εἶναί τι καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, ἐν οἷς φησιν: «αἰτία ἑλομένου, θεὸς ἀναίτιος» καὶ «θεσμός τε Ἀδραστείας ὅδε»: οὕτω τὸ καθ' εἱμαρμένην οἶδε καὶ τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν. Ἀκούσια δέ φησιν εἶναι τὰ ἁμαρτήματα: εἰς γὰρ τὸ κάλλιστον τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχή, οὐκ ἄν τινα τὸ κακὸν παραδέξασθαι, τουτέστι τὴν ἀδικίαν: κατὰ ἄγνοιαν δέ [τινας] καὶ σφάλμα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, οἰομένους καλόν τι ποιεῖν, ἐπὶ τὸ κακὸν ἔρχεσθαι. καὶ λέξις τούτου ἐμφανεστάτη ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ, ἐν ᾗ φησιν: «πάλιν δ' αὖ τολμᾶτε λέγειν ὡς αἰσχρὸν καὶ θεομισὲς ἡ ἀδικία: πῶς οὖν δή τις τό [γε] τοιοῦτον κακὸν [ἐκὼν] αἱροῖτ' ἄν; ἥττων ὃς ἂν ᾖ, φατέ, τῶν ἡδονῶν. οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῦτο ἀκούσιον, εἴπερ τὸ νικᾶν ἑκούσιον; ὥστε ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου τό γε ἀδικεῖν ἀκούσιον [ὁ] λόγος αἱρεῖ». ἀντιτίθεται δέ τις αὐτῷ πρὸς τοῦτο: διὰ τί οὖν κολάζονται [ἄνθρωποι], εἰ ἀκουσίως ἁμαρτάνουσιν; ὁ δὲ λέγει: ἵνα τε αὐτὸς ὅτι τάχιστα ἀπαλλαγῇ κακίας καὶ κόλασιν ὑπόσχῃ_τὸ γὰρ κόλασιν ὑποσχεῖν οὐ κακὸν εἶναι ἀλλ' ἀγαθόν, εἴπερ μέλλει κάθαρσις τῶν κακῶν γίνεσθαι_καὶ ἵνα μηδὲ[ν] ἁμαρτάνωσιν οἱ λοιποὶ ἀκούοντες ἄνθρωποι, ἀλλὰ φυλάσσωνται τὴν τοιαύτην πλάνην. κακοῦ δὲ φύσιν οὔτε ὑπὸ θεοῦ γενέσθαι οὔτε καθ' αὑτὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἐναντίωσιν καὶ παρακολούθησιν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ γενέσθαι ἢ καθ' ὑπερβολὴν ἢ κατὰ μείωσιν, ὡς περὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν προείπομεν. ὁ μὲν οὖν Πλάτων, καθὼς προείπομεν, συναγαγὼν τὰ τρία μέρη τῆς κατὰ πάντα φιλοσοφίας οὕτως ἐφιλοσόφησεν.