Commentary on Aristotle's De Anima

 BOOK ONE

 CHAPTER I

 LECTIO ONE

 CHAPTER II

 LECTIO TWO

 LECTIO THREE

 LECTIO FOUR

 LECTIO FIVE

 CHAPTER III

 LECTIO SIX

 LECTIO SEVEN

 LECTIO EIGHT

 CHAPTER IV

 LECTIO NINE

 LECTIO TEN

 CHAPTER V

 LECTIO ELEVEN

 LECTIO TWELVE

 LECTIO THIRTEEN

 LECTIO FOURTEEN

 BOOK TWO

 CHAPTER I

 LECTIO ONE

 LECTIO TWO

 CHAPTER II

 LECTIO THREE

 LECTIO FOUR

 CHAPTER III

 LECTIO FIVE

 CHAPTER IV

 LECTIO SIX

 LECTIO SEVEN

 LECTIO EIGHT

 LECTIO NINE

 CHAPTER V

 LECTIO TEN

 LECTIO ELEVEN

 LECTIO TWELVE

 CHAPTER VI

 LECTIO THIRTEEN

 CHAPTER VII

 LECTIO FOURTEEN

 LECTIO FIFTEEN

 CHAPTER VIII

 LECTIO SIXTEEN

 LECTIO SEVENTEEN

 LECTIO EIGHTEEN

 CHAPTER IX

 LECTIO NINETEEN

 LECTIO TWENTY

 CHAPTER X

 LECTIO TWENTY-ONE

 CHAPTER XI

 LECTIO TWENTY-TWO

 LECTIO TWENTY-THREE

 CHAPTER XII

 LECTIO TWENTY-FOUR

 BOOK THREE

 CHAPTER I

 LECTIO ONE

 CHAPTER II

 LECTIO TWO

 LECTIO THREE

 CHAPTER III

 LECTIO FOUR

 LECTIO FIVE

 LECTIO SIX

 CHAPTER IV

 LECTIO SEVEN

 LECTIO EIGHT

 LECTIO NINE

 CHAPTER V

 LECTIO TEN

 CHAPTER VI

 CHAPTER VII

 LECTIO ELEVEN

 LECTIO TWELVE

 CHAPTER VIII

 LECTIO THIRTEEN

 CHAPTER IX

 LECTIO FOURTEEN

 CHAPTER X

 LECTIO FIFTEEN

 CHAPTER XI

 LECTIO SIXTEEN

 CHAPTER XII

 LECTIO SEVENTEEN

 CHAPTER XIII

 LECTIO EIGHTEEN

CHAPTER II

THE DEFINITION JUSTIFIED

MODES OF LIFE

             SINCE it is from the less clear, though more obvious, facts that what is certain and more evident to thought emerges, let us attempt to approach the matter afresh.§ 245

             For it is not enough that a defining principle should merely show a fact, as do most formulae, but also there should be contained and made plain the causes involved. Usually the constituent terms are like conclusions: for instance, what is a square, that is equal to an oblong? An equilateral orthogon. Such a term is of the nature of a conclusion. But to say that a square is the discovery of a mean line states the reason why.§§ 246-52

             Going back, then, to the beginning of our enquiry, let us say that the animate is distinguished from the inanimate by being alive.

             To live, however, is predicated in several ways; and even if one only of these is present, we say there is life; as, for example, intellection, sensation, or movement and rest in place; as well as the movement and rest involved in nourishment, and growth and decay.§§ 253-5

             Hence all plants seem to live. They appear to have in themselves a power and principle of this kind, by which they increase or decay in various directions--that is to say, they do not grow up but not down, but alike either way; and in all their parts they are continually nourished, and they live so long as they can take nourishment.§§ 256-7

             It is possible for this power to exist apart from the others; but for the others to exist apart from it is impossible, at least in mortal beings. This is evident in plants; for there is in them no other soul-power. To live by this principle, then, is common to all living things.§ 258

             But an animal is such primarily by sensation. For we also call animals things that do not move or change their place, provided they have sensation, and do not merely live. There seem to be many of this sort: by nature they stay in one place, but they have one of the senses. 259

             Touch is in all, primarily. As the vegetative powers can be separated from touch and all sensation as a whole, so can touch from the other senses. (We give the name 'vegetative' to that part of the soul in which plants participate). All animals are seen to possess the sense of touch.§ 260

             For what cause each of these facts is so we shall say later on. At present only this need be said: that soul is the principle of the qualities we have discussed, and is characterised by the vegetative, sensitive, intellective and motive powers.§ 261