LESSON 1

The Need of Questioning Everything in the Search

for Universal Truth

Chapter 1: 995a 24-995b 4

             176. With a view to the science under investigation we must attack first those subjects which must first be investigated. These are all the subjects about which some men have entertained different opinions, and any other besides these which has been omitted.

             177. Now for those who wish to investigate the truth it is worth the while to ponder these difficulties well. For the subsequent study of truth is nothing else than the solution of earlier problems. For it is impossible to untie a knot without knowing it. But a perplexity on the part of the mind makes this evident in regard to the matter at hand; for insofar as the mind is perplexed, to that extent it experiences something similar to men who are bound; for in both cases it is impossible to move forward. For this reason, then, it is first necessary to consider all the difficulties and the reasons for them.

             178. [This is also necessary] for another reason, namely, that those who make investigations without first recognizing the problem are like those who do not know where they ought to go.

             179. Again, one would not even know when he finds the thing which he is seeking [and when not]; for the goal is not evident to such a man, but it is evident to one who previously discussed the difficulties.

             180. Furthermore, one who has heard all the arguments of the litigants, as it were, and of those who argue the question, is necessarily in a better position to pass judgment.

COMMENTARY

             338. Having indicated in Book II (171:C 331), the method of considering the truth, the Philosopher now proceeds with his study of the truth. First (176:C 338), he proceeds disputatively, indicating those points which are open to question so far as the truth of things is concerned. Second (294:C 529), he begins to establish what is true, and he does this in Book IV, which begins: "There is a certain science."

             The first part is divided into two sections. In the first, he states what he intends to do. In the second (181:C 346), he proceeds to do it ("The first problem").

             In regard to the first he does two things. First, he states what he intends to do. Second (177:C 339), he gives the reasons for this ("Now for those").

             He says first (176), then, that with a view to this science which we are seeking about first principles and what is universally true of things, we must attack, first of all, those subjects about which it is necessary to raise questions before the truth is established. Now there are disputed points of this kind for two reasons, either because the ancient philosophers entertained a different opinion about these things than is really true, or because they completely neglected to consider them.

             339. Now for those (177).

             Here he gives four arguments in support of this thesis. First, he says that for those who wish to investigate the truth it is "worth the while," i.e., worth the effort, "to ponder these difficulties well," i.e., to examine carefully those matters which are open to question. This is necessary because the subsequent study of truth is nothing else than the solution of earlier difficulties. Now in loosening a physical knot it is evident that one who is unacquainted with this knot cannot loosen it. But a difficulty about some subject is related to the mind as a physical knot is to the body, and manifests the same effect. For insofar as the mind is puzzled about some subject, it experiences something similar to those who are tightly bound. For just as one whose feet are tied cannot move forward on an earthly road, in a similar way one who is puzzled, and whose mind is bound, as it were, cannot move forward on the road of speculative knowledge. Therefore, just as one who wishes to loosen a physical knot must first of all inspect the knot and the way in which it is tied, in a similar way one who wants to solve a problem must first survey all the difficulties and the reasons for them.

             340. [This is also necessary] (178).

             Here he gives the second argument. He says that those who wish to investigate the truth without first considering the problem are like those who do not know where they are going. This is true for this reason, that, just as the terminus of a journey is the goal intended by one who travels on foot, in a similar way the solution of a problem is the goal intended by one who is seeking the truth. But it is evident that one who does not know where he is going cannot go there directly, except perhaps by chance. Therefore, neither can one seek the truth directly unless he first sees the problem.

             341. Again, one would (179).

             Here he gives the third argument. He says that, just as one who is ignorant of where he is going does not know whether he should stop or go further when he reaches his appointed goal, in a similar way one who does not know beforehand the problem whose solution marks the terminus of his search cannot know when he finds the truth which he is seeking and when not. For he does not know what the goal of his investigations is, but this is evident to one who knew the problem beforehand.

             342. Furthermore (180).

             He gives the fourth argument, which is taken from the viewpoint of a judge. For a judge must pass judgment on the things which he hears. But just as one can pass judgment in a lawsuit only if he hears the arguments on both sides, in a similar way one who has to pass judgment on a philosophy is necessarily in a better position to do so if he will hear all the arguments, as it were, of the disputants.

             343. Now it must be noted that it was for these reasons that Aristotle was accustomed, in nearly all his works, to set forth the problems which emerge before investigating and establishing what is true. But while in other works Aristotle sets down the problems one at a time in order to establish the truth about each one, in this work he sets forth all the problems at once, and afterwards in the proper order establishes the things that are true. The reason for this is that other sciences consider the truth in a particular way, and therefore it belongs to them to raise problems of a particular kind about individual truths. But just as it belongs to this science to make a universal study of truth, so also does it belong to it to discuss all the problems which pertain to the truth. Therefore it does not discuss its problems one at a time but all at once.

             344. There can also be another reason [why Aristotle proceeds in this way], namely, that those problems on which he touches are chiefly those about which the philosophers have held different opinions. However, he does not proceed to investigate the truth in the same order as the other philosophers did. For he begins with things which are sensible and evident and proceeds to those which are separate from matter, as is evident below in Book VII (650:C 1566), whereas the other philosophers wanted to apply intelligible and abstract principles to sensible things. Hence, because he did not intend to establish the truth in the same order as that followed by the other philosophers, and from whose views these problems arise, he therefore decided to give first all the problems in a separate section, and afterwards to solve these problems in their proper order.

             345. Averroes gives another reason [for Aristotle's procedure]. He says that Aristotle proceeds in this way because of the relationship of this science to logic, which will be touched on below in Book IV (319:C 588); and therefore he made dialectical discussion a principal part of this science.