LESSON 3

Questions Concerning the Things with Which This Science Deals

Chapter 1: 995b 27-996a 17

             185. And we must inquire whether it is genera that constitute the principles and elements of things, or the parts into which each existing thing is divided. And if it is genera, whether it is those that are predicated of individuals first or last. And we must also inquire whether animal or man is a principle, and exists more truly than the singular.

             186. But most of all it is necessary to investigate and treat the question whether besides matter there is any cause in the proper sense or not; and whether it is separable or not; and whether it is numerically one or many. And we must ask whether there is anything besides the synolon (and by synolon I mean matter when something is predicated of it), or nothing; or whether this is true of some things but not of others, [and what these things are].

             187. Further, we must inquire whether the principles of things are limited in number or in kind, both those in the intelligible structures of things and those in the underlying subject; and whether the principles of corruptible and of incorruptible things are the same or different; and whether they are all incorruptible, or whether those of corruptible things are corruptible. And the most difficult question of all, and the most disputed one, is whether unity and being are not something different from the substances of existing things, as the Pythagoreans and Plato say, or whether this is not the case, but the underlying subject is something different, as Empedocles holds of love, another thinker of fire, another of water, and another of air. And we must inquire whether the principles of things are universals or singular things.

             188. Again, we must inquire whether they exist potentially or actually. And also whether they are principles of things in some other way or in reference to motion; for these questions present great difficulty.

             189. And in addition to these questions we must inquire whether numbers or lengths and points are somehow substances or not. And if they are substances, whether they are separate from sensible things or are found in them. Concerning all of these matters it is not only difficult to discover what is true, but it is not even easy to state the problems well.

COMMENTARY

             355. Having raised questions pertaining to the method of investigation which this science uses, the Philosopher now raises questions pertaining to the things which this science considers. And since this science considers first principles, as has been stated in Book I (13:C 35), he therefore raises here questions pertaining to the principles of things.

             Now both the Forms and the objects of mathematics were held to be the first principles of things. Therefore, first (185:C 355), he raises questions concerning the Forms; and second (189:C 366), concerning the objects of mathematics ("And in addition to these").

             In regard to the first he does two things. First, he asks what things are principles; and second (187:C 361), what sort of beings they are ("Further, we must inquire").

             And since separate universals were held to be the principles of things, he asks, first, whether universals are the principles of things; and second (186:C 357), whether separate entities are the principles of things ("But most of all").

             Concerning the first (185) he asks two questions. The first is whether genera constitute the principles and elements of things, or the ultimate parts into which each individual thing is dissolved. This question arises because an element is that of which a thing is first composed and into which it is ultimately dissolved. Now we find a twofold mode of composition and dissolution. One has to do with the intelligible constitution, in which species are resolved into genera, and according to this mode genera seem to be the principles and elements of things, as Plato claimed. The other mode of composition and dissolution has to do with the real order; for example, natural bodies are composed of fire, air, water and earth, and are dissolved into these. It was for this reason that the natural philosophers claimed that the elements constitute the first principles of things.

             356. And assuming that genera are the principles of things, the second question is whether the principles of things are to be identified with the universals which are predicated of individual things, i.e., the lowest species, which he calls genera after the usage of the Platonists, because the lowest species contain under themselves many individuals just as genera contain many species; or whether it is rather the first and most common genera that constitute principles, for example, which of the two is more of a principle, animal or man; for man is a principle according to the Platonists, and is more real than any singular man. Now this problem arises because of two divisions which reason makes. One of these is that whereby we divide genera into species, and the other is that whereby we resolve species into genera. For it seems that whatever is the last term in a process of division is always the first principle and element in a process of composition.

             357. But most of all (186).

             Here he inquires whether separate entities are the principles of things; and he raises four questions. For since the first philosophers of nature posited only a material cause, the first question is whether besides matter there is anything else that is a cause in the proper sense or not.

             358. And granted that there is some other cause besides matter, the second question is whether it is separable from matter, as Plato held, or as Pythagoras held.

             359. And if there is something separable from matter, the third question is whether it is a single thing, as Anaxagoras claimed, or many, as Plato and Aristotle himself claimed.

             360. The fourth question is whether there is anything "besides the synolon," i.e., the concrete whole, or nothing; or whether there is something in certain cases and not in others; and what kind of things they are in those cases in which there is something else, and what kind of things they are in those in which there is not. And he explains what a synolon or concrete whole is; i.e., it is matter when something is predicated of it. Now in order to understand this we must note that Plato claimed that man and horse, and universals which are predicated in this way, are certain separate Forms; and that man is predicated of Socrates or Plato by reason of the fact that sensible matter participates in a separate Form. Hence Socrates or Plato is called a synolon or concrete whole, because each is constituted as a result of matter participating in a separate form. And each is, as it were, a kind of predicate of matter. Hence the Philosopher asks here whether the whatness of the individual thing is something else in addition to the individual thing itself, or not; or also whether it is something else in the case of some things and not in that of others. The Philosopher will answer this question in Book VII (588:C 1356).

             361. Further, we must inquire (187).

             Here he raises questions about the way in which principles exist. And since being is divided by the one and many, and by act and potency, he asks, first, whether these principles are one or many; and second (188:C 365), whether they are actual or potential ("Again, we must inquire").

             In regard to the first he asks four questions. The first is whether the principles of things are limited in number or in kind; as we say, for example, that there are three principles of nature. Now the statement that they are limited in number can mean that the principle of nature is numerically a single form and a single matter and privation. And the statement that they are limited in kind can mean that there are many material principles which have in common the specific nature of material principle, and so on for the rest. And since some of the philosophers, such as the Platonists, attributed formal causes to things, while others, such as the ancient natural philosophers, attributed only material causes to things, he adds that this question is applicable both "in the intelligible structures," i.e., in formal causes, "and in the underlying subject," i.e., in material causes.

             362. The second question is whether the principles of corruptible and of incorruptible things are the same or different. And if they are different, whether all are incorruptible, or whether the principles of corruptible things are corruptible and those of incorruptible things are incorruptible.

             363. The third question is whether unity and being signify the very substance of things and not something added to the substance of things, as the Pythagoreans and Platonists claimed; or whether they do not signify the substance of things, but something else is the subject of unity and being, for example, fire or air or something else of this kind, as the ancient philosophers of nature held. Now he says that this question is the most difficult and most puzzling one, because on this question depends the entire thought of Plato and Pythagoras, who held that numbers are the substance of things.

             364. The fourth question is whether the principles of things are "somehow universals or are in some sense singular things," i.e., whether those things which are held to be principles have the character of a principle in the sense of a universal intelligible nature, or according as each is a particular and singular thing.

             365. Again, we must inquire (188).

             Here he asks whether these principles exist potentially or actually. This question seems to refer especially to material principles; for it can be a matter of dispute whether the first material principle is some actual body, such as fire or air, as the ancient philosophers of nature held, or something which is only potential, as Plato held. And since motion is the actualization of something in potency, and is, in a sense, midway between potentiality and actuality, he therefore adds another question: whether the principles of things are causes only in reference to motion, as the philosophers of nature posited only principles of motion, either material or efficient, or also whether they are principles which act in some other way than by motion, as Plato claimed that sensible things are caused by immaterial entities by a certain participation in these. Furthermore, he says that these questions have been raised because they present the greatest difficulty, as is clear from the manner in which the philosophers have disagreed about them.

             366. And in addition to these (189).

             Here he raises questions concerning the objects of mathematics, which are posited as the principles of things. He raises two questions. The first is whether numbers, lengths, figures and points are somehow substances, as the Pythagoreans or Platonists held, or whether they are not, as the philosophers of nature held.

             367. And if they are substances, the second question is whether they are separate from sensible things, as the Platonists held, or exist in sensible things, as the Pythagoreans held.

             368. Now these questions are raised as problems which must be debated and settled below, because in these matters it is not only difficult to discover the truth, but it is not even easy to debate the matter adequately by finding probable arguments for either side of the question.