LESSON 10

Do All Things Have a Single Substance? Do All Things Have the Same or Different Principles?

Chapter 4: 999b 20-1000a 4

             245. Again, there is the problem whether all things, for example, all men, have a single substance.

             246. But this is absurd; for not all things whose substance is one are themselves one, but are many and different. But this too is untenable.

             247. And at the same time there is the problem how matter becomes each of the many things and a concrete whole.

             248. And again one might also raise this problem about principles. For if they are specifically one, there will be nothing that is numerically one. Nor again will unity itself and being be one. And how will there be science unless there is some unity in all things?

             249. But, on the other hand, if they are numerically one, each of the principles will also be one, and not as in the case of sensible things, different for different things; for example, if the syllable ba is taken as a species, its principles in every case are specifically the same, for they are numerically different. However, if this is not so, but the things which are the principles of beings are numerically one, there will be nothing else besides the elements. For it makes no difference whether we say "numerically one" or "singular," because it is in this way that we say each thing is numerically one. But the universal is what exists in these. For example, if the elements of a word were limited in number, there would have to be as many letters as there are elements. Indeed, no two of them would be the same, nor would more than two.

COMMENTARY

             456. Having asked what the principles are, and whether some are separate from matter, the Philosopher now asks what the principles are like. First (245:C 456), he asks whether the principles are one or many; second (287:C 519), whether they exist potentially or actually ("And connected with these problems"); and third (290:C 523), whether they are universals or singular things ("And there is also the problem").

             In regard to the first he does two things. First (245:C 456), he inquires how the principles stand with respect to unity; and second (266:C 488), what relationship unity has to the notion of principle ("But the most difficult").

             In regard to the first he does three things. First, he inquires specially about the formal principle: whether all things that are specifically the same have a single form. Second (248:C 460), he asks the same question of all principles in general ("And again one might"). Third (250:C 466), he asks whether corruptible and incorruptible things have the same principles or different ones ("Again there is the problem").

             In regard to the first he does two things. First, he introduces the problem. Second (246:C 457), he debates it ("But this is absurd").

             The problem (245), then, is whether all things that belong to the same species, for example, all men, have a single substance or form.

             457. But this is absurd (246).

             Then he advances arguments on one side of the question, to show that all things belonging to one species do not have a single form. He does this by means of two arguments, the first of which runs thus. Things that belong to one species are many and different. Therefore, if all things that belong to one species have a single substance, it follows that those which have a single substance are many and different. But this is unreasonable.

             458. And at the same time (247).

             Then he gives the second argument, which runs thus. That which is one and undivided in itself is not combined with something divided in order to constitute many things. But it is evident that matter is divided into different singular things. Hence, if substance in the sense of form is one and the same for all things, it will be impossible to explain how each of these singular things is a matter having a substance of the kind that is one and undivided, so that as a singular thing it is a concrete whole having two parts: a matter and a substantial form which is one and undivided.

             459. Now he does not argue the other side of the question, because the very same arguments which were advanced above regarding the separateness of universals are applicable in the inquiry which follows it against the arguments just given. For if a separate universal exists, it must be held that things having the same species have a single substance numerically, because a universal is the substance of singular things. Now the truth of this question will be established in Book VII (588:C 1356) of this work, where it is shown that the whatness or essence of a thing is not other than the thing itself, except in an accidental way, as will be explained in that place.

             460. And again one might (248).

             Here he raises a difficulty concerning the unity of principles in general: whether the principles of things are numerically the same, or only specifically the same and numerically distinct. And in regard to this he does two things. First, he advances arguments to show that they are numerically the same. Second (249:C 464), he argues on the other side of the question ("But, on the other hand").

             In regard to the first (248) he gives three arguments; and he introduces the problem, saying that the same question which was raised about substance can be raised about principles in general, i.e., whether the principles of things are numerically the same.

             461. He introduces the first argument to show that they are numerically the same. For things composed of principles merely contain what they receive from these principles. Therefore, if principles are not found to be one numerically but only specifically, the things composed of these principles will not be one numerically but only specifically.

             462. The second argument runs thus: unity itself or being itself must be numerically one. And by unity itself or being itself he means unity or being in the abstract. Hence, if the principles of things are not one numerically but only specifically, it will follow that neither unity itself or being itself will subsist of themselves.

             463. The third argument is this: science is had of things because there is found to be a one-in-many, as man in common is found in all men; for there is no science of singular things but of the unity [i.e., common attribute] found in them. Moreover, all science or cognition of things which are composed of principles depends on a knowledge of these principles. If, then, principles are not one numerically but only specifically, it will follow that there is no science of beings.

             464. But, on the other hand (249).

             Here he argues the opposite side of the question in the following fashion. If principles are numerically one so that each of the principles considered in itself is one, it will be impossible to say that the principles of beings exist in the same way as the principles of sensible things. For we see that the principles of different sensible things are numerically different but specifically the same, just as the things of which they are the principles are numerically different but specifically the same. We see, for example, that syllables which are numerically distinct but agree in species have as their principles letters which are the same specifically though not numerically. And if anyone were to say that this is not true of the principles of beings, but that the principles of all beings are the same numerically, it would follow that nothing exists in the world except the elements, because what is numerically one is a singular thing. For what is numerically one we call singular, just as we call universal what is in many. But what is singular is incapable of being multiplied, and is encountered only as a singular. Therefore, if it is held that numerically the same letters are the principles of all syllables, it will follow that those letters could never be multiplied so that there could be two of them or more than two. Thus a could not be found in these two different syllables ba or da. And the argument is the same in the case of other letters. Therefore, by the same reasoning, if the principles of all beings are numerically the same, it will follow that there is nothing besides these principles. But this seems to be untenable; because when a principle of anything exists it will not be a principle unless there is something else besides itself.

             465. Now this question will be solved in Book XII (1046:C 2464); for it will be shown there that the principles which things have, namely, matter and form or privation, are not numerically the same for all things but analogically or proportionally the same. But those principles which are separate, i.e., the intellectual substances, of which the highest is God, are each numerically one in themselves. Now that which is one in itself and being is God; and from Him is derived the numerical unity found in all things. And there is science of these, not because they are numerically one in all, but because in our conception there is a one in many. Moreover, the argument which is proposed in support of the opposite side of the question is true in the case of essential principles but not in that of separate ones, which is the class to which the agent and final cause belong. For many things can be produced by one agent or efficient cause, and can be directed to one end.