LESSON 11

Do Corruptible and Incorruptible Things Have the

Same or Different Principles?

Chapter 4: 1000a 5-1001a 3

             250. Again, there is a problem which has been neglected no less by the moderns than by their predecessors: whether the principles of corruptible and incorruptible things are the same or different.

             251. For if they are the same, how is it that some things are incorruptible and others corruptible? And what is the cause?

             252. The followers of Hesiod and all those who were called theologians paid attention only to what was plausible to themselves and have neglected us. For, making the principles of things to be gods or generated from the gods, they say that whatever has not tasted nectar and ambrosia became mortal.

             253. And it is clear that they are using these terms in a way known to themselves, but what they have said about the application of these causes is beyond our understanding. For if it is for the sake of pleasure that the gods partake of these things, nectar and ambrosia are not the cause of their being. But if they partake of them to preserve their being, how will the gods be eternal in requiring food?

             254. But with regard to those who have philosophized by using fables, it is not worth our while to pay any serious attention to them.

             255. However, from those who make assertions by means of demonstration it is necessary to find out, by questioning them, why some of the things which are derived from the same principles are eternal in nature and others are corrupted. But since these philosophers mention no cause, and it is unreasonable that things should be as they say, it is clear that the principles and causes of these things will not be the same.

             256. For the explanation which one will consider to say something most to the point is that of Empedocles, who has been subject to the same error. For he posits a certain principle, hate, which is the cause of corruption.

             257. Yet even hate would seem to generate everything except the one. For all things except God are derived from this. Hence he says: "From which have blossomed forth all that was and is [and will be]: trees, and men and women, and beasts and flying things, and water-nourished fish, and the long-lived gods." And apart from these things it is evident that, if hate did not exist in the world, all things would be one, as he says: "For when they have come together, then hate will stand last of all."

             258. For this reason too it turns out that God, who is most happy, is less wise than other beings. For he does not know all the elements, because hate he does not have, and knowledge is of like by like. "For one knows earth by earth, water by water, affection by affection, and hate by mournful hate."

             259. But it is also clear (and this is where our discussion began) that hate no more turns out to be the cause of corruption than of being.

             260. Nor, similarly, is love the cause of existence; for in blending things together into a unity it corrupts other things.

             261. Moreover, he does not speak of the cause of change itself, except to say that it was naturally disposed to be so.

             262. [He says]: "But thus mighty hate was nourished among the members and rose to a position of honor when the time was fulfilled, which being changeable dissolved the bond." Hence change is a necessity, but he gives no reason for its necessity.

             263. Yet he alone speaks expressly to this extent. For he does not make some beings corruptible and others incorruptible, but makes all things corruptible except the elements. But the problem that has been stated is why some things are corruptible and others are not, supposing that they come from the same principles. To this extent, then, it has been said that the principles of things will not be the same.

             264. But if the principles are different, one problem is whether they will be incorruptible or corruptible. For supposing that they are corruptible, it is evident that they must also come from certain things, because all things that are corrupted are dissolved into those elements from which they come. Hence it follows that there are other principles prior to these principles. But this is also unreasonable, whether the process stops or goes on to infinity. Further, how will corruptible things exist if their principles are destroyed? But if they are incorruptible, why will corruptible things come from incorruptible principles, and incorruptible things from others? For this is unreasonable, and is either impossible or requires a great deal of reasoning.

             265. Further, no one has attempted to say that these things have different principles, but [all thinkers] say that all things have the same principles. But they admit the first problem, considering it a trifling matter.

COMMENTARY

             466. Having investigated in a general way whether all principles belonging to one species are numerically the same, the Philosopher inquires here whether the principles of corruptible and incorruptible things are numerically the same. In regard to this he does three things. First (250:C 466), he raises the question. Second (251:C 467), he introduces an argument to show that the principles of corruptible and those of incorruptible things are not the same ("For if they are the same"). Third (264:C 483), he introduces arguments to show that they are not different ("But if the principles").

             He says first (250), then, that there is a problem which has been neglected no less by the modern philosophers, who followed Plato, than by the ancient philosophers of nature, who also were puzzled whether the principles of corruptible and incorruptible things are the same or different.

             467. For, if they are the same (251).

             Here he advances an argument to show that the principles of corruptible and of incorruptible things are not the same. In regard to this he does three things. First (251:C 467), he gives the argument. Second (252:C 468), he criticizes the solution of the proposed argument which the theological poets gave ("The followers of Hesiod"). Third (255:C 472), he criticizes the solution which some philosophers of nature gave ("However, from those who").

             He says first (251), then, that if the principles of corruptible and of incorruptible things are held to be the same, since from the same principles there follow the same effects, it seems that either all things are corruptible or all are incorruptible. Therefore the question arises how some things are corruptible and others incorruptible, and what the reason is.

             468. The followers of Hesiod (252).

             He criticizes the solution given by the theological poets. First (252:C 468), he gives their solution. Second (253:C 470), he argues against it ("And it is clear that"). Third (254:C 471), he gives the reason why he does not criticize this position with more care ("But with regard to those").

             Concerning the first (252) it must be noted that there were among the Greeks, or philosophers of nature, certain students of wisdom, such as Orpheus, Hesiod and certain others, who were concerned with the gods and hid the truth about the gods under a cloak of fables, just as Plato hid philosophical truth under mathematics, as Simplicius says in his Commentary on the Categories. Therefore he says that the followers of Hesiod, and all those who were called theologians, paid attention to what was convincing to themselves and have neglected us, because the truth which they understood was treated by them in such a way that it could be known only to themselves. For if the truth is obscured by fables, then the truth which underlies these fables can be known only to the one who devised them. Therefore the followers of Hesiod called the first principles of things gods, and said that those among the gods who have not tasted a certain delectable food called nectar or manna became mortal, whereas those who had tasted it became immortal.

             469. But some part of the truth could lie hidden under this fable, provided that by nectar or manna is understood the supreme goodness itself of the first principle. For all the sweetness of love and affection is referred to goodness. But every good is derived from a first good. Therefore the meaning of these words could be that some things are incorruptible by reason of an intimate participation in the highest good, as those which participate perfectly in the divine being. But certain things because of their remoteness from the first principle, which is the meaning of not to taste manna and nectar, cannot remain perpetually the same in number but only in species, as the Philosopher says in Book II of Generation. But whether they intended to treat this obscurely or something else, cannot be perceived any more fully from this statement.

             470. And it is clear (253).

             He argues against the aforesaid position. He says that the meaning which these followers of Hesiod wished to convey by the terms nectar or manna was known to them but not to us. Therefore their explanation of the way in which these causes are meant to solve this question and preserve things from corruption is beyond our understanding. For if these terms are understood in their literal sense, they appear to be inadequate, because the gods who tasted nectar or manna did so either for the sake of pleasure or because these things were necessary for their existence, since these are the reasons why men partake of food. Now if they partook of them for the sake of pleasure, nectar and manna could not be the cause of their existence so as to make them incorruptible, because pleasure is something that follows on being. But if they partook of the aforesaid nourishment because they needed it to exist, they would not be eternal, having repeated need of food. Therefore it seems that gods who are first corruptible, as it were, standing as they do in need of food, are made incorruptible by means of food. This also seems to be unreasonable, because food does not nourish a thing according to its species unless it is corrupted and passes over into the species of the one nourished. But nothing that is corruptible can be responsible for the incorruptibility of something else.

             471. But with regard to those (254).

             Here he gives his reason for not investigating this opinion with more care. He says that it is not worth our while to pay any attention to those who have philosophized "by using fables," i.e., by hiding philosophical truth under fables. For if anyone argues against their statements insofar as they are taken in a literal sense, these statements are ridiculous. But if one wishes to inquire into the truth hidden by these fables, it is not evident. Hence it is understood that Aristotle, in arguing against Plato and other thinkers of this kind who have treated their own doctrines by hiding them under something else, does not argue about the truth which is hidden but about those things which are outwardly expressed.

             472. However, from those who make assertions (255).

             Then he argues against the answer given by some of the philosophers of nature; and in regard to this he does three things. First (255:C 472), he gives the argument. Second (256:C 473), he gives the answer ("For the explanation"). Third (257:C 474), he criticizes it ("Yet even hate").

             Accordingly, he says, first (255), that, having dismissed those who treated the truth by using fables, it is necessary to seek information about the aforesaid question from those who have treated the truth in a demonstrative way, by asking them why it is that, if all beings are derived from the same principles, some beings are eternal by nature and others are corrupted. And since these men give no reason why this is so, and since it is unreasonable that things should be as they say (that in the case of beings having the same principles some should be corruptible and others eternal), it seems clearly to follow that corruptible and eternal things do not have the same principles or the same causes.

             473. For the explanation (256).

             Then he gives one solution. He says that the explanation given to the aforesaid question which seems to fit it best is the one which Empedocles gave, although he was subject to the same error as the others, because the explanation which he gave is no more adequate than theirs, as is about to be shown. For he maintained that corruptible and incorruptible things have certain common principles, but that a special principle, hate, causes the corruption of the elements in such a way that the coming together of this cause and another principle produces corruption in the world.

             474. Yet even hate (257).

             Here he criticizes Empedocles' argument, and he does this in three ways. First (257:C 474), he does this by showing that the argument which Empedocles gave is not in keeping with his position; second (261:C 478), by showing that it is not adequate ("Moreover, he does not"); third (263:C 481), by showing that it is not to the point ("Yet he alone speaks").

             In regard to the first he does three things. First, he shows that Empedocles' argument does not agree with his other views about hate; second (258:C 476), that it does not agree with his view about God himself ("For this reason"); and third (260:C 477), that it does not agree with his view about love ("Nor, similarly").

             Accordingly, he says, first (257), that Empedocles' position that hate is the cause of corruption is untenable, because according to his position hate also seems to be the cause of the generation of all things except one. For he held that everything else is composed essentially of hate along with the other principles, with the exception of God alone, whom he claimed to be composed of the other principles without hate. Moreover, he called the heavens God, as was stated above in Book I (49:C 101), because Xenophanes, after reflecting upon the whole heaven, said that the one itself is God. And Empedocles, considering the indestructibleness of the heavens, held that the heavens are composed of the four elements and love, but not of strife or hatred. But in the case of other things he said that all those which are or were or will be, come from hate, such as sprouting trees, and men and women, and beasts (which are terrestrial animals), and vultures (which are flying and long-lived animals), and fish (which are nourished in the water), and the long-lived gods. And by the gods he seems to mean either the stars, which he held are sometimes corrupted, although after a long period of time, or the demons, which the Platonists held to be ethereal animals. Or by the gods he also means those beings whom the Epicureans held to be of human form, as was stated above (210:C 408). Therefore, from the fact that all living things except one are generated from hate, it can be said that hate is the cause of generation.

             475. And in addition to this there is another reason [why hate can be said to be the cause of generation]; for according to Empedocles' position it is evident that, if hate did not exist in the world, all things would be one, since hate is the reason why things are distinct, according to Empedocles. Hence he quotes Empedocles' words to the effect that, when all things come together into a unity, for example, when chaos comes into being, hate will stand last of all, separating and dissolving things. Hence the text of Boethius says: "When it comes together, then chaos knows the ultimate discord." Thus it is clear that, since the being of the world consists in the distinction of things, hate is the cause of the world's generation.

             476. For this reason (258).

             Here he gives a second argument, which pertains to the deity. He says that, since Empedocles would hold that hate is not a constituent of the divine composition, it follows, according to his arguments, that God, who is said by all men to be most happy, and consequently most knowing, is less prudent than all other beings who have knowledge. For according to Empedocles' position it follows that God does not know the elements because He does not contain hate. Hence He does not know himself. And like knows like according to the opinion of Empedocles, who said that by earth we know earth, by water water, "and by affection," i.e., love or concord, we know affection, or love or concord. And in a similar way we know "hate by hate," which is sadness, whether unpleasant or evil, according to the text of Boethius, who says that "by evil discord we know discord." It is evident, then, that Aristotle thought this untenable and contrary to the position that God is most happy because He himself would not know some of the things that we know. And since this argument seemed to be beside the point, therefore, returning to his principal theme, he says (259) that, in returning to the point from which the first argument began, it is evident, so far as Empedocles is concerned, that hate is no more a cause of corruption than of being.

             477. Nor, similarly, is love (260).

             Here he gives the third argument, which pertains to love. He says that in like manner love is not the cause of generation or being, as Empedocles claimed, if another position of his is considered. For he said that, when all the elements are combined into a unity, the corruption of the world will then take place; and thus love corrupts all things. Therefore, with respect to the world in general, love is the cause of corruption, whereas hate is the cause of generation. But with respect to singular things, hate is the cause of corruption and love of generation.

             478. Moreover, he does (261).

             Here he shows that Empedocles' argument is not adequate. For Empedocles said that there exists in the world a certain alternation of hate and friendship, in such a way that at one time love unites all things and afterwards hate separates them. But as to the reason why this alternation takes place, so that at one time hate predominates and at another time love, he said nothing more than that it was naturally disposed to be so.

             479. And next he gives Empedocles' words, which, because they are written in Greek verse, are difficult and differ from the common way of speaking. These words are (262): "But thus mighty hate was nourished among the members and rose to a position of honor when the time was fulfilled, which being changeable dissolved the bond." But the text of Boethius runs thus: "But when mighty discord in the members was promoted to a place of honor, because it marched forward in a completed year, which, when these things have been changed, returns to a full bond." Now in order to understand this it must be noted that he speaks poetically of the whole world as though it were a single living thing in whose members and parts there is found at first the greatest harmony, which he calls love or concord, and afterwards there begins to exist little by little a certain dissonance, which he calls discord. And, similarly, in the parts of the universe at first there was maximum concord, and afterwards hate was nourished little by little until it acquired "the place of honor," i.e., it acquired dominion over the elements. This comes about when a completed time is reached or a year is completed, as Empedocles held, "which" (hate or discord, or the year), being changeable, dissolves "the bond," i.e., the former union of the elements; or the year or hate returns to a full bond, because by a certain ability and hidden power it returns to predominate over things.

             480. After these words of Empedocles, Aristotle, in giving the meaning of the word "changeable" which he used, adds the explanation as though change were necessary; for he says that Empedocles made the foregoing statements as though it were necessary that there should be an alternation of hate and love, but he gives no reason for this necessity. For in the case of this one living thing it is evident that what causes the alternation of hate and love is the motion of the heavens which causes generation and corruption in the world. But no such cause can be assigned why the whole should be changed in this way by love and hate. Hence it is clear that his argument was inadequate.

             481. Yet he alone (263).

             Here he shows that this argument of Empedocles is not to the point. He says that Empedocles seems to say "expressly," i.e., clearly, only that he does not hold that some of the things derived from these principles are corruptible and others incorruptible, but he holds that all things are corruptible with the exception of the elements alone. Thus he seems to avoid the foregoing problem inasmuch as the question remains why some things are corruptible and some not, if they come from the same principles. Hence it is also clear that his argument is not to the point, because he neglects the very point that requires explanation.

             482. But it can be asked how he can say here that Empedocles held all things to be corruptible except the elements, since Empedocles has said above that the one is God, i.e., what is composed of the other principles except hate. It must be noted, however, that Empedocles posited two processes of corruption in the world, as is clear from what was said above. He posited one with respect to the blending of the whole universe, which was brought about by love; and from this process he did not make even God immune, because in God he placed love, which caused other things to be mixed with God. And he posited another process of corruption for singular things, and the principle of this process is hate. But he excluded this kind of corruption from God, seeing that he did not posit hate in God. In summing up, then, Aristotle concludes that this much has been said for the purpose of showing that corruptible and incorruptible things do not have the same principles.

             483. But if the principles (264).

             Here he argues the other side of the question, with two arguments. The first is this: if the principles of corruptible and incorruptible things are not the same, the question arises whether the principles of corruptible things are corruptible or incorruptible. If one says that they are corruptible, he proves that this is false by two arguments. The first runs thus: every corruptible thing is dissolved into the principles of which it is composed. If, then, the principles of corruptible things are corruptible, it will be necessary to hold also that there are other principles from which they are derived. But this is untenable, unless an infinite regress is posited. Now it was shown in Book II (152:C 299) that it is impossible to have an infinite regress in principles in any class of cause. And it would be just as untenable for someone to say that this condition applies in the case of corruptible principles, since corruption seems to come about as a result of something being dissolved into prior principles.

             484. The second argument runs thus. If the principles of corruptible things are corruptible, they must be corrupted, because every corruptible thing will be corrupted. But after they have been corrupted they cannot be principles, for what is corrupted or has been corrupted cannot cause anything. Therefore, since corruptible things are always caused in succession, the principles of corruptible things cannot be said to be corruptible.

             485. Again, if it is said that the principles of corruptible things are incorruptible, evidently the principles of incorruptible things are incorruptible. Therefore the question remains why it is that from certain incorruptible principles corruptible effects are produced, and from certain others incorruptible effects are produced; for this seems to be unreasonable and is either impossible or requires considerable explanation.

             486. Further, no one (265).

             Then relative to his main thesis he gives his second argument, which is drawn from the common opinions of all men. For no one has attempted to say that corruptible and incorruptible things have different principles, but all say that all things have the same principles. Yet the first argument, given in favor of the first part of the question, all pass over lightly, as though it were of little importance; but this is to acknowledge its truth. Hence the text of Boethius says: "But they swallow the first argument as though they considered it a minor matter."

             487. Now the solution to this problem is given in Book XII (1078:C 2553), where the Philosopher shows that the first active or motive principles of all things are the same but in a certain sequence. For the first principles of things are unqualifiedly incorruptible and immobile, whereas the second are incorruptible and mobile, i.e., the celestial bodies, which cause generation and corruption in the world as a result of their motion. Now the intrinsic principles of corruptible and of incorruptible things are the same, not numerically but analogically. Still the intrinsic principles of corruptible things, which are matter and form, are not corruptible in themselves but only in reference to something else. For it is in this way that the matter and form of corruptible things are corrupted, as is stated in Book I of the Physics.