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The Discourses of Epictetus

Table of Contents

BOOK ONE

BOOK TWO

Confidence then ought to be employed against death, and caution against the fear of death. But now we do the contrary, and employ against death the at

Such will I show myself to you, faithful, modest, noble, free from perturbation. What, and immortal too, exempt from old age, and from sickness? No,

Well then the matter is not now very safe, and particularly at Rome for he who attempts to do it, must not do it in a corner, you may be sure, but m

For this reason when Zeno was going to meet Antigonus, he was not anxious, for Antigonus had no power over any of the things which Zeno admired and Z

See how tragedy is made when common things happen to silly men.

Of things some are good, some are bad, and others are indifferent. The good then are the virtues and the things which partake of the virtues the bad

Do you think that Admetus did not love his own child when he was little? that he was not in agony when the child had a fever? that he did not often sa

Such are the wishes that they utter.

Then having this purpose before you, if some little form of expression pleases you, if some theorems please you, do you abide among them and choose t

BOOK THREE

Was Hermes going to descend from heaven to say this to him? And now the Gods say this to you and send the messenger, the slayer of Argus, to warn you

And we ought to retain these verses in such way that we may use them, not that we may utter them aloud, as when we exclaim Paean Apollo. Again in fe

This, then, may be applied even to a father: I must not, even if a worse man than you should come, treat a father unworthily-, for all are from pater

And what does he say himself?

Wretch, which of your affairs goes badly? Your possessions? No. Your body? No. But you are rich in gold and copper. What then is the matter with you?

whose duty it is to look after others, the married and those who have children to see who uses his wife well, who uses her badly who quarrels what

he answered, when he was half-asleep,

But before all the Cynic's ruling faculty must be purer than the sun and, if it is not, he must be a cunning knave and a fellow of no principle, sinc

and also, If so it pleases the gods, so let it be why should he not have confidence to speak freely to his own brothers, to his children, in a word

So he was conscious of his own qualification, and knew her weakness.

And still earlier it was the fortune of Hercules to visit all the inhabited world

casting out and clearing away their lawlessness and introducing in their place good rules of law. And yet how many friends do you think that he had in

Relying on what? Not on reputation nor on wealth nor on the power of a magistrate, but on his own strength, that is, on his opinions about the things

BOOK FOUR

But what do you say, philosopher? The tyrant summons you to say something which does not become you. Do you say it or do you not? Answer me. Let me c

Is it your will that I should go to Rome? I will go to Rome. To Gyara? I will go to Gyara. I will go to Athens? I will go to Athens. To prison? I will

he transfers to these things. Where have I failed in the matters pertaining to flattery? What have I done? Anything like a free man, anything like

And not this only, but he neither desires nor seeks anything, nor man nor place nor amusement, as children seek the vintage or holidays always fortif

Why is this your ill? Do you, then, instead of removing it, blame your mother for not foretelling it to you that you might continue grieving from that

For Aristophanes says of Socrates that he also walked the air and stole clothes from the palaestra. But all who have written about Socrates bear exact

Chapter 26

What is the property of error

Every error comprehends contradiction: for since he who errs does not wish to err, but to he right, it is plain that he does not do what he wishes. For what does the thief wish to do? That which is for his own interest. If, then, the theft is not for his interest, he does not do that which he wishes. But every rational: soul is by nature offended at contradiction, and so long as it does not understand this contradiction, it is not hindered from doing contradictory things: but when it does understand the contradiction, it must of necessity avoid the contradiction and avoid it as much as a man must dissent from the false when he sees that a thing is false; but so long as this falsehood does not appear to him, he assents to it as to truth.

He, then, is strong in argument and has the faculty of exhorting and confuting, who is able to show to each man the contradiction through which he errs and clearly to prove how he does not do that which he wishes and does that which he does not wish. For if any one shall show this, a man will himself withdraw from that which he does; but so long as you do not show this, do not be surprised if a man persists in his practice; for having the appearance of doing right, he does what he does. For this reason Socrates, also trusting to this power, used to say, "I am used to call no other witness of what I say, but I am always satisfied with him with whom I am discussing, and I ask him to give his opinion and call him as a witness, and through he is only one, he is sufficient in the place of all." For Socrates knew by what the rational soul is moved, just like a pair of scales, and that it must incline, whether it chooses or not. Show the rational governing faculty a contradiction, and it will withdraw from it; but if you do not show it, rather blame yourself than him who is not persuaded.