LESSON 10

Priority of Parts to Whole and Their Role in Definition

  Chapter 10: 1035b 3-1036a 25

             625. The truth, then, has now been stated; but let us state it even more clearly by repeating the same discussion. For all things which are parts of a thing's intelligible expression and that into which its intelligible expression is divided, are prior to it, either all or some of them. But the intelligible expression of a right angle is not divided into that of an acute angle, but the intelligible expression of an acute angle is divided into that of a right angle; and one who defines an acute angle uses a right angle, for an acute angle is less than a right angle. And the same thing is true of a circle and a semicircle; for a semicircle is defined by means of a circle, and a finger is defined by means of the whole man, because a finger is such and such a part of man. Hence all parts which have the nature of matter and are that into which the whole is divided as matter are subsequent [to the whole]. But all things which are parts of the intelligible expression and of the substance according to its intelligible expression are prior, either all or some of them.

             626. And since the soul of animals (for this is the substance of living things) is their form according to the intelligible expression, and is the substance, species, or essence of such a body (for if a part of each animal is properly defined, it will not be defined without its function, and this will not be possible without sensation), therefore parts of this kind, either all or some of them, are prior to the concrete whole, the animal; and this is likewise true of every individual thing. But the body and parts of this kind are subsequent to this substance; and it is not substance but the concrete whole which is divided into these as its matter. Therefore in a sense these are prior to the concrete whole and in a sense they are not; for they cannot exist apart, because a finger is not a part of an animal when it is disposed in just any way at all; for a dead finger is called a finger equivocally. But some parts are simultaneous with the whole, and these are the principal parts in which the intelligible expression and substance are present, for example, the heart or the brain, because it makes no difference which of them is such. But man and horse and those terms which are applied in this way to singular things, but are taken universally, are not substance, but a certain concrete whole composed of this matter and this intelligible expression taken universally. Socrates, however, is already a singular thing by reason of ultimate matter; and it is similar in other cases. Hence a part is a part of the species (which means the essence of a thing) and of the concrete whole which is composed of species and matter itself.

             627. But only the parts of the species are parts of the intelligible expression, and the intelligible expression is of the universal; for the being of a circle is the same as a circle, and the being of a soul the same as a soul. But in the case of a concrete whole, for example, this circle, or any singular thing, either sensible or intelligible (by sensible circles I mean those made of bronze and wood, and by intelligible, such as are the objects of mathematics), of these there is no definition; but they are known by intellect or by sense, i.e., when they are actually seen. And when they are removed from a state of actuality, it is not clear whether they exist or not; but they are always known and expressed by a universal formula. Now matter is unknowable in itself. And in one respect matter is sensible, and in another it is intelligible; sensible matter being such as brass and wood and anything mobile, and intelligible matter being what is present in sensible things but not as sensible, such as the objects of mathematics. How this applies to whole and part and to the prior and subsequent has therefore been stated.

             628. But when anyone asks whether a right angle and a circle and an animal are prior to the parts into which they are divided and of which they are composed, the answer must be that these are not parts without qualification. For if the soul is the same as an animal or a living thing, or the soul of each individual is the same as each individual, and if a circle is the same as the being of a circle, and a right angle is the same as the being of a right angle, the thing must be said to be subsequent to that by which it is, for example, to those parts which are included in its intelligible expression and to those in the universal right angle. For both the right angle which is found in matter, which is a bronze right angle, and that found in these particular lines, are subsequent to their parts; but the right angle which is immaterial is subsequent to the parts found in the intelligible expression, but is prior to those found in a particular thing. But to this question an unqualified answer must not be given. However, if the soul is something different and is not the same as an animal, even if this is so, in one sense it must be said that the parts are prior, and in another sense it must not, as has been stated.

 COMMENTARY

             1482. Since the foregoing solution was not always clear, for he had not yet shown how parts are prior and subsequent or even distinguished the universal composite from the particular or the species from the form, he therefore now explains the foregoing solution. This is divided into two parts. In the first (625:C 1482) he explains the foregoing solution. In the second (628:C 1498) he tells us how the solution should be applied to this question ("But when anyone").

             The first part is divided into two sections. First, he answers the question about the priority of parts; and second (627:C 1492), the question whether the parts of the thing defined enter into its definition ("But only").

             The first part is again divided into two sections. First, he shows how parts are prior to wholes. Second (626:C 1484), he clarifies this by an example ("And since the soul").

             He accordingly says, first (625), that while the explanation given above in the solution advanced is true in itself, it is still necessary to go over it again so that it may become more evident in reference to the present discussion. For all parts of a thing's intelligible expression, i.e., those into which the intelligible expression is divided, must be prior to the thing defined, either all or some of them. This is said because sometimes the parts of the form are not necessarily parts of the species, but relate to the perfection of a thing; for example, sight and hearing, which are parts of the sentient soul, are not integral or necessary parts of an animal, inasmuch as there can exist an animal which does not have these senses. They nevertheless belong to the perfection of animal, because perfect animals do have these senses. Thus it is universally true that those parts which are given in the definition of anything are universally prior to it.

             1483. But even though an acute angle is part of a right angle, it is still not given in its definition; but the opposite is true, for the intelligible expression of a right angle is not dissolved into the definition of an acute angle, but the reverse. For he who defines an acute angle uses right angle in its definition, because an acute angle is less than a right angle. The same is true of a circle and a semicircle, which is defined by means of a circle, because it is a half of a circle. And the same thing holds true of a finger and a man, who is given in the definition of a finger; for a finger is defined as such and such a part of man. For it was stated above that the parts of the form are parts of the intelligible expression but not those of the matter. Therefore, if only the parts of the intelligible expression are prior and not those of the matter, it follows that all things which are material parts of the thing defined, into which it is dissolved in the same way that a composite is dissolved into its material principles, are subsequent. "But all things which are parts of the intelligible expression and of the substance according to its intelligible expression," i.e., the parts of the form according to which the intelligible expression of the thing is understood, are prior to the whole, either all or some of them, according to the argument given above.

             1484. And since (626).

             Here he explains what he has said, by using an example. He says that since the soul of living things is their substance according to its intelligible expression, i.e., the form from which they derive their intelligible expression, then the soul of an animal "is the substance," i.e., the form or specifying principle or essence "of such a body," namely, of an organic body; for an organic body can be defined only by means of a soul. And from this point of view a soul is said to be the essence of such a body.

             1485. The truth of this is shown by the fact that, if anyone properly defines a part of any animal at all, he can define it properly only by means of its proper operation, as, for example, if someone were to say that an eye is that part of an animal by which it sees. But the operation itself of the parts does not exist without sensation or motion or the other operations of the soul's parts; and thus one who defines some part of the body must use the soul.

             1486. And since this is so, its parts, i.e., those of the soul, must be prior (either all of them, as happens in the case of perfect animals, or some of them, as happens in the case of imperfect animals) "to the concrete whole," i.e., to the composite of body and soul. The same thing is true of every other individual thing, because the formal parts must always be prior to any composite.

             1487. But the body and its parts are subsequent "to this substance," i.e., to the form, which is the soul, since the soul must be given in the definition of the body, as has already been stated (C 1485); and what is divided into the parts of the body as its matter is not "the substance itself," but "the concrete whole," i.e., the composite. It is clear, then, that in a sense the parts of the body are prior to "the concrete whole," i.e., to the composite, and in a sense they are not.

             1488. In fact they are prior in the way in which the simple is prior to the complex, inasmuch as the composite animal is constituted of them. However, they are not prior in the sense in which prior means something that can exist without something else; for the parts of the body cannot exist apart from the animal. Thus a finger is not a finger under all conditions, because one that is severed or dead is called such only equivocally, for example, the finger of a statue or that in a painting. But from this point of view parts of this kind are subsequent to the composite animal, because an animal can exist without a finger.

             1489. But there are certain parts which, even though they are not prior to the whole animal with this sort of priority, are nevertheless simultaneous with the whole, from this point of view; because, just as the parts themselves cannot exist without the entire body, neither can the entire animal exist without them. And parts of this kind are the principal parts of the body in which "the form," i.e., the soul, first exists, namely, the heart or the brain. Nor does it make any difference to his thesis what things may be such.

             1490. Yet it must be borne in mind that this composite, animal or man, can be taken in two ways: either as a universal or as a singular. An example of a universal composite would be animal and man, and of a singular composite, Socrates and Callias. Hence he says that man and horse and those predicates which are used in this way in reference to singular things but are taken universally, as man and horse, "are not substance," i.e., they are not just form alone, but are concrete wholes composed of a determinate matter and a determinate form (i.e., insofar as these are taken not individually but universally). For man means something composed of body and soul, but not of this body and this soul, whereas a singular man means something composed of "ultimate matter," i.e., individual matter; for Socrates is something composed of this body and this soul, and the same is true of other singular things.

             1491. Hence it is clear that matter is a part of the species. But by species here we mean not just the form but the essence of the thing. And it is also clear that matter is a part of this whole which "is composed of species and matter," i.e., the singular, which signifies the nature of the species in this determinate matter. For matter is part of a composite, and a composite is both universal and singular.

             1492. But only the parts (627).

             Here he explains what parts should be given in a definition. For since it was shown (622:C 1463) which parts are parts of the species as well as which are parts of the individual (because matter taken commonly is part of the species, whereas this definite matter is part of the individual), it is evident that only those parts which are parts of the species are parts of the intelligible expression, and not those which are parts of the individual; for flesh and bones, and not this flesh and these bones, are given in the definition of man; and the reason is that the definitive expression is applied only universally.

             1493. For since the essence of a thing is the same as the thing of which it is the essence, as was shown above (591:C 1362), there will be a definition which is the intelligible expression or essence only of that which is the same as its own essence. Now things of this kind are universal and not singular; for a circle and the being of a circle are the same, and it is similar in the case of a soul and the being of a soul. But there is no definition of those things which are composed of a form and individual matter, as of this circle or of any other singular thing.

             1494. Nor does it make any difference whether the singulars are sensible or intelligible; sensible singulars being such things as brazen and wooden circles, and intelligible singulars being such as mathematical circles. Now that some singulars are considered among the objects of mathematics is clear from the fact that in this order many things of the same species are observed, as many equal lines and many similar figures. And such singulars are said to be intelligible insofar as they are grasped without the senses by means of imagination alone, which is sometimes referred to as an intellect, according to the statement in Book III of The Soul: "The passive intellect is corruptible."

             1495. Therefore there is no definition of singular circles, because those things of which there is definition are known by their own definition. But singulars are known only as long as they come under the senses or imagination, which is called an intellect here because it considers things without the senses just as the intellect does. But "when" singular circles of this kind "are removed from a state of actuality," i.e., when they are no longer considered by the senses (in reference to sensible circles) and by imagination (in reference to mathematical circles), it is not evident whether they exist as singulars; yet they are always referred to and known by their universal formula. For even when they are not actually being perceived, these sensible circles are known inasmuch as they are circles, but not inasmuch as they are these circles.

             1496. The reason for this is that matter, which is the principle of individuation, is unknowable in itself and is known only by means of the form, from which the universal formula is derived. Therefore when singular things are absent, they are known only by their universals. Now matter is the principle of individuation not only in singular things but also in the objects of mathematics; for there are two kinds of matter, one sensible and the other intelligible. And by sensible matter is meant such things as bronze and wood, or any changeable matter, such as fire and water and all things of this sort; and singular sensible things are individuated by such matter. But by intelligible matter is meant what exists in things which are sensible but are not viewed as sensible, as the objects of mathematics. For just as the form of man exists in such and such matter, which is an organic body, in a similar way the form of a circle or of a triangle exists in this matter, which is a continuum, whether surface or solid.

             1497. He therefore concludes that he has explained the relationship of whole and part, and the sense in which there is priority and posteriority, i.e., how a part is a part of the whole, and how it is prior and how subsequent. For the parts of individual matter are parts of the singular composite but not of the species or form, whereas the parts of universal matter are parts of the species but not of the form. And since universals and not singulars are defined, the parts of individual matter are therefore not given in a thing's definition, but only the parts of common matter together with the form or parts of the form.

             1498. But when anyone (628).

             He now adapts the proposed solution to the question previously noted. He says that when someone asks whether a right angle and a circle and an animal are prior to their parts, or the reverse: whether the parts into which these things are divided and of which they are composed are prior, we must meet this question by using the foregoing solution. Now in reply to this an unqualified answer cannot be given; for there are two opinions on this point. Some say that the whole species is the same as the form so that man is the same as his soul, and others say that they are not, but that man is a composite of body and soul. And it is necessary to answer each opinion in a different way.

             1499. For if a soul is the same as an animal or a living thing, or in a similar way, if each thing is the same as its form (for example, a circle is the same as the form of a circle, and a right angle the same as the form of a right angle), we must answer by establishing which is subsequent and in what way it is subsequent; because from this point of view the parts of the matter are subsequent to those in the intelligible expression, and to those "in some right angle," i.e., in the universal right angle, but they are prior to those in a particular right angle. For this right angle which is bronze has sensible matter, and this right angle which is contained in singular lines has intelligible matter; but that right angle which is "immaterial," i.e., common, will be subsequent to the parts of the form present in the intelligible expression, and it will be prior to the parts of the matter which are the parts of singular things. And according to this opinion it will not be possible to distinguish between common matter and individual matter. Yet an unqualified answer must not be given to this question, because it will be necessary to distinguish between the parts of the matter and those of the form.

             1500. If, however, the other opinion is true, namely, that the soul is different from the animal, it will be necessary both to say and not to say that the parts are prior to the whole, as was previously established; because with regard to this opinion he instructed us above to distinguish not only between matter and form, but also between common matter, which is part of the species, and individual matter, which is part of the individual.