LESSON 5

Why Definitions and Matters Are Unities. The Union of Matter and

Form

Chapter 6: 1045a 7-1045b 23

             733. It seems that we must discuss next the problem which was mentioned with regard to definitions and numbers: what it is that causes them to be one. For all things which have several parts, and of which the whole is not a kind of heap but is something over and above the parts, have some cause that makes them one. For in some bodies contact is the cause of their unity, and in others stickiness or some other such quality. But a definition is one intelligible structure not by the connection of its parts, like the Iliad, but by being one thing. What is it, then, that makes man to be one; and why is he one thing and not many, for example, animal and two-footed?

             734. And if, in a different way, as some claim, there is an animal-itself and a two-footed-itself, why is man not these two things? And if this were the case, men would not be such by participating in man, i.e., by participating in one thing, but in two, namely, in animal and two-footed. Hence in general man will not be one thing but many, i.e., animal and two-footed.

             735. It is evident, then, that those who accept this position and discuss and define things in the way they have been accustomed to do, cannot find an answer or solution to this problem. But if (as we say) one part is as matter and the other as form, or one is in potency and the other in act, the problem with which we are dealing will no longer appear to be a difficulty.

             736. For this problem is just the same as we should have if the definition of cloak were round bronze. Now let us suppose that this term is the sign of this definition. Then when one asks what causes round and bronze to be one thing, there will no longer be a problem, because one is as matter and the other as form. What is it, then, apart from the efficient cause, that causes the potential to become actual in the case of things which are generated? For there is no other cause of the potential sphere being an actual sphere; but this was the essence of each.

             737. Further, some matter is intelligible and some sensible. And one part of a definition is always as matter and the other as actuality; for example, a circle is a plane figure.

             738. But each of those things which do not have matter, either intelligible or sensible, is at once one thing, just as it is a being: a particular thing, a quality, or a quantity; and for this reason neither being nor unity is expressed in their definitions. And their essence is at once one thing just as it is also a being. For this reason there is not some other cause of each of these being one or of being something; for each is at once a being and a unity, not as belonging to the class of being or unity, nor because these distinctions exist separately from singular things.

             739. And it is because of this difficulty that some men speak of participation, and raise the question as to what causes participation and what it is to participate. For some speak of the coexistence of the soul, as Lycophron, who says that knowledge is the coexistence of the act of knowing and the soul; and others say that life is the composition or connection of soul with body.

             740. The same argument applies in all cases. For being healthy will be either the coexistence or conjunction or composition of soul and health; and being a bronze triangle will be the composition of bronze and triangle; and being white will be the composition of surface and whiteness.

             741. Now the reason for this position is that these thinkers are looking for some unifying principle and difference of potentiality and actuality. But, as we have pointed out (736), both the ultimate matter and form are the same, one potentially and the other actually. Hence to ask what the cause of their unity is, is the same as to ask what makes them one; for each particular thing is a unity, and what is potential and what is actual are in a sense one thing. Hence there is no other cause except that which causes motion from potentiality to actuality. And all those things which do not have matter are simply one.

COMMENTARY

             1755. Having dealt with the material and formal principles, Aristotle now intends to settle the question about the way in which they are united to each other; and in regard to this he does three things. First (733:C 1755), he raises the question. Second (735:C 1758), he answers it ("It is evident"). Third (739:C 1765), he rejects the false opinions about this question ("And it is because").

             In regard to the first, he gives two reasons for saying that this question involves a difficulty. He says (733) that, in regard to the question which was touched on above about definitions and numbers as to what makes each of them one, it must be noted that all things which have several parts (and of which the whole is not merely a heap of parts but is something constituted of parts and is over and above the parts themselves) have something that makes them one. For in some bodies which have unity in this way, contact is the cause of their unity, and in others stickiness or something else of this kind.

             1756. Now it is evident that, while a defining concept is one thing composed of many parts, it is not one thing merely by the addition of its parts, "like the Iliad," i.e., the poem written about the history of the Trojans, which is one thing only by way of aggregation. But a definition is one thing in an absolute sense, for it signifies one thing. It is reasonable, then, to ask what makes both the definition of man to be one thing, and man himself, whose intelligible structure is the definition. For since man is animal and two-footed, and these seem to be two things, it is reasonable to ask why man is one thing and not many.

             1757. And if, in a different way (734).

             Then he gives the reason why this question is a problem. For if what some men claim is true, i.e., if animal itself is a particular thing which exists of itself and is separate, and the same is true of two-footed, as the Platonists held, then it is reasonable to ask why man is not these two things connected together, so that particular men are such only by participating in man, and not by participating in one thing but in two, animal and two-footed. And according to this man will not be one thing but two, namely, animal and two-footed.

             1758. It is evident (735).

             He solves the above problem; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he offers an explanation that seems to provide a solution to the problem. He says that, if some men accept the things which have been said about Plato's position, and change the natures of things in this way because they hold that universals are separate as the Platonists were accustomed to define and speak of them, it will evidently be impossible to give the cause of a man's unity or solve the foregoing problem. But if, as is stated above (706:C 1700), one holds that in definitions one part is as matter and the other as form, i.e., one as potentiality and the other as actuality, then it will be easy to solve the question, because there does not seem to be a problem.

             1759. For this problem (736).

             Second, he solves this problem in the aforesaid way. First, he solves it in the case of natural substances which are generated and corrupted. He says that this problem would be the same as if we were to ask why bronze is round. For let us assume that the definition of the term cloak is round bronze, and that this term signifies this definition. Then when one asks why the definition round bronze is one, there does not seem to be any problem, because bronze is as matter and round as form. For there is no other cause of these being one except that which makes what is in potency to become actual. And in everything in which there is generation this is the agent. Hence, since this (what is in potentiality to become actual) is the essence signified by the definition, then in the case of things subject to generation and corruption it is evidently the agent which causes the definition of the essence to be one.

             1760. Further, some matter (737).

             Then he solves the above problem in regard to the objects of mathematics. He says that matter is of two kinds, sensible and intelligible. Sensible matter is what pertains to the sensible qualities, hot and cold, rare and dense and the like; and with this matter natural bodies are concreted. Now the objects of mathematics abstract from this kind of matter. But intelligible matter means what is understood without sensible qualities or differences, for example, what is continuous. And the objects of mathematics do not abstract from this kind of matter.

             1761. Hence, whether in the case of sensible things or in that of the objects of mathematics, their definitions must always contain something as matter and something as form; for example, in the definition of a mathematical circle, a circle is a plane figure, plane is as matter and figure as form. For a mathematical definition and a natural definition are each one thing on the same grounds (even though there is no agent in the realm of mathematical entities as there is in the realm of natural entities), because in both cases one part of the definition is as matter and the other as form.

             1762. But each of those things (738).

             He solves the above problem in regard to the things that are wholly separate from matter. He says that in the case of all those things which do not have intelligible matter, as the objects of mathematics have, or sensible matter, as natural bodies have, that is to say, in the case of the separate substances, each one of these is at once one thing. For each of those things which have matter is not at once one thing, but they are one because unity comes to their matter. But if there is anything that is only a form, it is at once one thing, because it is impossible to posit in it anything prior in any order whatever that must await unity from a form.

             1763. He gives this example: the ten categories do not derive being by adding something to being in the way that species are established by adding differences to genera, but each is itself a being. And since this is true, it is evident that being does not await something to be added to it so that it may become one of these, i.e., either a substance or quantity or quality; but each of these from the very beginning is at once either a substance or quantity or quality. This is the reason why neither unity nor being is given as a genus in definitions, because unity and being would have to be related as matter to differences, through the addition of which being would become either substance or quality.

             1764. Similarly, that which is wholly separate from matter and is its own essence, as was stated above (710:C 1708), is at once one thing, just as it is a being; for it contains no matter that awaits a form from which it will derive being and unity. In the case of such things, then, there is no cause that makes them one by means of motion. However, some of them have a cause which supports their substances without their substances being moved, and not as in the case of things subject to generation, which come to be through motion. For each of them is at once a particular being and a one, but not so that being and unity are certain genera or that they exist as individuals apart from singular things, as the Platonists held.

             1765. And it is because (739).

             Then he rejects the false opinion which some men held about this question; and in regard to this he does three things.

             First, he states their position. He says that it is because of this problem that some, namely, the Platonists, posited participation, by which inferior beings participate in superior ones; for example, this particular man participates in man, and man in animal and two-footed. And they asked what the cause of participation is, and what it is to participate, in order that it might become clear to them why this thing which I call two-footed animal is one thing. And others held that the cause of a man's unity is a certain consubstantiality or coexistence of the soul with the body, as if soul's being with body were signified in the abstract; as if we were to speak of animation as Lycophron said that knowledge is a mean between the soul and the act of knowing; and others said that life itself is the mean whereby soul is joined to body.

             1766. The same argument (740).

             He rejects these positions. He says that if the statement made about the soul and the body is correct, i.e., that there is some mean uniting them, the same argument will apply in all things which are related as form and matter. For, according to this, being healthy will be a mean as a kind of consubstantiality or a kind of connection or bond between the soul, by which the animal subsists, and health. And being a triangle will be a mean combining figure and triangle. And being white will be a mean by which whiteness is connected with surface. This is obviously false. Hence it will be false that animation is a mean by which the soul is joined to the body, since animation means merely being ensouled.

             1767. Now the reason (741).

             He gives the reasons for the error in the above positions. He says that the reason why these thinkers held such views is that they sought for some principle which makes potentiality and actuality one thing, and looked for the differences of these as though it were necessary for them to be brought together by some one mean like things which are actual and diverse. But, as has been stated, both the ultimate matter, which is appropriated to a form, and the form itself are the same; for one of them is as potentiality and the other as actuality. Hence to ask what causes a thing is the same as to ask what causes it to be one, because each thing is one to the extent that it is a being. And potentiality and actuality are also one in a certain respect, for it is the potential that becomes actual; and thus it is not necessary for them to be united by some bond like those things which are completely different. Hence there is no other cause that produces the unity of things which are composed of matter and form except that cause which moves things from potentiality to actuality. But those things which simply do not have matter are some one thing of themselves just as they are something existing. These explanations will suffice for Book VIII.

Book IX

BOOK IX

Actuality and Potentiality

CONTENTS

Book IX

Lesson 1. The Division of Potency into Active and Passive. The Nature of Incapacity and Privation

Lesson 2. Rational and Irrational Potencies

Lesson 3. Rejection of the Opinion That a Thing Has Potency Only When It Is Acting. Rejection of the View That All Things Are Possible

Lesson 4. The Relative Priority of Actuality and Potency. The Reduction of Natural Potencies to Actuality

Lesson 5. Actuality and Its Various Meanings

Lesson 6. Matter Is Potential When Ultimately Disposed for Actuality. The Use of the Term Matter in an Extended Sense

Lesson 7. The Conceptual and Temporal Priority of Actuality to Potency and Vice Versa

Lesson 8. The Priority of Actuality to Potency in Substance

Lesson 9. The Substantial Priority of Actuality in Incorruptible Things

Lesson 10. The Relative Excellence of Actuality and Potency

Lesson 11. The Reference of Truth and Falsity to Actuality. The Exclusion of Falsity from Simple and Eternal Things