LESSON 1

Metaphysics Is the Science of Principles

Chapter 1: 1059a 18-1060a 2

             899. That wisdom is a science of principles, then, is evident from the first chapters (45-143) of this work, in which problems were raised concerning the statements of other philosophers about the principles of things.

             900. But one might raise the question whether wisdom must be understood to be one science or many (181, 190). For if it is one, then the objection might be raised that one science always deals with contraries; but principles are not contraries. And if it is not one but many, what kind of sciences must they be assumed to be (190-197)?

             901. Further, one might raise the question whether it is the office of one science or of many to study the principles of demonstration? For if it is the office of one science, why should it be the office of this science rather than of another? And if it is the office of many, what kind of sciences must these be admitted to be (198-201)?

             902. Further, there is the question whether it is the office of wisdom to deal with all substances or not (182)? And if not with all, it is difficult to say with what kind it does deal. But if there is one science of all substances, the problem arises how one science can deal with many subjects (202-204).

             903. Again, there is the question whether this science is a demonstration of substances alone, or also of accidents (184, 205-207); for if it is a demonstration of accidents, it is not a demonstration of substances. But if there is a different science of accidents, what is the character of each, and which of the two is wisdom? For a demonstrative science of accidents is wisdom; but that which deals with primary things is the science of substances.

             904. But the science which we are seeking must not be assumed to be the one which deals with the causes mentioned in the Physics. For it does not deal with the final cause, because such is the good, and this is found in the sphere of practical affairs and in things which are in motion. And it is the first thing which causes motion (for the end is such a nature); but there is no first mover in the realm of immobile things (192).

             905. And in general there is the question whether the science which is now being sought is concerned with sensible substances, or whether it is not concerned with these but with certain others (183). For, if it deals with other substances, it must be concerned with either the separate Forms or with the objects of mathematics. Now it is evident that separate Forms do not exist.

             906. But nevertheless even if one were to assume that these separate Forms exist, the problem would arise why the same thing should not be true of the other things of which there are Forms as is true of the objects of mathematics. I mean that they place the objects of mathematics between the Forms and sensible things as a kind of third class of entities besides the Forms and the things which exist here. But there is no third man or horse over and above man-in-himself and horse-in-itself and singular men and horses.

             907. If, however, the situation is not as they say, with what kind of things must the mathematician be assumed to deal? For he is not concerned with the things which exist here, because none of these are the kind of things which the mathematical sciences study. Nor is the science which we are now seeking concerned with the objects of mathematics; for no one of these is capable of existing separately. Nor does it deal with sensible substances, for these are corruptible (208-219).

             908. And in general one might raise the question to what science it belongs to consider the problem about the matter of the mathematical sciences (627). It is not the office of the philosophy of nature, for this science is wholly concerned with things which have in themselves a principle of rest and of motion. Nor is it the office of the science which investigates demonstration and scientific knowledge, for it is about this class of things that it makes its investigations. It follows, then, that it pertains to the philosophy which we have proposed to investigate these things.

             909. And one might raise the question whether the science which is now being sought must deal with the principles which are called elements by some thinkers (184). But all men suppose these to be present in composite things. And it would seem rather that the science which is now being sought ought to deal with universals, for every intelligible nature and every science is of universals and not of extremes (228), so that in this way they would deal with the primary genera.

             910. And these would become being and unity; for these most of all might be thought to contain all existing things and to be principles in the highest degree, because they are first by nature; for when they have been destroyed, everything else is destroyed, since everything is a being and one. But if one supposes them to be genera, then inasmuch as it is necessary for differences to participate in them, and no difference participates in a genus, it would seem that they must not be regarded either as genera or as principles.

             911. Further, if what is more simple is more of a principle than what is less simple, and the ultimate members resulting from the subdivision of different genera are more simple than the genera themselves (for these members are indivisible, whereas genera are divided into many different species), it would seem that species are principles to a greater degree than genera. But since species are involved in the destruction of their genera, genera are like principles to a greater degree; for whatever involves something else in its destruction is a principle of that thing (229-234). These and other such points, then, are the ones which cause difficulties.

COMMENTARY

             2146. Because the particular sciences disregard certain things which should be investigated, there must be a universal science which examines these things. Now such things seem to be the common attributes which naturally belong to being in general (none of which are treated by the particular sciences since they do not pertain to one science rather than to another but to all in general) and to the separate substances, which lie outside the scope of every particular science. Therefore, in introducing us to such knowledge, Aristotle, after he has investigated these attributes, begins to deal particularly with the separate substances, the knowledge of which constitutes the goal to which the things studied both in this science and in the other sciences are ultimately directed.

             Now in order that a clearer understanding of the separate substances may be had, Aristotle first (899:C 2146) makes a summary of the points discussed both in this work and in the Physics which are useful for knowing the separate substances. Second (1055:C 2488), he investigates the separate substances in themselves (in the middle of the following book: "Since there are").

             The first part is divided into two. In the first he summarizes the points which act as a preface to the study of substances. In the second (1023:C 2416) he restates the things that pertain to the study of substances (at the beginning of the following book: "The study here").

             He prefaced his study of substances by doing three things. First, he raised the questions given in Book III, which he now restates under the first point of discussion. Second (924:C 2194), he expressed his views about the things that pertain to the study of this science. These are given in Book IV and are restated here under the second point of discussion ("Since the science"). Third (963:C 2268), he drew his conclusions about imperfect being, i.e., accidental being, motion, and the infinite, about which he had partly established the truth in Books II (152:C 299) and VI (543-59:C 1171-1244) of this work, and partly in Book III of the Physics; and he gives a summary restatement of these under the third point of discussion ("Since the term being").

             The first part is divided into two. First, he raises a question about the study of this science; and second (912:C 2173), about the things established in this science ("Further, there is").

             In regard to the first he does two things. First, he asks in what way the study of this science is concerned with principles and substances. Second (904:C 2156), he asks with what principles and what substances it deals ("But the science").

             In regard to the first he does two things. First, he raises questions about the study of the principles of this science; and second (902:C 2152), about this science's study of substances ("Further, there is the question").

             In treating the first point (899) he does three things. First, he assumes that the investigations of this science are concerned with principles. He says that it is evident from Book I (45-143:C 93-272), in which he argued against the statements that other philosophers have made about the first principles of things, that wisdom is a science of principles. For it was shown in the Prologue to this work that wisdom considers the highest and most universal causes, and that it is the noblest of the sciences.

             2147. But one might (900).

             Second, he raises a question about the study of the principles by this science which is called wisdom. He says that one can ask whether wisdom, which considers principles, must be one science or many.

             2148. However, if we say that it is one, this seems to be inconsistent, because many of the things studied in one science are contraries, since one contrary is the basis for knowing the other, and thus both contraries seem to fall under one art. But since the principles of things are many, they are not contraries, otherwise they could not be combined in one subject. Hence, wisdom, which is concerned with principles, does not seem to be one science. And if it is not one science but many, it is impossible to state what these sciences are.

             2149. Now the truth of the matter is that, while wisdom is one science, it considers many principles inasmuch as they are reduced to one genus, because contraries fall under one science since they belong to one genus.

             2150. Further, one might (901).

             Third, he raises a question about the study which this science makes of the principles of demonstration. He says that it is still a problem whether the study of the principles of demonstration (for example, every whole is greater than one of its parts, and the like) belongs to the study of one science or many. If one claims that such a study belongs to one science, it seems difficult to explain why it belongs to this science rather than to another, since all sciences make common use of these principles. But if one claims that it belongs to many sciences, it seems difficult to give many such sciences.

             2151. Now the truth of the matter is that there is one science which is chiefly concerned with these principles, and this is the one which investigates the common terms involved in these principles, such as being and non-being, whole and part, and the like; and the other sciences receive such principles from this science.

             2152. Further, there is (902).

             Then he raises questions about this science's study of substances; and there are two of these. First, he asks whether or not this science considers all substances. If one claims that it does not, it is difficult to indicate what substances it does consider and what not. And if one claims that it considers all substances, the question remains how one and the same science can deal with many substances, since each science treats of one thing.

             2153. The truth is that, although this science deals especially with the separate substances, it does treat all substances inasmuch as all belong to one common class of essential being.

             2154. Again, there is (903).

             Second, he asks whether there is demonstration only with regard to substances or also with regard to accidents; for, if demonstration, properly speaking, were concerned with accidents, there would be no demonstration with regard to substances, since it is the function of demonstration to infer the essential accidents of substances. But if one claims that there is one demonstrative science of substances and another of essential accidents, the question remains as to which science each of these is, and whether each is worthy of the name of wisdom. For, on the one hand, it does seem that the science which deals with accidents is wisdom, because demonstration is properly concerned with accidents, and demonstrative science is the most certain. Thus it seems that wisdom, which is a demonstrative science, deals with accidents. But, on the other hand, it seems to deal with substances; for since substances are the primary kind of being, it seems that the science which treats of them is the primary science.

             2155. Now the truth is that wisdom considers both substances and accidents inasmuch as they have being in common, which constitutes the subject of wisdom; but its demonstrations are concerned chiefly with substances, which are the primary kind of essential beings, and of these it demonstrates the accidents.

             2156. But the science (904).

             Then he raises more specific questions about the study of this science. First (904:C 2156), he asks about the substances which this science considers; and second (909:C 2166), about the principles which it considers ("And one might").

             In treating the first point he raises four questions. The first (904) has to do with the causes of sensible substances. He says that it does not seem that we should hold that the science which we are seeking is concerned with the four classes of causes discussed in the Physics, because it seems to deal especially with the final cause, which is the most important of all.--But this science does not seem to deal with "the final cause," or goal, because an end or goal has the nature of the good. Now the good relates to operations and to things which are in motion. Hence in the case of immovable things, such as the objects of mathematics, nothing is demonstrated by way of the final cause. It is also evident that the end is what first moves a thing, for it moves the efficient cause. But there does not seem to be a first cause of motion in the case of immovable things.

             2157. Now the truth of the matter is that this science considers the classes of causes mentioned, especially the formal and final cause. And furthermore, the end, which is the first cause of motion, is altogether immovable, as will be shown below (1069:C 2526).

             2158. And in general (905).

             Second, he raises a question about the study of sensible substances. He asks whether this science is concerned with sensible substances or not. For if it is concerned with them, it does not seem to differ from the philosophy of nature. But if it is concerned with other substances, it is difficult to state what these substances are. For it must deal with either "the separate Forms," i.e., the Ideas, which the Platonists posited, or with the objects of mathematics, which some supposed to exist as an intermediate class of things between the Ideas and sensible substances, for example, surfaces, lines, figures and the like. But it is evident from the previous books that "separate Forms do not exist," i.e., separate Ideas; and so he immediately raises the question about the objects of mathematics.

             2159. Now the true answer to this question is that this science deals with sensible substances inasmuch as they are substances, but not inasmuch as they are sensible and movable; for this latter belongs properly to the philosophy of nature. But the proper study of this science has to do with substances which are neither Ideas nor separate mathematical entities but primary movers, as will be seen below (1055:C 2488).

             2160. But nevertheless (906).

             Third, he raises a third difficulty as a secondary issue. For, since he had said that there are evidently no separate Forms, he poses the question whether the objects of mathematics are separate. First, he shows that they are not. For if one claims that there are separate Forms and separate mathematical entities over and above sensible substances, why is not the same thing true of all things which have Forms as is true of the objects of mathematics? So that just as the objects of mathematics are assumed to be intermediate between the separate Forms and sensible substances as a third class of things over and above the separate Forms and the singular things which exist here (for example, a mathematical line over and above the Form of a line and the perceptible line), in a similar fashion there should be a third man and a third "horse over and above man-in-himself and horse-in-itself" (i.e., the ideal man and the ideal horse, which the Platonists called Ideas) and individual men and horses. But the Platonists did not posit intermediates in such cases as these but only in that of the objects of mathematics.

             2161. If, however (907).

             Then he argues on the other side of the question; for, if the objects of mathematics are not separate, it is difficult to indicate the things with which the mathematical sciences deal. For they do not seem to deal with sensible things as such, because no lines and circles such as the mathematical sciences investigate are found in sensible things. It seems necessary to hold, then, that there are certain separate lines and circles.

             2162. Now the truth of the matter is that the objects of mathematics are not separate from sensible things in being but only in their intelligible structure, as has been shown above in Book VI (537:C 1162) and will be considered below (919:C 2185).

             2163. And since he had interjected as a secondary issue this difficulty about the separateness of the objects of mathematics because he had said that forms evidently are not separate, therefore when he says, "Nor is the science which we are now seeking concerned with the objects of mathematics," he returns to the main question that was raised, namely, with what kind of substances this science deals. And since he had shown that it does not deal with separate Forms (for there are no separate Forms), he now shows by the same reasoning that it does not deal with the objects of mathematics; for neither are they separate in being. And it does not seem to deal with sensible substances, because these are destructible and in motion.

             2164. The true answer to this question is the one given above.

             2165. And in general one might (908).

             Then he gives a fourth difficulty by asking to what science it belongs "to consider the problems about the matter of the mathematical sciences," i.e., to investigate the things with which the mathematical sciences are concerned. This does not pertain to the philosophy of nature, because it is wholly concerned with those things which have in themselves a principle of rest and of motion and are called natural beings. Therefore he does not examine this problem. Similarly, the investigation of this problem does not seem to belong to that science which is called mathematical, which has as its aim the demonstration and knowledge of mathematical entities; for this kind of science presupposes matter of this sort or a subject of this sort, and some science does investigate this subject. It follows, then, that it is the business of this philosophical science to consider the things of which the mathematical sciences treat.

             2166. And one might (909).

             Then he asks what kind of principles this science investigates. In regard to this he raises three questions. First, he asks whether this science studies the principles which are called elements by some thinkers. This question seems to refer to the common supposition that principles of this kind are present in, i.e., intrinsic to, the composite, so that in order to know composite things these principles must be known. But from another point of view it seems that this science is concerned with more universal things, because every intelligible nature and every science seems to be "of universals and not of extremes," i.e., not about the particular things in which the division of common genera terminates. Thus it seems that this science has to do especially with the first genera.

             2167. But the truth is that this science deals chiefly with common attributes, yet without making the common factors principles in a Platonic sense. However, it does consider the intrinsic principles of things--matter and form.

             2168. And these would (910).

             Second, he raises the second problem. For, on the one hand, it seems that unity and being are principles and genera, because these most of all seem to contain all things within their general ambit. And they seem to be principles because they are first by nature; for when they are destroyed, other things are too; for everything is a being and one. Hence, if being and unity are destroyed, everything else is destroyed, but not the other way around.

             2169. But, on the other hand, it seems that unity and being are not genera, and therefore they are not principles if genera are principles. For no difference participates actually in a genus, because difference is derived from form and genus from matter; for example, rational is taken from intellective nature, and animal from sensory nature. Now form is not included actually in the essence of matter, but matter is in potentiality to form. And similarly difference does not belong to the nature of a genus, but a genus contains differences potentially. And for this reason a difference does not participate in a genus, because, when I say "rational," I signify something having reason. Nor does it belong to the intelligibility of rational that it should be animal. Now that is participated in which is included in the intelligibility of the thing which participates; and for this reason it is said that a difference does not participate in a genus. But there cannot be any difference whose intelligibility does not contain unity and being. Hence unity and being cannot have any differences. Thus, they cannot be genera, since every genus has differences.

             2170. Now the truth of the matter is that unity and being are not genera but are common to all things analogically.

             2171. Further, if what (911).

             Then he raises the third question. The problem now is whether genera are principles to a greater degree than species. First, he shows that species are principles to a greater degree than genera; for what is more simple is a principle to a greater degree. But species seem to be more simple, for they are the indivisible things in which the formal division of a genus terminates. But genera are divided into many different species, and therefore species seem to be principles to a greater degree than genera. But in view of the fact that genera constitute species, and not vice versa, genera seem to be principles to a greater degree; for the intelligible structure of a principle is such that, when it is destroyed, other things are destroyed.

             2172. Now the truth is that universals are principles, namely, of knowing; and thus genera are principles to a greater degree because they are simpler. The reason why they are divided into more members than species are is that they contain more members potentially. But species contain many members actually. Hence they are divisible to a greater degree by the method of dissolving a composite into its simple constituents.