LESSON 3

All Beings Reduced to Being and Unity

  Chapter 3: 1060b 31-1061b 17

             924. Since the science of the philosopher treats of being as being in general and not of some part of it, and the term being is used in many senses and not merely in one, it follows that, if being is used equivocally and not with a common meaning, being does not fall under one science (for such terms do not have a common class). But if the term is used according to one common meaning, being will fall under one science.

             925. Therefore the term seems to be used in the way mentioned, like the terms medical and healthy; for each of these is used in many senses. Now the term is used in each of these ways because of some kind of reference. Thus the former is used in reference to the science of medicine; the latter, to health; and still another, to something else; yet in each case the term is referred to the same thing. For both a discussion and a knife are called medical: the one because it comes from the science of medicine, and the other because it is useful to it. The same is true of the term healthy; for one thing is called healthy because it is a sign of health, and another because it produces it. The same is true of other terms. Hence the same thing is true of every instance of being; for each thing is called a being because it is either a modification or a state or a disposition or a motion or something else of this kind which belongs to being as being.

             926. And since every being is referred to something one and common, each of the contrarieties may also be referred to the primary differences and contrarieties of being, whether the primary differences are plurality and unity, likeness and unlikeness, or any others; for these have been considered (304).

             927. And it makes no difference whether an existing thing is referred to being or to unity. For even if they are not the same but different, they are nevertheless interchangeable; for what is one is somehow a being, and what is a being is somehow one.

             928. Now since it is the office of one and the same science to study all contraries, and one of each pair involves privation (though one might be puzzled how some contraries are predicated privatively, i.e., those which have an intermediate, as just and unjust), in all such cases it is necessary to hold that the privation of the one is not the privation of the whole notion of the other, but only of the last species. For example, if a man is just because of some habitual tendency to obey the laws, the unjust man will not always be deprived of the perfection completely but will fail to obey the laws in some respect; and in this respect privation will belong to him. The same holds true in other cases.

             929. Now the mathematician in a sense studies things which are gotten by taking something away; for he speculates by removing from things all sensible qualities, such as heaviness and lightness, hardness and its contrary, and also heat and cold and other sensible contrarieties, and leaves only the quantified and the continuous (some things being such in one, some in two, and some in three dimensions). And he studies the properties of the quantified and the continuous as such and not in any other respect. And of some he considers the relative positions and attributes, and of others the commensurability and incommensurability, and of others the ratios; yet we claim that there is only one science of all these things, namely, geometry. The same holds true of being.

             930. For an investigation of the attributes of being as being, and of the contrarieties of being as being, belong to no other science than [first] philosophy; for one would not assign to the philosophy of nature the study of things insofar as they are beings but rather insofar as they participate in motion. For dialectics and sophistry are concerned with the accidents of existing things, but not as beings, nor do they deal with being as being. It follows, then, that it is the philosopher who speculates about the things which we have mentioned, insofar as they are beings.

             931. And since every being is referred to some one common meaning, which is used in many senses, and the same applies to contraries (for they are referred to the primary differences and contrarieties of being), and such things can fall under one science, the difficulty which was stated at the beginning of this work (900-904) is solved in this way. I mean the question how there can be one science of things which are many and different in genus.

COMMENTARY

             2194. Having raised the foregoing questions, Aristotle now begins to assemble the things that belong to the consideration of this science. This is divided into two parts. In the first (924:C 2194) he indicates the things which this science considers. In the second (956:C 2247) he compares this science with the others ("Every science").

             The first part is divided into two members. First, he shows that it is the office of this science to consider all beings; and second (932:C 2206), that it has to consider the principles of demonstration ("And since the mathematician").

             In considering the first part he does two things. First, he shows that all things are somehow reduced to one. Second (929:C 2202), he shows that the study of this science extends to all things insofar as they are somehow reduced to some one thing ("Now the mathematician").

             In treating the first part he does two things. First, he shows that in view of the goal of our present study it is necessary to ask whether all things are somehow reduced to one. He says that, since the science of philosophy treats being as being in such a way as to consider being in terms of its universal character and not merely in terms of the intelligible character of any particular being, and since the term being is used in many senses and not just in one, if the many senses of being were purely equivocal without any common meaning, not all beings would fall under one science, because they would not in any way be reduced to one common class. And one science must deal with one class of things. But if the many senses of being have one common meaning, all beings can then fall under one science. Hence, in order to answer the question that was raised as to whether this science is one even though it treats many different things, we must consider whether or not all beings are reduced to some one thing.

             2195. Therefore the term (925).

             Here he shows that all things are reduced to some one thing. In treating this he does two things. First (925:C 2195), he explains his thesis. Second (928:C 2200), he clears up a point that might present a difficulty ("Now since").

             The first is divided into two parts. In the first he shows that all things are reduced to one. In the second (927:C 2199), he explains what this one thing is to which all things are reduced ("And it makes no difference").

             In regard to the first part he does two things. First, he shows that all beings are reduced to one common being; and second (926:C 2198), that all contrarieties are reduced to one contrariety ("And since every").

             He accordingly says, first (925), that the term being is used in the way mentioned above; i.e., it is used of many things according to some common meaning. He makes this clear by means of two examples: the terms medical and healthy.

             2196. For both of these terms are used variously, yet in such a way that they are reduced or referred to some one thing. The term medical is used in many ways inasmuch as it is referred in one sense to a medicine and in another to something else. And similarly the term healthy is used in many ways inasmuch as it is referred in one sense to health and in another to something else. Yet in both cases the various senses have reference to the same thing, though in different ways. For example, a discussion is called medical because it comes from the science of medicine, and a knife is called medical because it is an instrument that is used by the same science. Similarly one thing is called healthy because it is a sign of health, as urine, and another because it causes health, as a medication. The same applies to other terms which are used in a similar way.

             2197. It is evident that terms which are used in this way are midway between univocal and equivocal terms. In the case of univocity one term is predicated of different things with absolutely one and the same meaning; for example, the term animal, which is predicated of a horse and of an ox, signifies a living, sensory substance. In the case of equivocity the same term is predicated of various things with an entirely different meaning. This is clear in the case of the term dog, inasmuch as it is predicated both of a constellation and of a certain species of animal. But in the case of those things which are spoken of in the way mentioned previously, the same term is predicated of various things with a meaning that is partly the same and partly different--different regarding the different modes of relation, and the same regarding that to which it is related; for to be a sign of something and to be a cause of something are different, but health is one. Terms of this kind, then, are predicated analogously, because they have a proportion to one thing. The same holds true also of the many ways in which the term being is used; for being in an unqualified sense means what exists of itself, namely, substance; but other things are called beings because they belong to what exists of itself, namely, modifications or states or anything else of this kind. For a quality is called a being, not because it has an act of existence, but because a substance is said to be disposed by it. It is the same with other accidents. This is why he says that they belong to a being (or are of a being). It is evident, then, that the many senses of the term being have a common meaning to which they are reduced.

             2198. And since (926).

             Next he shows that all contrarieties are reduced to one first contrariety. Since all beings are reduced to one common meaning, and the contrarieties of beings, which are opposite differences, are in themselves a natural consequence of beings, it follows that contrarieties must be reduced to some primary contrariety, whatever it may be, whether it is plurality and unity, likeness and unlikeness, or whatever else are primary differences of beings. And contrarieties of this kind have to be considered in the science which establishes what is true about beings.

             2199. And it makes (927).

             Then he indicates what this common thing is to which all things are reduced. He says that it makes no difference whether things are reduced to being or to unity; for if it is said that being and unity are not the same conceptually but differ inasmuch as unity adds the note of indivisibility to being, none the less it is evident that they are interchangeable; for everything that is one is somehow a being, and everything that is a being is somehow one; because, just as a substance is a being properly and of itself, so too it is one properly and of itself. The way in which unity is related to being has been explained above in Book IV (301-04:C 548-60) and in Book X (832:C 1974).

             2200. Now since (928).

             Then he removes a difficulty. He says that, since all contraries are investigated by one science (and the most cogent reason seems to be that in each pair of contraries one contrary is used privatively, and this is known from its opposite term), the difficulty arises how contraries which have an intermediate can be predicated as privations, since in the case of opposites which are privatively opposed there is no intermediate.

             2201. The answer to this must be that in the case of such contraries one opposite is not posited as a privation removing all the intelligible notes of the other but as the privation of the last species inasmuch as it detracts from the complete intelligible constitution of the whole species. For instance, if someone is said to be just because he habitually obeys the laws, he will not always be said to be unjust, as if he were deprived of the entire notion of justice, which would be the case if he obeyed the laws in no way--but rather because he fails to obey them in some respects. Hence the privation of justice will be found in him to the extent that he falls short of the perfection of justice. It is for this reason that he can be in an intermediate state, because not everyone who lacks justice is completely deprived of it but only of some part of it. And this intermediate state is one that differs in degree. The same holds true of other contraries. The privation of sight, however, is said to consist in the total lack of sight, and therefore there is no intermediate state between blindness and sight.

             2202. Now the mathematician (929).

             Here he shows that the investigations of this science extend to all beings insofar as they are reduced to one thing. In treating this he makes a tripartite division. First, he shows by an example from geometry that it is the office of one science to consider all things which are reduced to being. He says that the science of mathematics studies "those things which are gotten by taking something away," i.e., abstract things. It makes this abstraction, not because it supposes that the things which it considers are separate in reality from sensible things, but because it considers them without considering sensible qualities. For the science of mathematics carries on its investigations by removing from the scope of its study all sensible qualities, such as lightness, heaviness, hardness, softness, heat and cold, and all other sensible qualities, and retains as its object of study only the quantified and the continuous, whether it is continuous in one dimension, as a line, or in two, as a surface, or in three, as a body. And it is primarily interested in the properties of these inasmuch as they are continuous and not in any other respect; for it does not consider the properties of surface inasmuch as it is the surface of wood or of stone. Similarly it considers the relationships between its objects. And in considering figures it also studies their accidents, and how quantities are commensurable or incommensurable, as is clear in Book X of Euclid, "and their ratios," or proportions, as is clear in Book V of the same work. Yet there is one science of all these things, and this is geometry.

             2203. Now what was true for the mathematician is also true for the philosopher who studies being. He passes over a study of all particular beings and considers them only inasmuch as they pertain to being in general. And though these are many, there is nevertheless a single science of all of them inasmuch as all are reduced to one thing, as has been pointed out.

             2204. For an investigation (930).

             Second, he indicates what science it is that considers the above-mentioned things. He says that the study of the attributes of being as being does not belong to any other science but only to this branch of philosophy. If it did belong to another science, it would mostly seem to belong to the philosophy of nature or to dialectics, which seemingly are the most common of the sciences. Now according to the opinion of the ancient philosophers who did not posit any substances other than sensible ones, it would seem to be the philosophy of nature that is the common science. In this way it would follow that it is the function of the philosophy of nature to consider all substances, and consequently all beings, which are reduced to substance.--But dialectics would seem to be the common science, and also sophistry, because these consider certain accidents of beings, namely, intentions and the notions of genus and species and the like. It follows, then, that it is the philosopher who has to consider the above-mentioned things, inasmuch as they are accidents of being.

             2205. And since every (931).

             Third, from what has been said, he draws his thesis as his chief conclusion. He says that, since being is used in many senses in reference to some one thing, and since all contrarieties are referred to the first contrariety of being, such things organized in this way can fall under one science, as has been pointed out. Thus he solves the question previously raised: whether there is one science of things which are many and generically different.