Hiero

 I

 II

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 IV

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 VI

 VII

 Or, in this strong aspiration after honour. Holden aptly cf. Spectator, No. 467: The love of praise is a passion deeply fixed in the mind of ever

 VIII

 IX

 X

 XI

 Al. pastasi , = colonnades.

X

And Hiero replied: Thus far you reason prettily, methinks, Simonides; but about these mercenary troops have you aught to say? Can you suggest a means to avoid the hatred of which they are the cause? Or will you tell me that a ruler who has won the affection of his subjects has no need for body-guards?

Nay, in good sooth (replied Simonides), distinctly he will need them none the less. I know it is with certain human beings as with horses, some trick of the blood they have, some inborn tendency; the more their wants are satisfied, the more their wantonness will out. Well then, to sober and chastise wild spirits, there is nothing like the terror of your men-at-arms. 189 And as to gentler natures, 190 I do not know by what means you could bestow so many benefits upon them as by means of mercenaries.

Let me explain: You keep them, I presume, in the first instance, for yourself, as guards of your own person. But for masters, owners of estates and others, to be done to death with violence by their own slaves is no unheard-of thing. Supposing, then, the first and foremost duty laid on mercenary troops were this: they are the body-guards of the whole public, and bound as such to come to the assistance of all members of the state alike, in case they shall detect some mischief brewing 191 (and miscreants do spring up in the hearts of states, as we all know); I say then, if these mercenary troops were under orders to act as guardians of the citizens, 192 the latter would recognise to whom they were indebted.

But in addition to these functions, such a body might with reason be expected to create a sense of courage and security, by which the country labourers with their flocks and herds would greatly benefit, a benefit not limited to your demesne, but shared by every farm throughout the rural district.

Again, these mercenaries, if set to guard strategic points, 193 would leave the citizens full leisure to attend to matters of more private interest.

And again, a further function: Can you conceive a service better qualified to gain intelligence beforehand and to hinder the secret sudden onslaughts of a hostile force, than a set of troopers always under arms and fully organised? 194

Moreover, on an actual campaign, where will you find an arm of greater service to the citizens than these wage-earning troops? 195 than whom, it is likely, there will none be found more resolute to take the lion's share of toil or peril, or do outpost duty, keeping watch and ward while others sleep, brave mercenaries.

And what will be the effect on the neighbour states conterminous with yours? 196 Will not this standing army lead them to desire peace beyond all other things? In fact, a compact force like this, so organised, will prove most potent to preserve the interests of their friends and to damage those of their opponents.

And when, finally, the citizens discover it is not the habit of these mercenaries to injure those who do no wrong, but their vocation rather is to hinder all attempts at evil-doing; whereby they exercise a kindly providence and bear the brunt of danger on behalf of the community, I say it must needs be, the citizens will rejoice to pay the expenses which the force entails. At any rate, it is for objects of far less importance that at present guards 197 are kept in private life.

189 Lit. "spear-bearers"; the title given to the body-guard of kings and tyrants.

190 Lit. "the beautiful and good," the kalois kagathois. See "Econ." vi. 11 foll.

191 "If they become aware of anything of that sort." Is not this modelled on the krupteia? See Pater, "Plato and Platonism," ch. viii. "Lacedaemon," p. 186.

192 Or, "as their police." toutous, sc. "the citizens"; al. "the evil-doers." If so, transl. "to keep watch and ward on evil-doers; the citizens would soon recognise the benefit they owe them for that service."

193 Or, "as garrisons of critical positions," like Phyle or Decelia near Athens.

194 Or, "trained to act as one man." See Sturz, s.v.

195 The author is perhaps thinking of some personal experiences. He works out his theory of a wage-earning militia for the protection of the state in the "Cyropaedia." See esp. VII. v. 69 foll.

196 Or, "that lie upon your borders," as Thebes and Megara were "nigh-bordering" to Athens. Cf. Eur. "Rhes." 426; Soph. "Fr." 349.

197 "Police or other."