CHAPTER FOUR

Whence Lots Derive Their Power

             654. It is also necessary to consider if the above-mentioned search for information by lots is efficacious. In this regard it is necessary to take into consideration various opinions about the occurrence of human affairs.

             There have been some who thought human affairs were regulated by no higher control, but by reason alone, in such a way that whatever happened in human affairs beyond human prudence, they believed to be completely fortuitous. Therefore, according to their opinion, there can be no foreknowledge of future events. For those things which happen fortuitously are unknowable. Whence, the divining lot is completely done away with. Similarly also, the advisor lot has no place, for the usefulness of seeking advice is reckoned from future events. Whence if the happenings of the future are unknowable, consultation will be in vain. Nevertheless, according to them, the distributive lot can have a place, not that through it might be discerned what is advantageous in dividing things, but so that what cannot be determined by reason may at least be left to fortune.

             But this opinion confines divine providence, which is infinite, within a certain limit. For while they remove from divine providence human affairs in which, however, clear indications of divine rule are for the most part apparent, they also do an injustice to human affairs, which they admit vacillate without direction. It also removes cult from all religion, and takes from men the fear of God. Whence it is to be utterly repudiated.

             655. But there have been others who said that all human actions, and their issue, and all human affairs are subject to the necessity of the stars. Whence, because there exists a certain order by which the heavenly bodies are moved, they think that from the consideration of these they can foreknow with certitude future human occurrences, except insofar as men lack experience for this. And because according to their opinion all human actions result by necessity from the stars, it follows that even those human actions which are required for lots, proceed from the disposition of the stars, that this or that thing might result. For example, if a geomancer marks out points in the dust, they claim that his hand is moved according to the power of the heavens to this extent--that such a number of points appears as is in agreement with the heavenly disposition. They say the same thing in other similar matters. Thus they say that the future can be foreknown according to those things which come about from actions of this type inasmuch as they proceed from the power of the heavenly bodies, from which they thought human occurrences to be disposed.

             And thus according to this opinion, the divining lot, through which future occurrences are considered, has a place. And consequently the advisory lot, which depends on a consideration of future events. The distributive lot also has a place, not only to this extent, that the distribution of things is left to the judgment of the lot, but also that, as the disposition of the heavens requires, things are possessed.

             And because they say that not only human acts, but also the movements of other animals, and of all natural bodies are subject to the stars, they also say according to the preceding opinion, that future events can be foreknown through auguries, and the other already mentioned methods of inquiry pertaining to the same type, inasmuch as they say that these movements or dispositions proceed from the power of the stars. Whence they call stars of this type second, because there appears in these a certain impression of the heavenly bodies.

             And because a sleeping man does not have perfect use of reason, but is moved according to the common imagination, for the above-mentioned reason, they say that dreams have a divining power, namely, inasmuch as the movements of the phantasms which occur in dreams proceed from the disposition of the heavenly bodies.

             656. But this opinion also contains evident falsity. For it is not possible that the heavenly bodies make an impression on anything incorporeal because any incorporeal thing is more powerful and more exalted than any body. The human intellect, however, is neither a body nor the power of a bodily organ, as Aristotle proves; otherwise it would not be able to know the natures of all bodies, just as the eye would not be able to see all colors, if the pupil were tinged by some color.

             It is, therefore, impossible for a heavenly body to make an impression on the human intellect. The will, moreover, is in the intellective part and is moved by the good apprehended through the intellect. Whence, with equal reason, the heavenly bodies are unable to make an impression on it. All human acts, moreover, proceed principally from the intellect and the will. By an investigation of the heavenly bodies, therefore, future human acts cannot be foreknown for certain, and much less through an investigation of any other things which are moved by them, for example, by the chattering of birds, by marking off points, and by the other things already mentioned. It is clear, however, that most of the occurrences in human affairs depend upon human acts. Whence, the occurrences in human affairs cannot be foreknown in the ways just mentioned.

             657. Yet insofar as the issue of human events depends upon some corporeal causes, such as the abundance of crops from the dryness of the atmosphere, or from the rainfall, nothing prevents these from being foreknown from an investigation of the stars, and consequently from a consideration of other bodies which follow upon the disposition of the stars, for, as Augustine says in the fifth book of the City of God, "It is not altogether absurd to say that certain sidereal influences have some power to cause differences in bodies alone,--as, for instance, we see that the seasons of the year come round by the approaching and receding of the sun." We see also the times of the year change, and by the lunar waxings and wanings certain kinds of things are increased or diminished. Whence also sailors foreknow oncoming winds and storms from a consideration of the stars and from the condition of animals.

             658. There will not, however, be similar reasoning about lots, because through lots not only are human acts investigated, but the very inquiry itself also proceeds through human acts. For that reason one cannot say that the throwing of lots itself follows necessarily the disposition of the heavenly bodies.

             Yet, because in human acts not only are the intellect and will involved, which are not subject to the impression of the stars, but also the sensitive part of the soul, which, because it uses a corporeal organ, is necessarily subject to the heavenly bodies, one can say that from the disposition of the heavenly bodies, some inclination exists in us to do this or that, insofar, that is to say, as we are led to this through the apprehension of the imagination, and through the passions of the sensitive appetite, namely, anger, fear and other of this type, to which man is more or less disposed according to bodily make-up, which is subject to the disposition of the stars.

             659. Nevertheless, because man through the intellect and the will can curb the phantasms of the imagination and the passions of the sensitive appetite, no necessity from the disposition of the stars impels men to act, but only some inclination, which wise men restrain by moderation. For this reason Ptolemy in the Centiloquium says that "the wise man rules the stars," that is, the inclination which remains from the disposition of the stars.

             660. Foolish people, on the other hand, are led entirely according to such things, as though not making use of reason. In this they differ little from beasts, according to Psalm 48, "And man when he was in honor did not understand; he is compared to senseless beasts, and is become like to them." And because according to Solomon, "the number of fools is infinite," reason rules perfectly but in a few; the inclinations of the heavenly bodies decide the outcome in many men. And for this reason astrologers sometimes foretell true things from an examination of the stars, especially about common occurrences, although in particular occurrences they frequently fail, on account of reason, which is not subject to the heavenly bodies. Whence, in the drawing of points of geomancy, the performers think that this should be observed, that he who draws the points proceed without the premeditation of reason, and that he who consults questions as though urged by an inner solicitude, and not as it were from the deliberation of reason. This they say should be observed also in all such consultations.

             661. But although according to the above-mentioned mode of inclination the heavenly bodies by not imposing a necessity dispose to some human acts, nevertheless such an inclination cannot extend to all human occurrences. For the heavenly bodies act naturally. Moreover, this is proper to nature--that it tend to one thing, just as also the action of a natural thing also proceeds from one principle, namely, from the proper form of the thing, which is the principle of natural action. The intellect, however, acts through forms conceived in the mind, which in the same intellect can be multiplied. Consequently, the rational powers are not determined to one thing, but pertain to many. But indeed those things which happen by chance in human events are per accidens, for example, that a man should find a treasure while digging a grave. But what is per accidens is not one. Whence, no natural agent can be inclined to that which occurs per accidens. There could be, therefore, in a man some natural inclination to dig a grave, because here this is some one thing, and similarly to seek a treasure; but that he should meet up with treasure while digging--this cannot have a natural cause.

             Therefore an investigation of lots according to the preceding opinion through a mode of inclination to all human occurrences cannot be efficacious. But the intellect can receive as one that which happens per accidens by forming from many things one composite. Therefore, nothing prevents things which seem to happen by accident from being pre-ordained by some intellect. For example, if someone places a stone in the road on which one sent [along the road] by him, trips and falls. The falling of the traveler is indeed by accident, not happening according to his intention; it is, however, disposed by the intellect of the other who sends him.

             662. And according to this mode, others say that those things which in human occurrences seem to be fortuitous according to us are ordained by some superior intellect. But the supreme intellect is God, Who, just as by His wisdom He causes all things to exist, so also He conserves and moves the same, directing all to their appointed end, according to the Book of Wisdom, "She reacheth therefore from end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly."

             However, by divine disposition not only bodies are moved, but the minds of men with respect to their proper actions as well. For the human intellect is enlightened by God to know the truth, for which reason the Psalmist begs, "Enlighten my eyes that I never sleep in death." By His power as well human wills are moved to desire and to act, according to the Apostle in the Epistle to the Philippians, "For it is God who of His good pleasure works in you both the will and the performance." And because the intellect and will are the proper principles of human acts, it follows that human acts are subject to divine disposition, according to Isaias, "For thou has wrought all our works in us."

             Therefore, because both human acts and the motions of external things are subject to divine providence, that which is bound to befall each one, proceeds from the divine disposition, through which some achieve the appointed end of their design. Wherefore, the Psalmist begs, "Direct me in thy truth."

             And sometimes also men are led to some good by divine disposition beyond their own intention. Whence the Apostle said to the Ephesians, "God is able to accomplish all things in a measure far beyond what we ask or conceive."

             In the same way also from the divine disposition it turns out that men fall away from their own purpose, according to Job, "Who bringeth to nought the designs of the malignant, so that their hands cannot accomplish what they had begun."

             And from time to time some are cast down by the divine disposition into adversities which they could not avoid, according to Isaias, "... her feet shall carry her afar off to sojourn. Who hath taken this counsel against Tyre, that was formerly crowned...?" And after that follows, "The Lord of hosts hath designed it." And then there is that said in Jeremias, "I know, O Lord, that the way of a man is not his: neither is it in a man to walk, and to direct his steps."

             From these things, therefore, it is proved that the occurrences of human affairs are not totally subjected to a human disposition, but to a divine disposition. Whence it happens that some come to ampler goods than they were able to devise; they are called fortunate. Others, on the other hand, fall short of those things which they have prudently planned and are cast down into disordered evils; they are called unfortunate.

             663. This is established, however, not only on divine authority, but is proven by the opinions of philosophers. For Aristotle, in the book De Bona Fortuna says this: "The starting-point of man is not reason, but something better. What, then, could be better than knowledge and intellect but God? And for this reason they are rightly called fortunate who, whatever they start on, succeed in it without being good at reasoning, for they have in them a principle that is better than intellect and deliberation."

             664. Thus therefore, according to what has already been determined, an investigation of lots can have efficacy from the divine disposition both insofar as the occurrences of external things are subject to divine providence, and insofar as through it human acts are directed. And thus it can happen, by God's doing, that human acts draw such an effect or course which belongs to the occurrences of external things. Whence in Proverbs it says, "Lots are cast into the lap, but they are disposed of by the Lord." And Dionysius, in the fifth chapter of the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy says concerning the divine lot which fell divinely upon Matthias: "Certain others say otherwise, speaking not in a religious fashion, as I think; but I myself will say my opinion. It seems to me that the sacred sayings called the lot thearchic, that is, a certain divine gift, showing to that hierarchic band," that is, to the apostolic band, "that he had been chosen by divine election." One is given to understand through this that it pertains to lot, when by a gift of God there is declared to men through a certain effect of human acts what the divine disposition is--either in dividing things, which pertains to the distributive lot; or in doing things, which pertains to the advisory lot; or in foreknowing future things, which pertains to the divining lot.

             665. We ought, moreover, to consider that the divine disposition works by the ministry of certain spirits, according to Psalm 102, "Bless the Lord, all ye His angels." And after that follows, "you ministers of His that do His will." Whence their operation accords in all things with the divine disposition, and thus the judgment is the same about those things which are done through them as about those things which are done by the divine disposition.

             There are, however, certain beguiling spirits, whom we call demons, whom, even though they reject the divine disposition insofar as they are capable, nevertheless God uses for the fulfillment of His disposition, just as He uses evil men to fulfill the purpose of His will, as is clear in the case of tyrants whose wickedness was used to form the crowns for the martyrs.

             Moreover, such foul and deceiving spirits solicit for themselves the transfer by men of the honor of divinity, and thus they involve themselves in those things which seem to pertain to God, so that the honor of divinity might be shown to themselves by deceived men. And so it is that the demons involved themselves in the images which men made from the beginning out of an inordinate regard toward the dead, and in them they gave answers, so that from this they might procure divine honor for themselves.

             Likewise also, when through lots or in some other way men inordinately seek after the occult, demons obtrude themselves so that they might lead men into error under a pretext of divination. Whence Augustine in the second book of the Litteral Interpretation of Genesis, speaking about mathematicians who foretell future occurrences through the stars says: "It should be acknowledged that when truths are spoken by such as these, they are said by a certain very hidden instinct which human minds undergo without knowing it. This is the work of the foul and seducing spirits, since its purpose is to deceive men." And in book two of Christian Doctrine he says that all types of such divination pertain to pacts made with the demons. And the opinion of Valerius Maximus does not disagree with this, who says that "men's observance rested upon some contract of religion, for not upon a chance motion is it believed to depend but upon divine providence."

             It is clear from the preceding from what source lots have efficacy.