INTRODUCTION

I. The Works of St. Thomas Aquinas

St. Thomas Aquinas' career as a teacher and writer covered a period of more than twenty years (1252-1274). The writings of St. Thomas may be classified as theological works, commentaries, Opuscula or short treatises, and Quaestiones Disputatae. The following might be mentioned among the theological writings: the commentaries on the Gospels (1252-1254); the commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard (1254-1256); the Summa Contra Gentiles (1260); the Summa Theologiae (1265-1272, which was left unfinished); the Compendium Theologiae (1272). The commentaries include those on Boethius, the De Trinitate and the De Hebdomadibus (1257-1258); on Dionysius, De Divinis Nominibus (about 1261); on the Liber de Causis (1268); on Aristotle, including parts of the Organon, the Physics, On the Heavens, On Generation and Corruption, Metaphysics, On the Soul, Nicomachean Ethics, Politics (1260-1272). Among the Opuscula or short treatises, some of the more prominent are the De Ente et Essentia (about 1252); De Aeternitate Mundi; De Unitate Intellectus; De Substantiis Separatis (the last three written during the years 1268-1272). The Quaestiones Disputatae (1256-1272) is comprised of eleven treatises, the lengthiest and perhaps most important being the De Veritate and the De Potentia.

             Scholars have also grouped the works of St. Thomas according to three phases of his life. The first phase of St. Thomas' life is referred to as the first sojourn in Paris. This phase comprises two periods: the period of his baccalaureate (1252-1256); the period of his activity as Master at the University of Paris (1256-1259). The principal work composed during his baccalaureate was the Commentary on the Sentences, and the most developed writing as Master at the University of Paris (1256-1259) was the Quaestiones Disputatae De Veritate. The second phase of St. Thomas' life is called the sojourn in Italy (1259-1268). During this period St. Thomas wrote the Summa Contra Gentiles and some of the commentaries on the work of Aristotle. The Summa Theologiae dates from about 1265 to the time of his death. Parts of the Quaestiones Disputatae were written in Italy, namely, the De Spiritualibus Creaturis, the De Potentia and the De Anima. Finally, five Quodlibeta are also assigned to this Italian period. The third phase of St. Thomas' life is called the second sojourn in Paris (1268-1274). During this period St. Thomas wrote some commentaries on Aristotle's works, the first six Quodlibeta, the De Unitate Intellectus, the Liber de Causis, commentaries on Scripture (The Book of Job and the Gospel of St. John), the Compendium Theologiae, the De Substantiis Separatis and the Quaestiones Disputatae (with the exception of the De Veritate, De Potentia, De Spiritualibus Creaturis and De Anima.

II. Authenticity of the Disputed Questions

The Disputed Questions is a compilation of eleven distinct treatises or 510 disputations in the form of articles covering a variety of subject matter and a wealth of scholarly and penetrating analyses. The treatises are the following: the De Veritate (1256-1259), which contains twenty-nine questions and 253 disputations; the De Potentia (1265-1267), ten questions and 83 disputations; the De Spiritualibus Creaturis (1266-1272), one question and 11 disputations; the De Anima (after 1265), one question and 21 disputations; the De Virtutibus in Communi (1269-1272), one question and 13 disputations; the De Caritate (1269-1272), one question and 13 disputations; the De Unione Verbi Incarnati (1269-1272), one question and five disputations; the De Malo (1269-1272), sixteen questions and 101 disputations; the De Virtutibus Cardinalibus (1269-1272), one question and four disputations; the De Spe (1269-1272), one question and four disputations; the De Correctione Fraterna (1269-1272), one question and two disputations.

             Much literature has been written on the authenticity, date and style of the Disputed Questions. Various introductions to the Disputed Questions, along with introductions to individual questions, have adequately developed these points.

             The Disputed Question on Charity was written late in St. Thomas' life. The date usually preferred is 1269-1272. No critical edition of this text is available at the present time; the Leonine editors have advised that this text will be completed in about ten years. In the meantime, it is hoped that this English translation will serve some purpose to the English reader. The Marietti edition (Quaestiones Disputatae, Turin, 1949, Vol. II) is the basis for this translation, and instances of a corrupt text have been indicated. Scriptural references are translations from the Latin Vulgate; at times references to Aristotle and other authorities have had to be changed.

III. The Style of the Quaestiones Disputatae. Comparison of the Quaestiones Disputatae with the Quaestiones Quodlibetales and the Summa Theologiae.

In mediaeval theological instruction, the quaestio method began during the exercises in disputation which the master prepared for his pupils. The most important in subject matter and the most frequent were the Disputationes Ordinariae. Every master held them several times a year, and these were closely connected with his lectures. The characteristic feature of the Disputationes Ordinariae is the weighty, difficult, and related themes, often representing a large and uniform complexity of questions, which were discussed with all the thoroughness and depth of scholastic research. On such a comprehensive subject, many Disputationes Ordinariae could be arranged, sometimes extending over a period of several years.

             The procedure of a single disputation, which lasted for two days, was the following. On the first day, the master presided, with the student called upon to answer the arguments and difficulties raised by the master on the proposed question. Students and scholars were present at this solemn academic function. On the second day, the teacher took the active part. He put in order and grouped the arguments and objections which were brought up on the preceding day of disputation. He then advanced against these objections a sed contra or short argument, drawn from reason and authority, which in a general way announced his solution of the problem. The master then undertook his independent solution of the question in a detailed and thorough fashion by entering into the historical and speculative connections and presuppositions, formulating his own definitive answer and substantiating it. This decision of the question by the master was termed the Determinatio Magistralis. On the basis of this decision, the master finally disposed of the objections against it. The completed Disputationes Ordinariae became the Quaestiones Disputatae.

             The Quaestiones Disputatae differ from the Quaestiones Quodlibetales in that the latter were held twice a year, usually during Advent and during Lent. The Quaestiones Quodlibetales dealt with diverse and unrelated questions and did not enter too deeply into the problems. They were frequently arranged in a loose and superficial order under the direction of the master.

             There is an intimate relation between the Quaestiones Disputatae and the Summa Theologiae. The style of the disputation is similar to the article form of the Summa, beginning with a statement of the question, followed by a series of difficulties, the on the contrary, the main answer or reply and, finally, the answers or replies to the objections. The questions in the Quaestiones Disputatae include more difficulties than those of the Summa; they sometimes contain a statement of the difficulty (sed dicebat . . .) followed immediately by a special argument to the contrary (sed contra . . . ). Whereas the Summa has one sed contra, the Quaestiones Disputatae offer more arguments to the contrary. It is common to find in the Quaestiones Disputatae, following the replies to the difficulties, a series of answers to the arguments sed contra. These arguments to the contrary are not necessarily the thought of St. Thomas but are rather statements in opposition to the difficulties.

             In addition to the similarity in style of the Quaestiones Disputatae and the Summa Theologiae, the subjects of discussion are almost identical. For example, the Disputed Question on Truth, which preceded the Summa by almost ten years, deals with questions that are found in the three parts of the Summa. The other Disputed Questions were, for the most part, written along with some parts of the Summa and resemble the Summa in content.

             The outstanding characteristics of the Disputed Questions are their depth and fullness of detail. Inasmuch as the material exposed in the arguments and counter-arguments (sed contra) grew directly out of disputations, the Disputed Questions display a richer content than was compatible with the purpose of the Summa. And because the arguments or objections issued from the circle of University professors and students, the Disputed Questions show more clearly than any other writing the convergence of Thomistic doctrine with the theology of the age. The historical and critical reviews of traditional opinions and attempted solutions are searchingly made and the body of the article is, as a rule, quite detailed and penetrating. The formulation of the Determinatio Magistralis and the finished product, or the Quaestiones Disputatae, under the critical inspection of the entire faculty called for an exceptionally precise elaboration of ideas and distinctions.

             In this way, the Disputed Questions and the Summa Theologiae were written for different purposes. Whereas the Disputed Questions were intended for the proficient, the Summa, as St. Thomas states in the Prologue, ought not only to instruct the proficient, but should instruct beginners. St. Thomas' purpose in the Summa was to treat of the things which belong to the Christian religion in such a way that it is compatible with the instruction of beginners. In the Prologue, St. Thomas mentions three faults in the method and purpose of instructing beginners. (1) Beginners have been hampered partly because of the multiplication of useless questions, articles, and arguments. Simplicity, clearness, and strict objectivity were to be the basic qualities of the method proper to the Summa. (2) Beginners have been hampered by the lack of systematic arrangement and sequence. The Prologue specifies that this drawback to the progress of theology students consisted in the fact that the subjects of knowledge necessary for the beginner were not taught according to the order of the subject matter. The subjects were not presented in a methodical and systematic sequence, but followed the order suggested by the exposition demanded in books, or as the occasion for disputation arose. The disputation method, therefore, was not adapted to the didactic needs of the students of Sacred Doctrine. (3) Beginners were hampered by the frequent and futile repetition of the same topics in the oral teaching and in the writings of the scholastics which engendered weariness and confusion in the minds of listeners and readers. St. Thomas sought to retain the greatest amount of clearness and precision; he assigned to every subject its logical place and thus avoided tiresome repetitions. Further, St. Thomas introduced new articles into his lectures, adopted a new and clear method of scientific research and synthesis, and developed new proofs in his demonstration.

IV. Doctrinal Summary

It was stated above that the subjects treated in the Disputed Questions and in the Summa were the same. This is especially true of the Disputed Question on Charity. St. Thomas discusses the virtue of charity at great length in the Summa, and devotes six questions and sixty-nine articles to the virtue of charity. St. Thomas' arguments are essentially the same in both works.

             In the Summa, St. Thomas treats charity according to the following headings: (1) charity in itself; (2) the subject of charity; (3) the object of charity; (4) the order of charity; (5) the principal act of charity, and (6) the precepts of charity. The same points are treated in the Disputed Question on Charity but with slight variations.

             The starting point, both in the Summa and in the Disputed Question on Charity, is the consideration of charity in itself. In Article I of the Disputed Question on Charity, St. Thomas begins by saying that charity is either something created in the human soul, or it is the Holy Spirit. St. Thomas' argument is largely a refutation and exposition of Peter Lombard's text which identifies charity with the Holy Spirit. Now if charity is the Holy Spirit, then the act of charity in man cannot be voluntary or meritorious, for man would be an agent only instrumentally. And there appears to be a contradiction: charity must be something created in the human soul; yet charity exceeds the capacity of human nature. St. Thomas' resolution of the difficulty is made in the following way. In order that the act of charity be voluntary, some habit must be added to human nature, perfecting the will in such a way that the action would proceed from an intrinsic principle. The Holy Spirit, therefore, moves man's will to the act of love by giving the form and power whereby the will is inclined to that which He Himself moves it, so that the will tends to the act of love of its own free accord.

             Charity is, therefore, a habit created in the human soul. Article II is an attempt to establish this habit as a virtue. There are some reasons why it would seem that there is no need for the virtue of charity: (1) charity is included in the other virtues; (2) grace is adequate to unite man to God, and (3) if charity is friendship, and if friendship implies equality, there can be no friendship or equality between man and God. The necessity for saying that charity is a virtue is posited in this way. Virtue is that which makes man good and renders his work good. Virtue, therefore, operates for the good; and virtue operates well for the good, viz., voluntarily, readily, with delight, and firmly. Now some goods are by nature in the human will, e.g., the love of the good of reason. However, there are other goods which are not in man by nature, for example, the artistic good, the political good, and the highest good. The love of the highest good, as the object of beatitude, requires infused virtue. In this way charity is not only a virtue, but is the most powerful of the virtues.

             Charity is not only the most powerful of the virtues, but charity is the form of the virtues. The objections, in the main, center around the notion that charity cannot be the form of other virtues because form confers being. Charity, however, does not give being to the other virtues. Nor is charity included in the definition of the other virtues, for then all the virtues would be of one species. St. Thomas' answer is that each virtue has a common or general form from charity. Charity, therefore, gives a common species to each virtue and is the form of the virtues as informing the other virtues; charity is not part of the essence of the other virtues. The acts of all the other virtues are ordered to the proper end of charity which is its object, namely, the highest good. Therefore, in the acts of all the virtues, there is the formal element which comes from charity; and charity is the form of all the virtues because all the acts of the virtues are ordered to the highest good, which is the end of charity. In this way, charity commands the acts of the virtues and is called the mother and root of the virtues because, from its end, it produces the acts of all the virtues.

             Though the form of the other virtues, charity is nevertheless a virtue in itself, distinct from the other virtues. Article IV will establish charity as one virtue. Now it would appear that because acts are distinguished by their objects, and since charity has two objects, viz., God and neighbor, therefore charity is two virtues. St. Thomas argues that charity regards God as the principal object, and neighbor is loved because of God. Materially, therefore, there are two objects in charity; formally, however, they are considered as one object. Further, though two precepts are given in charity, viz., Love the Lord thy God and Love thy neighbor, these precepts concern the acts of the virtues; and it does not follow that from a diversity of precepts, there is a diversity of virtues.

             St. Thomas' analysis of the unity of virtue is made in the following way. The unity of any power or habit is derived from the object. In the object, the form is that according to which the object is referred to a power or a habit; the matter is that in which it has its foundation. Power or habit, therefore, are related essentially to the formal notion of the object, and only accidentally to the material notion of the object. This distinction can be carried over to the virtue of charity, where man can love something in a twofold way. First, by reason of its very self, and secondly, by reason of another. If someone is loved for his own sake, his family, relatives, and friends are loved inasmuch as they are related to the one loved. However, in all of these, there is only one formal notion of love, viz., the good of the one loved for his own sake. In this way, charity loves God for His own sake; and because of Him, it loves all others according as they are ordered to God. There is, therefore, one virtue by which God and neighbor are loved.

             The last point that St. Thomas makes regarding the virtue of charity considered in itself, is charity considered as a special virtue. It would seem that charity is not a special virtue because it is included in the definition of each virtue and operates in the acts of the other virtues. St. Thomas argues that charity has God as its formal object, whereas the other virtues have God as their final end; thus the definition of charity is other than the definition of the other virtues. Nor does charity elicit the acts of the other virtues; charity commands the acts of the virtues because they are related to the end of charity. Charity is also a special virtue because its object is not a common good or the good in general, but the highest good; thus charity is not a general virtue, but is the highest virtue.

             Though charity is spoken of as existing in different subjects, viz., in the mind, in the soul, in the heart, and in strength, nevertheless charity exists only in the will which moves the other powers through its command. And through its manner of commanding the other virtues, charity can even take away all sins; however, the other virtues are necessary to directly and in an elicited way drive out sin. Finally, all the virtues are generated and corrupted with charity. Charity is generated along with the other virtues, not because it is not distinct from the other virtues, but because the works of God are perfect. Thus, when charity is established, so all the other virtues are established which are necessary for salvation. Charity, however, is corrupted with the other virtues because whatever is opposed to the other virtues, is opposed to charity. The conclusion on this point is that since man is disposed through charity to regard himself well toward his final end, it is necessary to have other virtues by which he will be well-disposed toward the means to the end.

             St. Thomas then turns to the subject of charity. Three articles of the Disputed Question on Charity are devoted to this point; in the Summa there are twelve articles. The articles in the Summa deal largely with the following: the will as the subject of charity, charity as an infused virtue, the reception of charity, the increase of charity, the perfection and the grades of charity, the decrease of charity, the loss of charity, and the loss of charity through mortal sin. These subjects are included in the three articles of the Disputed Question on Charity, and, in part, in the first five articles.

             In Article VI, St. Thomas asks whether charity can exist with mortal sin. His reasons for a negative answer can be summarized briefly. (1) Though charity is stronger than moral virtue, the habit of charity is taken away through one act of vice, whereas one act of vice does not take away moral virtue. But since moral virtue is acquired by acts, and is an inclination of power to act, this inclination is not entirely taken away by sin. The influence that God exerts in the operation of charity, however, is taken away by one act. (2) Charity is strongest, whereas sin is weakest because evil is wicked and infirm. Thus it would seem that mortal sin cannot drive out charity. St. Thomas answers by saying that sin does not drive out charity by its own power, but only in virtue of the fact that man voluntarily subjects himself to sin. (3) There is no contrary to the pleasure which comes from contemplating God; therefore there is no contrary to charity, and thus charity cannot be driven out by sin. St. Thomas' solution is that the love of God is contrary to the love of sin, which excludes man from God. Contemplation, in so far as there is no contrary, is not an act elicited by charity; charity is only commanded by it as its effect. (4) Just as faith and hope exist without form, it would seem that charity can exist without form. Charity, however, cannot exist without form because charity has God as its formal object. Faith and hope, on the other hand, have God as their final end; thus they can exist without form for they are not the form of the other virtues. (5) Contraries are of the same genus; but sin is an act whereas charity is a habit. Therefore it would seem that sin is not contrary to charity. St. Thomas argues that acts are indirectly contrary to habits according as they conform to contrary habits, e.g., similar acts are generated from similar habits, and similar acts cause similar habits, though not all habits are caused by acts.

             Having answered the difficulties, St. Thomas clearly summarizes his position. The Holy Spirit dwells in man as long as he has charity; but charity is driven out when sin enters and cannot exist along with sin. Nor can one be worthy of eternal life and eternal punishment at the same time. Mortal sin, therefore, consists in choosing something other than to live according to God and to inhere in that other; by this fact one loves some other good more than he loves God. Since charity is infused in man by God not only in the beginning, but also in its entire duration, when mortal sin enters, it obstructs the direct sight of the soul for God; and the flow of charity is stopped. The soul of man can again return to God and charity, with the help of divine grace, by regarding God rightly, and by loving Him above all things.

             The object of charity follows the discussion of the nature of charity as a virtue, and the subject of charity. In the Summa, St. Thomas treats the object of charity in twelve articles, listing some possible objects to be loved out of charity: God, neighbor, irrational creatures, self, body, sinners, enemies, angels, and demons. Two articles in the Disputed Question on Charity are devoted to a discussion of the above objects as possible objects of the virtue of charity.

             St. Thomas asks whether a rational nature can be the object to be loved out of charity. First, all things should be loved out of charity, by ordering them to those who have a capacity for beatitude; not, however, by wishing beatitude for them. Secondly, angels and God, though not known by man in themselves, are to be loved; however, man is not able to love God here with the perfection with which he will love Him in heaven, through the direct vision of His essence. Angels, on the other hand, should be loved because man is able to share with the angels in the life of glory. Thirdly, a difficulty arises with regard to love of self and love of neighbor. Love of self is usually looked upon as a vice, and the precepts of charity seem to apply only to the love of God and the love of neighbor. St. Thomas explains the precepts of charity by saying that in the precept of loving God and neighbor, there is included the precept that man love himself; for it is said, Love thy neighbor as thyself. Thus, man is induced to love God, by which he especially loves himself and wishes for himself the highest good; and in this love of self there is included the love of the body.

             The object to be loved out of charity is summarized by St. Thomas according to a twofold consideration: (1) one for whom we wish the good; and (2) the good which we wish for someone. (1) Only intellectual nature ought to be loved out of charity since only such a nature can enjoy the good of divine beatitude. Now some objects are able to have eternal beatitude of different kinds; therefore four objects are distinguished to be loved out of charity. (a) God has eternal beatitude through His own essence; and intellectual nature has eternal beatitude through participation. God ought to be loved out of charity as the root of beatitude. (b) Every man ought to love himself according as he participates in beatitude. (c) Neighbor ought to be loved as an associate in the participation of beatitude. (d) The body should be loved according as beatitude redounds to it.

             (2) According to the good we wish for others, everything can be loved out of charity insofar as these are certain goods of those who are able to enjoy beatitude. In this way, all creatures are a means for man to tend towards beatitude, and all creatures are ordered to the glory of God inasmuch as the divine goodness is manifested in them. Thus, the love of charity includes all human loves, with the exception of those based on sin, which cannot be ordered to beatitude.

             In the Disputed Question on Charity, St. Thomas devotes a special article on the love of enemies as an object of charity; and asks, more specifically, if the love of enemies arises from the perfection of a counsel. The precepts of the Old Law command not only that the affection of love be had for enemies, i.e., love your enemies; but also that the effect of love must be imparted to them, i.e., do good to those who hate you. The love of enemies is, however, contrary to the inclination of nature. Charity, therefore, perfects the natural inclination of man and loves in man what is of God; it hates sin, which is not of God. Further, if the sign that a habit is formed is pleasure in the work, then to love a friend is more pleasing than to love an enemy. However, though to love an enemy as enemy is difficult and even impossible; to love an enemy because of the love of God, this love makes easy that which seems impossible in itself.

             The love of enemies, therefore, comes under the necessity of a precept in one way; and in another way, it comes under the perfection of a counsel. The love of God must predominate over the love of any other thing, and even over the hatred of the contrary of that thing. Thus it is from the necessity of a precept that enemies be loved. On the other hand, man is bound in affection and in effect to love all and to pray for all, even those not united to him by a special bond. When man shows a special affection and effect of love to those who are joined to him for the sake of God, this is perfect charity and follows from a counsel. Charity is the more perfect according to which man is moved to love and to do good, not only to those who are near, but also to those who are far away and even enemies, both in a general and in a special way.

             The order of charity is discussed in Article IX. The Summa devotes thirteen articles to this problem, and they are primarily concerned with the following: (1) should God be loved more than neighbor and self; (2) should man love himself and his own body more than his neighbor; (3) should one neighbor be loved more than another; (4) should those who are united be loved more than others; (5) should mother be loved more than father, wife more than mother and father, benefactor or those who have been benefitted, and (6) does the order of charity remain in heaven.

             These same points are discussed in Article IX of the Disputed Question on Charity. St. Thomas summarizes the order of charity in the following way. First, God should be loved above all things, both in affection and in the effect of love. Secondly, man should love himself. Thirdly, man should love his neighbor. Among his neighbors, man ought to give mutual help to those who are more closely united or related to him. Thus, in affection, one neighbor ought to be loved more than another; and he is loved out of charity which commands the act of the other lawful friendships. Fourthly, man ought to love his body. Regarding the charity of heaven, however, there is no order because those who are in heaven are united to their final end, and their love is regulated solely by that end. There is order in heaven only as regards one's nearness to God, and therefore those who are closer to God are loved more.

             In Article X, St. Thomas returns to the subject he started with, namely, the nature of the virtue of charity, and more especially to an analysis of the perfection of the charity of this life. In the Summa, on the other hand, the order is somewhat different. After discussing the order of charity, St. Thomas discusses the principal act of charity, i.e., to love. No article in the Disputed Question on Charity specifically discusses the act of charity; the act of charity is, however, treated throughout the other articles. The analysis of the perfection of charity in this life is introduced by the precept in which man is bound to love God with his whole heart, which does not mean that man should do this; but rather that man should tend toward this, for man's soul cannot be always directed perfectly to God in knowledge and in love in this life. God can be loved wholly by man in this life only insofar as there is nothing in man's affection contrary to the divine love. Further, the charity of this life cannot be perfect because the object of charity exceeds the powers of man. Moreover, for charity to be perfect, man would have to be entirely free from sin, which is not possible in this life.

             St. Thomas says that the perfect is spoken of in three ways. (1) The perfect in itself which lacks no perfection, and is said only of God. (2) The perfect according to nature which lacks nothing of what it should possess by nature. Man is impeded in this life to loving God as much as he is able because of (a) the contrary inclination of the soul; (b) the occupation with worldly affairs, (c) the infirmity of this life, and the burden of the body. In this life, it is possible for man to live without (a) and (b), but not (c); and therefore charity can be perfect in this life according to the first two ways, but not according to the third. Finally, (3) the perfect according to time lacks nothing of the things which it is created to have according to a particular time; and therefore perfect charity according to time can be had by man in this life.

             St. Thomas then asks if all are bound to perfect charity and argues that it is not possible to refer all acts to God in this life, just as it is not possible to know God in this life. However, all things can be referred to God by virtue, and this pertains to the perfection of charity to which all are bound. First of all, men are bound to the perfection of charity which follows from the species of charity, and this consists in removing any inclination toward the contrary of charity. Secondly, men are not bound to the perfection of charity which pertains to the well-being of charity, and which consists in the taking away of the occupations of the world by which human affection is hindered from freely advancing to God. Thirdly, men are not bound to the perfection of charity which is not possible in this life because of the infirmity of this life and the burden of the body. Finally, men are not bound to the perfection of charity which no created nature can attain, for the perfect in itself is said of God alone.

             The last two articles of the Disputed Question on Charity concern the loss of charity. In Article XII, St. Thomas asks whether charity, once possessed, can be lost. In sum, charity, according to its own power, cannot be lost; but it can be lost because of the power of the changing choice of the subject when he resists the movement of the Holy Spirit.

             This conclusion is arrived through a fourfold consideration of charity. (1) On the part of the Holy Spirit moving the soul to the love of God and neighbor. Here the movement of the Holy Spirit is always efficacious according to its own intention. Therefore, in those to whom the Holy Spirit freely wishes to give a persevering movement of divine love sin cannot drive out charity, although charity can be driven out on the part of the freedom of the will in man. Thus, the Holy Spirit freely gives to some that at times they might be moved to the love of God, but He does not give in such a way that they might persevere to the end in that love. (2) According to the power of charity. Here no one can sin by virtue of that charity. (3) According to the will, insofar as charity is subject to the will. In this life, charity does not perfect all the powers of the soul and is not always perfectly directed to God; therefore the charity in this life can be lost on the part of the subject. (4) Charity on the part of the subject according as it is compared in a special way to charity itself, as potency is compared to habit. The habit of virtue inclines man to act rightly, and through it man has the right estimation of the end. Yet one who has the habit of virtue sometimes acts contrary to the inclination of his proper habit; for a thing seems to him to be something else according to some other mode, such as passion which leads him away from the correct estimation. Only in heaven, therefore, is one unable to act contrary to the habit of charity because no one is able to have any judgment about the end and the object of charity other than that which he has according to the inclination of charity; and thus, only the charity of heaven cannot be lost. In this life, however, the soul does not see the essence of divine goodness but only some of its effects, which can seem either good or not-good according to different considerations, e.g., the spiritual good does not seem good insofar as it is contrary to some bodily pleasure.

             St. Thomas has shown the way in which the charity of this life can be lost. He will then show that charity can be lost through one act of mortal sin, and this is the subject of the last article of this Question. Charity is lost in two ways: directly, through an actual contempt of God; and indirectly, e.g., one who is not thinking of God consents to something against the law of God because of some passion of fear or concupiscence, and thus loses charity. St. Thomas cites the loss of charity in the denial of Peter as an indirect loss, caused by fear rather than a deliberate will. Since the habit of charity cannot exist along with mortal sin, the habit of charity is lost through one act of mortal sin. For, the habit of charity does not have a cause in the subject, but depends entirely on an extrinsic cause, viz., the Holy Spirit. Therefore God is the cause of charity and of grace in the soul both in their becoming and in their preservation; thus the habit of charity immediately ceases when the soul turns itself away from God through sin.

             The translator would like to thank Fr. Gerard Smith, S.J., and Fr. Francis C. Wade, S.J., for their kind encouragement in the preparation of this text. Thanks is also due to Fr. Wade, Dr. James H. Robb and Dr. Paul M. Byrne for their careful examination of the manuscript and for many helpful criticisms and suggestions. To Miss Astrid Richie, whose assistance in this work was invaluable, I am also grateful.

        LOTTIE H. KENDZIERSKI