CHAPTER II

IS IT LAWFUL FOR A RELIGIOUS TO TEACH?

CONSTANT efforts have been made to hinder religious from becoming learned, and, thereby, to ensure their inability to teach. The words of Our Lord, "But be not you called Rabbi" (Matt. xxiii. 8), have been quoted in defence of these measures. It has been maintained, that, as these words are a counsel to be observed by the perfect, Religious, as professors of perfection, ought in deference to them, to abstain from teaching. St. Jerome, likewise, has been brought forward as an advocate against the propriety of teaching being undertaken by religious. This saint, in his epistle to Riparius and Desiderius against Vigilantius (and the words are quoted in xvi. Quaest. I.) writes thus: "The office of a monk is to mourn, not to teach." Again, in VII. QUAEST. I. CAP. Hoc nequaquam, it is said, "The life of monks is one of subjection and discipline, not of teaching, nor ruling, nor of being pastors over others." And as canons regular and other religious are classed as monks (as it is stated in extra De postulando, ex parte, and Quod Dei timor), it follows that no religious may lawfully teach.

             It is further argued, that teaching is contrary to the vow of a religious, whereby he renounces the world. "For all that is in the world is the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life," by which we understand riches, pleasures, and honour. Now, teaching is considered to be an honour; and this theory is thought to be supported by the Gloss upon the words of St. Matthew (iv. 5), "he set Him upon the pinnacle." "In Palestine," says the Gloss, "the roofs were flat, and the Doctors sat thereon, and spoke to the people. The devil seduced many of them with vain glory. For they were puffed up by the honour of teaching." On these words is based the conclusion, that, teaching is contrary to the vow of religious.

             Again, it is urged, that, religious are bound as stringently to practise perfect humility, as they are obliged to observe perfect poverty. As their vow of poverty forbids them to possess anything of their own, so the humility, to which they are bound, does not permit them to enjoy any honour. Teaching is, as has been proved, an honour. It is not lawful, consequently, for religious to teach.

             A passage from Dionysius (V. CAP. Eccles. hierarch.), is quoted as a proof that religious ought not to teach. This writer divides the hierarchy into three classes, viz., those who perform sacred functions; those who share in these functions; and those who, merely, receive the benefit of them. In the same chapter, he divides these functions, likewise, into three classes, viz., that of cleansing, which is the office of deacons; that of enlightening, which is the office of priests; and that of making others perfect, which is the office of bishops. Those that receive the benefit of these sacred functions are also, again, divided into three classes. Of these the first consists of the unclean, who are purified by the deacons; the second is composed of the holy people of God, who are enlightened by priests; and the third class is formed by monks, (who are of a higher rank than the other classes), and these are perfected by bishops. Hence, the function of monks is to receive holiness, not to impart it to others. And as they who teach must instruct their pupils in sacred science, teaching is not the lawful work of monks.

             Again, the scholastic office is more remote from the monastic life, than is the ecclesiastical. But we find (XVI. quaest. I.), that, "no one can exercise the priestly functions, and persevere in the due observance of monastic rules." Much less, then, can a monk devote himself to the scholastic office, by teaching or listening.

             It is, likewise, supposed to be contrary to the doctrine of the Apostles for religious to teach. For St. Paul says (2 Cor. x. 13), "We will not glory beyond our measure, but according to the measure of the rule which God hath measured to us." On these words, the Gloss thus comments: "We use power in-so-far as it has been given to us by the Author of our being: but we do not go beyond the limit, or measure, of our power." The argument, drawn from these words, is, that any religious, overstepping the measure of power assigned by the author of his rule, contravenes the Apostolic doctrine. As no religious order originally included teachers, no monk ought to be promoted to the scholastic office.

             Some enemies of religion, however, failing in their attempt to completely prevent religious from teaching, try to prove, that no religious community ought to have many teachers. In support of this theory they quote the words of St. James (iii. 1), "Be ye not many masters, my brethren." These words the Gloss explains to mean, " Do not desire to have many teachers in the Church." Now, one community of religious is one Church. Hence, there ought not to be many masters in a religious community. St. Jerome writes thus to Rusticus--and the words are quoted in VII. quaest. I.--"Bees have one queen. Cranes follow one leader. There is one captain to a vessel. And one lord in a house." Hence, in one community of religious, it is argued, there ought to be only one master.

             Furthermore, it must be remembered that there are many religious communities. If each college has more than one teacher, there will be so many religious teachers, that secular masters will, from dearth of pupils, be altogether shut out from the profession. There ought, also, to be a definite number of teachers for every branch of learning; but this great multiplicity of religious professors will cause sacred science to be held in low esteem.

             These advocates of half measures, commit, in reality, as great an error, as those who desire to see religious totally excluded from the office of teaching. For, all who go astray and cannot keep on the beaten track of truth, fall, in their efforts to avoid one mistake, into the opposite error. Thus, Sabellius, as St. Augustine remarks, striving to keep clear of the Arian heresy of the division of the Divine Essence, fell into the error of confusing the Divine Persons. Boetius also observes, that Eutyches, although avoiding the Nestorian heresy of dividing the Person of Christ, fell into the error of teaching that in Him there is unity of nature. The same observation applies to Pelagius, to Manichaeus and to other heretics. On this account St. Paul speaks, (2 Tim. iii. 8), of "men corrupted in mind, reprobate concerning the faith." On which text the Gloss enlarges, by saying, that such men " do not stay in the faith, but walk round about it, never remaining on the mean line."

             The passages quoted from the Decretals and the writings of the Fathers against the right of religious to teach, owe their origin to the following fact. There existed, formerly, among certain presumptuous monks, a mistaken idea, that, because they were monks, they had a right to usurp the office of teachers. This assumption of authority, on their part, gave rise to considerable disturbance to the Church. We find this fact stated in XVI. quaest. I., "Certain monks, bearing no commission from their own bishop, come to Constantinople, and cause confusion to arise in the church of that city." This statement is fully corroborated in ecclesiastical history. The Fathers used every effort, both by arguments and decrees, to suppress these presumptuous monks.

             But, certain men of our own day, being "unlearned and unstable, wrest" these decrees "as they do also the other Scriptures, to their own destruction" (2 Peter iii. 16). They, thus, fall into an opposite error, to that which the Fathers strove to rectify. For, it is now asserted by the enemies of religion, that no religious has any right to exercise, or to undertake, the function of teaching; and that such an office ought not to be open to religious orders. We will produce proofs that such a conclusion is utterly unfounded. We will, then, proceed to confute the arguments adduced in its support.

             First, we quote the authority of St. Jerome, who writes thus to Rusticus (the words are cited in XVI. quaest. I.), "Lead such a life in thy monastery, that thou mayest deserve to become a cleric. Learn, for a long time, that which, hereafter, thou mayest teach." Again, he continues in the following chapter, " If the desire for the priesthood attract thee, learn that which thou canst teach." From these words, it is plain, that monks may accept the office of teaching. The same fact is proved by the example of the Saints, who taught whilst living in religious orders. We read in the History of the Church, that St. Gregory of Nazianzen, a monk, was sent to Constantinople, in order to teach Holy Scripture. St. Damasus, likewise a monk, instructed his scholars, not only in Scripture, but in liberal arts. We have proof of this in the book De miraculis beatae Virginis. St. Jerome, also, although a monk, promises, in his prologue to the Bible, to instruct Paulinus, (also a monk), in Holy Scripture, and he exhorts him to its study. St. Augustine, likewise, we are told, after he had founded the monastery in which he lived by the rule drawn up by the Apostles, wrote books, and instructed the unlearned. In fact, some of the greatest Doctors of the Church--such as SS. Gregory, Basil, Chrysostom, and many others--were religious.

             Our Lord Himself has set the same example. For, as we read (Acts i. 1), "Jesus began to do and to teach." The Gloss thus comments on these words: "Christ, by beginning to do and to teach, shows that a good teacher must do what he teaches." The Gospels contain not only doctrine, but likewise counsels. Therefore, he who not only instructs others in the Evangelical precepts, but likewise himself observes the counsels (as do religious), are the most fit exponents of the Scriptures.

             Again, when a man dies, he passes away from the works belonging to the life which he quits. When he begins a new life, those works best beseem him which belong to the life on which he enters. Dionysius, 2 CAP. Eccles. hierarch., shows, that, before Baptism, whereby man receives the Divine life, he is incapable of any Divine operation; for life must precede work. In like manner a religious, by his vows, dies to the world in order to live to God. Hence, he is excluded from any share in secular business, such as commerce; but he is not forbidden to perform those Divine functions which require for their exercise life in God. Among such offices, is that of giving praise to God, which is only rightly done by those who have knowledge of sacred things. "The dead shall not praise Thee, O Lord . . . . But we that live" (Ps. cxiii. 17).

             Another office from which religious are not excluded by their vows is that of teaching. On the contrary, being rendered by contemplation capable of understanding Divine things, they are certainly the most fit to impart them to others. Hence, St. Gregory says (6 Moral), "They that contemplate with undistracted mind, drink in that knowledge, which they afterwards, when they are busied in speech, communicate to others." Now, religious are chiefly set apart for contemplation. Thus, then, we see, that religious become, by their vocation, more, rather than less, fit for teaching.

             It is ridiculous to assert, that a man is rendered incapable of teaching, because he has adopted a life which gives him more quiet, and greater facility for study and learning. It would be as reasonable to say that a person is debarred from running, because he avoids the obstacles on his course. Now, religious, as we have already seen, renounce, by their vows, all those things that chiefly disquiet the human heart. They, therefore, are the men best adapted for study and for teaching. "Write wisdom (i.e., Divine wisdom, according to the Gloss) upon the tables of thy heart" (Prov. vii. 3). "The wisdom of a scribe cometh by his time of leisure; and he that is less in action, shall receive wisdom" (Eccli. xxxviii. 25).

             St. Jerome teaches, that the poor of Christ have a special claim to the knowledge of the Scripture. "They know," he says, (in prol. Hebraicarum quaestionum, super Gen), "that we are poor and lowly, and do not own property nor accept alms. They know, likewise, that none can possess the treasure of Christ, i.e., the knowledge of the Scriptures, together with the riches of the world." But it behoves those to teach, who have knowledge of the Scripture. Hence, religious, who profess poverty, are peculiarly fitted to teach.

             We have already pointed out that religious Orders may be founded for the prosecution of any work of charity. Now teaching is numbered amongst the spiritual works of mercy. Therefore a religious Order may be instituted for the purpose of teaching.

             Certain religious Orders exist in the Church for the purpose of defending her against her enemies by force of arms, although there is no dearth of secular princes who are her official champions. Surely, warfare with sword and shield, must appear less consonant with a religious life, than is that spiritual combat waged against heresy by sacred writings, and such-like intellectual weapons against heresy. It is of this spiritual armour that St. Paul says, "the weapons of our warfare are not carnal, but powerful through God," etc. (2 Cor. x. 4). Why, then, may not Orders be lawfully founded for the purpose of teaching, and thus, of defending the Church against her enemies, although she has other defenders, who are not religious?

             We must remember, once more, that he who is fit for a greater thing in which a lesser is included, ought to be accounted fit for the lesser, included in the greater one. Now a religious, even if he do not belong to an order founded for teaching, may, as we know (De monachis; CAP. XVI. QUAEST. I.), be promoted to the office of a prelate. As, therefore, the office of prelate is greater than that of a doctor, (which is exercised by the masters who hold professorships in the schools), and, as a prelate is bound to be versed in sacred learning, it ought not to appear unseemly for a monk, by permission of lawful authority, to undertake the function of teaching.

             "Lesser goods may be sacrificed for greater ones," as the Gloss remarks on the words, "go thou, and preach the kingdom of God" (Luke ix. 60); but the common welfare must always be preferred to any private advantage. Now, while a monk is observing his rule in his cloister, he is working only for his personal advantage, i.e., for his own salvation. When, however, he is instructing many, his efforts redound to the profit of the whole Church. Hence, it is not unseemly for a religious to live outside his monastery, in order, by permission of lawful authority, to exercise the office of teaching.

             Neither is it a valid objection to urge, that monks ought not to act thus at present, while there is no dearth of secular teachers. For, the common welfare ought not to be sought by any means that may offer, but, by the surest means possible. Now, a plurality of teachers is greatly to the public advantage; for one will be well versed in subjects, of which another is ignorant. Hence, we read in Wisdom vi. 26, "The multitude of the wise is the welfare of the whole world." "O that all the people might prophesy," Moses cried out in his zeal for knowledge (Numb. xi. 29). The Gloss remarks upon his words, that, "a faithful preacher would fain have all men to utter the truth, which he himself does not suffice to declare." And, in another place, the Gloss continues, in the same strain, "He" (i.e., Moses) "wished all men to prophesy; for he was not jealous of the gift bestowed upon him."

             It matters little whether teaching be conveyed by the word of a master who is present, or by the writing of one who is absent. To quote St. Paul (2 Cor. x. 11), "Such as we are in word by epistles when absent, such also we will be in deed when present." Now, no one who has seen the libraries of books, composed by monks, for the instruction of the Church, doubts that they can teach, by writing, when absent. Therefore, it is lawful for them to teach, by word, when present.

             We will now proceed to the easy task of confuting the objections brought against the right of religious to teach.

             The first argument, namely, that Our Lord gave a counsel to His disciples not to be masters, is, for several reasons, misleading. First, because the works of supererogation, concerning which the counsels are given, are rewarded by a peculiar recompense. "Whatsoever thou shalt spend, over and above, I, at my return, will repay thee" (Luke x. 33). These words are applied, by the Gloss, to works of supererogation. Hence, it cannot be a counsel to abstain from works that are to be specially rewarded. Now, teachers, like virgins, are promised a peculiar recompense. For we read in Daniel xii. 3, "They that instruct" (i.e., by word and example, as the Gloss explains) "many to justice, (shall shine) as stars for all eternity." Hence, there is no better ground for saying that it is a counsel to refrain from the function of teaching, than there is for maintaining that it is a matter of counsel to abstain from virginity, or from martyrdom.

             Again, there cannot be a counsel which is contradicted either by another counsel, or by a precept. But, teaching is a matter both of precept and of counsel. For, Our Lord said: "Going, therefore, teach ye all nations" (Matt. xxviii. 19). St. Paul also writes: "You, who are spiritual, instruct such a one in the spirit of meekness" (Galat. vi. 1). Hence, there can be no counsel forbidding us to teach.

             Again, Our Lord willed that His Apostles should themselves put His counsels in practice, in order that, by their example, others should be led to their observance. Hence, St. Paul, giving the counsel of virginity, says, (1 Cor. vii. 7), "I would that all men should be even as I myself." But, the Apostles, certainly, did not observe the so-called counsel not to teach. For they themselves were sent forth to teach over the whole world. Thus, there can be no counsel against teaching.

             It is unreasonable to say that it is a counsel to abstain from those things that embrace the dignity of teaching. Solemnities pertaining to an office are not a cause of personal elation. Otherwise all men would be bound to shun them; since it is the duty of all to avoid pride. External insignia merely demonstrate the exalted character of an office. Hence, as it is not imperfect for a priest to sit above a deacon, or to wear costly vestments, it can, certainly, be no imperfection to make use of the insignia pertaining to the scholastic office. Our Lord said of the Pharisees, "They love the first places at feasts" (Matt. xxiii. 6); but, "He did not," (as the Gloss remarks), "forbid masters to occupy the first seats, he merely reproved the desire to have, or not to have them." It is truly absurd to say, that, though it be not a counsel to refrain from teaching, it is a counsel to refuse the name of master. There cannot be a counsel, or a precept, regarding what is not in ourselves but in another. To teach or not to teach is our own concern, and we have shown that it is not a matter of counsel. But the fact that we are called master or doctor, is no affair of ours. It regards those who give us these names. Therefore, to refrain from being called master, cannot be a counsel.

             Further, as names are used to mean certain things, it is foolish to say that a name is forbidden, while the thing signified by it, is allowed. Likewise, the observance of the Counsels was, primarily, the duty of the Apostles. It is only through their instrumentality that they are observed by any other persons. Now, the name of Master cannot be forbidden by any counsel, since the Apostles called themselves both masters and teachers. "I am appointed a preacher and an apostle (I say the truth, I lie not) a doctor of the Gentiles in faith and truth" (1 Tim. ii. 7). "In which I am appointed a preacher and an apostle, and a teacher of the Gentiles" (2 Tim. i. 11).

             It remains to be considered that Our Lord's words: "Be ye not called Rabbi" are not a councel but a precept, by which all men are bound. He wished not to forbid the office of teaching, but the sin of ambition. Neither when He added, "nor masters," did He forbid us to teach, nor yet to bear the name of master. What His words signify, according to the Gloss, is: "do not desire to be called masters." He forbids the desire of place. He does not forbid all such desire, but only such as is inordinate, and therefore unlawful. This has been proved both by a foregoing quotation from the Gloss, and also by Christ's words about the Pharisees, "They love the first places," etc. Nevertheless, these words, may (says the Gloss) bear another interpretation. If Our Lord forbids us to be called by the name of master and teacher, He equally prohibits our bearing the name of Father; for we have one Father who is in Heaven and one Master Christ. "For God" (as the Gloss says) "is by nature both our Father and our Master." A man may be called father, to signify his tenderness; and master, to denote the authority which he exercises. That which Our Lord forbids is, that to any man should be attributed either right over physical, or spiritual life, or plenitude of wisdom. Hence, the commentary of the Gloss on this prohibition of Christ, is as follows: "Do not you be called masters, as assuming to yourselves that which is due to God. Do not you call others Rabbi, as paying to man Divine homage." And in another place we find the following commentary on the same passage: "A man may be called father, as a mark of respect to his age; but not to denote that he is the author of life." In the same way, a man may be addressed as master, meaning that he is united to the true master, and that we reverence Him whose commission he holds. But, if Our Lord had absolutely forbidden, either by counsel or precept, the name of father or master to be given to men, the Fathers of the Church would, certainly, not have allowed monastic superiors to be called Abbots, a word equivalent to father. If the name father were forbidden, how could the Vicar of Christ, who ought to set an example of perfection, be called Pope or father? Again, both St. Augustine and St. Jerome frequently addressed bishops as popes, or fathers. Hence it is the height of folly to pretend, that the words, "be ye not called Rabbi," are to be understood as a counsel.

             But, even granted that these words were intended by Our Lord as a counsel, it does not follow that all such as are perfect would be bound to observe it. For, those who make profession of the state of perfection, are not under an obligation to obey all the counsels, but only such as they, by their vows, are bound to observe. Were it otherwise, the Apostles, who were in the state of perfection, would have been bound to perform the work of supererogation, which St. Paul practised in taking no stipend from the churches in which he preached; and they would have sinned had they acted otherwise (1 Cor. ix.). Were all religious equally bound to observe every counsel, and to perform every work of supererogation, great confusion would ensue, and the distinctions which now differentiate the various Orders would be abolished. Those who are in a state of perfection are not bound to observe all the Counsels, but only those to which their vows oblige them.

             The argument, that the office of a religious is not to teach, but to mourn, carries no weight. St. Jerome meant, by the words quoted, that the chief duty of a monk, as a monk, is to do penance, not to teach. He, hereby, shows that a monk is not, by virtue of his profession, bound to teach; and he rebukes the presumption of those religious who claimed the function of teaching as their special prerogative. He writes in the same sense in his epistle to Vigilantius. But, it does not, by any means, follow that, although a monk has not the office of teaching, it may not at some future time be imposed upon him. It is not the duty of a subdeacon to read the Gospel, but that does not prove that this office will never fall to his share, as Gratian points out (XVI. quaest. I. "Superiori"). St. Jerome wished to emphasise the distinction between the person of a monk and that of a cleric, and to show, that certain duties were peculiar to the office of each. One function belongs to a monk, as a monk; another to an ecclesiastic, as an ecclesiastic. The duty peculiar to a monk, by reason of his state of life, is to mourn for his own sins, and those of others. The task especially allotted to an ecclesiastic is that of preaching to, and instructing, the people. This distinction appears still more clearly in another chapter of Gratian, in which he treats of the teaching conveyed by preaching, which is the special duty of prelates, not of scholastic teaching in which they are not specially well practised. Hence, in raising this objection against the right of religious to teach, our adversaries are begging the question.

             But, even supposing that it be not lawful for a monk to teach, that does not prove that it is not right for Canons regular to teach; since these are counted as ecclesiastics. St. Augustine, in his sermon de communi vita clericorum (quoted XII. QUAEST. I. Nemo), says, speaking of Canons regular: "He who possesses, or desires to possess, private property, and to live on his own means, virtually renounces his life with me, and is not a cleric." This passage shows, that they who lived under the rule of this Saint, in the practice of poverty, were recognised as clerics. Although St. Augustine withdrew the assertion that no one was a cleric who retained private property, he never contradicted his words, that those who lived under him without possessing anything of their own, were clerics (see cap. Certe ego sum. quaest. eadem).

             When canons regular and monks are said to be equally counted as religious, it is to be understood, that they are equal in observance of the points common to all religious Orders, i.e., the renunciation of private property, abstention from commerce or from legal business, and the like. Unless this be made clear, it might be thought, that canons regular were bound to certain observances, e.g. the disuse of wearing linen apparel, to which monks are bound. Even if it be not lawful for monks to teach, this function is certainly permissible to religious belonging to Orders instituted for the purpose; just as it is lawful for the Knights Templar to bear arms, although the use of armour is forbidden to monks.

             The objection, that the exercise of the teaching office is contrary to the religious vows, is, on several accounts, ill-founded. Religious do not renounce the world in the sense that they can make no use of secular things. They renounce a worldly life, i.e. they are not allowed, by their vows, to be employed in secular affairs. Even among men living in the world, there are some who are not of the world, i.e. who are disengaged from temporal interests. But religious do not act contrary to their vows, by making use of the riches or even, at times, of the pleasures, of the world. Otherwise occasional feasting would for them be mortal sin, which is, of course, out of the question. If it be not against the religious vows to make use of secular riches, or pleasure, why should it be contrary to these vows, to make use of worldly honour?

             Not only religious, but all men are, in one sense, bound to renounce the world, as we learn from the words of St. John already quoted (1 Ep. cap. ii. 15). "If any man love the world the charity of the Father is not in him, for all that is in the world is the concupiscence of the flesh, and the concupiscence of the eyes, and the pride of life." The Gloss says, that, "lovers of the world have nothing except these three things, viz. the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life; from which sources spring every vice." Hence, we see, that it is not riches or pleasure simply, which are said to belong to the world, but the inordinate desire for them; and that not honour, but ambition, is forbidden, not to religious alone, but to all mankind. "The pride of life," says the Gloss, "signifies worldly ambition." But, even if honour simply, be understood as belonging to the world, this would not be true of every kind of honour, but only of such as consists of worldly things. The honour of the priesthood cannot be said to belong to the world. Neither can the honour given to a teacher, when the teaching which is honoured, concerns spiritual things. Thus, if religious do not, by their vows, renounce the priesthood, they need not renounce the office of teaching. Again, it is untrue to say that the act of teaching is an honour. It is the teacher's office, which is honourable. And, even if religious renounce all honours, they cannot renounce all honourable functions; otherwise they would renounce all those works of mercy which are most deserving of honour. "Honour," to quote Aristotle, "is the reward of virtue" (I. Ethic). That the devil deceives some men, and fills them with pride on account of their office as teachers, is no more reason for refusing the work of teaching, than it is for declining to do any virtuous actions. For, as St. Augustine says, "Pride insinuates itself into good works, to make them worthless."

             The assertion, that religious profess perfect humility, is absolutely untrue. They make no vow of humility. Their vow is of obedience. Neither humility, nor any other virtue, is a matter of vow. Acts of virtue, being a matter of precept, are a necessity. Vows are only concerned with that which is voluntary. Again, no one can make a vow of perfect humility, or of perfect charity. For perfection is a gift of God; it does not depend upon our will.

             Granted, however, that religious were bound to perfect humility, that would not hinder their receiving certain honours. The possession of property is certainly contrary to perfect poverty, but the acceptance of honours is not contrary to humility. For, pride consists, not in possessing honours, but in being unduly elated by them. Hence, St. Bernard says (in libro de consideratione), "Even in the tiara of the Sovereign-Pontiff there is no jewel brighter than humility ! He that is in a more exalted position than others, becomes, by humility, superior to himself." And in the book of Ecclesiasticus iii. 20, we read: "the greater thou art, the more humble thyself in all things." Who would dare to say that St. Gregory became less humble, by being promoted to the highest ecclesiastical honour? Moreover, as we have said, the function of teaching is not an honour. Therefore, objections brought against it, on that ground, are worthless.

             Another argument brought against the right of religious to teach is, that Dionysius distinguishes monks as apart from deacons, priests, and bishops. We know from ecclesiastical history, that the monks of the primitive Church, until the time of Eusebius, Zozimus, and Siricius, were not clerics (CF. XVI. QUAEST. I. Superiori). Therefore, as it is of these monks, that Dionysius speaks, we cannot, from his words, come to any conclusion about the monks who were bishops, priests, or deacons. Any difficulty on the point, arises from a misunderstanding of the words of Dionysius. This author calls the Sacraments of the Church sacred actions. Baptism he terms cleansing and illumination. Confirmation and the Blessed Eucharist he names perfecting (IV. Cap. Eccl. hierarch.). Now, it is not lawful for any, save bishops, priests, or deacons, to perform these sacred functions. Teaching in the schools, however, is not one of the holy rites, or sacred actions, whereof he speaks; otherwise it could be undertaken by none save by a priest, or a deacon. Again, ordained monks can consecrate the Body of Our Lord, a power pertaining to none but priests. Why, then, should they not exercise the function of teaching, for which no Orders are required?

             It is further urged, that, as no monk can be employed in ecclesiastical duties, and yet keep his monastic rule aright, much less can he combine the work of teaching with regular observance. Our answer is, that, as we have already shown, this objection does not hold good with regard to the essentials of religious life. For these can be practised by those who hold ecclesiastical offices. As for such religious observances as silence, vigils, and the like, it is shown in another chapter, that, "he who is obliged to serve daily in the ministry of the Church, practises the strictness of his monastic life." But, it is not unseemly if anyone neglect regular observance, for the sake of performing an action, such as teaching, which is for the common good. Thus, religious who are called to the office of prelates, sometimes while they are still in their monastery, accept a dispensation for such reason. There are, also, religious, living in their cloister in strict observance, who exercise the function of teaching, because it is enjoined by their rule.

             The seventh objection to the right of a religious to teach is, that by so doing, he oversteps his measure, or, as the Gloss says, goes further than is permitted to him. Now, when we say that a thing is permitted, we mean that it is not forbidden by any law. Hence, if a religious do something not prohibited by his rule, even though the thing be not mentioned in the Rule, he does not overstep his measure. Otherwise, religious who live under a mitigated rule, would have no right to undertake the customs and usages of a more perfect life. Such a prohibition would be opposed to the sentiments of St. Paul, (Philipp. iii.), who says, that, forgetting the things that were behind, he stretched forth himself to those that were before. We must, further, remember that some religious are, by the rule of their Order, destined for teaching. To them, of course, the foregoing objection cannot apply.

             The suggestion, that in one community of religious there ought not to be two teachers, is manifestly unfair. Religious, as we have shown, are not less humble than are seculars; and their position in the office of teaching, ought not to be worse than that of seculars. But, if the suggestion, to which we have alluded, were carried out in practice, religious would have far less chance of success in the profession of teaching, than would be the case with seculars. For a number of religious would have no more opportunity of promotion to a professorship, than any individual layman would have who studied alone. Hence, the progress of religious would be seriously impeded. We may compare their position to that of wrestlers, whose spirit in their match would be damped, if the prize for which they strove, were withdrawn. For, as Aristotle says (III. Ethics), "The bravest in the fight, are those who despise cowardice, and honour courage." In like manner, it is a hindrance to a student, if the chance of a professorship, the prize for which he is working, be denied him. It would be regarded as a penalty for some offence, if a man, who, by his learning, had gained a right to some scholastic post, were not allowed to occupy it; and in the same way, a religious would be punished for being a religious, were obstacles placed in the way of his gaining a professorship. Nothing could be more unjust, than, thus, to punish a man for leading a meritorious life.

             The authority of St. James, "be ye not many masters, my brethren," brought forward in support of this suggestion, applies as much to laymen as to religious. For, in the New Testament, all Christians are called brethren; and the Church is called a society of Christians. Neither is a multitude of religious teachers more stringently forbidden, (by the authority cited), than is a multiplicity of secular teachers. For, as St. Augustine says, "by many teachers is meant teachers teaching contrary doctrines. Many who teach alike are but as one teacher." Hence, St. James' prohibition is directed against divergence of doctrine, not against plurality of masters. His words may also be understood in their literal sense, as meaning, that discrimination must be exercised in the choice of teachers; that only such men must be chosen for this office as are discreet and well versed in the Scriptures. But, as the Gloss remarks, there are not many such to be found. In another passage, the Gloss says, that, "they who are not learned in the word of faith, should not be allowed to teach; lest true preachers be hindered in their work." Or, again, the words of St. James, which have been quoted, may apply to masters, in the sense of prelates of the Church. For it is forbidden for one bishop to govern several churches; or for several bishops to rule over one church. Hence, the Gloss says, "Do not desire to be masters, i.e. prelates (who alone are ecclesiastical masters), in many churches; or to have many masters in one church." For, he that teaches in a community is not a master of a church; although the community to which he belongs may be called a church.

             We can answer the second argument of our adversaries, by saying, that, although there be several masters in one community they do not rule, as a captain guides a ship, or a queen-bee reigns in a hive. Each master presides over his own school. Hence, the words of St. Jerome ("among bees there is one queen") cannot be understood in the sense in which our opponents use them. They only mean, that there should not be many masters in the same school.

             To the third argument brought against a multiplicity of religious teachers, we reply, that the fact that there may be several religious houses, each containing many masters, does not debar laymen from the profession of teaching. There are not always in a community of religious, enough men capable of teaching. Again, the fact that in any diocese there may be a sufficiency of teachers, does not exclude seculars from this function, Religious and laymen ought to be judged on the same lines; and the most capable masters, be they secular or religious, ought to be selected without distinction of person. We need not fear that the Holy Scriptures will fall into contempt, on account of a multiplicity of teachers to expound them. There is more danger of this being the case, when the professors of Scripture are few in number. Hence, there is no reason why the number of teachers should be limited; or why, through fear of their being too many, men capable of teaching should be excluded from that office.