CHAPTER XII

REFUTATION OF THE ERRORS OF THOSE WHO PRESUME TO DETRACT FROM THE MERIT OF OBEDIENCE, OR OF VOWS

SATAN, in his jealousy of human perfection, has raised up several foolish and misleading men, who, by their teaching, have shown themselves hostile to the different modes of perfection of which we have been speaking. Vigilantius attacked the first counsel of perfection. St. Jerome thus combats his objections to it: "Some men hold that they act more virtuously who keep the use of their fortune, and divide the fruit of their possessions piecemeal among the poor, than they do who sell their goods, and, at once, give all they possess to the poor. The fallacy of this assertion is proved not by my words but by those of the Lord Himself, ' If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell all that thou hast and give to the poor, and come follow me.' Christ is here speaking to one who desires to be perfect, and who, with the Apostles, leaves father, ship, and net. The man who is praised for retaining the use of his possessions, is in the second or third degree of perfection; and we know that the first degree is preferable to either the second or the third." Hence, in order to exclude error on this point, we find in the book, De ecclesiasticis dogmatibus the following words: "It is good to distribute one's goods prudently among the poor; but it is better if it be done with the intention of following the Lord, to give them all away at once, and, in our dealings with Christ, to be free from all earthly solicitude."

             Jovinian argued against the second counsel of perfection, and declared that marriage was equal in merit to virginity. St. Jerome refuted his opinions, in the book which he wrote against him. St. Augustine, likewise, thus speaks of his error, in his book Retractationum: "The heresy of Jovinian asserted that the merit of consecrated virgins was equalled by conjugal chastity. Hence, it is said that in Rome, certain nuns who had not hitherto been suspected of immorality, contracted marriage. Our holy mother the Church has always stoutly resisted this error. In the book De ecclesiasticis dogmatibus we find the following declaration: "It is not Christian but Jovinian to set virginity on a level with matrimony, or to deny an increase of merit to those who, for the sake of mortifying the flesh, refrain from wine or flesh meat."

             But the devil is not content with these old devices. Even in our own days he has stirred up some men to declaim against the vow of obedience and all other vows, and to preach that good works are more meritorious when performed without obedience or vow, than when executed under such obligations. Others, again, say that a vow made to enter religion may, without danger to salvation, be broken, and they strive to confirm their opinion by frivolous and empty arguments. For they contend that an act is meritorious in proportion as it is voluntary, and that, if such an act be less voluntary in proportion as it is more necessary, good works done at a man's pleasure, without the constraint of obedience or vow of any kind, are worth more than such as are performed under the obligation of a vow, either of obedience or of some other nature. They quote in support of their teaching the words of Prosper (Book II. De vita contemplativa), "We ought to fast and abstain, not as though forced by necessity, lest by acting reluctantly we should be called unwilling rather than devout." They might also bring forward the words of St. Paul (2 Cor. ix. 7), "Every one as he hath determined in his heart, not with sadness or of necessity; for God loveth a cheerful giver."

             We must now show the fallacy of these arguments, and confute this foolish reasoning. First, in order to manifest the error of these arguments we will quote the Gloss on the verse of Ps. lxxv. 12, "Vow ye and pay to the Lord your God." "We must observe," says the Gloss, "that some vows made to God are common to all men, and are necessary to salvation: such are our Baptismal promises and the like, which we should be bound to keep, even if we had not made them. The verse, 'Vow ye and pay,' alludes to such vows as these, and is addressed to all men. There are also other vows made by individuals, such as chastity, virginity, and the like. The Psalmist invites us, but does not command us, to make such vows as these, and to pay them when we have made them. For the emission of a vow is a decision of the will; but the payment of such a vow is a decided necessity."

             Hence a vow is, in one sense, a matter partly of counsel, and, in another sense, a matter of precept. But, from whichever point of view we consider it, we shall see plainly that good works performed under vow, are more meritorious than those executed without a vow. For, it is clear, that, in all that is necessary for salvation, all men are bound by the precept of God; neither would it be right to think that God would give a command without a purpose. For, as St. Paul says (1 Tim. i. 5), "Now the end of the Commandment is charity." In vain, then, would God have given a commandment concerning the performance of anything, if the execution of such a thing had not tended more towards the increase of charity than its omission would have done. Now we are not only bidden by precept to believe, and forbidden to steal, but, further, we are commanded to make a vow to believe and to abstain from theft. Therefore, believing on account of our vow, and abstention from theft on the same account, tend more to augment charity than would be the case if we had no vow. Again, the more anything increases charity, the more it is praiseworthy and meritorious. Hence it is more praiseworthy and meritorious to perform any work under vow, than without such an obligation. Once more, the counsel is given to us not only to preserve virginity or chastity, but (as the Gloss points out) to make a vow to do so. But since, as we have said, a counsel is only given concerning that which is the greater good, it must be better to observe chastity under a vow than without one.

             The same argument holds good concerning the other counsels. Now, amongst other good works virginity meets with special commendation. Our Lord speaking of it says, "He that can take, let him take" (Matt. xix. 12). It is, however, the vow of virginity which renders that state so praiseworthy. St. Augustine says, in his book, De virginitate, "Virginity is honourable, not because it is virginity, but because it is consecrated to God, and because it vows to Him, and preserves for Him, the continence of piety." And, again, he says, "We do not praise virgins because they are virgins, but because they are consecrated to God by the holy continence of virginity." Hence we see, that the fact of their being performed under a vow, renders good works the more meritorious.

             Again, every finite good acquires additional value by bearing a promise of some other good. There is no doubt that the promise of good is in itself a good. Hence, when one man makes a promise to another, he is considered to confer some advantage upon him; and he to whom the promise is made returns thanks. Now a vow, is a promise made to God, as we see from Ecclesiastes (v. 3), "If thou hast vowed anything to God, defer not to pay it; for an unfaithful and foolish promise displeaseth him." It is better, therefore, to make a vow and to perform it, than simply to execute a good work without being bound thereto by vow.

             Again, the more one person gives to another, the more he deserves from that other. Now, he that does a good work without a vow, offers to God only that single act which he performs for love of him: he, on the contrary, who not only accomplishes a good work, but also makes a vow to perform it, gives to God not only that which he does, but also the power whereby he does it. For he puts it out of his power not to do such a good work; although, before making his vow, he might legitimately have omitted it. Hence he merits far more from God who acts under vow, than he who is not under any obligation.

             Once more, the merit of a good work is increased in proportion as the will is confirmed in good, just as the heinousness of sin is aggravated in proportion to the obstinate malice of the will. Now it is evident, that he who makes a vow, confirms his will to accomplish that which he promises; and that when he accomplishes the good work which he has vowed to do, its consummation proceeds from the strength which his will has acquired. Just as the gravity of a crime proceeds from the fact that he who commits it acts from a determined purpose, or, as is usually said, sins out of malice; so the merit of any good work is enhanced by the fact that it is done under a vow.

             Again, the more excellent the virtue from which any action proceeds, the more meritorious does that action become, since an action derives all its merit from the virtue which inspires it. Now, it may sometimes happen that an action of inferior virtue may have its origin in a superior virtue. For example we might do an act of justice from a motive of charity. Hence, it is far best to perform acts of inferior virtue from motives of superior virtue; just as an act of justice is enhanced in value, if it be performed out of charity. Now, we know, that the particular good works that we accomplish proceed from inferior virtues; fasting, for instance, is an act of abstemiousness; continence proceeds from chastity, and so of the rest. But, on the other hand, a vow is, strictly speaking, an act of latria, which, undoubtedly, is a higher virtue than abstemiousness, chastity, or any other virtue. For it is more meritorious to worship God, than to order ourselves rightly, towards, either our neighbour, or ourselves. Hence chastity, abstemiousness, or any other virtue, inferior to latria, derives additional value if it be performed under a vow.

             This opinion is supported by the pious desire of the Church which invites men to make a vow to go to the Holy Land, or elsewhere, in her defence, and grants indulgences and other privileges to such as make this vow. She would certainly not invite the faithful to bind themselves by vow, were good works, done without such obligation, more meritorious than those done under vow. Did she act thus, she would be disobeying the exhortation of St. Paul (1 Cor. xii. 31), "Be zealous for the better gifts." If the good works done without a vow were the most praiseworthy, the Church, far from encouraging her children to bind themselves by vow, would withhold them from so doing, either by prohibition or dissuasion; and, as it is her desire that the faithful should be in the most meritorious state, she would absolve them all from their vows, in order, as far as possible, to enhance the merit of their good works. Hence, the opinion that vows detract from the value of good works, is repugnant to the spirit of the Church, and must be rejected as heretical.

             All the arguments alleged in favour of this opinion, may be easily answered. First, the proposition, that a good work performed under vow, is less voluntary than one done without an obligation, is by no means universally true. For many persons perform what they have vowed to do, so promptly, that even had they not already made vows, they would not only have done those same good works, but they would have also vowed to do them. Secondly, granted that a deed performed under vow, or under obedience, be in a sense involuntary, nevertheless, he who accomplishes such a deed, does so from the necessity of his vow or of obedience, which he has no desire to violate. Hence he acts in a more praiseworthy and meritorious manner, than if he were performing a good work at his own pleasure and without a vow. And, even if he have not a will to do some particular thing (e.g. to fast), he, nevertheless, desires to accomplish his vow, or to practise obedience, which is much more meritorious than fasting. Hence, he who fasts out of obedience performs a more acceptable work than he who fasts by his own desire. And the will to fulfil a vow, or to practise obedience, is held to be so much the more perfect in proportion as the deed accomplished for the sake of obedience, or of keeping a vow, is repugnant to nature. Hence St. Jerome says to Rusticus, "My principal exhortation to thee is, not to be guided by thine own judgment." Then he adds, "Neither shalt thou do according to thine own will; but thou shalt eat as thou art bidden; thou shalt have as much as is given thee; thou shalt wear the raiment appointed thee; thou shalt perform the whole task allotted to thee; thou shalt be subject to him to whom thou wouldst fain not submit; thou shalt go weary to bed; thou shalt fall asleep on thy feet and shalt be forced to rise before thou hast slumbered thy fill."

             The passage just cited shows us, that the merit of a good work consists in a man doing or suffering something for the love of God, which is contrary to his own will. For, alacrity of will, and fervour of divine love, are chiefly shown when that which we do for God is repugnant to our own inclinations. The martyrs are commended inasmuch as, for the love of God, they endured many things repugnant to nature. Hence, when Eleazar was tortured he said, "I suffer grievous pains in body: but in soul I am well content to suffer these things because I fear thee."

             It is argued, that a man may not perchance retain the will to fulfil his vow, or to practise obedience; but God, as we know, judgeth the heart, and will hold such an one unfaithful to his vow and to obedience. If a man perform what he has vowed, or obey an order, solely out of motives of fear or human respect he gains no merit before God; for he acts, not from a desire to please Him, but solely under compulsion. Nevertheless, his vow, if it were made out of charity, is not unprofitable to him; for he has merited more by making it, than others have done by fasting without any vow. Moreover, the merit of his vow remains to him if he repent of the infidelity of his heart. This is our answer to the authorities adduced. They apply to the cases wherein men keep their vows under the compulsion of human motives, such as fear, or shame; but they do not speak of the necessity whereby men are constrained, from motives of Divine love, to do or suffer what is naturally repugnant to them, in order thereby to fulfil the will of God. This is made clear by the words of St. Paul, "Not with sadness or of necessity" (2 Cor. ix. 7). For human necessity induces sadness; whereas the constraining of divine love dissipates, or lessens it.

             We may, in support of what we have said, quote the words of Prosper. "Lest we should act not devoutly but unwillingly. For the necessity which proceeds from divine love does not diminish love, but increases it." And St. Augustine, in his epistle (127) to Armentarius and Paulina, shows that this necessity is desirable and praiseworthy. "Since," he says, "thou now hast bound thyself, it is not lawful for thee to act otherwise. Before thou wert under a vow, thou wert free to do as thou wouldst: now, however, thou art subject to thy vow. Nevertheless, liberty is not a matter of congratulation, since it renders man debtor for what he cannot repay with money. But now that thy promise is made to God, I do not invite thee to great justice (i.e. to the chastity which thou hast vowed), but I warn thee against great iniquity. For, if thou dost not perform what thou hast vowed, thou wilt not remain as thou wert before thy vow. Before thy vow thou wert lower than at present, not worse; now, if thou dost (which God forbid) break thy faith with Him, thou wilt be as much the more accursed as thou wilt be blessed if thou dost keep thy vow. Repent not of thy promise to God; but rather rejoice that now it is no longer lawful for thee to do that which formerly, to thy detriment, was permissible to thee. Act firmly and fulfil in deed what thou hast promised by word. He will help thee who asks for thy vows. Blessed necessity which constrains us to better things." From these words we see, how erroneous is the doctrine, that persons are not bound to keep a vow that they may have made to go into religion.