An Apology for the Religious Orders

 CONTENTS

 INTRODUCTION

 Part I

 CHAPTER I

 CHAPTER II

 CHAPTER III

 CHAPTER IV

 CHAPTER V

 CHAPTER VI

 CHAPTER VII

 CHAPTER VIII

 CHAPTER IX

 CHAPTER X

 CHAPTER XI

 CHAPTER XII

 CHAPTER XIII

 CHAPTER XIV

 CHAPTER XV

 CHAPTER XVI

 CHAPTER XVII

 CHAPTER XVIII

 CHAPTER XIX

 CHAPTER XX

 CHAPTER XXI

 CHAPTER XXII

 CHAPTER XXIII

 CHAPTER XXIV

 CHAPTER XXV

 CHAPTER XXVI

 Part II

 CHAPTER I

 CHAPTER II

 CHAPTER III

 CHAPTER IV

 CHAPTER V

 CHAPTER VI

 CHAPTER VII

 CHAPTER VIII

 CHAPTER IX

 CHAPTER X

 CHAPTER XI

 CHAPTER XII

 CHAPTER XIII

 CHAPTER XIV

 CHAPTER XV

 CHAPTER XVI

 CHAPTER I

 CHAPTER II

 CHAPTER III

 CHAPTER IV

 CHAPTER V

 CHAPTER VI

 CHAPTER VII

 CHAPTER VIII

 CHAPTER IX

 CHAPTER X

 CHAPTER XI

 CHAPTER XII

 CHAPTER XIII

 CHAPTER XIV

 CHAPTER XV

 CHAPTER XVI

 CHAPTER XVII

 CHAPTER XVIII

 CHAPTER XIX

 CHAPTER XX

 CHAPTER XXI

 CHAPTER XXII

 CHAPTER XXIII

 CHAPTER XXIV

 CHAPTER XXV

 CHAPTER XXVI

CHAPTER XV

WHAT IS REQUIRED TO CONSTITUTE THE STATE OF PERFECTION

IT must, as we have before said, be borne in mind that perfection does not consist in the mere accomplishment of a perfect work, but, likewise, in the vow to accomplish such a work. A counsel, as we have already observed, has been given us on each of these two points. He therefore who performs a perfect work under a vow attains to a twofold perfection. For, just as a man who observes

continence is practising one form of perfection; so, he who obliges himself by vow to live in continence and who keeps his vow, practises both the perfection of continence and the perfection of a vow. For that perfection which comes from the observance of a vow changes the state and condition of a man as completely, as freedom alters the state and condition of a slave. This proposition is established in II. quaestion. IX., where Pope Adrian says, "If at any time we are called upon for judgment in a capital cause, or in a cause affecting a state of life, we must act at our own discretion, and not depend upon others to examine the case." For, if a man make a vow to observe chastity, he deprives himself of liberty to marry. But he who simply observes chastity without a vow, is not deprived of his liberty. Therefore, he is not in an altered condition, as is the case with a man bound by a vow. Again, if one man serve another, his state is not thereby changed, as it is if he lay himself under an obligation to serve him.

             We must remember, however, that a man may deprive himself of liberty either absolutely (simpliciter) or relatively (secundum quid). If he bind himself, either to God or man, to perform some specific work for some allotted time, he renounces his freedom, not absolutely but partially, i.e., with regard to the particular matter, about which he has laid himself under an obligation. If, however, he place himself entirely at the disposal of another, reserving to himself no liberty whatsoever, he makes himself a slave absolutely, and thereby absolutely alters his condition. Thus, if a person make a vow to God to perform some specified work, such as a pilgrimage or a fast, he does not change his condition entirely, but only partially, i.e., with regard to that particular work which he vows to accomplish. If he dedicate his whole life to serve God in works of perfection he absolutely embraces the condition or state of perfection. But, as some men perform works of perfection without any vow, and others fail to accomplish the works of perfection to which they have vowed their whole lives, it is perfectly possible for persons to be perfect without being in the state of perfection, or to be in a state of perfection without being perfect.