CHAPTER V

THE OPINION OF AVICEBRON AND HIS ARGUMENTS FOR IT

             19.--Among those who came after Plato and Aristotle, some departed from their positions and fell into error. First among these was Avicebron who, in the book The Fount of Life, held that separate substances were of a different state. For he held that all substances established below God are composed of matter and form, an opinion that disagrees both with the view of Plato and the view of Aristotle. Avicebron seems to have been twice deceived: First, because he thought that according to the intelligible composition found in the genera of things, inasmuch, namely, as a species is composed of genus and difference, there would likewise be understood such a composition in things themselves, so that in the case of each and every thing existing in a genus, the genus is matter and the difference is form. Secondly, because he thought that "to be" in potency, "to be" a subject, and "to be" a recipient would in all cases be said according to one notion. Therefore, basing himself upon these two positions, he proceeded in a certain reductive way in investigating the composition of all things up to intellectual substances.

             20.--In the first place, he noticed in the case of artificial things that they are composed of an artificial form and of matter, which is a certain natural thing, for example, iron or wood, which is disposed to the artificial form as potency to act. Furthermore, he observed that such particular natural bodies were composed of elements. Hence he asserted that the four elements are related to the particular natural forms, e.g., of stone or iron, as matter to form and potency to act. Moreover, he noted that the four elements agree in that each one of them is a body and they differ according to contrary qualities. Hence in the third place, he held that body itself is the matter of the elements, which matter he named universal natural matter, and that the forms of this matter are the qualities of the elements. But because he observed that a heavenly body agrees with the elements in corporeity but differs from them in not being receptive of contrary qualities, he placed the matter of a heavenly body in a fourth order, which likewise is related to the form of heavenly body as potency is to act. Avicebron thus posited four orders of corporeal matter.

             21.--Again, because he saw that every body signifies a certain substance with length, width, and thickness, he thought that the body, insofar as it is such a body, has three dimensions which are as form; substance, which is the subject of quantity and the other genera of accidents, is matter of the body so far as it is a body. Thus, therefore, as he himself says, the substance which supports the nine predicaments is the prime spiritual matter. And just as he posited in universal corporeal matter, which he called a body, something higher which was not receptive of contrary qualities, (namely, the matter of the body of the heavens), and something lower which is receptive of contrary qualities, which he believed to be the matter of the four elements, -so likewise, in substance itself, he posited something higher which is not receptive of quantity and which he considered to be a separate substance and something lower which is receptive of quantity, which he posited as the incorporeal matter of bodies.

             22.--Furthermore, he asserted that the separate or spiritual substances themselves are composed of matter and form. This he proved by several arguments: First, because he held that there would be no diversity among spiritual substances unless they were composed of matter and form. For if they are not composed of matter and form, they are either matter alone or form alone. If they are matter alone, then spiritual substances cannot be many because matter of itself is one and is diversified through forms. In like manner, if a spiritual substance is form alone, no cause of the diversification of spiritual substances can be assigned. For if you say that they are diverse according to perfection and imperfection, it would then follow that spiritual substance is the subject of perfection and imperfection. But to be a subject belongs to the nature of matter and not to the nature of form. Therefore, it remains either that spiritual substances are not many or that they are composed of matter and form.

             His second reason is that the concept of spirituality is outside the concept of corporeity. And thus corporeal spiritual substances have something in which they differ and likewise in which they agree since each is a substance. Hence, just as in the case of corporeal substance, substance is as matter upholding corporeity, so in the case of spiritual substance, substance is as matter upholding spirituality. And according as matter participates more or less in the form of spirituality, spiritual substances are accordingly higher or lower, just as the finer the air is, the more it participates in clarity.

             23.--His third reason is that esse is found in common among spiritual substances as in higher beings, and in corporeal substances as in lower beings. Therefore, that which follows upon esse in corporeal substances will also follow upon esse in spiritual ones. But a three-fold order is found in corporeal substances, namely, a gross body which is the body of the elements, a refined body which is the heavenly body, and finally, the matter and form of body. Therefore, in a spiritual substance there is found a lower spiritual substance, for example, one which is joined to a body, and a more excellent one which is not joined to a body, and again, matter and form from which a spiritual substance is composed.

             His fourth reason is that every created substance must be distinguished from the Creator. But the Creator is one only. Therefore every created substance cannot be one only but must be composed of two constituents, of which one must necessarily be form and the other matter, because it cannot be composed of two matters or of two forms.

             His fifth reason is that every created spiritual substance is finite. But a thing is finite only through its form because a thing which does not have a form through which to become one, is infinite. Therefore every created spiritual substance is composed of matter and form.