Treatise on Separate Substances

 TABLE OF CONTENTS

 PREFACE

 INTRODUCTION

 CHAPTER I

 CHAPTER II

 CHAPTER III

 CHAPTER IV

 CHAPTER V

 CHAPTER VI

 CHAPTER VII

 CHAPTER VIII

 CHAPTER IX

 CHAPTER X

 CHAPTER XI

 CHAPTER XII

 CHAPTER XIII

 CHAPTER XIV

 CHAPTER XV

 CHAPTER XVI

 CHAPTER XVII

 CHAPTER XVIII

 CHAPTER XIX

CHAPTER XII

ON THE ERROR OF THOSE WHO HOLD THAT ALL

SPIRITUAL SUBSTANCES ARE CREATED EQUAL

AND ITS REFUTATION

             62.--Just as the aforementioned positions, considering the order of immaterial substances, taught that they proceeded from the First Principle not immediately but according to a certain order, so, some thinkers, contrariwise, wishing to save their immediate procession from the First Principle, completely took away an order of nature among them. The author of this position is recognized to have been Origen. For it was his opinion that diverse and unequal things could not proceed from an author who is one and just unless some diversity were presupposed. But no diversity could precede the first production of things by God, which presupposes nothing at all. Whence he posits that all the things which were first produced by God were equal. Hence, because bodies cannot be made equal to non-bodily substances, he posited that there were no bodies in the first production of things. Afterwards, when the things had been produced by God, a diversity entered creation as a result of the diversity in the motions of the will of the non-bodily substances which, of their nature, have freedom of choice.

             According to this view, some of them, turning to their principle by an orderly motion of their will, advanced in goodness, and this diversely, according to the diversity of their voluntary motion. Whence, some among them were made superior to others. Some others, however, were turned away from their principle by a disorderly motion of the will and these deteriorated in goodness, some more and some less; so that this was the occasion for the production of bodies, namely, that non-bodily substances having turned away from the order of the good, might be bound to them as having fallen down to the level of a lower nature. Whence Origen was wont to say that the whole diversity of bodies was based on the diversity in the disorderliness of the voluntary motion of non-bodily substance, so that those that had turned in a lesser way from God, were bound to nobler bodies, and those that were turned away more, were bound to less noble bodies.

             63.--The principle of this position is groundless and the position itself is impossible. The ground of this impossibility can be gathered from what we have already said. For we said above that spiritual substances are immaterial. If, therefore, there is any diversity in them, this must be according to a formal difference. Now among those beings which differ by a formal difference, no equality can be found, for every formal difference must be reduced to the first opposition which is the opposition of privation to form. Therefore, among all beings that differ formally, the nature of one that is imperfect with respect to another is related to that other in the disposition of privation to form. And this is apparent to us in the diversity of the species known to us. Thus among animals and plants and metals and elements, we find that a difference of species proceeds according to the order of nature so that step by step, nature rises from the lower to the most perfect. This is likewise apparent in the species of colors and flavors and other sensible qualities. But in things which differ materially, nothing prevents things that have the same form from being equal. For diverse subjects can participate in the same form either equally or by excess and defect. Consequently, it would be possible for all spiritual substances to be equal, if, having specifically the same form, they differed only in matter. And perhaps this is what Origen thought them to be by not distinguishing noticeably between spiritual and corporeal natures. But because spiritual substances are immaterial, there must be an order of nature among them.

             64.--Further, according to this position, it is necessary that spiritual substances be either imperfect or superfluous. For we do not find a multitude of beings on the same grade of nature except through some imperfection of any one of them or because of the necessity of continuing in existence, so that those things that cannot endure in numerical sameness, might endure through multiplication; just as among corruptible things, we find many individuals equal according to the nature of the species; or through the necessity of some operation for which the power of one is not sufficient but the power of many must be joined together as constituting one complete power, as is evident in a number of warriors and in a multitude of persons pulling a boat. But those things whose power is complete and which are enduring in the order of their nature are not multiplied numerically in the equality of the same species. For there is only one sun which suffices for permanent endurance and to produce all the effects which belong to it according to the grade of its nature; the same is clear in the case of the other heavenly bodies. But spiritual substances are much more perfect than even the heavenly bodies. Therefore, there is not among them a multitude in the same grade of nature, for, since one of them is sufficient, others would be superfluous.

             65.--Again, the aforementioned position takes away the perfection of goodness from the universe of things produced by God. For the perfection of each and every effect consists in this, that it is likened to its cause, for that which according to its nature is something generated is then perfect, when it reaches the likeness of its generator. Artifacts are likewise made perfect when they achieve the form of the art. But in the case of the First Principle, we recognize not only that He is good, and being, and one, but also that He possesses this perfection above and beyond all other things and that He leads other things to a participation in His own goodness. Therefore, the perfect assimilation of the universe produced by God requires not only that each thing be good and be a being, but also that one thing should excel another and that one thing should move the other to its end. Hence the good of the universe, like the good of an army, is the good of an order. Accordingly, the aforementioned position, by establishing a complete equality in the production of things, takes away the good of order from the universe of things.

             Moreover, it is unbefitting to attribute that which is best in the universe to chance. For that which is best has most especially the nature of the intended end. Now the good of order is that which is best in the universe of things, for this is the common good; while other goods are singular goods. This order, which is now found in things, the aforementioned position attributes to chance according, namely, as it happens that one spiritual substance is moved in a certain way according to its will, and another spiritual substance in another way. Therefore the above opinion must be completely rejected.

             66.--Furthermore, the basis of this position is clearly absurd. For the same notion of justice is not involved in the constitution of some whole out of several and diverse parts and in the distribution of some thing common among singulars. For he who intends to make a given whole, aims that the whole be perfect and accordingly, brings together diverse and unequal parts to its constitution. For if all the parts were equal, then the whole would not be perfect, which is evident both in a physical whole and in a civil whole. For the body of man would not be perfect, unless it had members that are diverse and of unequal importance, nor would the body politic be perfect unless there were found in it unequal conditions and diverse offices. But in the distribution of something common, the concern is with the good of each singular; and therefore diverse things are assigned to diverse beings according to a preexisting diversity in them, in accordance with which, diverse things befit them. Therefore in the first production of things, God brought forth diverse and unequal things in being, looking to that which the perfection of the universe requires and not to any preexisting diversity in things. But He will look to this point in the rewarding of final judgment by giving to each according to his merit.