ARTICLE VIII

Whether Loving One's Enemies Arises From the Perfection of a Counsel?

It seems that loving one's enemies is not from the perfection of a counsel.

             1. That which comes under a precept is not from the perfection of a counsel. But to love one's enemies comes under this precept, viz., Love your neighbor as yourself, for by the word neighbor is understood all men, as Augustine says in the De Doctrina Christiana. Therefore to love one's enemies is not from the perfection of a counsel.

             2. But it should be objected that the love of enemies is from the perfection of a counsel, at least to the extent of displaying acquaintance and the other effects of charity. On the contrary, we are bound to love all men in charity. But the love of charity is not only in the heart but also in works, for it is said (I John iii. 18), Let us not love in word, nor in tongue, but in deed, and in truth. Therefore, considered as the effect of charity, love of enemy comes under a precept.

             3. Moreover, it is also written (Matt. v. 44), Love your enemies, do good to them that hate you. If, therefore, to love your enemy is from a precept, then to do good to him, which pertains to the effect of charity, is also from a precept.

             4. Moreover, those things which pertain to the perfection of the counsels were not written in the Old Law, as is said (Hebr. vii. 19), The law brought nothing to perfection. But in the Old Law, it was taught that not only the affection of love be had for enemies, but also that the effect of love be imparted to them. For, it is written (Exod., xxiii. 4), If thou meet thy enemy's ox or ass going astray, bring it back to him; (Levit. xix. 17), Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart, but reprove him openly, lest thou incur sin through him; (Job xxxi. 29, 30), If I have been glad at the downfall of him that hated me, and have rejoiced that evil had found him. For I have not given my mouth to sin; (Prov. xxv. 21), If thy enemy be hungry, give him to eat; if he thirst give him water to drink. Therefore the love of enemies, insofar as it shows the effects of charity, is not from the perfection of a counsel.

             5. Moreover, a counsel is not contrary to a precept of the law. For the Lord, when He was about to teach the perfection of the New Law, first said (Matt. v. 17), I am not come to destroy the law but to fulfill it. But to love enemies seems to be contrary to the precept of the law, for it is said (Matt. v. 43), Thou shalt love thy neighbor and hate thy enemy. Therefore the love of enemies does not come under the perfection of a counsel.

             6. Moreover, love has its proper object toward which it inclines, as Augustine says, My weight is my love. An enemy does not seem to be the proper object of love, but rather he seems to be one resisting love. Therefore it is not of the perfection of charity that an enemy should be loved.

             7. Moreover, the perfection of a virtue is not contrary to the inclination of nature; rather, through virtue the inclination of nature is perfected. But it is nature that moves us to hate our enemies, for every natural being rejects its own contrary. Therefore it is not of the perfection of charity that an enemy should be loved.

             8. Moreover, the perfection of charity, and of any virtue, consists in our becoming like to God. But God loves His friends and hates His enemies, according to the text (Malac. i. 2), I have loved Jacob, but have hated Esau. Therefore it is not of the perfection of charity that someone should love his enemies, but rather he should hate them.

             9. Moreover, the love of charity looks directly to the good of eternal life. But we ought not to wish the good of eternal life for some of our enemies; for, either they have been condemned to hell, or if they are still living, they have been rejected by God. Therefore to love enemies does not pertain to, the perfection of charity.

             10. Moreover, we cannot lawfully kill one whom we are bound to love in charity, nor can we wish his death or any other evil for him, because the meaning of friendship is that we wish to be friends and to live. But it is lawful for us to kill some, for, according to the Apostle (Rom. xiii. 4), For he is God's minister: an avenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evil. Therefore we are not bound to love our enemies.

             11. Moreover, the Philosopher in the Topicorum, teaches that in the case of contraries the argument runs as follows. If to love your friends and to do good for them is a good thing, then to love your enemies and to do good for them is an evil thing. But no evil attains to the perfection of charity, nor is it included under a counsel. Therefore to love your enemies does not pertain to the perfection of a counsel.

             12. Moreover, friend and enemy are contraries. Therefore both to love a friend and to hate an enemy are contraries. But contraries cannot exist together. Therefore, since we are bound to love our friends in charity, it cannot be a counsel that we love our enemies.

             13. Moreover, a counsel cannot be concerned with the impossible. But to love an enemy seems to be impossible, since it is contrary to the inclination of nature. Therefore to love our enemies is not a counsel.

             14. Moreover, to obey the counsels is for the perfect. The Apostles were perfect to a high degree, but they did not love their enemies both with regard to affection and deed. For it was written of St. Thomas the Apostle that he called down upon the one who struck him with an open hand, a curse such that his hand was snatched off by hungry dogs. Therefore to love enemies both as regards affection and deed does not come under the perfection of a counsel.

             15. Moreover, to call down evils on anyone, especially the evil of eternal damnation, is opposed to love both as regards affection and deed. But the Prophets called down evils for their adversaries, for it is said (Psalms lxviii. 29), Let them be blotted out of the book of the living; and with the just let them not be written. And again, (Psalms liv. 16), Let death come upon them, and let them go down alive into hell. Therefore to love enemies does not come under the perfection of charity.

             16. Moreover, it is of the very nature of true friendship that someone be loved for his own sake; but charity includes friendship, as the perfect includes the less perfect. But to love one's enemy for his own sake is contrary to charity, for only God is loved for His own sake. Therefore it is not from the perfection of a counsel that our enemy is loved.

             17. Moreover, that which is from the perfection of a counsel is better and more meritorious than that which is from the necessity of a precept. But to love an enemy is neither better nor more meritorious than to love a friend, which clearly is from the necessity of a precept; for, if it is good to love something good, it is better and more meritorious to love what is better. But a friend is better than an enemy. Therefore to love an enemy is not from the perfection of a counsel.

             18. But it was stated that to love an enemy is more meritorious because it is more difficult. On the contrary, to love an enemy is more difficult than to love God. Therefore, by the same reasoning, it should be more meritorious to love an enemy than to love God.

             19. Moreover, a sign that a habit has been formed is pleasure in the work, as the Philosopher writes in Book II of the Ethic. But to love a friend is more pleasing than to love an enemy. Therefore it is also more virtuous, and consequently more meritorious. Thus to love an enemy does not come from the perfection of a counsel.

             On the contrary, Augustine writes in the Enchir., that it is for the perfect sons of God to love their enemies; indeed each one ought to show himself faithful in this love.

             I answer. It must be said that to love one's enemies comes under the necessity of a precept in one way; yet in another way it comes under the perfection of a counsel.

             To prove this, it must be known that, as has been said above in Article IV of this Question, the proper and essential object of charity is God; and whatever is loved in charity is loved in terms of that very relationship by which it is related to God. For example, just as if we love some man, we consequently love everything with whom he is concerned, even if they are our own enemies. But it is agreed that all men are related to God as created by Him and as capable of a happiness which consists in the enjoyment of Him. It is clear, therefore, that this meaningful basis of the love that charity involves is found in all men.

             Therefore, in one who acts unfriendly toward us, two things are to be considered: one which is the basis of love, viz., in that he is related to God; and another which is the basis of hate, viz., in that he is our adversary. However, if in anyone is found both the basis of love and of hate, and if love is neglected and we turn in the direction of hate, it is clear that the basis of hate predominates in our heart over the basis of love. Thus, therefore, if one regards his enemy with hatred, his enmity toward him predominates in his heart over divine love. Therefore he hates the friendship with such a one more than he loves God. But we hate something to the degree that we love the good of which we are deprived by the enemy. Therefore it remains that whoever hates his enemy loves some created good more than he loves God; and this is against the precept of charity.

             But to regard your enemy with hatred is against charity, for it is necessary, if we are bound by the precept of charity, that the love of God predominate in us over the love of any other thing and, as a consequence, also over the hatred of the contrary of that thing. Therefore it follows that we are bound to love our enemies out of the necessity of a precept.

             At this point, however, although we are bound by the precept of charity to love our neighbor, the precept does not extend to this that we should actually love each and every neighbor in particular or do well by each one in a particular way, because no man is capable of having all men in mind in such a way that he would actually love each one in a particular way, nor is there any one capable of doing good or helping each and every one in a particular way.

             But we are bound to love some in a special way and to act for the welfare of those who are joined to us because of some other bond of friendship, for all other lawful loves are included under charity, as was said above. Whence Augustine says, You cannot do good to all men, you are to pay special regard to those who, by the accidents of time, or place, or circumstance, are brought into closer connection with you. . . . You must take the matter as decided for you by a sort of lot, according as each man happens for the time being to be more closely connected with you.

             From this it is clear that we are not bound by the precept of charity to be moved by the affection of love or by the carrying out of the works of charity in a special way towards him who is not united to us by any other bond, except to him united to us by the chance bond of location or of time, and especially if we would see him in some necessity through which he would not be able to be helped except by us. We are bound, however, by the affection and the carrying out of the works of charity, by which we love all our neighbors and pray for them, not to exclude even those who are not joined to us by any special bond, as for instance those who live in India or Ethiopia.

             When no other bond remains to join us to our enemies except the bond of charity, we are bound by the obligation of precept to love them in common, both with affection and deed, and individually when the moment of need threatens. But when man for the sake of God shows toward his enemies that special affection and deeds of love which he devotes to those who are joined to him, this is perfect charity and follows from a counsel. For, it arises from the perfection of charity that charity alone should so move one toward an enemy in the manner that both charity and particular love move one toward a friend.

             It is evident, however, that the fact that the action of an agent attains to that which is distant is due to the perfection of its active power. For the power of fire is more perfect when not only things nearby but also those distant are heated. So also that charity is more perfect through which one is moved, both in loving and in doing good, toward not only neighbors but also foreigners, and beyond this even to enemies, not only in general but in particular.

             To the first, it must be said that the love of enemies is contained in a precept, as has been said.

             To the second, it must be said that we ought to love our enemies, just as much in deed as in affection, as has been said.

             The answer to the third objection can be seen from the above.

             To the fourth, it must be said that those authorities of the Old Testament speak of the case of necessity when we are bound by a precept to do good to our enemies, as has been said in the body of the Article.

             To the fifth, it must be said that what is written, Hate your enemy, is not found in the entire Old Testament, but this is from the tradition of the Scribes to whom it seemed that it should be added because the Lord commanded the sons of Israel to persecute their enemies. It should also be said that this saying, Hate your enemy, should not be interpreted as an order to the just but as a permission to the weak, as Augustine says in the De Sermone Domini in Monte. Or, as Augustine also writes in the Contra Faustum, men ought not to hate their enemy but only vice.

             To the sixth, it must be said that one's enemy, considered as enemy, is not the object of love but is so only insofar as he pertains to God. Therefore we ought to hate in our enemy the fact that he hates us, and to desire that he would love us.

             To the seventh, it must be said that man, by nature, loves all men, as the Philosopher says in Book VIII of the Ethic. But that one becomes an enemy is from something that is superadded to nature, and, accordingly, the inclination of nature ought not to be taken away. Therefore charity, when it moves to the love of enemies, perfects the natural inclination; the case is otherwise in things which are natural contraries, such as fire and water, or wolf and lamb.

             To the eighth, it must be said that God does not hate anything that is His own, such as the natural good or any other thing; but He only hates what is not His, viz., sin. And so also we ought to love in men that which is of God, and to hate what is foreign to God, according as it is said (Psalms cxxxviii. 22), I have hated them with a perfect hatred.

             To the ninth, it must be said that we ought not to wish those who are known to be damned to have eternal life, because they are already wholly excluded from this by the divine decree; but we can love them as works of God in which the divine justice is manifested. In this manner does God love them. But we ought to wish those who are not yet known to be damned to have life eternal. This foreknowledge is not given to us, and the foreknowledge of God does not exclude the possibility of their attaining eternal life.

             To the tenth, it must be said that he whose office prescribes it, may lawfully punish evil-doers or even kill them while loving them out of charity. For, Gregory says in one of his Homilies that the just, while still loving, may cause a persecution; for if outwardly they create unrest by disciplining, inwardly, however, they may preserve their serenity by charity.

             Now we can desire or cause some temporal evil for those whom we love in charity for three reasons: first, we can do it in order to correct them; secondly, it may be because the temporal prosperity of some is detrimental to the good of some multitude or even the whole Church, whence Gregory writes in XXII Moral., It often happens that the ruin of our enemy can make us happy without our losing charity, and again, his glory can sadden us without incurring the fault of envy. This happens when, by his downfall, we believe that some are profited more, or when, by his advantage, we fear that many will be unjustly oppressed. Thirdly, our motive may be in order to preserve the order of divine justice, according as it is written (Psalms lvii. 11), The just shall rejoice when he shall see the revenge.

             To the eleventh, it must be said that propositions of this kind, by which the Philosopher argues, are to be taken as evident in themselves. For, just as it is good to love a friend insofar as he is a friend, so it is evil to love an enemy because he is an enemy. But it is good to love an enemy insofar as he pertains to God.

             To the twelfth, it must be answered that to love a friend as friend and an enemy as enemy are contraries. But to love a friend and an enemy insofar as they both belong to God is not contrary; just as it is not contrary to see white and to see black when both are considered as colored.

             To the thirteenth, it must be said that to love an enemy as enemy is difficult, even impossible. But to love an enemy because of some greater love is easy. That is why the love of God makes easy that which seems to be impossible in itself.

             To the fourteenth, it must be said that St. Thomas did not ask for the punishment of his assailant because of a desire for revenge, but as a manifestation of the divine justice and power.

             To the fifteenth, it must be said that these pleas which are found in the Prophets should be understood as predictions, so that let them be blotted out (deleantur) means they will be blotted out (delebuntur). For, they used such a manner of speaking because they were conforming their own wills to the divine justice revealed to them.

             To the sixteenth, it must be said that to love one for his own sake can be understood in two ways. First, in such a way that one is loved as a final end; and thus only God should be loved for His own sake. Secondly, that we love him for whom we wish some good, as is proper to a friendship for a noble person; but not as the good which we wish for ourselves, as is proper to a friendship for a pleasant or useful person, in which we love a friend as our own good. For, it is not that we seek pleasure or utility for a friend, but that we seek pleasure or utility for ourselves from a friend; just as we also love things pleasing and useful for ourselves, such as food or clothing. But when we love one out of virtue, we wish good for him, and we do not wish him for ourselves; this is especially proper to the friendship of charity.

             To the seventeenth, it must be said that it is better to love an enemy than to love only a friend, because this shows more perfect charity, as was said above in the body of the Article. But if we consider these two absolutely, it is better to love a friend than an enemy; it is also better to love God than a friend. For, the difficulty which is found in loving an enemy does not constitute the reason for meriting, except insofar as perfect charity is demonstrated by it, which overcomes the difficulty. Thus, if there would be such a perfect charity as to take away all difficulty, to this extent it would be more meritorious. But we speak of one who loves a friend with such perfect charity that it even extends to the love of enemies; but this love operates with more ardor toward the friend, unless by chance it is considered accidentally insofar as it operates against something repugnant with a greater effort. For example, in natural things, water that is warm is with greater effort brought to the freezing point.

             The answer to the eighteenth and nineteenth objections is clear from what was just stated.