ARTICLE IX

Whether There Is Some Order In Charity?

It seems that there is no order in charity.

             1. For, just as faith involves what is believed, so charity involves what should be loved. But faith equally believes all things which should be believed. Therefore charity equally loves all things which should be loved.

             2. Moreover, order pertains to the intellect. But charity is not in the intellect, for it is in the will. Therefore order does not pertain to charity.

             3. Moreover, wherever there is order, there are various gradations. But according to Bernard, Charity does not know any hierarchy, nor does it consider any dignity. Therefore there is no order in charity.

             4. Moreover, the object of charity is God, as Augustine says in the De Doctr. Christ., for charity loves nothing except God in fellow-men. But God is not greater in Himself than in fellow-men, nor is He greater in one brother than in another. Therefore charity does not love God more than neighbor, nor does it love one neighbor more than another.

             5. Moreover, a similitude is the principle of love, according as it is written (Ecclus. xiii. 19), Every beast loveth its like. But there is a greater likeness of man to his neighbor than there is of man to God. Therefore there is no order in charity in the way Ambrose says that God is loved first.

             6. Moreover, it is said (I John iv. 20), He that loveth not his brother, whom he seeth, how can he love God, whom he seeth not? But St. John argues by a negation from the love of neighbor to the love of God. A negative argument, however, is not taken from the minor premise, but from the major. Therefore neighbor ought to be loved more than God.

             7. Moreover, love is a unitive force, as Dionysius says. But nothing is more one to a person than he himself. Therefore man ought not to love God more than himself in charity.

             8. Moreover, Augustine says in I De Doctrina Christ., that all men are to be loved equally. Therefore one neighbor ought not to be loved more than another.

             9. Moreover, it is commanded that one love his neighbor as himself. Therefore all fellow-men should be loved equally.

             10. Moreover, we have greater love for him to whom we wish the greater good. But in charity we wish one good for all our neighbors, i.e., eternal life. Therefore we ought not to love one neighbor more than another.

             11. Moreover, if order is a condition of charity, the order of charity would then fall under one of the precepts. But it does not seem that order is from a precept, because whenever we love one whom we ought to love, it does not seem to be a sin to love another even more. Therefore order is not a condition of charity.

             12. Moreover, the charity of this life is in imitation of the charity of heaven. But in heaven, those who are better are loved more; not necessarily those who are closer to us. Therefore it seems that if there is any order in charity, then those who lead better lives here, not those who are closer to us, ought to be loved more. This is contrary to Ambrose who says that God ought to be loved first, then parents, then children, and finally the rest of the domestic household.

             13. Moreover, the reason for loving someone in charity is God. But sometimes those who are not close to us are united with God more than our relatives or even our parents. Therefore they ought to be loved more in charity.

             14. Moreover, as Gregory writes in one of his Homilies, the proof of love is a demonstration in works. But sometimes the effect of love, which is doing good, is shown more toward those who are not close to us rather than it is to our neighbors; as is clear in the case of the collection for ecclesiastical benefices. Therefore it does not seem that those close to us ought to be loved more in charity.

             15. Moreover, it is said (I John iii. 18), Let us not love in word, nor in tongue, but in deed, and in truth. But sometimes we show more of the deeds of love to others than we do to our parents; e.g., a soldier obeys the general of the army more than he does his father, and one ought to give more to a benefactor than to his father if they are both in equal necessity. Therefore parents ought not to be loved more.

             16. Moreover, Gregory says that those whom we receive from the sacred fountain ought to be loved more by us than those who are born to our flesh. Therefore those who are not members of one's family are to be loved more than those who are close to us.

             17. Moreover, he ought to be loved more whose friendship is broken off with more blame. But it seems that the friendship of those friends whom we freely choose is more culpably broken off than that of our relatives who are given to us, not of our own choice, but by a chance of nature. Therefore other friends ought to be loved more than our own relatives.

             18. Moreover, if by reason of a closer proximity one should be loved more, then since a wife who is one in flesh is closer, or children who are a part of the parent are closer than the parents are, it seems that children or a wife ought to be loved more than parents. Therefore parents should not be loved most. Thus there does not seem to be that order in charity which is designated by the saints.

             On the contrary, it is said (Cant. ii. 4), The king brought me into the cellar of wine, he set in order charity in me.

             I answer. It must be said that, according to every opinion or authority on Scripture, such order must, without doubt, be designated to charity so that God is loved above all things, both in regard to affection and to the effect of love.

             However, concerning the love for fellow-men, it was the opinion of some that the order of charity had to do with the effects of love, and not with the loving itself; and they were influenced by the words of Augustine, who writes that all men ought to be loved equally, but since you cannot do good to all, you are to pay special regard to those who, by the accidents of time, or place, or circumstance, are brought into closer connection with you.

             But this seems to be an unreasonable position, for God so provides for each man according as his state in life requires. Thus love and a desire for the end are implanted by God in those things which tend toward the end of their nature, according as each one's individual state demands that it tend toward its end. Therefore in these things there is a stronger movement according to nature toward a certain end, and there is also in them a greater inclination, which is the natural appetite; as can be seen in heavy and light objects. But, just as the appetite or natural love is a certain inclination implanted in natural things to ends which are connatural to them, so the love of charity is a certain inclination infused in rational nature for the purpose of tending toward God. Therefore, according as it is necessary for one to tend toward God, thus is he inclined out of charity.

             However, for those who will tend toward God as to an end, what is especially needed is that there be divine help; secondly, that there be some self-help; and thirdly, that there be cooperation with fellow-men. And in this we see a gradation, for some cooperate only in a general way, while others who are more closely united cooperate in a special way. Not all are able to cooperate in a special way. Our body and those things which are necessary for the body also help us tend toward God, but only instrumentally.

             Thus it is necessary that the affection of man be so inclined through charity that, first and foremost, each one loves God; secondly, that he love himself; and thirdly, that he love his neighbor. And among the fellow-men, he ought to give mutual help to those who are more closely united to him or who are more closely related to him.

             But whoever there is that is a hindrance to this love, should be hated, for the Lord said (Luke xiv. 26), If any man come to me, and hate not his father, and mother, . . . he cannot be my disciple. Finally, we ought to love our body. Thus, regarding the act which charity evokes, an order ought to be established according to the affection in the love of fellow-men.

             However, it should also be considered that, as we said above in Article VII and VIII, other lawful and noble loves which arise from other causes are also able to be ordered to charity. Thus, the charity of these loves can command an act; and therefore that which is loved more according to some of these loves is loved more out of that charity which commands the act. It is also clear that, according to natural love, our relatives are more loved in affection; according to a social love, those who are closely united to us are loved more; and so for all the other kinds of love.

             Therefore it is also evident that in affection, one neighbor ought to be loved more than another; and he is loved out of a charity which commands the act of the other lawful friendships.

             To the first, it must be said that the object of faith is the true, whence according as something happens to be more true, so is it more believed. But since truth consists in the conformity of intellect and thing, and if truth is considered according to the characteristic of equality which does not allow a greater or less degree, it does not then happen that a thing is more or less true. But if the being itself of the thing is considered, which is the basis of truth, as is said in II Metaphys., then the disposition of things in being and in truth is the same. Thus, those things which are more in being are more true, and because of this, principles in scientific demonstrations are believed more than conclusions. And thus it happens also in regard to those things which concern faith. In this way the Apostle (I Cor. xv) proves the future resurrection of the dead through the resurrection of Christ.

             To the second, it must be said that the order of reason is as that which orders, but the order of the will is as that which is ordered. Therefore order is proper to charity.

             To the third, it must be said that charity does not recognize a hierarchy of the lover to the loved because it unites the two. It does, however, recognize the hierarchy of two objects to be loved.

             To the fourth, it must be said that although God is not greater in one than in another, however He is more perfectly in Himself than in creatures, and in one creature than in another.

             To the fifth, it must be said that in the love whose principal object is the one loving, it is necessary that what is more similar to the one loving be loved more, as in a natural love. But in the love of charity, the principal object is God Himself. Thus other things being equal, that which is more one with God ought to be loved more out of charity.

             To the sixth, it must be said that the Apostle (I John iv. 20) was arguing according to those who are attached in a great degree to what is visible, and by these men, what can be seen is loved more than what cannot be seen.

             To the seventh, it must be said that by a unity of nature nothing is more one than we ourselves. But by a unity of affection, whose object is the good, the highest good ought to be more one than we are.

             To the eighth, it must be said that all men ought to be loved equally insofar as we ought to wish for all of them the same good, viz., eternal life.

             To the ninth, it must be said that one is bound to love his neighbor as himself, but not however as much as himself. Because of this, it does not follow that all fellow-men ought to be loved equally.

             To the tenth, it must be said that we speak of loving someone more not only because we wish a greater good for him, but also because we wish the same good for him with more intense affection. Thus, although we wish the one good, which is eternal life, for all; we do not, however, love all equally.

             To the eleventh, it must be answered that we are not giving to a person that love which we ought to give if we love more one whom we ought to love less. For, it can happen that in the moment of necessity we give more to the latter, to the neglect of the former whom we ought to love more.

             To the twelfth, it must be said that those who are in heaven are joined to their final end, and therefore their love is regulated solely by that end; thus there is no order of charity in them, except that which is concerned with their nearness to God. Because of this, those who are closer to God are loved more. But in this life, it is necessary for us to tend toward our end; and therefore the order of love is also established according to the measure of help in tending to that end which is obtained from others. And thus it is not always those who live better lives that are loved more, but there also arises a factor of propinquity, so that the reason for greater love is found jointly in each of these factors.

             From this the answer to the thirteenth objection is also evident.

             To the fourteenth, it must be said that any prelate of the Church does not confer benefices insofar as he is Peter or Martin, but only insofar as he is a master of the Church. Therefore, in the collection for ecclesiastical benefices he ought not to regard any closeness to himself but rather the closeness to God and the usefulness to the Church; just as the overseer of any household in attending to the affairs of his master ought to consider the service as being rendered to his master and not to himself. But in one's own private affairs, such as the goods of patrimony, or those things which are acquired by one's own personal effort as an individual, in these goods one ought to observe an order of closeness in doing good.

             To the fifteenth, it must be said that concerning those things which properly pertain to the individual person of anyone, he ought to show more of the effects of love towards his parents than toward someone who is not a member of his family; except if by chance, when the common good which each one ought also to desire for himself would depend on the good of someone who is not a member of one's family, as when one would expose himself to the danger of death in order to save the general of the army in war time, or to save the leader of a state insofar as the welfare of the entire community depends on these men. But considering those things which pertain to some other thing by reason of a certain bond, such as the fact that one is a citizen or a soldier, he ought to obey the ruler of the state or his general more than his parents.

             To the sixteenth, it must be said that when we refer to those whom we receive from the sacred fountain, the text of Gregory ought to be understood as meaning that which pertains to a spiritual regeneration.

             To the seventeenth, it must be said that this argument applies only to those things which pertain to our social life, in which is founded friendship for someone who is not a member of one's family.

             To the eighteenth, it must be said that according to that love by which one loves himself, he loves his wife and children more than his parents because a wife is some part of the husband, and the son of the father. Therefore the love which one has for his wife and son is more included in the love by which a person loves himself than is the love which he has for his parents. But this is not to love the son for the son's sake, but rather for one's own sake.

             But according to the mode of love by which we love another for the other's sake, a father ought to be loved more than a son insofar as we receive greater benefit from the father, and also insofar as the honor of the son depends more on the honor of the father than vice versa. Therefore in a display of reverence, in obedience, in doing the will of another, and in other similar things, man is bound more to his father than to his son. But in providing the necessities, he is bound more to the child than to the parent, because parents ought to lay away treasures for their children and not vice versa, as is said in I Corinth., iv.