ARTICLE XII

Whether Charity, Once Possessed, Can Be Lost?

It seems that charity, once possessed, cannot be lost.

             1. It is said (I John iii. 9), Whosoever is born of God, committeth not sin: for his seed abideth in him, and he can not sin, because he is born of God. But only the sons of God have charity, for this distinguishes the children of God's kingdom from the children of perdition, as Augustine says in Book XV of the De Trinit. Therefore he who has charity cannot lose it by sinning.

             2. Moreover, every virtue that is lost by sinning withers away through sin, as Augustine says, Charity is an invisible unction which will be the foundation wherever it is and which cannot wither away; it is nourished by the heat of the sun so that it does not dry up. Therefore charity cannot be lost through sin.

             3. Moreover, Augustine says in Book VIII of the De Trin. that if love is not true it ought not to be called love. But, as he also says in Ad Julianum Comitem, charity which is able to be lost was never true. Thus it was not charity. Therefore he who has charity cannot lose it by sinning.

             4. Moreover, Prosper says in the De Contemplatione, Charity is a right will inseparably united to God, free from any defilement, not knowing corruption, not liable to the fault of change; for when it is possessed, one neither was able, nor will he be able to sin. Therefore charity, once possessed, cannot be lost through sin.

             5. Moreover, Gregory says in one of his Homilies, that the love of God does great works, if it is present. But no one loses charity by doing great works. Therefore if charity is in us, it cannot be lost.

             6. Moreover, man loves God more by charity than he loves himself by a natural love. But the love of self is never lost through sin; therefore neither is charity.

             7. Moreover, free will does not incline toward sin unless it be through something that moves to sinning. But that which moves to every sin is self-love, which, as Augustine says in Book XIV of the De Civit. Dei, caused the city of Babylon. But charity does not allow this, as Dionysius says, Divine love causes rapture, not allowing men to be lovers of self. Likewise, the desire of money is the root of all evils, as St. Paul says (I Tim. vi. 10). But neither does charity allow this, as Augustine says in the LXXXIII Quaestionum. Therefore he who has charity cannot lose it by sinning.

             8. Moreover, whoever has charity is directed by the spirit of God, according to this, If you are led by the spirit, you are not under the law (Galat. v. 18). But the Holy Spirit, since He is of infinite power, cannot fail in His action. Therefore it seems that one having charity cannot sin.

             9. Moreover, no one sins against a habit that is in operation, for the Philosopher says in Book VII of the Ethic., one does not sin against science in its actual state, but only against science in its habitual state. But charity is always in operation, for Gregory says in one of his Homilies, the love of God is never idle. Therefore one cannot sin against charity so that it can in this way be lost by sin.

             10. Moreover, if anyone loses charity, he loses it either while he is possessing it or while he is not possessing it. But while he has it, he does not lose it through sin, because sin would then exist along with charity. Nor does he lose it when he does not have it, because he cannot lose what he does not have. Therefore in no way can charity be lost.

             11. Moreover, charity is a sort of accident in the soul. But accidents can fail in four ways. The first way is through the corruption of the subject. But charity is not deficient in this way because the human soul, which is its subject, is incorruptible. An accident fails in the second way through a defect of cause, as light fails in the air through an absence of the sun. But charity cannot fail in this way because its cause, which is God, is unfailing. An accident fails in a third way by a deficiency of its object, as paternity ceases through the death of a child. But neither is charity deficient in this way, because its object is the eternal good, which is God. In the fourth way, an accident fails through the action of its contrary agent, as the cold quality of water fails through the action of heat. But charity does not fail in this way because it is stronger than sin which is the agent acting against it, according to this (Cantic. viii. 6), Love is strong as death; and (Cant. viii. 7), Many waters cannot quench charity. Therefore charity can in no way fail in one who possesses it.

             12. Moreover, for rational nature, sin is in the class of evil. But evil does not act except in virtue of the good, as Dionysius says in chap. IV of the De Divin. Nomin. But one good is not contrary to another, as is said in the Praedicamentis; and thus one good cannot destroy another, because each thing is destroyed by its contrary. Therefore charity cannot be destroyed by sin.

             13. Moreover, if charity is destroyed by sin, it is destroyed either by existing sin or by non-existing sin. But it cannot be destroyed by existing sin, for then mortal sin would be existing along with charity. Again, it cannot be destroyed by non-existing sin, because non-being cannot act. Therefore charity cannot be lost by sin in any way.

             14. Moreover, if charity is lost by sin, charity and sin exist in the soul either at the same moment or at different moments. They cannot exist at the same moment, because then they would exist together. Nor can charity exist at one instant, and sin at another; because it would then be necessary that there be a medium time during which man has neither charity nor sin, which cannot happen. Therefore charity cannot be lost through sin.

             15. Moreover, the Master says in Book III of the Sentent., d. 31, perfect charity cannot be lost through sin.

             16. Moreover, just as the intellect is related to the knowledge of the truth, so is the will related to the love of the good. But the intellect, by knowing anything whatever, knows the first truth. Therefore by loving anything good, the will loves the greatest good. But he who loves never sins unless he turn himself by his love to a mutable good. Therefore in every sin man loves the highest good, the love of which is charity. Therefore charity can never be lost by sin.

             17. Moreover, just as there is a universal and a proper agent in the genus of efficient cause, so also is there in the genus of final cause. But the proper agent always acts in virtue of the universal agent. Therefore the proper end always moves the will in virtue of the final end. But the final end is God. Thus the same argument as above follows.

             18. Moreover, charity is a sign that someone is a true disciple of Christ, according to this (John xiii. 35), By this shall all men know that you are my disciples, if you have love one for another. But he is not a true disciple of Christ who is not always His disciple, as Augustine says. In explaining this text (John vi. 67), After this many of His disciples turned back, Augustine says that they were not true disciples of Christ; and the Lord said (John viii. 31), If you abide in my word, you shall be my disciples indeed. Therefore he who does not remain in charity never had charity.

             19. Moreover, every motion follows the direction of that which rules it. But charity is the ruler of the heart of the one who has charity, for it seizes the entire heart for itself, as is commanded (Deut. vi. 5), Love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart. Therefore the movement of the one who has charity follows according to charity; thus charity cannot be lost through sin.

             20. Moreover, differences diversifying genus and species cannot exist together as the same in number. But corruptible and incorruptible are of different genera, as is said in Book X of the Metaph. Therefore, since the charity of this life and the charity of heaven are the same in number, it seems that just as the charity of heaven cannot be destroyed, neither can the charity of this life.

             21. Moreover, if charity is destroyed, it is destroyed either in something or in nothing. But it is not destroyed in something, because this concerns only form which is educed from the potency of matter. It cannot be destroyed in nothing, because God Who alone is able to make nothing out of something, just as He alone is able to make something out of nothing, never destroys charity. Both are equally far apart. Therefore it seems that charity cannot be lost.

             22. Moreover, that by which sin is taken away cannot be destroyed by sin. But sin is taken away by charity, according to this (I Peter iv. 8), Charity covereth a multitude of sins. Therefore charity cannot be lost through sin.

             23. Moreover, commenting on this text (Psalms xxvi. 2), While the wicked draw near against me to eat my flesh, Augustine says in a marginal gloss, If a gift be taken away, the giver is restrained. But God Who is the giver of charity cannot be restrained. Therefore charity cannot be taken away by sin.

             24. Moreover, the soul, through charity, is united to God; just as a spouse, according to a kind of spiritual marriage. But a bodily marriage cannot be dissolved by any disagreement that overshadows the marriage. Therefore charity cannot be taken away by sin, in which the soul disagrees with those things which pertain to God.

             On the contrary, (1) it is said (Apoc. ii. 4), But I have somewhat against thee, because thou hast left thy first charity.

             (2) Moreover, Gregory says in a Homily, God comes into the hearts of some, but he does not dwell there; for they regard God out of remorse, but in time of temptation they return to committing sins, as if they lamented these sins very little. But God does not come into the hearts of the faithful except through charity. Therefore one is able to lose charity after it is possessed by pursuing sin.

             (3) Moreover, it is said of David that the Lord was with him (I Kings xvi. 13). But shortly after, he sinned by committing adultery and murder. However, God is in man through charity. Therefore after charity is once possessed, one can lose it by sinning mortally.

             (4) Moreover, charity is the life of the soul, according to this (I John iii. 14), We know that we have passed from death to life, because we love the brethren. But natural life can be lost through natural death. Therefore the life of charity can also be lost through the death of mortal sin.

             I answer. It must be said that the Master wrote in Book I, dist. 17, that the charity in us is the Holy Spirit. But his intention was not to say that the very act of our love is the Holy Spirit, but rather that the Holy Spirit moves our soul to love God and neighbor; just as He moves our soul to the acts of the other virtues. But to the act of the other virtues, He moves the soul through certain habits of infused virtues, whereas to the act of love for God and neighbor He moves the soul without any habitual medium. Therefore, Peter's opinion was indeed true insofar as he maintained that the soul is moved by the Holy Spirit to love God and neighbor. However, it was imperfect in this respect that he did not posit in us a certain created habit by which the human will is perfected to the act of this kind of love. For, it is necessary that a habit of this kind be found in the soul, as was said above in Article I of this Question.

             There is, therefore, a four-fold consideration of charity that can be made.

             First, charity is considered on the part of the Holy Spirit moving the soul to the love of God and neighbor. In this regard, it is necessary to say that the movement of the Holy Spirit is always efficacious according to its own intention. For, the Holy Spirit operates in the soul, dividing to everyone according as he will, as is written (I Cor. xii. 11). Therefore those to whom the Holy Spirit freely wishes to give a persevering movement of divine love, in them sin cannot drive out charity. This cannot be, I say, on the part of the moving power, although it is possible on the part of the indetermination of free choice. For, these are the gifts of God by which those who are liberated are most certainly liberated, as Augustine says in De Praedest. Sanctor. For though the Holy Spirit freely gives to some that at times they might be moved to love God, He does not give in such manner that they might persevere to the end in that love, as is clear from St. Augustine in De Correct. et Gratia.

             Secondly, charity is considered according to the power of that charity. In this respect, no one who possesses charity can sin, in the sense of committing a sin by virtue of that charity; just as no one possessing any form can act contrary to that form by virtue of the form. For example, that which is warm, although it can lose heat and become cold, cannot become cold or be cold by virtue of its warmth. It was in this way that Augustine spoke in De Sermone Domini in Monte, explaining this text (Matt. vii. 18), A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit. For, he said that it can happen that what was snow is not now snow, but it does not happen that snow is warm. Thus, he who was evil is not now evil, but it cannot be that an evil man acts rightly. And concerning the good, this same reasoning applies to all the virtues, for no one uses virtue for evil.

             Thirdly, there is a consideration of charity from the side of the will insofar as the will is subjected to charity, as matter is to form. It must be noted that when form completes the entire potentiality of matter, the potency cannot remain in matter as potency to another form. Whence, it possesses that form in a manner such that it cannot be lost, as is evident with celestial matter. But there is a certain form which does not complete the entire potentiality of matter, but it remains in potency to another form. Then that form is possessed in such a manner that it can be lost on the part of matter, i.e., on the subject; as is evident with the forms of the bodily elements. But charity completes the potentiality of its subject according as it reduces its subject to the act of love. Therefore in heaven, where the rational creature loves God in act with his whole heart, and loves nothing else except by referring it perfectly to God, charity is possessed in such a way that it is not lost. But in this present state of life, charity does not perfect all of the potentialities of the soul, and is not always perfectly directed to God because it must refer everything to Him by an actual intention. Therefore the charity of this life can be lost, considered on the part of the subject.

             The fourth consideration of charity is on the part of the subject according as it is compared in a special way to charity itself, as potency is compared to habit. It must be considered that the habit of virtue inclines man to act rightly according as through it man has the right estimation of the end. For, as is said in Book III of the Ethic., according as a man is, such does the end seem to him. For example, just as taste judges flavor insofar as it is the affection for some good or bad disposition, so also that which is suitable to man according to a habitual disposition, inhering in him either as good or evil, is judged by him as a good; and what is not in accord with this is considered as evil and repugnant. Whence the Apostle says (I Cor. ii. 14), The sensual man perceiveth not these things that are of the spirit of God.

             But it sometimes happens that that which seems to one to be according to the inclination of habit does not seem to him to be according to something else. For example, to one who has carnal delight, the delight of the flesh seems to be a good according to the inclination of his proper habit; but it seems to be contrary to the good according to the deliberation of reason or the text of Scripture. And because of this estimation, one who has the habit of carnal delight sometimes acts contrary to that habit. Likewise, one who has the habit of virtue sometimes acts contrary to the inclination of his proper habit; for a thing seems to him to be otherwise, according to some other mode, such as through passion or anything that entices him from the correct estimation.

             Therefore, no one will be able to act contrary to the habit of charity, because no one is able to have any judgment about the end and the object of charity other than that which he has according to the inclination of charity. This, however, will be in heaven where the very essence of God, which is the essence of goodness, will be seen. Thus, just as now no one can wish anything unless it be under the aspect of good, nor is any one able not to love the good as good; so also in the next life, no one will be able not to love this good, which is God. Because of this, no one who sees God in His essence can act against charity; and that is why the charity of heaven cannot be lost.

             However, now our mind does not see that essence of divine goodness; it sees some of its effects which can seem either good or not-good, according to different considerations. For, the spiritual good appears as not-good to some insofar as it is contrary to their carnal delight, which concupiscence desires. Therefore the charity of this life can be lost through mortal sin.

             To the first, it must be said that what St. John wrote (I John iii. 9), should be understood according to the power of the Holy Spirit moving the soul, Who unfailingly operates as He wishes.

             To the second, it must be said that Augustine speaks of charity as the power of charity itself; for charity is sufficient that it will never wither away. But that it is lost, is due to the indetermination of the subject, as has been said.

             To the third, it must be said that true love has an essential note that is never lost; for he who truly loves man has foremost in his soul that he will never diminish that love. But when this commitment in the soul is changed, that which was true love is lost. Further, if anyone would have this commitment that he would sometimes cease loving, his love would not be true. Whence it is clear that charity, considered according to its own power cannot be lost; but it can be lost because of the indeterminate power of the subject.

             To the fourth, it must be said that Prosper also speaks of charity according to the power of charity itself, and not according to the power of the subject.

             To the fifth, it must be said that charity, if it is present, has an inclination to do great works, and Gregory wished to speak in this manner according to the quality of his own virtue. But sometimes one can fail from this because of the indetermination of the subject.

             To the sixth, it must be said that since there is in man a twofold nature, viz., the intellectual which is primary, and the sensitive which is lesser; he truly loves himself who loves himself for the good of reason. But when a man loves himself and wants sensual goods for himself which are contrary to the good of reason, he hates himself more than he loves himself, because it is written (Psalms x. 6), He that loveth iniquity hateth his own soul. And this the Philosopher also said in Book IX of the Ethic. According to this, true love of self is lost through the contrary sin; just as the love of God is also lost.

             To the seventh, it must be said that charity excludes every movement of sin according to its own determination. For, it pertains to the essence of charity that it wishes not to desire concupiscibly, nor to love self inordinately. But sometimes the contrary happens because of the indetermination of free choice and the corruption of nature; thus the Apostle said (Rom. vii. 19), For the good which I will, I do not; but the evil which I will not, that I do.

             To the eighth, it must be said that whenever one follows the movement of the Holy Spirit, he does not sin; but when he resists it, then he sins.

             To the ninth, it must be said that the being (esse) of charity is not always to be in operation, otherwise when one sleeps, he would not have charity. But it is said that the love of God is never idle according to the determination of charity, whose whole purpose is that a man give himself completely to God.

             To the tenth, it must be said that a loss is related to the thing had, as corruption is related to the thing existing. Therefore, as corruption begins in an existing thing and terminates in its non-being (non-esse), because the change is from being (esse) to non-being (non-esse); so does a loss, since it is a change from having to non-having, begin in having and terminate in non-having. Therefore the beginning of the loss of charity is when charity is had; its end, however, is when charity is not had.

             To the eleventh, it must be said that charity ceases to exist in the soul in some way according to these four modes. For, the subject of charity, although it is incorruptible according to its substance, becomes indisposed to this form through the contrary disposition of sin. Likewise, although the cause of charity is incorruptible, the influence of this cause is impeded by sin which separates us from God. Also, charity fails on the part of its object insofar as the will diverts itself from the unchangeable good. Charity even fails through the contrary movement to sinning; for, essentially speaking, although sin is weaker than charity, in some instances sin can be stronger, viz., when charity is not operating in act and the movement of sin directs toward some other particular operation. The Philosopher also showed in Book VII of the Ethic., that science, although it is stronger, can be overcome by passion; this is considered insofar as the agent is not in act but is bound up in habit because of passion. For, just as science is strongest in the universal, passion however operates in the particular; so also charity is strongest when acting toward the final end, but it allows the movement of sin which has strength in some particular act.

             To the twelfth, it must be said that the Philosopher did write that the good of one virtue is not contrary to the good of another, and this is what he intended to say in the Praedicamentis and in Book II of the Ethic. But in nature, one good is contrary to another, for each of the contraries is a certain good of nature. Therefore, the good which moves the appetite to sin is contrary to the divine good which is the object of charity, insofar as the end is found in the divine good. For there can be only one final end; just as in a kingdom, where there can be only one king, he who makes himself to be a king is contrary to the actual king, according to what is written (John xix. 12), Whosoever maketh himself a king, speaketh against Caesar.

             To the thirteenth, it must be said that charity is not driven out by sin as by an agent, but as by its contrary. Thus, that intervening of sin is the expulsion of charity; just as the coming of light is the expulsion of darkness. For, the light drives out darkness by its own becoming; but a movement to sin drives out charity according as it pre-exists in the understanding of the soul.

             To the fourteenth, it must be said that when man stands in mortal sin, this is done by a certain deliberation of reason; for without a deliberating consent, there can be no mortal sin. But this deliberation is a measured movement of time in the last moment of which sin exists in the soul. But before that final instant, the nearest instant in which charity exists cannot be designated; because these moments are not regarded as moments following one another, for time is a continuum. Therefore in the entire time which precedes the moment that terminates in the final instant, charity exists in the soul; after the last instant of this time, sin exists. Thus it is not possible to designate the final instant in which charity exists, but the final time, as is shown by the Philosopher in Book VIII of the Physic.

             To the fifteenth, it must be said that if the Master understood of charity that it is the charity of heaven, it is true that it is not lost, according to the proofs given above. But if he meant the charity of this life insofar as it is perfect, it is not true that it cannot be lost because of the mode of inhering in its subject, but only by virtue of the movement of the Holy Spirit; and thus it is said that those who were strengthened, were strengthened in this life.

             To the sixteenth, it must be said that just as the first truth is understood in the knowledge of anything that is true, as the first exemplar is understood in an image or vestige, so is the highest good loved in the love of anything that is good. But such a love of the highest good is not sufficient for the definition of charity; it is necessary that the highest good be loved as the object of beatitude.

             The answer to the seventeenth objection is evident from this.

             To the eighteenth, it must be said that, as Augustine says explaining this text (John x. 27), My sheep hear my voice and do not hear the voice of others, there is a certain voice of Christ which no one hears unless he be His sheep through a predetermination. This voice says, He who perseveres to the end will be saved. And in this way he understands that he who does not remain faithful to the words of Christ is not a true disciple, because he has not learned from Him to persevere effectively. However, he can be a temporary disciple when he loves God for a time and his neighbor.

             To the nineteenth, it must be said that as long as charity is actually dominant in man, man is not moved by a contrary motion, but he follows the movement of charity. Therefore the greatest remedy against sin is for man to return into his heart, converting it to the love of God. But when man is not moved in act according to charity, he is under pressure from the contrary movement of sin.

             To the twentieth, it must be said that to be corrupted and to be generated or to become, is proper to that which has being (esse); i.e., only a thing subsisting in its being (esse). But accidents and forms that are not subsisting are not called being because they have existence, but rather because by them something exists. Therefore, to become and to be corrupted are not proper to accidents and to forms, but to subjects. For example, when any thing becomes white, this is whiteness in becoming; just as for any thing to be white, is this existing whiteness. And the same reasoning holds for corruption. Therefore corruptible and incorruptible are not attributed directly to accidents, but only to substance. Whence, there is nothing that prevents the charity of this life and of heaven from being the same in number; although the charity here can be lost while the charity of heaven cannot be lost.

             To the twenty-first, it must be said that, as has already been said, charity, properly speaking, is not corrupted; but the subject ceases to participate in charity. Whence it is not proper to say that charity is corrupted either in something or in nothing.

             To the twenty-second, it must be said that because of the indetermination of the subject, just as charity that overshadows sin destroys it, so also does sin overshadowing charity, drives it out; for contraries are mutually exclusive.

             To the twenty-third, it must be said that if a gift can be taken away by violence, then it seems that the giver who must preserve the gift for the one to whom he has bestowed it, is defeated. But if he to whom the gift is given voluntarily rejects it, it does not seem that this causes the donor, who ought not to force men to virtue, to be defeated.

             To the twenty-fourth, it must be said that a wife in marriage loses the power over her own body. But the soul, through charity, does not lose the power of free choice. Whence the argument does not follow.